Information available as of July 2000 was used in this report.

We have uncovered no Gulf war releases of Iraqi-produced radioactive material that would have reached Coalition troops. This is not surprising, based on our understanding of the status of Iraq's nuclear program, the location of Iraqi nuclear facilities far from Coalition ground forces, and the apparent localization of any contamination. A comprehensive review of relevant information indicates:

• Iraq did not use nuclear or radiological dispersal devices or deploy these weapons during the Gulf war.
• We conclude that only one site in Iraq that was attacked by the Coalition--the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center--had facilities containing highly radioactive material; however, postwar inspections indicate that contamination did not spread beyond the immediate compound area. The Ramadi Radiological Weapons Test Site had released radiological material in the late 1980s, but the half-life of the material was short enough that its radioactivity had decayed away before the Gulf war.
• Three nuclear sites in Iraq--the Tarmiya Uranium Enrichment Facility, the Al Qaim Superphosphate Fertilizer Plant, and the Mosul Feed Materials Production Facility--worked only with uranium--a material of low radioactivity. Coalition actions, or subsequent Iraqi actions such as stripping the facilities of equipment, also led to localized contamination.
• No releases of highly radioactive material were detected outside of Iraqi nuclear facilities either during the war or during inspections after the war and all known highly radioactive material was accounted for.
• The most significant source for potential radiological exposure during the Gulf war is antitank munitions that contained depleted uranium. The scope of exposure and potential effects are addressed by the Investigation and Analysis Directorate of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses.

We would like to thank the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for approving public release of their information for this report.

Before the Gulf war, there was considerable press reporting to raise concerns that Iraq had embarked on a clandestine nuclear weapons program, with particular emphasis on hidden uranium enrichment work. Acting on this and other information, allied forces were able to target and damage or destroy nearly all of the major nuclear facilities associated with the weapons effort.

According to postwar declarations by Iraq and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection information, at the time of the Gulf war, 22 facilities were involved in Iraq's nuclear weapons program or had been associated with the effort to develop a radiological dispersal device (see inset). To determine which of these Iraqi nuclear sites could have dispersed radioactive material, we developed a methodology based on two criteria:

• Intelligence or postwar inspection information indicating that the site held radioactive material at the time of the Gulf war. Ten sites in Iraq fit this category, according to Iraqi declarations and IAEA reporting (see inset).
• The site was damaged during the Gulf war or a release of radioactive material--intentional or unintentional--took place. A variety of intelligence indicates that 14 sites in Iraq fall into this category (see inset).

Figure 1: Iraqi Nuclear Program Sites

Only four sites in Iraq, however, met both criteria, and we include a fifth site because of a known prewar release:

• Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center.
• Tarmiya Uranium Enrichment Facility.
• Al Qaim Superphosphate Fertilizer Plant.
• Mosul Feed Materials Production Facility.
• Ramadi Radiological Weapons Test Site.

Tuwaitha, just south and east of Baghdad, was the original home of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program and the location of Iraq's nuclear reactors. Because of extensive bombing damage to those research reactors and other nuclear material processing buildings at Tuwaitha, the compound is the most likely source of radioactive contamination resulting from the Gulf war. That said, from the end of the Gulf war until December 1998, the Tuwaitha compound was routinely visited by international inspectors. Contamination of the Tuwaitha site was considered a potentially serious problem during the first inspection in May 1991; however, after visiting the facility and taking measurements, it does not appear that contamination spread beyond the immediate compound area. Between May 1991 and December 1998, the IAEA sent many teams to Tuwaitha without apparent concern over radiation contamination. The IAEA has accounted for all reactor fuels from Tuwaitha and these have been removed from Iraq. We are not aware of any fires or other events that could have played a role in dispersing radioactive materials downwind.

Tarmiya, located slightly north of Baghdad, was to be a full-scale uranium enrichment facility that used electromagnetic isotope separation (Calutron) technology. This facility also received extensive damage. We know of only about a half kilogram of low-enriched uranium--enriched to about 4 percent uranium-235--that was produced on site by the time of the Gulf war. In addition, uranium tetrachloride feed materials were at the site and other uranium compounds and solutions would have been handled here once the facility became fully operational. Tarmiya was also routinely visited by international inspectors until December 1998 and, again, we know of no special precautions that were necessary for these visits that would indicate contamination spread beyond the immediate compound. We have no indication that IAEA inspection of the site with handheld radiation measurement equipment or individual dosimetry of inspectors visiting the site indicated radioactive contamination. Similarly, we are not aware of any fires or other events that could have played a role in dispersing radioactive materials downwind.

At the time of the war, the Al Qaim plant, located in far western Iraq, had the capability of extracting natural uranium yellowcake (U)₃O₈ as a byproduct of phosphate production. Although this site was heavily damaged during the Gulf war, postwar international inspectors have not taken any special precautions that would indicate radiation contamination. As with Tarmiya, we have no indication that IAEA inspection of the site with handheld radiation measurement equipment or individual dosimetry of inspectors visiting the site indicated radioactive contamination.

The nuclear facility at Mosul, located in northern Iraq, was Iraq's site for full-scale production of uranium feed materials. A large variety of unenriched uranium compounds was stored on site including yellowcake, uranium dioxide (UO₂), and uranium tetrachloride (UCl₄). This site was heavily damaged by bombing during the Gulf war. Inspectors have visited this facility several times and have monitored the Iraqi efforts to consolidate and dispose of the contaminated equipment and waste sludge from the site. We know of no event, beyond the initial bombing of the site, that would have caused a release of radioactive material and know of no special precautions from postwar inspections that would indicate any contamination beyond the site, let alone pose a threat to Coalition forces. As with Tarmiya and Al Qaim, we have no indication that IAEA inspection of the site with handheld radiation measurement equipment or individual dosimetry of inspectors visiting the site indicated radioactive contamination.

In late 1987 or early 1988, according to limited reporting, Iraq conducted several tests of a primitive radioactive dispersal weapon at test sites near Ramadi in central Iraq. The program was abandoned soon afterward. The design incorporated very low levels of radioactive zirconium and possibly radioactive hafnium, weak radiation emitters that would have caused a minimal amount of local contamination, completely decaying away by early 1990.(1) There is no information on later radioactive weapons work or battlefield use.

Intelligence sources, Iraqi declarations to the IAEA, and international inspections following the Gulf war indicate that Iraq also planned for six other facilities to handle or process nuclear material (see inset).

The Ash Sharqat facility, located south of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, was a twin to the Tarmiya Uranium Enrichment Facility. We are confident, however, that the facilities at Ash Sharqat, which was also bombed, contained no nuclear materials on the basis of IAEA inspections that revealed it was still under construction.

Ar Rashidiyah was an R&D site for the centrifuge method for enrichment and probably held at least laboratory quantities of uranium feed materials. Al Furat was an empty shell at the time of the war, but would have been able to produce centrifuges and house at least a pilot-scale enrichment cascade. None of these facilities, located close to Baghdad, were bombed in the war.

The Al Atheer facility is known to have participated in nuclear weapons design activities, and Al Hadre was probably capable of doing so. Nuclear materials such as natural or depleted uranium would have been a logical surrogate for highly enriched uranium as various design concepts were tested. Given what we now know of the Iraqi nuclear weaponization program, we doubt Iraq would have been using very much uranium for device testing/development, so any contamination, if present, would be localized.

At the time of the war, Iraq also had several burial sites and warehouses that would have held nuclear material or equipment. None of these additional facilities were bombed in the war, so there was no mechanism by which nuclear contaminants from these locations could have reached Coalition forces. These storage sites were located around the main facility at Tuwaitha, as part of uranium ore operations from the Al Qaim plant, or part of waste handling at Mosul. Some of this equipment and material was moved after the war in an attempt to deceive inspectors.

The types of nuclear materials possessed by Iraq varied widely at the time of the war. Iraq had hundreds of tons of natural uranium ore and uranium oxides and comparatively small amounts of natural uranium metal and uranium hexafluoride. Iraq also had highly enriched research reactor fuels and trivial amounts of indigenously produced enriched uranium. Baghdad possessed isotopes produced for medicine and gamma sources. Among the isotopes being sought for military use were plutonium and polonium, but these were only available in gram quantities at the time, and posed no threat to Coalition forces.

At the time of the Gulf war, we judge that a radiological dispersal device or weapon was the only type of nuclear-related weaponry that Iraq could have possibly produced because of the difficulties it was experiencing in producing fissile materials for a weapons program. From that perspective, most of the materials listed above would not have been applicable to developing a contamination device. Although limited intelligence reporting indicates Iraq tested a radiological weapon design, we have no indication that Iraq used a radiological dispersal device against US or Coalition troops during the Gulf war, or that any were ever developed beyond the studies mentioned.

We have uncovered no Gulf war release of Iraqi-produced radioactive material that would have reached Coalition troops. Our understanding of Iraq's nuclear program, the location of Iraqi nuclear material and facilities far from Coalition ground forces, and the apparent localization of any contamination, lead us to conclude that it is unlikely that any Coalition forces were exposed to these materials. For completeness, we also note that there were small amounts of nuclear materials present in the theater, specifically, plutonium-239 in chemical agent detectors on the T-72 tank and the BMP and BTR series Iraqi vehicles; radium-226, tritium, and promethium found in selected dials and switches of Iraqi equipment; and cesium-137 in one of the straps of the RWA 72K radiation warning and detection kit. We have no reason, however, to believe that such materials would have posed a health or radiation risk. We also note that depleted uranium was also present in selected antiarmor munitions and armor used by the United States and the United Kingdom. The possible health effects related to this material is part of a separate study, which is not covered in this report. (Source of the information: Identification Guide for Radioactive Sources in Foreign Materiel, AST-1500Z-100-93, US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Charlottesville, VA, March 1993.)

(1) Zirconium oxide was irradiated in a reactor to produce the radioactive material for this weapon. The two major resulting radioactive materials--zirconium-95 and hafnium-175--would have decayed away to undetectable levels within 700 days.