One prominent hypothesis about illnesses among Gulf War veterans is that some of the reported symptoms are the result of exposure to chemical warfare agents. During and after the Gulf War, some veterans reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents, and to assess the likelihood that chemical warfare agents were present in the Gulf, the Department of Defense developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community. The criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• The testimony of witnesses;
• Multiple analyses; and

A review of the evidence by experts.

While the methodology (Tab D) used to investigate suspected chemical warfare agent incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and to determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate the presence of a chemical warfare agent.

After following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence; after interviewing witnesses and key specialists; and after analyzing the results of all available information, we assess the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. This assessment is tentative, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: Do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence can be found.

Veterans who had been in the Al Jubayl area during Jan. 19-21, 1991, have reported hearing loud noises and seeing bright flashes of light in the night sky. Some people attribute the loud noises and bright flashes to an Iraqi chemical warfare agent attack on Al Jubayl. Although veterans’ descriptions of what happened are generally consistent, they sometimes differ when identifying the specific day(s) in question. After the investigation into the loud noises began, we determined the loud noises and bright flashes occurred during the early morning hours of Jan. 19, 1991, and during the evening-early morning hours of Jan. 20-21, 1991, but the primary cause for concern are the incidents that occurred on Jan. 19, 1991. The anxiety caused by the start of the air war, coupled with the incidents in question, made it difficult for some veterans to discriminate among the dates in question. Therefore, the investigation included all the incidents that occurred during the entire three-day period. For clarity, we discuss the events of January 19 and those of January 20-21 separately.

The first loud noise event, as it has come to be known, is a series of incidents that occurred within a relatively short period (3:32-6:30 a.m.) during the early morning of Jan. 19, 1991. The first incident occurred at 3:32 a.m. when the population of Al Jubayl heard a loud noise throughout the entire Al Jubayl area. Veterans described the noise as a single explosion, as two explosions, and as a sonic boom. Fearing an attack, local commanders ordered their units to implement general quarters. Some unit commanders ordered their personnel to put on their protective clothing while other unit commanders refrained from doing so because of shortages of protective clothing. Shortly after the loud noise, the Rear Area Operations Center in Al Jubayl began receiving reports of other incidents in the area. These other incidents include: locations being fired upon; detections of chemical warfare agents; sighting of a white cloud and mist in the air; a flash of light or fireball in the sky; and a propeller-driven aircraft flying over the area. Collectively, these observations caused some veterans to believe that Iraq’s military forces or an Iraqi-sponsored terrorist group had attacked Al Jubayl with chemical warfare agents. In response, nuclear, biological, and chemical teams began testing for the presence of chemical warfare agents. Although some locations initially reported positive test results for nerve agent and blister agent, all later tests were negative.

We have identified Coalition aircraft as the source of the loud noise. The 552d Computer Group at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, analyzed electronic data recorded during the Gulf War aboard Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft. The data showed that two Coalition aircraft exceeded the speed of sound causing two almost simultaneous sonic booms as they flew over the city of Al Jubayl at 3:27 a.m.—approximately the same time troops on the ground heard and reported the loud noise. We have assessed the likelihood that chemical warfare agents were present in Al Jubayl during the morning of Jan. 19, 1991, as Unlikely.

The second event occurred the following night (Jan. 20-21, 1991), when more explosion-like noises occurred and units in the Al Jubayl area again increased their level of alert and increased their protective posture to level four. Nuclear, biological, and chemical detection teams checked for the presence of chemical warfare agents with negative results. We believe a Scud missile probably caused the explosion-like sounds. At about the time of the explosion-like sounds, Iraq launched a Scud missile toward Dhahran. The missile flying over Al Jubayl at supersonic speeds most likely caused the explosion-like noise. There is also a high probability that a Patriot missile fired from a missile battery defending Dhahran intercepted and destroyed the Scud. Although numerous command log entries and the Scud launch data confirm a Scud launch, there is no record of an impact site. We have assessed the likelihood that chemical warfare agents were present in Al Jubayl during the evening-early morning of Jan. 20-21, 1991, as Unlikely.

After we published the original Al Jubayl case narrative on Aug. 13, 1997, two private citizens presented us with two different scenarios that they believed could relate to the loud noise on Jan. 19, 1991. In the first scenario, they claimed Iraq’s forces launched a Styx missile from an Iraqi fast patrol boat. Aimed at Al Jubayl and armed with a chemical warhead, the missile, caused the loud noise when it detonated. In the second scenario, Iraqi aircraft penetrated Saudi Arabian airspace, flew to Al Jubayl, and sprayed a dusty mustard chemical warfare agent over the city. Iraq’s fighter aircraft providing aircover for the spraying aircraft caused the loud noise.

The Center for Naval Analyses assisted in our investigation of the first scenario by reviewing naval operations’ records from the war for any report of a suspicious vessel (or vessels) operating off the coast of Saudi Arabia at the time of the loud noise on January 19. Finding none, the Center analyzed the capabilities of the surveillance systems used to provide the Coalition’s fleet with early attack warnings. The primary systems were those aboard the United States Navy’s P-3 Orion aircraft and Nimrod aircraft from the United Kingdom. The Center considered the surveillance systems’ swath of coverage, the extent of the aircraft’s patrol area, and the position of the Coalition’s warships to determine if a vessel could have sailed down the coasts of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, launched an attack, escaped, and avoided detection. The Center determined the probability of such an event occurring during the war as highly unlikely. We reviewed the information provided by the Center for Naval Analyses together with other information obtained during the course of the investigation and concluded that a Styx missile attack against Al Jubayl on January 19 definitely did not occur.

Just as there were surveillance systems watching the approaches to Coalition warships, there were also surveillance systems monitoring the flight activity of both the Coalition’s air forces and Iraq’s air forces. The United States Air Force’s Airborne Warning and Control System was the primary airborne system used during the war. The 552d Air Control Wing at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, reviewed the data recorded during the war to determine: 1) if any unidentified aircraft penetrated Saudi Arabian airspace during the early morning hours of Jan. 19, 1991, and 2) the likelihood that an Iraqi aircraft could have entered Saudi Arabian airspace while avoiding detection. The 552d Air Control Wing’s analysts subsequently determined that: 1) the only aircraft airborne at the time of the loud noise event were Coalition aircraft, and 2) that it would have been highly unlikely for Iraqi aircraft to have penetrated Saudi Arabian airspace and avoided detection. We subsequently concluded that an aircraft attack on Al Jubayl on Jan. 19, 1991, definitely did not occur.

Our analysis of information collected during this latest investigation of the loud noise event combined with information obtained during our original investigation indicates that Iraq definitely did not attack Al Jubayl on the day in question. We also found no additional information during this latest investigation that conclusively proves or disproves the presence of chemical warfare agents during the period of Jan. 19-21, 1991. Consequently, our assessment of Unlikely as to the presence of chemical warfare agents in Al Jubayl during the period Jan. 19-21, 1991, remains unchanged from our original Al Jubayl case narrative, dated Aug. 19, 1997.

On Feb. 16, 1991, Iraq launched its 66th Scud missile of the war. The Scud (an Al Hussein variant) impacted in the waters of Al Jubayl harbor at approximately 2:00 a.m. The Scud did not detonate and caused no equipment damage or injury to Coalition personnel. Eyewitnesses reported seeing an explosion that looked as if a Patriot missile intercepted the Scud. Although there was a Patriot missile battery near the harbor, it was not operational at the time to shoot down the Scud missile. Salvage operations of the Scud missile began on Feb. 22, 1991, and ended on March 2, 1991, with the recovery of the warhead. During the salvage operations and subsequent efforts to make the warhead safe, explosive ordnance disposal personnel found no evidence of chemical warfare agents—the missile’s warhead contained high explosives. Consequently, our assessment is that the Scud definitely did not contain a chemical warfare agent.

On Mar. 19, 1991, a cloud of noxious fumes enveloped seven Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24. The Seabees sought medical attention after the fumes caused acute short-term symptoms including burning throats, eyes, and noses, and difficulty in breathing. The Seabees reported that portions of their brown T-shirts turned purple, as did parts of their combat boots. None of the seven saw the origin of the cloud, but all believed the cloud came from one of the industrial plants near Camp 13. A master chief equipment operator who witnessed the event positively identified a fertilizer plant located near the camp as the source of the noxious cloud. Five of the seven exposed Seabees immediately sought medical attention, removed their contaminated clothing, showered, changed into clean clothes, and returned to work with no further symptoms. The remaining two Seabees donned their protective clothing and continued to work without interruption and without developing more severe symptoms.

According to a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 medical corpsman, testing of the T-shirts to determine what may have caused them to change color began shortly after the incident. Although no record exists, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24’s medical personnel recall that they collected the T-shirts, bagged them, and turned them over to a group of unnamed Marine officials. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 never received a written report of the analysis but learned via telephone that an exposure to ammonia caused the color change. In July 1993, the US Army Materiel Test Directorate at White Sands Missile Range tested a T-shirt with small holes on its front and back. The origin of the T-shirt is unknown, but we do not believe the T-shirt was one of those that turned purple. The Directorate tested the T-shirt because it may have been worn during the Gulf War and made from similar material (fabric and dyes) as the shirts that turned purple. The Test Directorate could not determine what might have caused the Seabee’s shirts to change color but they surmised from a previous study that some type of an acid caused the holes. Natick Laboratories conducted another analysis in May 1994. As in the previous study by the Army’s Materiel Test Directorate, the T-shirts tested were not among the shirts worn during the purple T-shirt incident, but the shirts’ material (fabric and dyes) was the same or similar type as the shirts worn during the Gulf War. The Natick report states that ammonia (a suspected cause) would not have changed the color of the T-shirts. Only a strong oxidizer like nitric or sulfuric oxide (a common by-product of some industrial operations) could have turned the shirts purple. No combat boots were tested. Our assessment is that no chemical warfare agent was present in Camp 13 and the surrounding area on March 19, 1991, and chemical warfare agents did not cause the T-shirts to change color.

The purple T-shirt event highlights the heavily industrialized environment of Al Jubayl. Its heavy concentration of industries possibly exposed personnel who lived and worked in Al Jubayl to a variety of industrial chemicals. During interviews of personnel stationed in Al Jubayl, we asked for each person's impression of Al Jubayl’s environment. We received both positive and negative comments. To provide as clear a picture as possible of Al Jubayl and the surrounding area, we have included a section in this case narrative devoted to discussing Al Jubayl’s environment.

During the pre-deployment phase of Operation Desert Shield, military planners became aware of the heavy concentration of industry in Al Jubayl. The large number of industrial complexes located within a relatively small geographic area was of special concern. Many of these facilities used, produced, or stored industrial chemicals that could pose a serious health risk to military personnel, if they were exposed. The large number of personnel and amount of equipment that arrived and departed through Al Jubayl compounded the problem.

Because of these concerns, military planners initiated several studies to determine what hazards existed in Al Jubayl. The studies confirmed that the Saudi Arabian government had stringent environmental standards, similar to United States Environmental Protection Agency standards, in place long before the commencement of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In 1988, the United Nations Environment Program declared the city of Al Jubayl to be as clean as any comparable city in the world.

Since the end of the Gulf War, several Seabees, primarily from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, have reported experiencing a variety of medical conditions that they attribute to their deployment to the Gulf. This has received national attention because the Seabees are from the same unit. Conclusions based on medical studies completed to date are inconclusive and do not identify a single factor as a likely cause for the Seabees’ ailments.

On Aug. 13, 1997, the predecessor to our Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments published an interim Al Jubayl [2] case narrative.[3] The narrative reported on an investigation of three separate events that occurred during the Gulf War at the port city of Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia. Through veteran testimony during congressional committee hearings, testimony before the Presidential Advisory Commission, news reports, and interviews of Gulf War veterans, these events became known as the "loud noise event," the "Scud impact event," and the "purple T-shirt event."

Veterans responded to the release of the interim case narrative. On Sept. 5, 1997, we met with two individuals who wished to discuss the loud noise event.[4] During the meeting, the two individuals presented two scenarios challenging our assessment of the loud noise event of Jan. 19, 1991. They believed that Iraqi military action—not the sonic booms from Coalition aircraft reported in the original case narrative—caused the loud noise. We agreed to investigate the new scenarios.

As the new investigation of the loud noise event progressed, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed the previously published case narrative. In their report, the GAO agreed with the finding and assessment of the original investigation of the loud noise event. However, the GAO criticized the narrative because it did not address the medical problems that some veterans, many of whom were assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, have experienced since returning home from the Gulf. The GAO recommended that we include this information in any updates to the narrative.[5]

This edition of the Al Jubayl narrative updates the original version, includes an analysis of the two scenarios, and addresses the GAO’s concerns. The focus of this paper is the investigation of the alleged incidents and is not a primer on chemical weapons, chemical warfare agents, or Iraq’s chemical weapons program.[6]

Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, is the largest of eight planned industrial cities designed to take advantage of Saudi Arabia’s vast oil resources. The city is located on the Persian Gulf coast (Figure 2), approximately 250 kilometers south of the Saudi Arabian-Kuwaiti border. The Saudis developed the Al Jubayl area as an industrial city in the early 1980s. Before that time, the land where Al Jubayl now stands was an uninhabited desert coastline.

Figure 2. Map of Saudi Arabia

Al Jubayl City consists of an industrial zone and port facilities (Figure 3). The city also contains a residential area and other non-commercial areas. The industrial zone of Al Jubayl is a nine-kilometer by nine-kilometer area, (5.5 miles by 5.5 miles) located approximately five kilometers (3 miles) inland. Jubayl Naval Air Facility lies northwest of the city, approximately 20 kilometers inland. King Abdul Aziz Naval Base (KAANB) is a naval station and airfield complex located on the coast, five kilometers southeast of the city.

Figure 3. King Fahd industrial port and Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia

Housing camps existed throughout the industrial zone to house the work force. US forces used several of these camps as billeting and administrative spaces. Two Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB), NMCB-40 and NMCB-24, occupied Camp 13 throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Camp 13, which was temporarily renamed Camp Rohrbach, was located in the north central part of the industrial area (Figure 3). The Seabees of NMCB-40 and NMCB-24 were the first tenants of Camp 13. The Saudis had built the camp some years before but never used it. During the Gulf War, Camp 13 was a fenced, 0.5 square kilometer (0.2 square mile) compound surrounded by various industrial plants, including a fertilizer plant, petrochemical plants, and a steel company. The Seabeesused an area located directly across the street from the main camp as the motor pool.[7] Other units of other Coalition forces near Camp 13 included the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) 32 Heavy Regiment Royal Artillery,[8] and maybe a Saudi Arabian military unit located in the area of Camp 13.

Al Jubayl played a crucial role during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Almost all Marine Corps personnel and many Army units deployed through this port city. The Navy positioned several fleet hospitals in the area, and the Air Force had units on the ground to support airlift missions and medical evacuation missions.[9]

During the evening of January 20 between 9:40 and 9:50 p.m., authorities issued a Scud[113] alert and air raid sirens sounded throughout Al Jubayl.[114] Consequently, units in the area went to MOPP-4. At 10:30 p.m., units secured from general quarters and returned to MOPP-0. At 12:46 a.m. on Jan. 21, 1991, the air raid sirens sounded again.[115] The NMCB-24 security log notes two explosions, 15 to 20 seconds apart, southeast of Camp 13 at 12:54 a.m..[116] At 1:15 a.m., units returned to normal operations.[117] The NMCB-24 security logs also noted that Saudi sirens sounded at 1:42 a.m..[118] The NMCB-24 air detachment log notes Scud alerts occurring at 10:00 p.m. on January 20 and at 12:45 a.m., 3:30 a.m., and 9:50 p.m. on Jan. 21, 1991. Approximately 20 minutes after each alert, the all clear was given.[119]

USCENTCOM NBC logs for Jan. 20-21, 1991, note that at 9:47 p.m. on January 20 Iraq fired two Scud missiles towards Al Jubayl-Dhahran and US forces fired four Patriot missiles in response—destroying the Scuds in the air. A 10:00 p.m. entry in the NBC log indicates that a Patriot battery fired five Patriots at a third suspected Scud. The NBC log notes the Patriots destroyed the missile, which may have targeted Dhahran. The USCENTCOM logs contain no entries to indicate the presence of chemical warfare agents in the Al Jubayl area during Jan. 20-21, 1991.[120]

Based upon available information, we have concluded that the loud noises were not the result of an attack upon Al Jubayl. The basis of our conclusion is the following:

• Entries in command logs and the Scud launch database show that several Scud missile launches occurred at approximately the same time as the events recorded in logs of units located in Al Jubayl. Although Al Jubayl was not the intended target, the Scuds flew over Al Jubayl on their way to their targets. Patriot missiles reportedly intercepted and destroyed the Scuds as they neared the targeted cities;
• There is no record of any impact site in the Al Jubayl area; and,
• We found no records of any individual receiving medical treatment for symptoms associated with exposure to chemical or biological warfare agents.

The UK MOD’s hypothesis of an aircraft leaking fuel as it flew over Al Jubayl presented a plausible answer for the three false positive detections reported by British forces. During our original investigation of the loud noise event, a small number of US veterans reported hearing a propeller-driven aircraft flying overhead at about the same time as the loud noise. A USCENTCOM NBC log entry notes the propeller-driven aircraft.[143] However, during the original investigation, we did not connect the propeller-driven aircraft to the loud noise event. When presented with the two alternate scenarios explaining the cause of the loud noise event and after the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence requested our help to determine whether a light aircraft leaked fuel over the city, we reconsidered the light aircraft.

Again, we turned to the 552d Air Control Wing at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma for answers. We asked the 552d to determine if a propeller driven aircraft flew over Al Jubayl at the time of the loud noise.[144] The AWACS data revealed that an aircraft did take off from KAANB at 3:35 a.m. After taking off, the aircraft flew around KAANB at low altitude, never exceeding 2,600 feet, for 11 minutes and then returned to the airfield (Figures 6 & 7).[145] Figure 8 shows the aircraft’s route of flight relative to the location of the false positive detections. The aircraft came no closer than one and one-half miles to the location of the first false positive detection. At that point, the aircraft’s airspeed was 133 knots at an altitude of 1,600 feet. Considering the distance from the false detections, it is unlikely that this aircraft caused the false positive detections. Even if the aircraft was leaking fuel, it is still doubtful that it caused the false detections. That is because fuel leaking from an airborne aircraft atomizes and evaporates before reaching the ground. A catastrophic event resulting in a rapid loss of a large quantity of fuel at low altitude could result in fuel reaching the ground, but we found no evidence of such an event in the Al Jubayl area on the morning in question.

Figure 6. Flight path of the propeller-driven aircraft

Figure 7.  Close-up flight path of the propeller-driven aircraft

Figure 8. Northern most points of the propeller-driven aircraft’s flight path relative to the British forces CWA detections

Members of the NMCB-24, the subjects of several studies and reports, were among the first veterans to report unexplained illnesses following the Gulf War. In a survey of NMCB-24 Seabees conducted in 1993-1994 by the Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, members from this unit reported a variety of symptoms but the Navy found no pattern of illness. Diagnosed diseases appeared to be normal for a group of that age.[199]

In a post-war study of Gulf War veterans, scientists at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center studied 249 survey participants of the 606 Gulf War veterans of NMCB-24 and found that 70% reported serious illnesses since returning from the war. Using factor analysis of symptoms reported by these individuals, the authors concluded that there were six distinct groups of symptoms in 63 of the individuals, and that these appeared to be related to neurological injury.[200] Neurological and psychological testing of 23 individuals from these groups showed subtle abnormalities,[201] which the authors linked to self-reported exposures to toxic chemical combinations.[202] More recently, these researchers have reported that there may be genetic susceptibilities to illness[203] and vestibular dysfunction[204] in the symptomatic individuals, but the number of individuals studied is small and the work will need to be confirmed in larger numbers of individuals.

A second study of 1,497 Seabees who served during the Gulf War period (527 Gulf War veterans and 970 non-deployed veterans) found that deployed Seabees reported substantially more symptoms and exposures than non-deployed Seabees and had more psychological symptoms and difficulties.[205] Ninety-six of these individuals (64 Gulf War veterans and 32 non-deployed veterans) were tested for antibody to the bacteria Mycoplasma fermentans (as a marker of the infection suggested by some to contribute to veterans’ illnesses), but there were no differences between the groups.[206] Data extracted from this ongoing national study did show that Seabees from NMCB-24 were more likely to report symptoms than Seabees from NMCB-40, an active duty unit that was collocated with NMCB-24 in Al Jubayl during the Gulf War, but substantial differences in the demographics, exposures, and news media attention make meaningful comparisons difficult.[207] The larger Seabee health study will take some years to complete, but may offer additional comparisons of importance between deployed and non-deployed Seabees, and perhaps between specific deployed units.

Although the purposes for conducting a military attack or a terrorist attack differ, the results have similarities—people get injured or killed, and damage occurs. It is understandable why some veterans believe that an attack occurred. Months of preparing for war coupled with repeated official and unofficial reports of Iraq’s war fighting capability instilled serious concerns for servicemembers by the time the air war began on Jan. 17, 1991. Actually going to war intensified everyone’s awareness of the danger. Therefore, when people in Al Jubayl heard the loud noise, the natural reaction was to assume an attack. However, of the many interviews of persons in Al Jubayl on Jan. 19, 1991, no veteran reported firsthand knowledge of damage or injuries. During our investigation, we looked hard for any injury or damage, but found none. We identified the source of the loud noise as sonic booms and verified that no enemy aircraft flew in Coalition airspace. Due to the absence of information to prove otherwise, we have assessed that an Iraqi military attack or terrorist attack definitely was not the cause of the loud noise event of Jan. 19, 1991. Although this may answer the loud noise question, it does not answer questions regarding the cause of the bright flash, white cloud, and burning skin. It is to these incidents that we now turn our attention.

There may be no such thing as a normal investigation, but a common approach is to collect physical or documentary evidence and look backwards for what may have caused a particular event or incident. In the case of the bright flash, white cloud, and burning skin there is no physical evidence to analyze and the scant amount of documentary evidence on any one of the incidents makes it impossible to pinpoint specific sources. Our approach was to view the incidents as if they actually happened, and then look for the results that should have occurred. For example, some veterans believe a Scud missile or the intercept of a Scud by a Patriot missile caused the bright flash. Because there is no record of damage or injures resulting from an attack on January 19, and no reported missile impact point, we had to look elsewhere for information to determine what may have caused the flash. Information of Scud launches compiled during the war shows with near certainty that Iraq launched no Scud missiles towards Saudi Arabia on January 19. We also know that it would have been highly unlikely for a Scud launch to go undetected. Next, we looked at the data compiled on the Patriot missile. We found that none of the Patriot missile batteries located in Saudi Arabia fired a missile on January 19; in fact, the battery located in Al Jubayl did not fire a single missile during the entire war. We also explored other possibilities for the bright flash such as a fiery aircraft crash or some type of industrial accident, but found no record of any such event. The only other explanations we have for the bright flash are the use of flares. The UK MOD’s report includes an explanation that one of their units had fired a maroon (a flare like signaling device) during the period of the loud noise. In addition to the MOD’s report, one US veteran reported seeing a flare fired from the USS Tarawa presumably at the time the loud noise event occurred. However, neither of these explanations is definitive. We do not believe the cause of the bright flash was malicious or was a threat to any personnel. Therefore, we list the cause for the bright flash as indeterminate.

The white cloud incident was more difficult to assess than the bright flash because of nearly a complete lack of evidence. Except for one entry in a Camp 13 security log and another entry in the RAOC log, there is no other record of the event in US documents. The UK MOD’s report also contains a discussion of a cloud sighting. However, because of the lack of information regarding the incident we can not determine if the UK sightings and US are of the same cloud. Although we believe weather related factors or industrial operations caused the cloud, we can not identify what actually caused the cloud to appear. Therefore, we list the cause for the white cloud as indeterminate.

The last issue in our investigation and analyses of incidents that occurred on Jan. 19, 1991 is reports that some NMCB-24 Seabees experienced a burning sensation on their skin during the time of the loud noise. Some Seabees point to the incidence of burning skin as further proof of an attack with chemical warfare agents. However, reports of burning skin are small in number and the phenomenon appears only to have affected a small number of NMCB-24 Seabees.

It appears that at the time of the incident, the Seabees who experienced the burning sensation felt that their condition was not serious enough to warrant medical attention because there is no record that any of the Seabees who experienced the burning skin reported to a medical facility for treatment. The only other evidence available to us is that several people reported smelling ammonia at the time of the loud noise. We have not found any record to indicate there was an ammonia release from a plant in Al Jubayl. Although ammonia can cause burns, its unique odor is not associated with any chemical warfare agent. Although the cause for the burning skin can not be identified, we believe that chemical warfare agents did not cause some of the NMCB-24 Seabees to experience a burning sensation on their skin. Therefore, we list the cause for the burning skin as indeterminate.

There are many facets to the loud noise event of Jan. 19, 1991. Even though we have assessed that the loud noise event of January 19 event was not caused by Iraqi military or terrorist action, we can not definitively identify what caused the bright flash, white cloud and burning skin. Therefore, our assessment as to whether chemical warfare agents were present in Al Jubayl on Jan. 19, 1991 continues to be unlikely.

The loud noise event of January 20-21 appears mild when compared to the events of January 19. There are no reports of white clouds; there are no reports of burning skin; and there are nor reports of bright flashes. The only event recorded in logs was the sound of explosion-like noises. We have confirmed the launching of several Scud missiles at approximately the same time as the events recorded in unit logs. The Scuds could have created the explosion-like noises as they flew over Al Jubayl on their way to Dhahran. The CENTOCM NBC log noted that Patriot missiles destroyed the Scuds. We know however, that the Patriot battery in Al Jubayl never fired a missile during the war. This means that a Patriot battery located outside of Al Jubayl, most likely the battery in Dhahran, engaged and destroyed the Scud missiles. It is unlikely that people in Al Jubayl could hear or see a Patriot intercept of a Scud missile that took place outside of Dhahran. Based upon available information, we have assessed that the events of Jan. 20-21, 1991 definitely did not involve an attack upon Al Jubayl and that chemical warfare agents were definitely not present.

Initially, this event received a considerable amount of attention. However, the initial surge of interest diminished over time because no personnel injuries and no equipment damage occurred as a result of the missile’s impact. Based on the information that is available to date, our assessment is that the Scud missile was definitely not armed with chemical warfare agents. We base our assessment upon the following information:

• The warhead was found to contain high explosives; and,
• Testing conducted for the presence of chemical warfare agents during recovery operations yielded negative results.

In addition to conducting investigations and veterans outreach, the Office of Special Assistant is working to assure future force protection by recommending changes in equipment, policies, and procedures. During an investigation such as this, accurate records are essential sources of information. Unlike a person’s memory that fades over time, official documents do not lose the information they contain. At the end of the war, units packed up their supplies and equipment and returned home. Some units undoubtedly destroyed records in the process. Some units kept records on file for varying periods, but destroyed them because they needed the space for more current records, or because they no longer had the manpower to maintain the records. The resulting information gaps have had a negative influence on this office’s findings and assessments. Ironically, when our reports highlight the absence of information, critics of the DOD use these information lapses to argue that the DOD is withholding information. To prevent information losses in the future, the DOD should develop procedures that will ensure retention of records created during special periods (e.g., the Gulf War). These procedures should assign responsibilities, identify which categories of information require retention (e.g., operations, intelligence, maintenance, etc), and establish the procedures and timelines for archiving these documents.

This case is still under investigation. As additional information becomes available, it will be incorporated. If you have records, photographs, recollections, or find errors in the details reported, please call 1-800-497-6261.

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

CWA chemical warfare agent

DOD Department of Defense

DS/DS Desert Shield/Desert Storm

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

EPMU-2 Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number Two

FMA Force Management Area

HQ headquarters

IFF Identification, Friend or Foe

I MEF I Marine Expeditionary Force

KAANB King Abdul Aziz Naval Base

MAW Marine Air Wing

MOD United Kingdom Ministry of Defence

MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture

NMCB Naval Mobile Construction Battalion

NAF Naval Air Facility

OIC officer-in-charge

OSAGWI Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses

PSU Port Security Unit

RAOC Rear Area Operations Center

SIF Selective Identification Feature

UDATS Underwater Damage Assessment Television System

UIC Unit Identification Code

UK  United Kingdom

US United States

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3 journal, January 19, 1991.

1^st Surveillance Reconnaissance Intelligence Group, Significant Events Report, February 21, 1991.

3^d Battalion, 24^th Marines, Watch Log (Extract), January 19, 1991.

24^th Marines Rear Area Operations Center, Radio Station Log, January 18-19, 1991.

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Lead Report 632, Interview of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 medical corpsman, March 19, 1996.

Lead Report 982, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, September 27, 1996.

Lead Report 983, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 Seabee, September 27, 1996.

Lead Report 1097, Interview of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, October 26, 1996.

Lead Report 1099, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, October 24, 1996.

Lead Report 1104, Interview of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 NBC watch officer, October 26, 1996.

Lead Report 1151, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, November 19, 1996.

Lead Report 1173, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, December 17, 1996.

Lead Report 1176, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 construction engineer, December 17, 1996.

Lead Report 1178, Interview of a Marine Corps noncommissioned officer, December 18, 1996.

Lead Report 1180, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, December 18, 1996.

Lead Report 1181, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 Seabee, December 18, 1996.

Lead Report 1207, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, December 1996.

Lead Report 1227, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, January 10, 1997.

Lead Report 1232, Interview of Navy warrant officer, January 10, 1997.

Lead Report 1257, Interview of an Army captain, January 21, 1997.

Lead Report 1261, "Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, January 24, 1997.

Lead Report 1281, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 chief builder, February 7, 1997.

Lead Report 1282, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 Seabee, February 7, 1997.

Lead Report 1400, Interview of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 senior noncommissioned officer, February 27, 1997.

Lead Report 1410, Interview of Port Security Unit-301A engineering officer, March 7, 1997.

Lead Report 3872, Interview of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion-40 medical corpsman, May 15, 1997.

Lead Report 5169, Interview of the commander of Port Security Unit 301-B, May 27, 1997.

Lead Report 5187, Interview of a Marine colonel, June 3, 1997.

Lead Report 5290, Interview of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 Air Detachment officer-in-charge, June 18, 1991.

Lead Report 5311, Interview of a Coast Guard boatswain’s mate third class, June 19, 1997.

Lead Report 5312, Interview of a Coast Guard port securityman second class, June 19, 1997.

Lead Report 6233, Interview of a Marine warrant officer, October 1, 1997.

Lead Report 6290, Interview of a Marine captain, October 2, 1997.

Lead Report 8565, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, October 10, 1997.

Lead Report 6494, Notes of Meeting held between Office of the Special Assistant's Investigators and Two Concerned Individuals, September 5, 1997.

Lead Report 11034, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, May 27, 1997.

Lead Report 11189, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, June 4, 1997.

Lead Report 11191, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, June 4, 1997.

Lead Report 11202, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, June 4, 1997.

Lead Report 12051, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, June 17, 1997.

Lead Report 12190, Interview of a Marine Corps noncommissioned officer, July 1, 1997.

Lead Report 15201, Interview of a Marine colonel, February 26, 1998.

Lead Report 15448, Interview of a Navy admiral, March 12, 1997.

Lead Report 15602, Interview of a Marine general, March 26, 1998.

Lead Report 24975, Affidavit from a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999.

Lead Report 24976, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999.

Lead Report 24977, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 NBC officer, October 5, 1999.

Lead Report 24978, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999.

Lead Report 24979, Interview of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999.

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Environmental Survey Program

Jubail Industrial Complex
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Monthly AQ Summary
Final Data

Figure 18. British forces units in Al Jubayl

We agreed to modify the Al Jubayl case narrative to place the events of this incident in fuller context to include that some service members stationed at Al Jubayl, especially members of NMCB-24, have reported high levels of health problems. We also agreed to request that the Naval Health Research Center undertake an analytical comparison regarding NMCB-24 and NMCB-40, and that independent reviewers are critical to a thorough and acceptable report on our investigations.