During and after the Gulf War, people reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents and to determine if chemical weapons were used, the DOD developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community where the criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site.
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples.
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence.
• Testimony of eyewitnesses.
• Multiple analyses.
• Review of the evidence by experts.

While the DOD methodology (Tab C) for investigating chemical incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Accordingly, our methodology is designed to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor is a single individual's observation sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence.

By following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence, and by interviewing eyewitnesses and key personnel, and analyzing the results, the investigator can assess the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because information from various sources may be contradictory, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from "Definitely" to "Definitely Not" with intermediate assessments of "Likely," "Unlikely," and "Indeterminate." This assessment is tentative, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of Chemical Warfare Agent Presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is "Indeterminate" until more evidence can be found.

On Sept. 18, 1995, a small metal sample was submitted for analysis to the Presidential Advisory Committee to determine if it contained chemical warfare agents. The sample was reported to be a piece of a SCUD missile hit by a PATRIOT missile near King Fahd Military Airport on or about Jan. 19, 1991. Analysis of the sample by the U.S. Army Edgewood Research and Development Center revealed no evidence of chemical warfare agents. The assessment for this case is "Unlikely" that chemical warfare agents were present.

On Sept. 18, 1995, a small piece of metal was provided to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses during a meeting in Charlotte, NC.[1] The person who provided this sample reported that he had been told that it was a portion of a piece from a SCUD missile hit by a PATRIOT missile near King Fahd Military Airport on Jan. 19, 1991. He further reported the following chain of custody: the metal piece had been picked up as a souvenir by a soldier stationed there. The soldier stored the fragment in a plastic bag, forgot about it, and then rediscovered it in August 1994 in Charlotte, NC. Upon rediscovery, this soldier gave the piece to the person who provided a portion of it to the PAC.

The original piece of metal was described as being about six inches long, five inches wide, about 3/8 inches thick, and burnt on both sides. The person who provided the sample told an investigator from the Army’s Foreign Materiel Program (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence) that:

The unprotected sample, when examined in an enclosed room with no ventilation, will cause a person’s eyes to water after about 10 minutes and sometimes will cause a tingly sensation. Additionally, touching the sample will cause a burning sensation within about 10 minutes on the contacted skin. Within 20 minutes, the area is red; within 30 minutes there is a slight ring around the red part; within an hour, there is a watery blister, and within three to four hours there is a large blister. The blister will rupture on its own in six to seven hours.[2]

No attempt has been made to determine whether these symptoms could be duplicated, but tests were conducted to determine if chemical warfare agents were present. The Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team (PGIIT)[3] and the Investigation and Analysis Directorate have investigated reports of SCUD missile attacks in the vicinity of King Fahd Military Airport during the period of Jan. 12-26, 1991. According to an Air Force Message, several missiles were launched during this period at Dhahran, which is near King Fahd Military Airport.[4] On Jan. 19, 1991, however, the only recorded SCUD activity was the firing of three missiles from Iraq at Tel Aviv, Israel.[5] Veterans who called the Veterans Reporting Hotline reported SCUD alerts in the vicinity of King Fahd Military Airport in that general period of time .[6]

The Presidential Advisory Committee gave the sample to the DOD Foreign Materiel Program, which in turn arranged for the U.S. Army Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center to test for chemical warfare agent.[7] ERDEC did a thorough analysis of the metal piece--using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, nuclear magnetic resonance techniques, high performance liquid chromatography/ion chromatography, and chemical ionization. "No compounds were found in either of the leachates of the piece of metal submitted for analysis." To further test its findings, ERDEC also analyzed the spectra taken from the fragment and spectra taken from a test sample spiked with mustard agent. "All NMR and GC Mass Spec tests [were] negative."[8] Note that the scientists who analyzed the sample wore protective gloves and worked in a ventilated laboratory as is routine in conducting these analyses; because the scientists were not exposed to the "unprotected sample," the scientists were unable to verify the symptoms reported by person who provided the sample.

The PGIIT then arranged for the Missile and Space Intelligence Center to perform a metallurgical analysis of the sample to determine its source; the piece was found to be consistent with the metallurgical properties of SCUD missiles.[9] The person who provided the sample reported that he also independently submitted two other portions of the metal fragment to two commercial laboratories, but these were returned because the laboratories refused to handle the material.[10] The person who provided the sample was informed of all test results.[11]

The case assessment is "Unlikely" for the presence of chemical warfare agents based on the following:

• Based on the metallurgical analysis, the sample was probably from a SCUD.
• No evidence of chemical warfare agent contamination was found by the chemical analysis of the sample performed by ERDEC.
• However, neither the chain of custody prior to the sample's submission nor confirmation of the reported symptoms due to exposure to the sample has been established. (Because these have not been established, the case assessment is "Unlikely" rather than "Definitely Not.")

This case is still being investigated. As additional information becomes available, it will be incorporated. If you have records, photographs, recollections, or find errors in the details reported, please contact the DOD Persian Gulf Task Force Hot Line at 800-472-6719.

DEFSMAC Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center

ERDEC Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center

GC Gas Chromatography

HPLC High Performance Liquid Chromatography

IC Ion Chromatography

LTC Lieutenant Colonel

MS Mass Spectrometry

MSIC Missile and Space Intelligence

NC North Carolina

NMR Nuclear Magnetic Resonance

PAC Presidential Advisory Committee

PGIIT Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation

U.S. United States

"ANALYSES METAL PIECE - ERDEC," not signed or dated.

File on Sample #OTH22395, ERDEC, November 1996.

Incident Report 459001155, Sept. 13,1995.

Incident Report 459001166, Sept. 14, 1995.

Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Clinical Services), July 15, 1996.

Letter from Director, Persian Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses Investigation Team, May 2, 1996.

Letter to Senator Rockefeller from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs).

Memorandum DAMI-ST-FM from IOS, Foreign Materiel Program, Department of the Army, Subject: [Redacted Name] SCUD Missile, Oct. 3, 1995.

Memorandum for Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Clinical Services), Subject: Request from [Redacted Name], from PGI, Dec. 8, 1995.

Memorandum for Director, Missile and Space Intelligence, Subject: Request for Analytical Support, dated Dec. 5, 1995.

Memorandum for Record, Subject: SCUD Piece Referred to PGIT by [Redacted Name] for Analysis Dec. 20, 1996.

Memorandum for Record from Director, Research and Technology, US Army Edgewood Research and Development Center, Subject: Analysis of Metal Scrap Final Report, Dec. 12, 1995.

Memorandum, Subject: Analysis of Sample (Steel Fragment), MSIC, June 2, 1994.

PGIIT Status Report, Subject: SCUD Missile Part, no date.

Results of analysis, ERDEC analyst, Oct. 13, 1995.

Special Study of the 347th’s Participation in Desert Shield/Desert Storm: January - December 1991, Vol. 1, Ninth Air Force Air Combat Command, USAF.

USAF Message, Serial Number S/DQ/148-81, Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center.

The DOD requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent incident reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community which had experience concerning chemical weapons. Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigation and validation protocols[12] to provide objective procedures for possible chemical weapons incidents. The standard that we are using is based on these protocols that include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site.
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation, or human or animal tissue samples.
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence.
• Testimony of eyewitnesses.
• Multiple analyses.
• Review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While the DOD methodology for investigating chemical incidents (Figure 2) is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Accordingly, the methodology is designed to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. The major efforts in this methodology are:

• Substantiate the incident.
• Document the medical reports related to the incident.
• Interview appropriate people.
• Obtain information available to external organizations.
• Assess the results.

Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor is a single individual’s observation sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence.

To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches for documentation from operational, intelligence, and environmental logs. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard" as well as anecdotal evidence. Additionally, the investigator looks for physical evidence that might indicate that chemical agents were present in the vicinity of the incident, including samples (or the results of analyses of samples) collected at the time of the incident.

The investigator searches the medical records to determine if personnel were injured as a result of the incident. Deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc. near the time and location of an incident may be telling. Medical experts should provide information about alleged chemical casualties.

Figure 2. Chemical Incident Investigation Methodology

Interviews of incident victims (or direct observers) are conducted. First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of the personnel involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. NBC officers or personnel trained in chemical and biological testing, confirmation, and reporting are interviewed to identify the unit’s response, the tests that were run, the injuries sustained, and the reports submitted. Commanders are contacted to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made concerning the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of the incident. Where appropriate, subject matter experts also provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment, and submit their evaluations of selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to provide additional clarifying information about the case. These would include, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case.
• The DOD and Veterans’ clinical registries, which may provide data about the medical condition of personnel involved in the incident.

1. Memorandum DAMI-ST-FM, from IOS, Foreign Materiel Program, Department of the Army, Subject: [Redacted Name] SCUD Missile, Oct. 3, 1995; PGIIT Status Report, Subject: SCUD Missile Part, no date; Letter to Senator Rockefeller from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs).
2. Memorandum DAMI-ST-FM, from IOS, Foreign Materiel Program, Department of the Army, Subject: [Redacted Name] SCUD Missile, Oct. 3, 1995.
3. The PGIIT is the predecessor organization to the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Investigation and Analysis Directorate.
4. USAF Message, Serial Number S/DQ/148-81, Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center. (This document is unavailable pending declassification procedures.)
5. Memorandum DAMI-ST-FM, from IOS, Foreign Materiel Program, Department of the Army, Subject: [Redacted Name] SCUD Missile, Oct. 3, 1995 and Special Study of the 347th's Participation in Desert Shield/Desert Storm: January - December 1991, Vol. 1, Ninth Air Force Air Combat Command, USAF.
6. SCUD alerts near King Fahd Military Airport are documented in Incident Reports 459001155 dated Sept. 13,1995 and 459001166 dated Sept. 14, 1995, respectively.
7. Memorandum for Director, Missile and Space Intelligence, Subject: Request for Analytical Support, dated December 5, 1995.
8. Memorandum for Record, Subject: Analysis of Metal Scrap: Final Report, dated Dec. 12, 1995; hand-written results of analysis signed by ERDEC analyst Oct. 13, 1995; typed results "ANALYSES METAL PIECE - ERDEC," not signed or dated; File on Sample #OTH22395, ERDEC, November 1996. Leachates are material removed from a sample during chemical analysis.
9. Memorandum, Subject: Analysis of Sample (Steel Fragment), MSIC, June 2, 1994.
10. Memorandum for Record, Subject: SCUD Piece Referred to PGIT by [Redacted Name] for Analysis, Dec. 20, 1996.
11.  Memorandum for Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Clinical Services), Subject: Request from [Redacted Name], from PGIT, Dec. 8, 1995; Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Clinical Services) dated July 15, 1996; Letter from Director, Persian Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses Investigation Team, May 2, 1996.
12.  "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on Jan. 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified by 93 States (as of June 1997.) It was signed by the U.S. on Jan. 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. [http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/chemical.htm]