One prominent hypothesis about illnesses among Gulf War veterans is that some of the reported symptoms are the result of exposure to chemical warfare agents. During and after the Gulf War, some veterans reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents, and to assess the likelihood that chemical warfare agents were present in the Gulf, the DOD developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community. The criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• The testimony of witnesses;
• Multiple analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by experts.

While the methodology (Tab C) used to investigate suspected chemical warfare agent incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and to determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate the presence of a chemical warfare agent.

After following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence; after interviewing witnesses and key servicemembers; and after analyzing the results of all available information, the investigator assesses the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. This assessment is our best judgement, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication. This case has been reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

 Figure 1. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: Do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence can be found.

On Sept. 18, 1995, a veteran submitted a small metal sample to the Presidential Advisory Committee for analysis and to determine if it was contaminated by chemical warfare agents. The veteran reported that the sample was given to him by another soldier who identified it as a piece of a Scud missile intercepted by a Patriot missile near King Fahd Military Airport on or about Jan. 19, 1991. Analysis of the sample by the U.S. Army Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center revealed no evidence of chemical warfare agents. The assessment for this case is that chemical warfare agent presence is unlikely. Because we cannot attest to the chain of custody before the Presidential Advisory Committee received the sample nor can we confirm the reported symptoms due to exposure to the sample, the assessment is unlikely rather than definitely not.

On Sept. 18, 1995, during a meeting in Charlotte, North Carolina, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses received a small piece of metal.[2] The veteran who provided this sample reported that the soldier who found it told him that it was a piece from a Scud missile intercepted by a Patriot missile near King Fahd Military Airport on Jan. 19, 1991. He further reported the following chain of custody: a soldier from King Fahd Military Airport picked up the metal piece as a souvenir; the soldier stored the fragment in a plastic bag, he forgot about it for more than three years; and subsequently, he rediscovered it in August 1994 in Charlotte, North Carolina. This soldier then gave the piece to the veteran who provided a portion of it to the PAC.

The veteran described the original piece of the Scud as being about six inches long, five inches wide, about 3/8 inches thick, and burned on both sides. The veteran who provided the sample told an investigator from the Army’s Foreign Materiel Program (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence) that:

The unprotected sample, when examined in an enclosed room with no ventilation, will cause a person’s eyes to water after about 10 minutes and sometimes will cause a tingly sensation. Additionally, touching the sample will cause a burning sensation within about 10 minutes on the contacted skin. Within 20 minutes, the area is red; within 30 minutes there is a slight ring around the red part; within an hour, there is a watery blister; and within three to four hours, there is a large blister. The blister will rupture on its own in six to seven hours.[3]

The Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team[4] (PGIIT) reviewed reports of Scud missile attacks near King Fahd Military Airport during the period of Jan. 12-26, 1991. Veterans who called the Veterans Reporting Hotline have reported Scud alerts near King Fahd Military Airport during that general period.[5] The only Scud activity on Jan. 19, 1991, (the date the soldier reported the Scud intercept) was four missiles fired from Iraq toward Tel Aviv, Israel.[6] However, available data suggests Iraq launched missiles toward Dhahran (located near King Fahd Military Airport) on Jan. 20-21, 1991.[7] Patriot missiles intercepted these Scuds, so we assume that this sample came from the Scud attack on the evening of January 20 or early morning of January 21.

The PAC gave the sample to the DOD Foreign Materiel Program, which in turn arranged for the U.S. Army Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center to test for the presence of any known chemical warfare agents.[8] ERDEC did a thorough analysis of the metal piece using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, nuclear magnetic resonance, high performance liquid chromatography/ion chromatography, and chemical ionization.[9] "They found no compounds in either of the leachates [material removed from a sample during chemical analysis] of the piece of metal submitted for analysis."[10] To further test its findings, ERDEC also analyzed the spectra taken from the fragment and spectra taken from a test sample spiked with mustard agent.[11] "All nuclear magnetic resonance and gas chromatography/mass spectrometry tests [were] negative."[12] The scientists who analyzed the sample wore protective gloves and worked in a ventilated laboratory. This is routine safety procedure for conducting these analyses. We did not attempt to duplicate the reported scenario that created the symptoms, and the scientists were not exposed to the unprotected sample and, therefore, were unable to verify the reported symptoms.

The PGIIT also arranged for the Missile and Space Intelligence Center to perform a metallurgical analysis of the sample to determine its source; the piece was found to be consistent with the metallurgical properties of Scud missiles.[13] The veteran who provided the sample to the PAC also reported that he independently submitted two other portions of the metal fragment to two commercial laboratories, but the laboratories refused to handle the material and returned them.[14] The veteran was informed of all test results.[15]

When reviewing the circumstances of this case, the investigator analyzed three key issues: 

• What was the origin of the sample? Since the Missile and Space Intelligence Center’s metallurgical tests on a portion of the metal fragment determined that it possessed characteristics aligned with the properties of Scud missiles, we accept that the metal fragment is a piece of a Scud missile.[16]
• What was the chain of custody for the sample? During a meeting on Sept. 18, 1995, the Presidential Advisory Committee received a small metal fragment from someone in the audience. This person stated that the fragment came from a soldier stationed at King Fahd Military Airport on Jan. 19, 1991. The soldier told him that this was a Scud fragment. He also stated that the soldier had stored it in a plastic bag and forgotten about it, until he rediscovered it in August 1994. He then gave it to the person who provided it to the PAC.[17] Since (reportedly) the soldier who initially found the fragment in 1991 cannot account for it from the time he stored it in a plastic bag until its rediscovery in August 1994, we cannot establish the chain of custody prior to its presentation to the PAC.
• Did the sample contain elements indicating the presence of chemical warfare agents? The U.S. Army Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center’s nuclear magnetic resonance and gas chromatography/mass spectrometry tests for the presence of chemical warfare agents on the sample were negative.[18] The sample did not contain any indication of chemical warfare agents. [19] Although the tests yielded no chemical warfare agents, the report does not preclude the possibility of other toxic substances on the Scud piece. For example, Iraq's Scuds were propelled by a combination of kerosene and a toxic oxidizer, inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA), which was reported to have caused iritations and injuries during the Gulf War.[20] However, the veteran did not report symptoms that indicated IRFNA presence, and the lab did not test for possible contamination by IRFNA or its by-products, so we can make no assessments about IRFNA presence.

Since the chemical analysis has shown no evidence of the presence of chemical warfare agents, we assess that it is unlikely that a chemical warfare agent existed on the Scud sample. Because we cannot attest to the chain of custody before the Presidential Advisory Committee received the sample nor can we confirm the reported symptoms due to exposure to the sample, the assessment is unlikely rather than definitely not.

The key lesson expressed throughout this investigation is that soldiers should not pick up battlefield souvenirs or artifacts. Items on the battlefield may contain contaminants or present other safety hazards that are not immediately obvious.

This is a final report. However, if you believe you have information which may change this case narrative, please contact my office by calling 800-497-6261.

CBDCOM Chemical and Biological Defense Command

ERDEC Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center

IRFNA Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid

PAC Presidential Advisory Committee

PGIIT Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team

US United States

Chemical Ionization

Chemical ionization is a process used to create molecules which have either a positive or negative charge.[21]

Chromatography 

The separation of chemical substances and particles by difference movement through a two-phased system.[22]

Gas Chromatography

The sample mixture is vaporized in gas chromatography. The process by which a vaporized mixture is separated into its component compounds. [23]

High Performance Liquid Chromatography

A chromatographic technology used to separate and measure mixtures of substances in solution.[24]

Ion Chromatography 

Ion chromatographic is a form of liquid chromatography that uses ion-exchange resins to separate atomic or molecular ions based their interaction with the resin.[25]

Leachates 

A leachate is the material removed from a sample during chemical analysis.[26]

Mass Spectrometry 

This is a method of identifying the chemical constitution of a substance by means of the separation of gaseous ions according to their differing mass and charge - called also mass spectroscopy. [27]

Nuclear Magnetic Resonance

The phenomenon in which atomic nuclei spin around the axis of a strong magnetic field. The spinning nuclei create oscillating magnetic fields and emit a detectable amount of electromagnetic radiation. [28]

82nd Airborne Division, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer’s Log," Jan. 21, 1991.

Air Force, Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center, Message, Serial Number S/DQ/148-81, Feb. 27, 1991.

Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Email, Subject: "DISUM," Oct. 19, 1995.

"Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997.

Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, Foreign Materiel Program, Memorandum, Subject: "[Redacted] Scud Missile," Oct. 3, 1995.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Clinical Services), Letter, July 15, 1996.

Edgewood Research and Development Engineer Center, Analytical Chemistry Team, Subject: "Analysis Metal Scrap: OTH22395," Oct. 5, 1995.

Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, File on Sample #OTH22395, November 1996.

Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Hand-written results of analysis signed by analyst, Oct. 13, 1995.

Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Metal Scrap Final Report," Dec. 12, 1995.

Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985.

Incident Report 459001155 Incident Description: Scud Alerts near King Fahd Military Airport, Sept. 13, 1995.

Incident Report 459001166 Incident Description: Scud Alerts near King Fahd Military Airport, Sept. 14, 1995.

Iowa State University, web site www.cif.iastate.edu/MassSpec/ci.html (as of July 11, 2000).

Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, web site www.m-w.com (as of July 13, 2000).

Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985.

Ninth US Air Force Air Combat Command, "Special Study of the 347th’s Participation in Desert Shield/Desert Storm: January - December 1991, Volume 1," June 30, 1992.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), Letter, Nov. 2, 1995.

Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team, Memorandum, Subject: "Request for Analytical Support," Dec. 5, 1995.

Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team, Memorandum, Subject: "Request from [Redacted]," Dec. 8, 1995.

Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team, Memorandum, Subject: "Scud Piece Referred to PGIT by [Redacted] for Analysis," Dec. 20, 1996.

Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team, Status Report, Subject: "Scud Missile Part," no date.

Persian Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses Investigation Team, Letter, May 2, 1996.

Scimedia, web site scimedia.com/chem-ed/sep/lc/ion-chro.htm (as of March 17, 2000).

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (Information Paper), Aug. 3, 1999.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Possible Chemical Agent on Scud Missile Sample" (Case Narrative), Aug. 19, 1997.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Scud Information Paper" (Information Paper), July 25, 2000.

Stedman’s Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd edition, ed. John H. Dirckx, M.D., Baltimore, Maryland, Williams & Wilkins, 1997, [on Compact Disk].

Unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary."

United States Army, Missile Command Structures Directorate, Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Sample (Steel Fragment) (U)," June 2, 1994.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992.

U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy NAVMED P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995.

U.S. Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," Nov. 25, 1985.

Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990.

The DOD requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community, which had chemical weapons experience (e.g., the United Nations’ investigation of the chemical weapons used during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war). Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigation and validation protocols[29] to provide objective procedures for possible chemical weapons incidents. The methodology we are using is based on these international protocols and guidelines. The methodology includes:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation, or human or animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence; The testimony of witnesses;
• Multiple analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While the methodology used to investigate chemical incidents (Figure 2) is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. The major efforts in our methodology are:

• To substantiate the incident;
• To document available medical reports related to the incident;
• To interview appropriate people;
• To obtain information available to external organizations; and
• To assess the results.

A case usually starts with a report of a possible chemical warfare agent incident, often from a veteran. To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches for documentation from operational, intelligence, and environmental logs. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard," as well as anecdotal, evidence.

Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate a chemical warfare agent presence. The investigator looks for physical evidence collected at the time of the incident that might indicate that chemical agents were present in the vicinity of the incident. Such evidence might include tissue samples, body fluid samples, clothing, environmental samples of soil or vegetation, weapons parts, and Fox MM-1 tapes with properly documented spectrums.

Figure 2. Chemical warfare incident investigation methodology

The investigator searches available medical records to determine if anyone was injured by the incident. Deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc., near the time and location of an incident are noted and considered. Medical experts are asked to provide information about any alleged chemical warfare agent casualties.

Interviews of those involved in or near the incident (participants or witnesses) are conducted. First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of those involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. Nuclear, biological, and chemical officers or specialists trained in chemical testing, confirmation, and reporting are interviewed to identify the unit’s response, the tests that were run, the injuries sustained, and the reports submitted. Commanders are contacted to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made concerning the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of the incident. Where appropriate, subject matter experts also provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment, and submit their evaluations of selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to provide additional clarifying information about the case. These would include, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case;
• The clinical registries of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs which may provide data about the medical condition of those involved in the incident; and
• Agencies capable of computer modeling meteorological and source characterization data in cases where airborne dispersion of agent is suspected.

Once the investigation is complete, the investigator evaluates the available evidence in order to make a subjective assessment. The available evidence is often incomplete or contradictory and thus must be looked at in the total context of what is known about the incident being investigated. Physical evidence collected at the time of the incident, for example, can be of tremendous value to an investigation. Properly documented physical evidence would generally be given the greatest weight in any assessment. The testimony of witnesses and contemporaneous operational documentation is also significant when making an assessment. Testimony from witnesses who also happen to be subject matter experts is usually more meaningful than testimony from untrained observers. Typically, secondhand accounts are given less weight than witness testimony. When investigators are presented with conflicting witness testimony, they look for other pieces of information supporting the statements of the witnesses. Investigators evaluate the supporting information to determine how it corroborates any of the conflicting positions. Generally, such supporting information will fit into a pattern corroborating one of the conflicting accounts of the incident over the others. Where the bulk of corroborating evidence supports one witness more than another, that person's information would be considered more compelling.

Our assessments rely on the investigators’ evaluation of the available information for each investigation. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 3) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. The investigator will use this scale to make an assessment based on facts available as of the date of the report publication. This case has been reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

 Figure 1. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: Do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence can be found.

This narrative was initially published on Aug. 19, 1997. Since that time, the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses has not received any new information on the material presented here, nor have any additional leads developed to change the narrative’s assessments. Additionally, the Presidential Special Oversight Board reviewed the narrative and recommended that the Office of the Special Assistant republish it as final. The only changes that have been made to the paper are:

• The narrative has been rewritten to reflect the updated methodology and footnoting standards of the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses.
• Some new source documents have been referenced to enhance the accuracy of the narrative.
• Sections discussing "Analysis" and "Lessons Learned" have been added.

1. Tab A contains acronyms, abbreviations, and a glossary.
2. Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, Foreign Materiel Program, Memorandum, Subject: "[Redacted] Scud Missile," Oct. 3, 1995; Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team, Status Report, Subject: "Scud Missile Part," no date; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), Letter, Nov. 2, 1995.
3. Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, Foreign Materiel Program, Memorandum, Subject: "[Redacted] Scud Missile," Oct. 3, 1995.
4. The Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team is the predecessor organization to the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Investigation and Analysis Directorate.
5. Incident Report 459001155 Incident Description: Scud Alerts near King Fahd Military Airport, September 13, 1995, and Incident Report 459001166 Incident Description: Scud Alerts near King Fahd Military Airport, Sept. 14, 1995.
6. Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, Foreign Materiel Program, Memorandum, Subject: "[Redacted] Scud Missile," Oct. 3, 1995; and Ninth U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, "Special Study of the 347th's Participation in Desert Shield/Desert Storm: January - Dec. 1991, Volume. 1," June 30, 1992.
7. Air Force, Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center, Message: Serial Number S/DQ/148-81, Feb. 27, 1991; Unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary;" 82nd Airborne Division, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," Jan. 21, 1991.
8. Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team, Memorandum, Subject: "Request for Analytical Support," December 5, 1995.
9. Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Metal Scrap Final Report," Dec. 12, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Hand-written results of analysis signed by analyst, Oct. 13, 1995; Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Email, Subject: "DISUM," Oct. 19, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Analytical Chemistry Team, Subject: "Analysis Metal Scrap: OTH22395," Oct. 5, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, File on Sample #OTH22395, November 1996.
10. Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Metal Scrap Final Report," Dec. 12, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Hand-written results of analysis signed by analyst, October 13, 1995; Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Email, Subject: "DISUM," Oct. 19, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Analytical Chemistry Team, Subject: "Analysis Metal Scrap: OTH22395," Oct. 5, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, File on Sample #OTH22395, November 1996.
11. Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Metal Scrap Final Report," Dec. 12, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Hand-written results of analysis signed by analyst, October 13, 1995; Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Email, Subject: "DISUM," Oct. 19, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Analytical Chemistry Team, Subject: "Analysis Metal Scrap: OTH22395," Oct. 5, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, File on Sample #OTH22395, November 1996.
12. Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Metal Scrap Final Report," Dec. 12, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Hand-written results of analysis signed by analyst, Oct. 13, 1995; Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Email, Subject: "DISUM," Oct. 19, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Analytical Chemistry Team, Subject: "Analysis Metal Scrap: OTH22395," Oct. 5, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, File on Sample #OTH22395, November 1996.
13. United States Army, Missile Command Structures Directorate, Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Sample (Steel Fragment) (U)," June 2, 1994.
14. Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team, Memorandum, Subject: "Scud Piece Referred to PGIT by [Redacted] for Analysis," Dec. 20, 1996.
15. Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team, Memorandum, Subject: "Request from [Redacted]," Dec. 8, 1995; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Clinical Services), Letter, July 15, 1996; Persian Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses Investigation Team, Letter, May 2, 1996.
16. United States Army, Missile Command Structures Directorate, Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Sample (Steel Fragment) (U)," June 2, 1994.
17. Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, Foreign Materiel Program, Memorandum, Subject: "[Redacted] Scud Missile," Oct. 3, 1995.
18. Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team, Memorandum, Subject: "Request for Analytical Support," Dec. 5, 1995.
19. Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Metal Scrap Final Report," Dec. 12, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Hand-written results of analysis signed by analyst, October 13, 1995; Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Email, Subject: "DISUM," Oct. 19, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Analytical Chemistry Team, Subject: "Analysis Metal Scrap: OTH22395," Oct. 5, 1995; Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, File on Sample #OTH22395, November 1996.
20. For information on Iraq's Scud missile program and the effects of IRFNA, see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Scud Information Paper" (Information Paper), July 25, 2000, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/scud_info/; and Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid" (Information Paper), Aug. 3, 1999.
21. Iowa State University, web site www.cif.iastate.edu/MassSpec/ci.html (as of July 11, 2000).
22. Stedman's Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd edition, ed. John H. Dirckx, M.D., Baltimore, Maryland, Williams & Wilkins, 1997, [on Compact Disk].
23. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, web site www.m-w.com (as of July 3, 2000).
24. Stedman's Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd edition, ed. John H. Dirckx, M.D.,
    Baltimore, Maryland, Williams & Wilkins, 1997, [on Compact Disk]
25. Scimedia, web site scimedia.com/chem-ed/sep/lc/ion-chro.htm (as of March 17, 2000).
26. Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary, web site www.m-w.com (as of July 13, 2000).
27. Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary, web site www.m-w.com (as of July 13, 2000).
28. Stedman's Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd edition., ed. John H. Dirckx, M.D., Baltimore, Maryland, Williams & Wilkins, 1997, [on Compact Disk].
29.  "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This chemical weapons convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 states and ratified or acceded by 106 states as of February 1998. It was signed by the United States on January 13, 1993, and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. Other protocols and guidelines were found in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-4, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992; U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy NAVMED P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995; US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," November 25, 1985; and other DOD investigational procedures contributed ideas for developing this methodology.