One prominent hypothesis about illnesses among Gulf War veterans is that some of the reported symptoms are the result of exposure to chemical warfare agents. During and after the Gulf War, some veterans reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents, and to assess the likelihood that chemical warfare agents were present in the Gulf, the DOD developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community. The criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the condition at the site; 
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• The testimony of witnesses;
• Multiple analysis; and
• A review of the evidence by experts. 

While the methodology (Tab D) used to investigate suspected chemical warfare agent incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and to determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate the presence of a chemical warfare agent.

The thoroughness and enormity of the investigation into the events in and around the Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Point in March 1991 are reflected in thousands of hours of research; declassification of several thousand documents; hundreds of personal interviews; and testimony to committees and subcommittees of both houses of Congress; town hall meetings throughout the United States; conducting field demolition tests at Dugway Proving Ground; and fact-finding trips to London, Prague, Paris, Kuwait City, Riyadh, Cairo, and Tel Aviv.

The DOD Khamisiyah team sought information and conducted its investigation in various locations:

• United Nations Special Commission on Iraq in New York City
• Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
• Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
• Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
• Fort Belvoir, Virginia
• Indianapolis, Indiana
• Dugway Proving Ground, Utah
• Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
• U.S. Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia
• Fort Gillem, Georgia
• MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

The Khamisiyah investigative methodology depended heavily on locating and interviewing veterans who had directly participated in the destruction of the facility. Investigators interviewed members and former members of more than forty military units. These units included:

• 37th Engineer Battalion
• 307th Engineer Battalion
• 307th Medical Battalion
• 3/73rd Armor Battalion
• 2/505th Parachute Infantry Regiment
• 3/505th Parachute Infantry Regiment
• 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment
• 1/319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment
• 92nd Chemical Platoon
• 450th Civil Affairs Battalion
• 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
• 84th Engineer Company
• 82nd Engineer Battalion
• 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment
• 101st Airborne Division
• 24th Infantry Division
• 4/64th Armor Battalion
• 82nd Airborne Division
• 1st Cavalry Division
• 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions
• 1st Infantry Division
• Support elements from XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps
• Separate Army Central Command elements

The methodology particularly emphasized interviewing the policy makers, as well as those directly involved in the demolitions at Khamisiyah. Commanders of engineer and explosive ordnance disposal units, operations officers of engineer and infantry units, intelligence officers at all levels of command, noncommissioned officers who supervised the bunker and warehouse inventory, and the soldiers who placed the demolition charges on munitions formed the core of the interviews. We interviewed more than 800 veterans who either participated in the demolitions, were believed to be on-site at the time of the demolitions, or responded to the survey distributed to soldiers believed to be within 50 kilometers of Khamisiyah. We interviewed some veterans on more than one occasion to clarify conflicting information. We also reviewed over 15 reports regarding Khamisiyah prepared by other Department of Defense and US government agencies, such as the Department of the Army Inspector General's "Inquiry into Demolition of Iraq Ammunition;" the Central Intelligencec Agency's "Khamisiyah: a Historical Perspective on Related intelligence;" and the Senate Investigative Unit's "Report of the Special Investigative Unit on Gulf War Illnesses."  Without the information provided by the veterans and agencies, the investigation would not have succeeded in recreating day-to-day activities that occurred more than six years before the publication of the initial case narrative.

Close coordination between the DOD, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency significantly aided the investigation and ultimately provided the answers to what happened at Khamisiyah in March 1991.

After following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence; after interviewing witnesses and key servicemembers; and after analyzing the results of all available information, the investigator assesses the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. This assessment is tentative, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

Immediately following the end of Operation Desert Storm, U.S. Army units occupied an area in southeastern Iraq that encompassed Khamisiyah (also known then as the Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Area). Soldiers of the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps conducted two large-scale demolition operations to destroy the munitions and facilities around Khamisiyah:

• March 4, 1991. Soldiers destroyed 37 large ammunition bunkers. Later, Iraq declared that one of these, Bunker 73, had contained 2,160 chemical warfare agent-filled rockets.
• March 10, 1991. Soldiers destroyed approximately 40 additional ammunition bunkers and 45 warehouses. In an open-air location outside the Khamisiyah Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) now known as "the Pit," soldiers also set charges to approximately 1,250 rockets, many of which UNSCOM later found had contained chemical warfare agent.

Soldiers also conducted numerous demolitions to destroy smaller caches of munitions and to test techniques for destroying bunkers. Demolition operations continued in the Khamisiyah area through the middle of April 1991. The soldiers conducting reconnaissance and completing the inventories before these demolitions were confident that they had destroyed only conventional munitions.

Throughout the U.S. occupation of Khamisiyah, including the demolition period, no reports were made of chemical warfare agent detections. Nor were there reports of anyone—soldier or civilian—experiencing symptoms consistent with chemical warfare agent exposure.

In October 1991, March 1992, May 1996, and in 1998, UNSCOM inspected Khamisiyah. In October 1991, Iraqi officials led UNSCOM inspectors to three sites that had contained chemical weapons (Figure 2):

• Bunker 73, inside the Khamisiyah ASP;
• The area referred to as the Pit, outside the southeast corner of the Khamisiyah ASP; and
• An above-ground storage area, approximately 3 kilometers from the Khamisiyah ASP.

Figure 2. Site locations shown to the UNSCOM

Bunker 73. During the 1991 inspection, Iraq claimed that chemical munitions found in the Pit had been salvaged from Bunker 73 and that Coalition forces had destroyed the bunker. UNSCOM could not determine if Bunker 73 contained chemical warfare agents at this time because damaged munitions made it too dangerous to get close enough to sample or take CAM readings. However, on a return visit to the site in May 1996, UNSCOM conclusively determined that debris  (e.g., burster tubes, fill plugs, and plastic inserts) in the rubble of Bunker 73 was characteristic of chemical munitions.

The Pit. In October 1991, UNSCOM inspectors found several hundred 122mm rockets that appeared to have been bulldozed and placed into piles in an excavated area southeast of the main ASP. This area became known as "the Pit." The UNSCOM investigation showed that the intact rockets contained the chemical warfare agents sarin and cyclosarin. During a subsequent visit in March 1992, UNSCOM ordered Iraq to destroy about 500 leaking rockets near the Pit, and ship the remaining rockets to Al Muthanna, Iraq, for destruction. UNSCOM supervised Iraqi destruction of a total of approximately 782 rockets at the Pit and Al Muthanna.

Above-ground storage area. Iraq also showed the UNSCOM team an above-ground storage site about 3 kilometers west of the Khamisiyah ASP that contained 6,323 intact 155mm artillery shells, one of which was leaking mustard agent. No evidence exists that any Coalition forces had been to this site. Again, UNSCOM ordered Iraq to ship these rounds to the destruction facility at Al Muthanna.

In November 1991, US intelligence and DOD became aware of the UNSCOM findings, but at the time, the information did not result in identifying which, if any, US troops participated in the Khamisiyah demolition activities. The lack of U.S. reports of chemical weapons, combined with Iraq’s less than full compliance with UNSCOM, led to doubts about Iraq’s claims that chemical weapons had been at the site when the demolition occurred.

The U.S. government did not immediately make the connection between the chemical munitions found by UNSCOM at Khamisiyah and US demolitions operations there. The following is a chronology of the government response.

• February 1994 - A request from Congressman Browder to the United Nations (UN) for any reports about chemical weapons found in Iraq after the Gulf War kindled DOD interest in Khamisiyah.  The United Nations responded in April 1994 with a letter that listed Khamisiyah along with other chemical weapons sites.
• May 1994 - During hearings before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, DOD and Intelligence Community witnesses admitted that UNSCOM found chemical weapons at a location at the time of UNSCOM inspections, but these witnesses were unable to confirm that any US troops were at the site.
• March 1995 - As a result of presidential concerns and the concerns of two Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees, the CIA began a reexamination of relevant intelligence.
• June 1995 - DOD formed the Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team (later shortened to Persian Gulf Investigation Team (PGIT)) that by October had identified some of the U.S. forces that had occupied the area around Khamisiyah during the Gulf War, including the 37th Engineer Battalion.
• August 1995 - President Clinton created the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses.
• May 1996 - The CIA and PGIT acknowledged at a Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses meeting the possibility that U.S. soldiers destroyed munitions at Khamisiyah.
• June 1996 - DOD confirmed publicly that "US soldiers from the 37th Engineer Battalion destroyed ammunition bunkers [at Khamisiyah] in early March 1991 ... It now appears that one of these destroyed bunkers contained chemical weapons."
• October 1996 - Deputy Secretary of Defense sent memorandum to 21,000 veterans who had been identified as being within 50 kilometers of Khamisiyah.
• November 1996 - The Secretary of Defense established the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses (hereafter referred to as the Office of the Special Assistant) to focus ongoing DOD investigations and expand the investigation into Gulf War veterans’ complaints of undiagnosed illnesses.
• January 1997 - The Deputy Secretary of Defense sent letters with a survey attached to veterans saying that chemical weapons had been present at Khamisiyah when the demolitions occured and urging them to call the Persian Gulf Incident Hotline with any additional information they may have about the Khamisiyah incident.
• May 1997 - DOD and CIA conducted open field demolition tests on 122mm rockets at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, to determine how chemical warfare agents in Iraqi rockets might have been released by demolitions at Khamisiyah.
• July 1997 - DOD and CIA jointly announced the results of the dispersion modeling for Khamisiyah. Given the unit locations available then, the modeling indicated a hazard area where some 99,000 veterans may have been exposed to low levels of nerve agent.  DOD sent written notices to two categories of veterans:  those in the potential hazard area (approximately 99,000) and those who had received the Deputy Secretary of Defense's letter and survey but were not in the potential hazard area (approximately 10,000).
• December 1997 - The Department of the Army Inspector General’s "Inquiry into Demolition of Iraq Ammunition" found no empirical evidence that chemical munitions or agents were present at the time of the demolition operations.
• January 1998 - President Clinton created the Presidential Special Oversight Board for the Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents to provide recommendations based on its review of Department of Defense investigations into possible detections of, and exposures to, chemical or biological weapons agents, and environmental and other factors that may have contributed to Gulf War Illnesses.
• January 2000 - DOD completed the remodeling and revised the 1997 hazard areas.

The early work of the Office of the Special Assistant placed an emphasis on researching US military operations at Khamisiyah. On Feb. 21,  1997, we published the first Khamisiyah case narrative. The narrative provided important insights into what actually took place and which US military units were involved. We intensified our efforts to identify and contact the thousands of soldiers potentially involved, and began detailed computer modeling of events in the spring and summer of 1997 to determine the size and path of the potential hazard area created by demolition activities in the Pit. The modeling resulted in DoD sending notification letters to approximately 99,000 veterans.  It is important to note that the modeling process is based on computer simulations and not empirical data.   Results, although based on best science, are predictions and should be evaluated carefully.

Modeling refinements continued through 1998 and 1999. Some of the more significant refinements included revision of meteorological models, an updated CIA estimate of how much chemical warfare agent was released, addition of deposition and decay to the models and consideration of toxicity of both sarin and cyclosarin in the models. The modeling team completed remodeling the Khamisiyah Pit demolition in January 2000 that resulted in redefined potential hazard areas. DoD identified 100,923 veterans in the potential hazard areas who possibly were exposed to low levels of nerve agent. Our fundamental modeling methodology has not changed since 1997. In 2000, like 1997, we used the outer boundaries of the union of the results from different models to define the potential hazard area. This conservative approach gave us greater assurance of identifying US units in the potential hazard area.  The veterans’ notification process is ongoing.

The first narrative left the following five questions for follow-up research:

• How many chemical warfare munitions were present in Bunker 73 and the Pit at the time of the US demolition operations?
• Were two separate groups working at the Pit on March 10, 1991?
• Was there an additional demolition of munitions in the Pit on March 12, 1991?
• Who were the 15 to 20 engineers assigned to assist the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) noncommissioned officer in the Pit on March 10 or 12, 1991?
• What were the weather conditions on the day(s) of the Pit demolition(s)?

This updated narrative includes significant additional information that enabled the Office of the Special Assistant to address each of these five questions and to better understand the effect of the demolition operations on U.S. soldiers.

Additionally, the updated narrative addresses, and assesses, two more questions:

• Did U.S. forces destroy chemical warfare weapons stored at Khamisiyah?
• Were U.S. forces exposed to nerve agents as a result of demolition activities?

This narrative includes the following conclusions:

• Chemical munitions were definitely present at three locations at Khamisiyah.
• U.S. soldiers definitely destroyed many—but not all—of the chemical rockets at Khamisiyah.
• Some U.S. ground forces were likely exposed to very low levels of nerve agent from the demolition of rockets in the Pit on March 10, 1991.
• It is unlikely U.S. ground forces were exposed to chemical warfare agent from the Bunker 73 demolition on March 4, 1991.

Name. Two national-level U.S. intelligence collection organizations—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA)—identified the ammunition storage point at Khamisiyah independently of one another. Each organization also gave it a different name. The name discrepancy was not identified or corrected until after the Gulf War.

In September 1976 the United States Intelligence Community[2] first identified the site now called the Khamisiyah ASP while it was still under construction. In June 1977, the CIA named it "Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Area" (after a nearby town) in their imagery database.[3]

In 1982, the NSA received intelligence about the "Al Khamisiyah ammunition depot." This report did not give the location of the depot. However, the NSA later received intelligence that placed this ammunition depot less than 3 kilometers from the town of Khamisiyah. This was the same facility that the CIA called "Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Area.

Yet another national-level intelligence organization, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), adopted the CIA name, which became the "official" name during the Gulf War.[4] Many U.S. soldiers, however, were unaware of the official name. Instead, they referred to it by other local place names, such as "Suq ash Shuyukh" or "Al Juwarin." To further complicate matters, Iraq referred to it in its early declarations by a different name altogether—"Khamisiyah Stores." (See Table 1.)

Table 1.  Names for Khamisiyah

This variety of names for a single location would later cause much confusion as stories of chemical weapons at Khamisiyah emerged after the war. This confusion contributed greatly to the initial delays in investigating the events that took place there, and did not end until 1996, when the National Security Council (NSC) directed DoD to use the name used by Iraq—Khamisiyah. For this narrative, we are using "Khamisiyah Ammunition Supply Point" (abbreviated to Khamisiyah ASP) to refer to the area inside the fence of the ASP and "Khamisiyah" to refer to the area within a 10 kilometer radius of the ASP.

Location. The Khamisiyah ASP was located 35 kilometers southeast of the city of An Nasiriyah, south of the Euphrates River (Figure 4). The coordinates for the ASP were:

• Geographic: Latitude 30�47' north, Longitude 46�26' east
• Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM): 38R PV375065[5]

Figure 4. Khamisiyah

Description. The Khamisiyah ASP was very large by any standard. It covered an area of nearly 40 square kilometers (Figure 5) and contained approximately 100 ammunition storage bunkers (Figure 6), 88 ammunition storage buildings, and numerous other buildings.

Figure 5. Khamisiyah Ammunition Supply Point

Figure 6. Typical bunker in the Khamisiyah Ammunition Supply Point; picture from 37th Engineer Battalion videotape

Surrounding Features. Several geographic features near Khamisiyah are important to the events that took place there (Figure 7). These include:

• Tallil Airfield: Tallil airfield was a large military airfield located approximately 35 kilometers northwest of Khamisiyah. Even before the Gulf War, U.S. forces knew that Tallil was possibly a chemical and biological weapons storage site. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi aircraft carrying chemical munitions flew from Tallil airfield to attack Iran. Furthermore, one of the ammunition storage bunkers at Tallil was an "S-shaped" bunker, which US intelligence analysts strongly associated with chemical weapons storage. A separate case narrative reports on this site.[6]
• An Nasiriyah Ammunition Storage Point Southwest (An Nasiriyah ASP SW): This depot was only 6 kilometers northeast of Tallil airfield. It had approximately 100 ammunition storage buildings and bunkers. Before the Gulf War, US forces believed that this might be a chemical or biological weapons storage site. Like Tallil, this site had one S-shaped bunker. Additionally, it had four "12-frame" bunkers with air conditioners. The Intelligence Community strongly associated S-shaped bunkers with chemical weapons storage and the refrigerated 12-frame bunkers with biological weapons storage.[7] A separate case narrative reports on this site.[8]
• Nahr al Man’ayah Irrigation Canal: [9] This canal is nearly 150 kilometers long and 100 meters wide. The canal passes within 3 kilometers of the access road to the Khamisiyah ASP. The Khamisiyah ASP was north of the canal. During Desert Storm, most US ground forces were south of the canal. Crossings over the canal were 10 - 15 kilometers apart and consisted of narrow wooden or earthen bridges.
• Highway 8: South of the canal, only 5 - 7 kilometers from Khamisiyah, are two, nearly parallel, large highways running southeast to Kuwait. One of these is Highway 8, a direct route between Kuwait and Baghdad. During Desert Storm, US forces pushed north across many kilometers of desert to reach Highway 8 to block Iraq’s forces attempting to escape from southern Iraq. US forces first reached Highway 8 at a point they designated "Objective Gold," barely 5 kilometers from the Khamisiyah ASP.
• Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Depot South: This depot is south of the Nahr al Man’ayah irrigation canal, only 3 kilometers from the Khamisiyah ASP. Iraq built this large depot after invading Kuwait.[10] It consisted of about 400 open revetments (an excavated area surrounded on three sides by earthen mounds).[11]

Figure 7. Area features surrounding Khamisiyah

Figure 8 shows the key events of the Pre-Desert Shield period. As previously mentioned, when the U.S. Intelligence Community first discovered the Khamisiyah ASP in 1976, they identified it as a storage depot for conventional[12](i.e., non-chemical, non-biological, and non-nuclear) munitions.

Figure 8. Pre-Desert Shield period

In May 1986, the CIA received and distributed a translated Iraqi document to limited policy, intelligence, and DOD officials that stated that Iraq had used the "al-Khamisiyah warehouses" in 1984 and 1985 to store chemical weapons used against Iran. This document stated:

3,975 155-mm mustard-loaded artillery grenades [sic] have been issued (from June 1984 to March 1985) to al-Khamisiyah warehouses. We do not have official data about using this quantity by the third army corps. The warehouses currently have 6,293 150-mm [sic] mustard bombs, enough to meet front demands for four days on a 15-minute mission.[13]

In November 1986, the CIA produced an assessment that used the information from this report to conclude that Iraq had indeed stored chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war "at the southern forward ammunition depot located at Tall al Lahm."[14] In this assessment, the CIA not only identified Tall al Lahm as a chemical storage site, but also made the connection between the ammunition depot they called "Tall al Lahm" and Iraq called "al Khamisiyah." However, this connection did not permanently resolve the earlier disconnect in names, which would persist until after the Gulf War. In the same assessment, the CIA also stated that "a new generation of 16 bunkers will expand Iraq's capability to store CW [chemical warfare] munitions at six airfields and at three ammunition storage depots that are strategically located throughout the country." The Intelligence Community called these new bunkers S-shaped bunkers.[15] Khamisiyah had no S-shaped bunkers; the nearest ones were at Tallil airfield and An Nasiriyah ASP SW. The CIA's assessment of Iraq’s report established an important link between chemical weapons storage and al Khamisiyah/Tall al Lahm. However, it also shifted future analyses of potential chemical storage sites to concentrate on locations that had S-shaped bunkers. The analytical bias toward S-shaped bunkers may explain why Khamisiyah was not on any of the lists of suspected chemical storage facilities generated from 1986 to the beginning of the Gulf War in 1990.[16]

1. Key Military Unit Involved

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). USCENTCOM was responsible for all Coalition military operations in the Gulf region. Its organizational structure is shown in Figure 9.[17]

Figure 9. USCENTCOM Organization

U.S. Army Component, Central Command (ARCENT). ARCENT was directly subordinate to USCENTCOM and was the parent unit of XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps.

XVIII Airborne Corps. XVIII Airborne Corps units attacked and occupied the portion of Iraq containing Khamisiyah. Their units were the first to conduct demolition operations at Khamisiyah in early March 1991. XVIII Airborne Corps withdrew from Iraq in mid-March, replaced by VII Corps. Key units of XVIII Airborne Corps included:

• 24th Infantry Division: The 24th Infantry Division was the first combat unit during Desert Storm to arrive at the Khamisiyah area. It did not enter the Khamisiyah ASP, but bypassed it in pursuit of Iraqi forces.
• 82nd Airborne Division: The 82nd Airborne Division followed the 24th Infantry Division to the Khamisiyah area, securing the Khamisiyah ASP and the surrounding area immediately after Desert Storm through March 23, 1991.
• 20th Engineer Brigade: The 37th Engineer Battalion from this brigade conducted demolition operations in and around the Khamisiyah ASP in support of the 82nd Airborne Division.

VII Corps. VII Corps replaced XVIII Airborne Corps in southeastern Iraq on March 24, 1991. VII Corps units continued demolition operations at Khamisiyah until early April. Key VII Corps units operating in the area included:

• 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR): The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment replaced the 82nd Airborne Division at Khamisiyah and occupied the area from March 24 to April 7, 1991. Its engineer unit (the 84th Engineer Company) conducted demolition operations at Khamisiyah on April 6,  1991.[18]
• 7th Engineer Brigade: The 82nd Engineer Battalion from this brigade conducted demolition operations around Khamisiyah in support of the 2nd ACR.

2. Key Events

Some of the key events from August 1990 to February 1991 that preceded US demolition operations in the Khamisiyah area are shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10. Desert Shield/Desert Storm Period

August 2, 1990: Iraq invaded Kuwait. By August 7th, Operation Desert Shield (the Defense of Saudi Arabia) began. Within days, US and Coalition forces began to arrive in Saudi Arabia.

During Operation Desert Shield, U.S. military leaders were acutely aware of the constant threat posed to U.S. soldiers by Iraq’s chemical weapons arsenal. U.S. soldiers knew that during the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq had repeatedly used chemical weapons against the Iranians, as well as against people within Iraq’s own borders.[19]

As a result, U.S. military operations and training focused heavily on defensive measures against a chemical weapons attack by Iraq. These defensive measures included training at every level, from individual survival skills (e.g., mask confidence exercises) to large-scale logistics operations. The immediacy of Iraq’s chemical threat caused soldiers to conduct this training with increased urgency.[20] Commanders’ emphasis was to fully equip all soldiers and units with chemical protective equipment, including masks, clothing, chemical alarms, decontamination kits, and nerve agent antidote kits.

Dec. 22, 1990: An XVIII Airborne Corps message to units emphasized the high state of preparedness against Iraq’s chemical weapons attack. XVIII Airborne Corps transmitted a message to its subordinate units that declared the ability of U.S. forces to protect themselves against Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. The message emphasized superior U.S. training and equipment in contrast to Iraqi armed forces. It also stated DOD’s assessment of the poor quality of Iraq’s chemical warfare agents. XVIII Airborne Corps intended the message to instill U.S. soldiers with confidence in their ability to prevail against an enemy known and expected to use chemical weapons.[21]

Defensive preparations against a chemical attack focused on training soldiers to protect themselves and their equipment from exposure to chemical warfare agents. This training included precautions to be taken against unexploded munitions on the battlefield suspected of being chemical (such as "duds" or abandoned ammunition stockpiles).

However, we did not train or expect the vast majority of soldiers to identify the hundreds of different kinds of munitions they might find on the battlefield, whether friendly or enemy, conventional or chemical. Nor did the vast majority of soldiers have the training or expectation of handling these munitions in any way, to include destroying them by demolition. The very technical and dangerous task of identifying and handling unexploded munitions of any kind belongs to the specially trained soldiers of the explosive ordnance disposal detachments.

January 1991: USCENTCOM completed the plan for the Desert Storm ground campaign. One of the critical objectives of the plan called for XVIII Airborne Corps to seize "Objective Gold," where a 3-kilometer strip of road connected two parallel highways. The center of Objective Gold was only five kilometers from the Khamisiyah ASP (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Location of Objective Gold

In retrospect, XVIII Airborne Corps blocked Iraqi forces attempting to escape from southern Iraq and Kuwait by gaining control of Highway 8. The 24th Infantry Division was the first XVIII Airborne Corps unit to reach Objective Gold. The 82nd Airborne Division followed behind the 24th Infantry Division and reached Objective Gold later.[22]

Jan. 10 - 15, 1991: Iraq moved 2,160 chemical-filled rockets to Khamisiyah.[23] According to Iraq’s declaration made later to the UNSCOM, Iraq moved the 122mm rockets from the Al Muthanna chemical weapons production facility to Khamisiyah between January 10 and Jan. 15, 1991. This was apparently intended to get the rockets away from Al Muthanna, which would be a likely target for Coalition air strikes. Iraq claimed to have initially placed all 2,160 rockets in Bunker 73, and discovering almost immediately that some of these rockets were leaking nerve agent, moved them from Bunker 73 to the Pit.[24] UNSCOM did not confirm the movement from bunker 73 to the Pit.

Jan. 17, 1991: Operation Desert Storm Commenced with the Air Campaign. The amount of munitions possibly stored at Khamisiyah made it a significant military target. As a result, Coalition aircraft attacked Khamisiyah on six dates (Table 2),[25] destroying approximately 45 warehouses.[26]

Table 2.  Coalition aircraft strikes on Khamisiyah

Feb. 14, 1991: ARCENT directed XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps to plan to destroy all of Iraq’s military equipment. According to this directive (called "planning guidance"), ARCENT directed XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps to destroy all of Iraq’s military equipment within their respective sectors of Iraq. This extended beyond the simple destruction of enemy equipment encountered during the course of battle. It also included the systematic destruction of all captured or abandoned enemy equipment and the destruction of ammunition storage areas. ARCENT sent this directive 10 days before the Desert Storm ground campaign. It stated in part:

While in Iraq [the ARCENT Commander’s] intent is to destroy all Iraqi equipment, ammo and military supplies in the pursuit/destruction of the RGFC [Republic Guard Forces Command]. Although care will be taken to preclude civilian casualties, it is our intent to destroy in detail Iraqi forces in the Iraqi portion of the KTO.[27]

This destruction was called "demilitarization" and was aimed at eliminating Iraq’s military capabilities in southeastern Iraq.

Around Feb. 15, 1991: Iraq moved more than 6,000 artillery rounds filled with mustard agent to a Khamisiyah site. Iraq declared these 155mm artillery rounds to have been originally stored in Bunker 8 at An Nasiriyah ASP SW. Coalition aircraft had already destroyed several ammunition bunkers at this site. Iraq feared that additional air strikes might hit Bunker 8 and the mustard rounds. Consequently, Iraq moved the rounds to a desert site approximately 3 kilometers west of the Khamisiyah ASP. According to Iraqi declarations to the United Nations, Iraq moved the munitions from Bunker 8 over a one-week period around Feb. 15, 1991.[28] They placed the rounds in several areas under tarpaulins, using the surrounding terrain to hide them (Figure 12 shows some of the rounds as viewed by UNSCOM). Iraq later reported to UNSCOM that they moved 6,240 mustard rounds. However, the UNSCOM team actually counted 6,323 rounds.[29]

Figure 12. Iraqi 155mm mustard rounds at Khamisiyah

February 18, 1991: XVIII Airborne Corps requested assistance from ARCENT in planning for the destruction of Iraqi chemical munitions. XVIII Airborne Corps understood that the ARCENT directive to "destroy all Iraqi equipment, ammo and military supplies" included the destruction of any chemical munitions that they might find. They also knew that there were several suspected chemical munitions storage sites in their sector. Compliance with ARCENT guidance would require the prompt development of a plan for destroying the chemical munitions that they anticipated finding at these sites. However, XVIII Airborne Corps did not have the resources or the expertise to develop or implement such a plan and requested ARCENT assistance. Their message stated in part:

This message requests that contingency planning be initiated to provide XVIII Abn [Airborne] Corps technical assistance to neutralize Iraqi chemical or biological munitions stored at Tallil airfield (305604N0460536E), An Nasiriyah Storage Facility SW (30570N0461030E), and As Salman airfield (303930N443500E)…. Current intelligence indicates that Iraq may be using one or more bunkers at above facilities to store chemical or biological weapons (CBW). These facilities fall inside the Corps area of operations. The Corps does not plan to occupy Tallil AF [airfield] and An Nasiriyah Storage Facility with a ground force, but this intent could change based on the situation or on direction from higher headquarters. If required to neutralize CBW, the Corps will require technical assistance…. Request that: 1) ARCENT develop a CONPLAN [contingency plan] to cover the above eventualities; 2) ARCENT provide preliminary guidance on probable disposition directions....[30]

This message lists the three sites in the XVIII Airborne Corps sector where they believed chemical or biological weapons might be stored. Notably, Khamisiyah was not a suspected chemical weapons site.

This message is the first known instance during Desert Shield/Desert Storm of any unit specifically addressing the issue of destroying chemical weapons they might find on the battlefield. It was sent to ARCENT less than a week before the start of the Desert Storm ground campaign.

February 20, 1991: XVIII Airborne Corps document provided guidance for destroying military equipment, including chemical munitions. XVIII Airborne Corps published a 16-page manual, "Demilitarization of Iraqi Equipment,"[31] which was divided into several sections. With four days remaining before the start of the Desert Storm ground campaign, XVIII Airborne Corps had not yet received the guidance on handling chemical munitions it had requested from ARCENT. XVIII Airborne Corps did not want to risk waiting for guidance that might not arrive before the ground campaign began. Therefore, it published its own guidance[32] to enable its soldiers to identify and destroy the chemical (and other) munitions it expected to find. Each section provided instructions for destroying specific types of Iraqi military equipment. Section VII described procedures for identifying and handling conventional munitions. It stated in part:

Due to the large number of countries supplying ammunition to Iraq, it is difficult to determine if any standard Iraq [sic] color coding systems exist. A review of pictures from an arms display in Bagdad [sic] provided a look at color markings on Iraqi manufactured ammunition…. A positive identification of the ordnance ... must be obtained prior to any disposal procedure ... EOD personnel must be involved in the identification, collection and disposal of all foreign ordnance.[33]

Section VIII of the document dealt specifically with the identification and handling of chemical munitions.

Do not attempt to destroy chemical munitions without guidance or authorization. Report all known or suspected chemical munitions to higher headquarters immediately…. At this time, there are no known markings/color scheme on Iraqi chemical and biological munitions.... Therefore, if munitions do not match the markings outlined in section VII, assume munitions are chemical.[34]

This manual emphasized the potential difficulty in identifying chemical munitions or conventional munitions based on external markings. It directed soldiers to assume that all munitions that they could not positively identify as conventional were chemical. It also emphasized that EOD must be involved in all aspects of identifying and disposing of all munitions. All XVIII Airborne Corps units were on the distribution list for this manual. However, none of the engineers we interviewed who participated in the demolition operations at Khamisiyah remember seeing it.[35]

February 23, 1991

A CIA message indicated there may be a chemical weapons storage site at Khamisiyah. The CIA sent a cable to its support elements in Saudi Arabia. It reported that a human source (believed to be in the Iranian Air Force or a related industry) indicated that chemical weapons may be stored at the following geographic coordinates: latitude 30�47' north, longitude 46�22' east (Figure 13).[36] These coordinates are approximately 5 kilometers from the Khamisiyah ASP and only 2 kilometers from the site where the Iraqis stored the mustard rounds from An Nasiriyah ASP SW. Thus, the message may have referred to either one of these sites. The CIA stated that this report was immediately made available to USCENTCOM and some subordinate US military elements in Riyadh.[37] This was the first known instance of intelligence passed to US forces in the Gulf that indicated the possibility of chemical weapons at Khamisiyah. We have not located military documentation  in USCENTCOM records that indicates that they received this information, or (if they did) they passed it to subordinate units.  At the time of our first Khamisiyah narrative publication, we thought this CIA cable was related to the February 26 XVIII Airborne Corps message warning of possible chemical munitions on Objective Gold (see February 26, 1991, entry).  Subsequent interviews revealed no connection between the CIA cable and the XVIII Airborne Corps message.

Figure 13. Mustard rounds and possible chemical munitions storage sites

Commander, US Army, Central Command (COMUSARCENT) published guidance for identifying and handling Iraq’s suspected chemical munitions. This brief message pointed out the potential difficulty in identifying these munitions. It described the possible marking schemes of some chemical munitions, but left open the possibility that chemical munitions might be marked in other—unspecified—ways. It stated in part:

Units who [sic] capture or find munitions suspected of being chemical/biological will not handle, move, or destroy them. Units will mark the location and, if possible, secure the area and identify the location to supporting EOD teams. Chemical munitions may be difficult to identify. Some are marked with gold, yellow, green or blue bands and may be stored with conventional munitions.[38]

February 24, 1991

Desert Storm Ground Campaign began. At 0400 hours local time, Coalition ground forces advanced north across the Saudi Arabia border into Iraq and Kuwait, beginning the 100-hour ground campaign of Desert Storm.[39]

US Commander in Chief Central Command (USCINCCENT) published guidance for handling Iraq’s chemical munitions. USCINCCENT developed a message in response to queries from lower echelons about the proper handling of chemical munitions. This message provided instructions to all US forces in the KTO concerning the proper disposition of Iraqi chemical munitions. It stated in part:

Captured indirect fire munitions (mortar, artillery or rocket warheads) in calibers greater than 120mm [emphasis added]… will not be moved or destroyed prior to an evaluation by an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team…. US units capturing systems capable of delivering chemical munitions and possessing either prepared or stored munitions will secure and report the location. The area will be secured, either by the capturing unit or by follow-on forces, until an EOD team is able to determine whether chemical/biological munitions have been captured.[40]

This message directed soldiers to treat all weapons that were even capable of delivering chemical munitions as if they were chemical weapons until EOD personnel could confirm otherwise. Thus, soldiers only needed to be able to recognize which munitions or weapons were 120mm or greater and to treat these as chemical munitions until EOD could identify them otherwise.

Some of Iraq’s weapon systems were capable of delivering several different kinds of munitions. For example, their 122mm rockets at Khamisiyah could deliver either high explosives or chemical warfare agents. According to the instructions in this message, the soldiers who would eventually find these rockets at Khamisiyah were to regard them as chemical munitions until EOD personnel could determine otherwise. The USCENTCOM J5 (Policy) staff wrote this message at the request of the USCENTCOM chemical officer.[41] The request came fewer than four days before the beginning of the ground campaign, and USCENTCOM developed the guidance quickly so they could send it before US forces entered Iraq. The policy staff developed this guidance from supporting documentation stating that "Iraqi chemical/biological munitions are not marked for identification."[42] The guidance in the message is consistent with this statement, though the statement itself does not appear in the message.

Although USCENTCOM prepared the message as quickly as possible, USCENTCOM did not transmit it until about 12 hours after the Desert Storm ground campaign began. It was sent only to ARCENT and four other USCENTCOM subordinate headquarters. Thus, no Army combat unit that had already advanced north into Iraq received this message from USCENTCOM.

February 25, 1991: ARCENT assigned EOD units to identify and destroy all of Iraq’s chemical munitions found in the KTO. The ARCENT plan provided all ARCENT units with guidance on post-war operations. Annex V of the plan directed the activities of EOD units. It stated in part: x

EOD is responsible for the detection, identification, field evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of all UXOs [unexploded ordnance] to include conventional explosives, chemical/biological weapons and nuclear munitions.[43]

February 26, 1991

XVIII Airborne Corps accident: seven soldiers die. The soldiers were engineers from the 27th Engineer Battalion (part of the 20th Engineer Brigade and a sister unit to the 37th Engineer Battalion). They died in an accidental explosion while preparing US unexploded munitions found at the As Salman Airfield (170 kilometers southwest of Khamisiyah) for demolition. In this single incident, XVIII Airborne Corps suffered one-third of its Desert Storm combat casualties. This widely reported incident was a tragic reminder of the extreme danger inherent in the task of handling munitions of any kind and engendered greater caution during subsequent operations.

XVIII Airborne Corps message warned of possible chemicals on Objective Gold. At 8:48 AM, 55 hours into the ground campaign, the XVIII Airborne Corps Tactical Operations Center transmitted a message to the 24th Infantry Division and the 101st Air Assault Division. The message read in part:

Subject: Possible Chemicals on OBJ GOLD

Enemy is departing vic[inity] OBJ[ective] GOLD in 2 directions, NW [northwest] and SE [southeast]. It is possible that we have hit chemical munitions, and enemy is fleeing as quickly as possible. Lead with Fox vehicles when entering area.[44]

The Persian Gulf Investigation Team discovered this message during the initial phase of DoD’s investigation. In early 1997, many analysts from DoD and CIA incorrectly concluded that this message provided a strong indication that the XVIII Airborne Corps knew that Khamisiyah might be a chemical weapons storage site (even before demolition operations began there.) The two key assumptions, which were the basis of this belief, are analyzed below:

• Objective Gold and the Khamisiyah ASP were one and the same; and
• The statement that US forces may indeed have "hit" chemical warfare weapons at Objective Gold should be taken at face value.

Were Objective Gold and the Khamisiyah ASP one and the same? USCENTCOM selected the location of Objective Gold for its access to Highway 8, not its proximity to Khamisiyah. During the Desert Storm ground campaign, US forces had no desire to seize or occupy enemy ammunition depots, however large. In fact, doing so would have diverted large forces and caused needless delays.

Did US forces "hit" chemical warfare weapons at Objective Gold? The XVIII Airborne Corps intended this message to alert soldiers to the possibility of chemical munitions at Objective Gold. US soldiers were alert to any indicators of the presence of chemical weapons. As the message itself indicates, this particular alert was based only on reports of movement. The message does not refer to any other indicators of chemical warfare agent exposure such as enemy casualties, decontamination activity, or chemical warfare agent detection. The tactical operations center sent the message without waiting for firm or conclusive evidence that chemical weapons were actually there.

This message served its purpose as an alert and was not intended to provide a firm basis for suspecting Objective Gold as a location of chemical warfare weapons. The assessment in the message did not take into account the alternative reason that, by this time, 55 hours into the ground campaign, large numbers of Iraq’s forces had indeed begun to flee southeastern Iraq and Kuwait to escape attacking Coalition ground forces. Iraqi forces were attempting to escape along Highway 8, which runs in a northwest-southeast direction directly through Objective Gold.

Subsequent investigation and interviews of the soldiers who produced this message revealed that they had no specific intelligence information indicating that Khamisiyah was a possible chemical weapons storage site. The soldiers who produced this message believe that since the activity in the report emphasized movement, the original source of this information was probably a Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System aircraft and not ground reconnaissance.[45,46]

The 24th Infantry Division reached Objective Gold. By late evening, the 24th Infantry Division reached Objective Gold, attacking to the edge of the Nahr al Man’ayah Canal, on the bank opposite the Khamisiyah ASP.

LTC [Lieutenant Colonel] John Craddock maneuvered his 4-64th Armor Battalion [of the 24th Infantry Division] toward a canal north of Highway 8.... Continuing north, the battalion overran a huge, untouched ammunition storage area and pushed the beaten Iraqis protecting the facility into the weeds near the canal.[47]

The "huge, untouched ammunition storage area" was the Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Depot South. Task Force 4-64 overwhelmed enemy opposition, and thus achieved military control of Objective Gold and the surrounding area, to include the Khamisiyah ASP. However, they did not enter or occupy the Khamisiyah ASP. Upon reaching the canal, they turned east and continued the attack.[48]

February 27, 1991

Ground operations. The 24th Infantry Division continued rapidly eastward along Highway 8 to cut off Iraq’s forces attempting to escape from Kuwait and southeast Iraq. The 82nd Airborne Division followed behind the 24th Infantry Division, clearing areas of enemy opposition that the 24th Infantry Division initially bypassed.

XVIII Airborne Corps published guidance for identifying and handling captured chemical munitions. The XVIII Airborne Corps derived this guidance from the February 23rd ARCENT message. The message does not refer to USCENTCOM guidance issued three days earlier, which told soldiers to disregard munitions markings for recognition of chemical weapons and to base chemical weapon determination on size. Instead, it reiterates the uncertainty of the ARCENT message about chemical weapons markings:

Chemical munitions may be difficult to identify. Some are possibly marked with gold, yellow, green or blue bands. Other marking schemes and/or patterns may exist. CW/BW [chemical weapons/biological weapons] may be stored with conventional munitions.[49]

This message indicates that XVIII Airborne Corps leaders knew of the potential difficulty that soldiers may have in recognizing chemical munitions while conducting demolition operations. XVIII Airborne Corps did not revise its guidance until March 9th to incorporate the February 24th USCINCCENT guidance and ARCENT’s revised guidance of March 6th.

XVIII Airborne Corps message directed 82nd Airborne Division to begin demolition operations. The XVIII Airborne Corps called the area it would occupy in southern Iraq, Area of Operations Bragg (Figure 14). It encompassed Tallil airfield and An Nasiriyah ASP SW to the northwest, Khamisiyah in the middle, and Jalibah airfield to the southeast. On February 27, 1991, at 9:30 PM local time, XVIII Airborne Corps published Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 74, which directed the 82nd Airborne Division to "clear enemy forces from Area of Operations Bragg and destroy all equipment" commencing by 10:00 AM on February 28, 1991.[50]

Figure 14. Area of Operations Bragg

February 28, 1991

Offensive operations ceased. As 82nd Airborne Division units moved to their assigned sectors in Area of Operations Bragg,[51] the XVIII Airborne Corps repeated USCENTCOM commander’s announcement that offensive operations would end effective 8:00 AM on February 28, 1991.[52]

XVIII Airborne Corps message indicated possible marking scheme of Iraq’s chemical munitions. XVIII Airborne Corps transmitted a message to all Corps units at 7:00 AM on February 28 stating:

Iraqi chemical munitions are color-coded as follows:

• Red signifies nerve agent.
• Yellow signifies blister agent.
• Green signifies phosgene.
• 1 or 3 rings of red indicates VX/Tabun/Sarin/Soman.
• 1 or 3 rings of yellow indicates Blister.
• 1 or 3 rings of green indicator [sic] non-persistent.

This information should be disseminated to all personnel involved with destruction of enemy equipment, munitions, and military facilities.[53]

The message definitively associated specific colors with specific types of chemical munitions, but did not address the possibility that other markings for chemical munitions may be used, or that some chemical munitions may not have been marked at all.

XVIII Airborne Corps sent this message to all its units, to include the 20th Engineer Brigade. Within two hours, the 20th Engineer Brigade received it and passed it to its subordinate engineer battalions. This included the 37th Engineer Battalion, which would soon perform demolition operations at Khamisiyah.[54]

US soldiers could not safely destroy Iraqi munitions unless they could first distinguish chemical munitions from conventional munitions.  By the last day of the ground war, XVIII Airborne Corps soldiers had received much ambiguous information about Iraq's chemical munitions markings:

• "There are no known markings" XVIII Airborne Corps handbook;
• "Some are marked with gold, green, or blue bands" ARCENT message;
• "Iraqi chemical munitions are color-coded" XVIII Airborne Corps message.

Table 3 shows a summary of changes to command-level guidance regarding procedures for soldiers to use when encountering potential chemical or biological warfare munitions on the battlefield.

Table 3. Guidance for Chemical Munitions

USCENTCOM message to ARCENT identified 17 sites—including the Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Area—as possible chemical weapons storage sites. In this message, USCENTCOM requested that ARCENT survey 17 locations to determine whether or not they contained chemical or biological weapons.[55] This message identified the Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Area [Khamisiyah ASP] and Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Depot South as two of the possible chemical weapons storage sites. USCENTCOM sent this message to ARCENT three days before the first demolition operations at Khamisiyah. In the message, USCENTCOM asked ARCENT to report the results of these site surveys by 12:00 noon on March 4, 1991.

Intelligence analysts at USCENTCOM developed this list of 17 sites from intelligence they collected during the air and ground war, as well as from information received from strategic-level intelligence agencies.[56]  USCENTCOM analysts based their analytical assessment that the Khamisiyah ASP might be a chemical weapons storage site on the ASP’s very large size and their suspicion that it might be a special weapons storage site.[57] Similarly, USCENTCOM analysts may also have selected Tall al Lahm Storage Depot South as a possible chemical weapons storage site because of its size, as well as its proximity to elite Republican Guard Special Forces. Table 4 shows the 17 sites according to CIA's categories of Large Storage Sites, Republican Guard Field Storage Sites, and Other Sites.   Nevertheless, US soldiers did not find any chemical weapons there, nor did Iraq later declare to UNSCOM that chemical munitions had been stored there.[58]

Table 4. Suspected chemcial/biological storage sites [59]

DIA message identified 12-frame storage bunkers at Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Area (the Khamisiyah ASP). DIA sent a message stating that 12-frame bunkers were at Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Area. It stated that 12-frame storage bunkers "have a BW [biological warfare] association," but emphasized that "the number of twelve frame bunkers in Iraq is so large as to suggest roles in addition to BW storage. They could include storage for chemical, fuel air explosives, and sensitive electronics for weapons."[60] In other words, DIA indicated that Iraq may not have used 12-frame bunkers exclusively for the storage of biological warfare munitions. Interviews with hundreds of personnel revealed that no engineers or EOD soldiers reported seeing any differently constructed bunkers at Khamisiyah.

This section describes the key events of U.S. demolition operations at Khamisiyah occurring after the cease-fire on Feb. 28, 1991. The events are divided into two time periods: from March 1 to March 23, 1991, and from March 24 to April 7, 1991 (Figure 15). These events cover demolition operations conducted after the cease-fire by U.S. forces at Khamisiyah, planning and intelligence affecting the demolition operations, and the general activities of U.S. forces after the cease-fire that affected demolition operations.

Figure 15. Demolition operations time period

1. From March 1 to March 23: XVII Airborne Corps Operations

Overview of XVIII Airborne Corps Operations. After the cease-fire, XVIII Airborne Corps’ 82nd Airborne Division maintained occupation of Area of Operations Bragg. As a result of the cease-fire, Coalition forces established a military demarcation line to separate Coalition and Iraqi forces in southern Iraq. The primary mission of the 82nd Airborne Division was to enforce the terms of the cease-fire agreement. Each of the three infantry brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division was responsible for a specific sector along the military demarcation line. During this period, engineers from the 82nd Airborne Division and from XVIII Airborne Corps conducted demolition operations in and around Khamisiyah. Key units from the 82nd Airborne Division and other units most involved in operations in the Khamisiyah area (Figure 16) were:

• 3rd Brigade (Includes 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment): One of the three principal combat infantry brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 3rd Brigade had the primary responsibility for the sector in which Khamisiyah was located. The 3rd Brigade was also responsible for ensuring Iraq’s compliance with the cease-fire agreement in its sector. One of its subordinate battalions, the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, conducted the initial reconnaissance of Khamisiyah, along with the 307th Engineer Battalion.
• 307th Engineer Battalion: The 307th Engineer Battalion conducted the initial reconnaissance of the Khamisiyah ASP for the 82nd Airborne Division and performed demolition of the warehouses at the Khamisiyah ASP and the revetments of Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Depot South.
• 92nd Chemical Platoon: Although not an 82nd Airborne Division unit, the 92nd Chemical Platoon supported the 82nd Airborne Division during demolition operations at Khamisiyah. It had six Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicles.
• 60th EOD Detachment: The 60th EOD Detachment was an ARCENT-allocated unit that was assigned to support the 82nd Airborne Division during demolition operations at Khamisiyah. It was responsible for identifying and handling all munitions at Khamisiyah.
• 37th Engineer Battalion: The 37th Engineer Battalion was an XVIII Airborne Corps-allocated unit assigned to support the 82nd Airborne Division during demolition operations at Khamisiyah. It performed demolition of bunkers at the Khamisiyah ASP and the Pit. The 37th Engineer Battalion consisted of one headquarters company (providing administrative and staff support) and three line companies (A, B, and C).

Figure 16. 82nd Airborne Division organization

None of the soldiers we interviewed from the 82nd Airborne Division or their attached units (including commanders and key staff members) knew that the Intelligence Community had previously identified Khamisiyah as a possible chemical weapons storage site. Nevertheless, units used higher mission oriented protective posture levels when they initially entered the bunkers to conduct their surveys,[61] and they used chemical warfare agent alarms (M8A1s) and chemical detection test kits (M256A1s) throughout the time they were at Khamisiyah. The soldiers working in and around Khamisiyah generally did not wear chemical protective clothing, but did carry their chemical protective masks.

XVIII Airborne Corps soldiers searched the bunkers and warehouses at Khamisiyah on several occasions during their occupation. They searched during the initial reconnaissance activities of the first few days, and later in preparation for demolitions. Engineers and EOD specialists searched the bunkers for chemical munitions, as well as to determine the type and amount of ammunition they were about to destroy.[62]

We found no detailed inventories of the contents of the bunkers or warehouses. However, the 307th Engineer Battalion compiled an aggregate inventory of the bunkers, and the 37th Engineer Battalion, which arrived later, made a videotape showing the interior of some of the bunkers (Figure 17).[63,64]

Figure 17. Inspection of Bunker; picture from 37th Engineer Battalion videotape

In a report written several weeks later (March 23, 1991), the 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer reported that the 82nd Airborne Division and associated engineer units took active measures to detect chemical warfare agents at Khamisiyah. He also affirmed that they detected no chemical warfare agent contamination and found no chemical munitions.[65]

March 1, 1991

The 82nd Airborne Division began post-cease-fire security operations near Khamisiyah. Soldiers from the 3rd Brigade conducted a security sweep of their entire sector, including the Khamisiyah ASP. During this sweep, the soldiers encountered some resistance from Iraqi soldiers and some local civilians who were looting the bunkers and warehouses inside the Khamisiyah ASP. Keeping Iraqi civilians out of the ASP was a recurring task for U.S. forces throughout their occupation of Khamisiyah. Once the sweep was completed, 3rd Brigade soldiers maintained security checkpoints in their sector.

Engineers from the 307th Engineer Battalion surveyed Khamisiyah for demolition operations. When elements of the 307th Engineer Battalion surveyed the Khamisiyah ASP, they were already planning the demolition operations at An Nasiriyah ASP SW, Tallil airfield, and Jalibah airfield. Therefore, they requested additional engineer support to conduct the demolitions at Khamisiyah. Subsequently, XVIII Airborne Corps’ 20th Engineer Brigade tasked the 937th Engineer Group to provide a battalion in direct support.[66,67]  The 937th Engineer Group then tasked the 37th Engineer Battalion to support the 82nd Airborne Division.[68]

March 2, 1991

Lead element of 37th Engineer Battalion arrived at Khamisiyah to prepare for demolition operations. This element consisted of the battalion commander, the executive officer, two intelligence noncommissioned officers, and one platoon from Company C, 37th Engineer Battalion. Upon arrival, they conducted a reconnaissance of Khamisiyah, based on an ASP mock-up (Figure 18), to determine the number of bunkers and amount of munitions for demolition.[69]

Figure 18. Khamisiyah ASP mock-up; picture courtesy of 37th Engineer Battalion operations officer

XVIII Airborne Corps report documented wide-scale destruction of Iraqi equipment and supplies that had begun. Once combat operations ceased, XVIII Airborne Corps reported in a March 2, 1991, situation report[70] that its units discovered numerous large complexes containing weapons, ammunition, and other materiel. The 24th Infantry Division had bypassed these areas during the ground campaign to maintain momentum. However, XVIII Airborne Corps had now begun to clear these complexes, and the enormity of the task was only beginning to become apparent.

March 3, 1991

Report of the chemical contamination of a VII Corps soldier prompted XVIII Airborne Corps to reevaluate chemical protective precautions. USCENTCOM forwarded a report to XVIII Airborne Corps that a VII Corps soldier had been exposed to mustard agent while searching an Iraqi ammunition storage bunker near Kuwait.[71] Word of the exposure spread rapidly. The next day, XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters sent the following message to its subordinate units, warning of the potential danger and recommending protective precautions:

SUBJECT: Suspected Chemical Agent Contamination

1. The purpose of this message is to remind XVIII Airborne Corps soldiers to take extra precautions when approaching or working around suspected chemical munitions.
2. [A message to XVIII Airborne Corps] disclosed that a VII Corps soldier is suspected of having been exposed to chemical contamination ....
3. In light of the suspected chemical agent contamination that occurred in the VII Corps sector, recommend units reevaluate their current chemical defense posture when clearing ammunition stockpiles and bunkers. Measures that should be considered include, though not limited to increased MOPP level and continuous chemical agent monitoring at the site. If a soldier is suspected of being contaminated by chemical agent, he must seek immediate medical attention.[72]

37th Engineer Battalion elements arrived at Khamisiyah. The 37th Engineer Battalion’s combat engineer elements and two teams (three soldiers each) from the 60th EOD Detachment arrived at Khamisiyah. With their arrival, the battalion was ready to begin demolition operations.[73] About half of the 37th Engineer Battalion soldiers remained in an assembly area south of Khamisiyah and were never part of the demolition operations at Khamisiyah.

The 37th Engineer Battalion had M8A1 chemical agent alarms mounted on various vehicles as they entered Khamisiyah ASP. Soldiers reported that these alarms were operational.[74] The battalion's chemical noncommissioned officer (NCO), wearing full mission oriented protective posture (MOPP-4)[75,76] clothing, checked some of the bunkers for chemical agents using M256 chemical detection kits. These checks proved negative.

The soldiers of the 37th Engineer Battalion examined the bunkers they were assigned to destroy the following day (Figure 19), noting the construction of the bunkers, and the type and amount of munitions they would destroy. At 3:40 PM, 37th engineers, under the supervision of EOD technicians, destroyed two bunkers, Bunker 98 and Bunker 99, (Figure 20) to test the demolition techniques they planned to use in the major demolition the following day.[77]

Figure 19. Khamisiyah ASP bunker entrance; picture from 37th Engineer Battalion videotape

Figure 20. Result of demolition test; picture from 37th Engineer Battalion videotape

March 4, 1991

The 37th Engineers conducted the first large-scale demolition at Khamisiyah. The 37th Engineer Battalion prepared 38 of the approximately 100 bunkers in the Khamisiyah ASP for demolition that day. The demolition destroyed 37 of these bunkers. One of these was Bunker 73, which Iraq indicated to UNSCOM later in October 1991 had contained 122mm rockets filled with the chemical warfare agents sarin and cyclosarin.[78]

7:00 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.: EOD specialists and engineers inventoried the bunkers at Khamisiyah and prepared them for demolition. The 37th Engineer Battalion operations officer assigned Companies A, B, and C to inventory 38 bunkers and to prepare them for demolition. [79,80]The EOD technicians assisted the engineers in both tasks.

Bunker Inventory. Engineers inventoried the bunkers to determine the type and amount of munitions that they were about to destroy and to search for chemical munitions. When the 37th Engineer Battalion soldiers compiled these inventories, they did not open every box and crate. Rather, they opened several boxes of ammunition, inspected their contents (Figure 21), and then extrapolated the type and quantity of ammunition in other boxes of identical shape and markings. The soldiers that inventoried the bunkers do not recall seeing any large 8-9 foot long crates in which the 122mm rockets would have been stored.[81]

Figure 21. Interior of bunker during inventory; picture from 37th Engineer Battalion videotape

The 60th EOD technicians had briefed the engineers about the special markings they expected to find on Iraq’s chemical weapons-they believed that Iraq’s chemical munitions would be distinctively marked as shown in EOD training manuals and pamphlets. Consequently, inspectors thought they could readily distinguish them from conventional munitions. According to the 60th EOD executive officer, these markings included various colored bands around the munitions and Cyrillic or Arabic writing indicating that they were chemical.[82,83]

The engineers used these identification criteria in the course of their inventory searching for chemical weapons. According to the Commander, Company C, 37th Engineer Battalion, "the explosive ordnance guys came through and said, here's what [kind of ammunition] you're looking at. These are safe to destroy."[84] Another soldier stated: "We were to look for yellow bands on the ammunition for chemical. I went in bunkers specifically looking for that and didn’t find any."[85]

Subsequent investigations by UNSCOM indicated that none of the chemical warfare agent-filled 122mm rockets they were shown at Khamisiyah had any distinctive markings that identified them as chemical.[86]

Preparations for demolition. After the engineers finished conducting the inventories, they prepared the bunkers for demolition. Again, EOD technicians provided technical assistance to the engineers who performed this task.

Once the engineers completed preparing the bunkers for demolition, all soldiers withdrew to an observation point approximately 3 - 4 kilometers northwest of the ASP in consideration of a crossing wind, assuming it to be a safe distance from which to observe the demolition (Figure 22).

Figure 22. Observation areas for March 4th demolition

Approximately 300 engineers and EOD technicians participated in the demolition at the ASP, while approximately 770 additional soldiers from the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, secured the area. The 450th Civil Affairs Battalion (of the XVIII Airborne Corps) used loudspeakers to warn civilians to stay away.[87]

Company A, 307th Engineer Battalion arrived at Khamisiyah. As the 37th Engineer Battalion completed their preparatory work for the demolition, Company A of the 307th Engineer Battalion arrived at Khamisiyah. Company A had completed its mission at Jalibah and would work with the 37th Engineer battalion on its subsequent demolitions at Khamisiyah.

12:00 Noon: Deadline passed for ARCENT to complete surveys of the 17 suspected chemical sites (see the February 28 entry of this narrative). We have found no evidence of any XVIII Airborne Corps or ARCENT response to the February 28, 1991 USCENTCOM message by the noon deadline. In fact, USCENTCOM did not receive a response until April 1, from VII Corps.[88] We do not know a reason for this delay.

2:05 PM: Demolition in the Khamisiyah ASP. With the weather clear and the prevailing winds blowing from the southwest to the northeast,[89] units for miles around observed a rapid sequence of large explosions. Within minutes of the first detonation (Figure 23), debris and "flyouts" (munitions that were thrown out from the explosion without detonating) began to fall among the soldiers at the observation points and elsewhere, posing a significant hazard.[90] The explosions created huge columns of dust and smoke, which the prevailing winds carried away from the soldiers at the observation points (Figures 24 and 25). The debris were thrown several kilometers in all directions, causing the engineers to reposition as far away as 12 kilometers from the ASP. Munitions continued to explode throughout the evening.  The next day EOD discovered that the demolition destroyed 37 of the 38 bunkers; the explosives in Bunker 92 failed to detonate due to a bad timer.[91]

Figure 23. First bunker demolition on March 4th; picture from 37th Engineer Battalion videotape

Figure 24.  Continuing demolition on March 4th at Khamisiyah (from 307th Engineer Battalion observation point, looking southeast)

Figure 25. Fully developed March 4th demolition cloud; picture from 37th Engineer Battalion videotape

2:45 PM: Chemical alarm sounded. At 2:45 PM, an M8A1 chemical detection alarm sounded in Company B, 37th Engineer Battalion’s area of the observation point.[92] On hearing the alarm, the soldiers in Company B immediately put on their chemical protective clothing, as did some soldiers from other units around the observation point. Others only put on their masks.[93] The four engineer companies as well as the two EOD teams each performed tests with the M256 chemical agent detection kit. [94,95] Typically, an NCO who had additional specialized training in chemical warfare would perform these tests. All chemical detection tests yielded negative results for chemical warfare agents (i.e., no chemical warfare agents detected) except for the following two instances. This information was obtained from personal interviews of participants.  We found no reports of this M8 alarm incident.

• When first interviewed, the chemical NCO of Company B, 37th Engineer Battalion stated that the results of the first test he performed were negative—meaning that no chemical agents were detected. The commander of Company B, who observed the chemical NCO performing this test, confirmed this result. However, in a later interview, the chemical NCO stated that he got slightly positive or weak results when performing the first tests. (Note: The chemistry used in the M256 detection kit produces only "positive" or "negative" results for hazardous concentrations of chemical warfare agent.) The chemical NCO performed a third follow-on test that yielded negative results.[96,97]
• The chemical NCO from Company A, 37th Engineer Battalion stated that the first test he performed yielded slightly positive results for the chemical warfare agent sarin, but that the second test was negative.[98]

After performing these tests and conducting unmasking procedures, the soldiers removed their masks and chemical protective clothing. Medical personnel in XVIII Airborne Corps reported that during and after Desert Storm they did not observe any symptoms of chemical warfare agent exposure or any other health problems.[99] The Department of the Army Inspector General reported that "no soldiers, civilians, or animals anywhere in the KTO showed any suspicious symptoms that might be associated with a chemical warfare agent release at Khamisiyah."[100]

The intelligence staff NCO of the 37th Engineer Battalion and his assistant reported that shortly after the explosion they saw "a dog running across [an] open area [that started] circling and dropped dead." [101,102] In follow-on interviews, the two individuals said that the dog did not display any symptoms consistent with nerve agent exposure.[103] The 37th Engineer Battalion videotape of the March 4, 1991, demolition shows several dogs running across the terrain without any obvious health effects from the ongoing explosions.

By this stage of the Gulf War, the soldiers experiences in the KTO taught them that many things common to their environment, such as blowing dust and vehicle exhaust, frequently caused the alarms to sound. Therefore, they generally did not regard the sounding of the chemical alarm as proof of the presence of chemical agents.

March 5, 1991

82nd Airborne Division commander delays further demolition operations at Khamisiyah. The extensive flyouts from the previous day’s demolition raised serious safety concerns and called into question the effectiveness of their demolition techniques. The 82nd Airborne Division commander postponed further operations to move nearby units further away and to re-evaluate the demolition techniques to minimize flyouts.[104] Heavy rains that morning caused many vehicles to become stuck, further delaying operations.

In the afternoon, the 60th EOD teams re-entered the ASP to examine the results of the previous day's demolition. They found that one of the 38 bunkers prepared for demolition (Bunker 92) did not explode. The engineers reset the explosives at Bunker 92 and destroyed it without incident.[105] After surveying the results of the previous day's demolition, engineer and EOD technicians decided to try a different technique to destroy the remaining bunkers. [106,107]

The 82nd Airborne Division engineer assigned Company A of the 307th Engineer Battalion the mission to destroy approximately 45 warehouses (not destroyed during the air campaign) in the northwest portion of the Khamisiyah ASP.[108]

The March 5 XVIII Airborne Corps situation report noted that the 82nd Airborne Division destroyed ammunition storage areas at Jalibah and Tallil airfields, but did not mention Khamisiyah.[109]

March 6, 1991

Soldiers conducted a limited test of revised demolition techniques. On the recommendation of EOD personnel, each of the A, B, and C Companies of the 37th Engineer Battalion and Company A of the 307th Engineer Battalion attempted to destroy a bunker by implosion. This involved placing demolitions on the columns of the bunkers, which would cave in the roof and crush the munitions under the rubble of the bunker. After the demolition, engineers inspected the bunkers and determined that this revised technique did not cause enough destruction to the munitions inside the bunkers. They decided to return to the original explosion technique but to increase the amount of explosives used.[110] They also connected the explosives on all the bunkers into a circuit that would create one large, simultaneous explosion instead of numerous individual ones. [111]

March 7-9, 1991

Weather delayed demolitions; operations officer found 122mm rockets in Pit. While poor weather delayed demolition operations, soldiers conducted demolition training and rehearsals, and inventoried the remaining bunkers and warehouses.

On March 9, 1991, the operations officer of the 37th Engineer Battalion found 122mm rockets in a large excavated area, later known as the Pit (Figure 26), located about 3 kilometers from the southeast corner of the ASP.[112,113] Iraq stored all the rockets at the Pit in wooden crates arranged in stacks approximately head height.[114]

Figure 26. Location of the Pit

Investigators’ analysis of the photos[115] of the Pit (Figure 27) determined that there were 13 separate stacks of crates which they later calculated to total approximately 1,250 rockets. The commander assigned the 60th EOD Detachment and the 37th Engineer Battalion intelligence staff to prepare these munitions for demolition.[116] (Note: Seven months later, Iraq showed UN inspectors the Pit containing 122mm chemical rockets, some of which were verified to be filled with nerve agents, that had been heaped into four piles.[117])

Figure 27. Pre-demolition imagery of the 600m x 150m Pit, showing the 13 stacks of rockets

March 10, 1991

Engineers conducted second large-scale demolition at Khamisiyah.

7:00 AM - 4:00 PM: Engineers and EOD technicians prepared for demolition. Engineers and EOD technicians made extensive preparations to demolish approximately 40 bunkers and 45 warehouses in the Khamisiyah ASP, and the 122mm rockets found in the Pit.

• Bunkers: Soldiers from the 37th Engineer Battalion prepared most of the remaining bunkers in the Khamisiyah ASP for demolition.[118] The engineers did not destroy bunkers that were empty or that were filled with small-caliber ammunition.[119]
• Warehouses: Company A, 307th Engineer Battalion inventoried and prepared approximately 45 ammunition warehouses in the Khamisiyah ASP for demolition.[120]
• The Pit: Soldiers from the 37th Engineer Battalion and 60th EOD Detachment prepared the 13 stacks of crated rockets in the Pit for demolition. EOD personnel and engineers inventoried these rockets using random samples as previously mentioned. None of the rockets in the Pit had the distinctive markings that EOD personnel associated with chemical munitions. Therefore, EOD technicians assessed that none of these rockets contained chemical agents.[121]

Two of the soldiers who worked in the Pit recall they saw or placed explosive charges on all stacks of rockets.[122,123] Other soldiers working in the Pit recall they personally prepared only some of the 13 stacks for demolition.[124,125] The 60th EOD executive officer stated that the rockets in the stacks did not face the same direction. Therefore, when an explosive charge was placed on the warhead of one missile (the preferred mode of destruction), it could be only inches away from the motor (at the rear) of the missile beside it. This increased the chance of igniting the motor and launching the missile, increasing the risk of flyouts during the demolition.

4:00 PM: Engineers detonated bunkers, warehouses, and the rockets in the Pit [126]. A 60th EOD incident journal entry on March 12th indicated that the demolitions destroyed 840 5-inch (i.e., 122mm) rockets at geographic coordinates that correspond to the ASP, not the Pit.[127] Subsequent interviews have determined that the 60th EOD made this log entry from memory and was inaccurate, since the demolition actually occurred on March 10.[128]

At the time of the detonation, the visibility was hazy with the wind blowing from the north-northwest to the south-southeast.[129] None of the soldiers interviewed could recall, or had specifically noted, that weather conditions at this time were other than hazy with some wind.

The 37th Engineer Battalion departed Iraq for Saudi Arabia. The 37th Engineer Battalion observation point for the demolition on March 10, 1991, was south of Khamisiyah on Highway 8, approximately 20 - 30 minutes travel time by vehicle from the ASP. Once personnel from the 37th Engineer Battalion heard the explosions, they proceeded to their tactical assembly area in Saudi Arabia.[130]

March 11 - 12, 1991: Company C of the 307th Engineer Battalion had completed operations around Tallil Airfield and joined Company A near Khamisiyah. When Company C arrived near Khamisiyah, elements of two companies of the 307th Engineer Battalion observed the destruction in the Pit (Figure 28) and identified additional ammunition stores southwest of the Khamisiyah ASP (Figure 29), described as "another enemy bunker complex of more than 400 revetted bunkers [three-sided, earth-mounded berms] with large caches inside."[131] This large complex was the Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Depot South.

Figure 28. One stack of 122mm rockets in the Pit after demolition; picture courtesy of Commander, 307th Engineer Battalion

Figure 29. Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Area South

March 15 - 20, 1991: The 307th Engineer Battalion conducted demolition operations at the Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Depot South. For several days, Companies A and C, 307th Engineer Battalion prepared munitions in the revetments for demolition (Figure 30). On March 20, 1991, at approximately 3:30 PM, engineers from 307th Engineer Battalion destroyed approximately 400 ammunition bunkers at the ammunition depot.[132]

Figure 30. Soldiers preparing munitions for demolition in a revetment; picture courtesy of Commander, 307^th Engineer Battalion

March 21 - 23 1991

XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps conduct transition operations. From March 21 to 23, 1991, XVIII Airborne Corps units (82nd Airborne Division) in southern Iraq prepared to leave their positions and return to Saudi Arabia, while VII Corps units (2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment) prepared to replace the XVIII Airborne Corps. A transition period lasting several days preceded the replacement (called a "relief in place").[133] During this period, key staff members from the 2nd ACR met with their 82nd Airborne Division counterparts. The meetings between staff counterparts consisted of briefings, interviews, and terrain-walks of the 82nd Airborne Division sector. Of particular importance was the transition between the engineer staff officers and the chemical staff officers of the 82nd Airborne Division and the 2nd ACR.

Engineer Transition. By the time the 2nd ACR replaced the 82nd Airborne Division, they already knew that there were munitions remaining inside Khamisiyah that required demolition. 82nd Airborne Division engineers gave the 2nd ACR engineers a list of 64 targets for demolition, which included Iraqi military vehicles and munitions. The list provided the location (in military UTM coordinates) and a very short description of each of the targets. Engineers from the 2nd ACR destroyed these targets during subsequent demolition operations. Of the 64 targets on the list, 17 targets were in the Khamisiyah ASP, including five that were described as military vehicles and 12 that were described simply as ammunition. Of the 12 ammunition targets, nine corresponded to locations of ammunition storage warehouses and three were locations of ammunition storage bunkers.

NBC Transition. The 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer gave the 2nd ACR a written report of chemical reconnaissance activities. The report summarized the chemical reconnaissance activities of the 82nd Airborne Division in their assigned sector in Iraq between February 28 and March 23,  1991. It stated in part:

… No chemical weapons were found in the 82d Abn Div [Airborne Division] sector. Numerous reports have been received from Iraqi refugee/resistance personnel concerning chemical weapons use, but none have been confirmed.

… When the 82d Abn Div initially occupied the sector, Fox vehicles and unit reconnaissance teams checked for evidence of contamination or chemical weapons. No contamination was found...

… The following areas were surveyed by the 82d Abn Div:

Tallil Air Base [sic] (PV 0423)
Jalibah S.E. Air Base [sic] (PU 5480)
Tall al Lahm ASP [sic] (PV 3706)[134]

The 2nd ACR was confident that the 82nd Airborne Division had performed a thorough chemical reconnaissance of Khamisiyah and that they did not need to conduct further chemical reconnaissance operations.[135] Nevertheless, the 2nd ACR continued to employ chemical warfare agent detection measures.[136]

2. From March 24 to April 7: 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment Operations

March 24, 1991

The 82nd Airborne Division returned to Saudi Arabia and the 2nd ACR assumed control of the 82nd Airborne Division sector. The 82nd Airborne Division, the 307th Engineer Battalion, and the 60th EOD Detachment departed for Saudi Arabia and subsequent redeployment.[137]

2nd ACR operations overview. As with the 82nd Airborne Division, the primary mission of the 2nd ACR was to enforce the terms of the cease-fire agreement. With the war over, all US commanders had the overriding concern for soldier safety. In order to reduce the loss of life from traffic accidents, demolition operations, and other causes, the 2nd ACR commander placed all ammunition storage areas in the 2nd ACR sector off-limits to all but EOD personnel or those accompanied by EOD personnel. In other words, soldiers—including engineers—were not allowed inside Khamisiyah or other ammunition storage areas in the 2nd ACR sector, unless accompanied by EOD personnel. Therefore, virtually no US soldiers were inside the Khamisiyah ASP from March 24 until April 5, 1991, when EOD personnel and engineers began final demolition operations. The key units serving with the 2nd ACR that were most involved in operations in the Khamisiyah area are (Figure 31):

• 1st Squadron: As one of the three principal cavalry squadrons of the 2nd ACR, the 1st squadron had primary responsibility for the sector containing Khamisiyah. Its primary mission was to ensure Iraq’s compliance with the cease-fire agreement in its sector.
• 84th Engineer Company: The 84th Engineer Company focused its operations on An Nasiriyah SW and Khamisiyah ammunition storage areas in the 2nd ACR area.
• 87th Chemical Company: The 87th Chemical Company had a Chemical Reconnaissance Platoon with six Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicles.
• 146th EOD Detachment: The 146th EOD Detachment had responsibility for identifying and handling all unexploded munitions found on the battlefield, including chemical munitions.
• 82nd Engineer Battalion: The 82nd Engineer Battalion concentrated on the destruction of Iraq’s military vehicles when they were with the 2nd ACR from March 24 to April 7, 1991; therefore, they performed very few demolition missions on munitions bunkers.

Figure 31. 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment organization

March 27, 1991: VII Corps directed the 2nd ACR to conduct a chemical reconnaissance of Khamisiyah. VII Corps issued Fragmentary Order 189-91 to its subordinate units, including the 2nd ACR. In Fragmentary Order 189-91, VII Corps directed the 2nd ACR to conduct a reconnaissance of three suspected chemical weapons storage sites:

• Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Area;
• Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Depot South; and
• An Nasiriyah ASP SW.

Fragmentary Order 189-91 also directed the 1st Armored Division to conduct a reconnaissance of one other suspected chemical weapons storage site and the 3rd Armored Division to conduct a reconnaissance of three such sites. The seven suspected chemical weapon storage sites listed in Fragmentary Order 189-91 were on the list of 17 sites that USCENTCOM had sent to ARCENT on February 28,  1991.[138]

March 28, 1991

The 2nd ACR replied to VII Corps Fragmentary Order 189-91. The 2nd ACR staff re-examined the report they received four days earlier from the chemical officer of the 82nd Airborne Division. Upon reviewing it, they determined that the report already met the requirements of the VII Corps fragmentary order and that no additional reconnaissance was necessary or justified.[139] The 2nd ACR was reluctant to put soldiers at risk by requiring them to conduct reconnaissance of any of the three sites. Earlier extensive demolition operations at each of these sites had made maneuvering within the sites difficult and dangerous.[140]

The 2nd ACR contacted VII Corps and told them of the 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer’s report. The 2nd ACR told VII Corps that they intended to answer the requirement of FRAGO 189-91 by sending VII Corps the chemical officer’s report rather than conducting an additional reconnaissance of these sites. VII Corps concurred with the 2nd ACR’s decision.[141,142]

April 1, 1991: VII Corps replied to the USCENTCOM directive to survey 17 suspected chemical weapons storage sites. VII Corps responded to USCENTCOM’s February 28, 1991, directive by stating that the assigned sites did not contain chemical/biological weapons.[143] The deadline to complete the survey was noon, March 4, 1991.[144] We have found no evidence ARCENT responded to the February 28, 1991, USCENTCOM message by the noon deadline. USCENTCOM finally received a response on April 1st, direct from VII Corps, long after the original response deadline had passed.

April 2, 1991: The 2nd ACR destroyed bunkers in An Nasiriyah ASP SW. At 7:20 PM, the 84th Engineer Company destroyed bunkers in the An Nasiriyah ASP SW weapons storage site in a huge explosion (Figure 32). The explosion created a mushroom fireball so large that soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division, 50 miles south, thought it might have been a nuclear explosion and reported it so to VII Corps.[145] Some Gulf War veterans incorrectly believed this explosion was the "Khamisiyah incident."

Figure 32. April 2nd detonation at An Nasiriyah ASP SW; picture courtesy 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment operations officer

April 3, 1991: Iraq reported US forces conducted demolition operations at "Khamisiyah." The day after the huge explosion at An Nasiriyah ASP SW, Iraq reported, "US forces blew up the Khamisiyah depot on April 1 and 2, 1991."[146] Since demolitions did not occur at Khamisiyah on either April 1 or 2, we believe Iraq’s report referred to the previous day’s demolition operations at An Nasiriyah ASP SW.

April 5 - 7, 1991: Coalition Forces conducted final ground operations in Khamisiyah area. To prepare for the demolition operations planned for the following day, soldiers from the 84th Engineer Company, accompanied by soldiers from the 146th EOD Detachment, conducted a reconnaissance inside the Khamisiyah ASP, found no chemical munitions, and prepared 6-10 bunkers for demolition. On April 6, 1991, they initiated the demolitions destroying these bunkers.[147] The next day, the 2nd ACR departed Iraq for Saudi Arabia and later returned to Europe.

Summary of bunker destructions. Table 5 summarizes the destruction of bunkers in the Khamisiyah ASP.

Table 5. Bunker destructions at Khamisiyah

Figure 33 shows the 1991 and 1992 events resulting from the United Nations Security Council’s establishing a Special Commission on Iraq.

Figure 33. UNSCOM events: 1991 to 1992

In April 1991, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 created the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). Its primary responsibilities were to identify and destroy Iraq’s surviving chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, have the weapons moved to an Iraq destruction facility, or destroy the weapons in place.[148] Almost immediately after its creation, UNSCOM began inspecting Iraq’s facilities and continued through December 1998.

May 16, 1991: Iraq announced for the first time that chemical weapons were stored at Khamisiyah Stores during the Gulf War. Iraq declared to UNSCOM that 2,160 destroyed sarin-filled rockets were located at Khamisiyah Stores. [149] US intelligence analysts knew before Desert Shield/Desert Storm that An Nasiriyah ASP SW was a suspected chemical weapons storage site and so assumed that Iraq had identified the site they knew as An Nasiriyah ASP SW as Khamisiyah.[150] Furthermore, the name Khamisiyah had no significance to US analysts since they generally did not refer to any of Iraq’s weapons storage sites by that name. Khamisiyah Stores was the site the US knew as Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Area.[151] This confusion over names would prevail within the US government for years[152] and was one of the main reasons the government did not realize sooner that US forces had destroyed chemical weapons at Khamisiyah. Iraq’s declaration also included "6,240 intact mustard-filled 155mm artillery shells at Khamisiyah Stores (Nasiriyah)."[153]

October 1991: An UNSCOM team inspected Iraq’s chemical weapons at Khamisiyah. The UNSCOM team inspected what their map depicted as An Nasiriyah Depot SW (Khamisiyah). However, the inspectors were actually taken to Khamisiyah. Here, Iraq told the UNSCOM team Coalition forces had destroyed chemical munitions and warehouses and showed UNSCOM inspectors three sites in and around Khamisiyah that Iraq claimed had chemical munitions.[154]

• Bunker 73. UNSCOM saw parts of 122mm rockets around a bunker Iraq called "Bunker 73" (Figure 34). Since it was too dangerous to get close enough to sample or obtain chemical agent monitor (CAM) readings, UNSCOM could not determine whether the munitions in Bunker 73 contained chemical warfare agents. At this time, inspectors did not document among the munition remnants any identifying traits characteristic of chemical weapons, such as high-density polyethylene inserts, burster tubes, or fill plugs.

Figure 34. UNSCOM photo of remnants of Bunker 73

• The Pit. The inspection team found 297 mostly-intact 122mm rockets (of the 1,250 estimated by investigators) containing the nerve agents sarin (GB) and cyclosarin (GF) in an excavated area approximately 3 kilometers southeast of the main bunker complex (Figure 35). On-site sampling and CAM readings confirmed the presence of GB/GF in some rockets. Some were neatly laid out, while others appeared to have been bulldozed into heaps or piles. The inspection team observed and recorded on video plastic inserts and burster rods characteristic of chemical warfare munitions.

Figure 35. UNSCOM photo of pit rockets

• Open area. The inspectors found 6,323 intact 155mm artillery shells (a CAM confirmed one shell contained mustard agent because it was leaking) in an open area approximately 5 kilometers west of the main bunker complex (Figure 36). The shells were in good condition but not stored in an orderly fashion.[155]

Figure 35. UNSCOM photo of pit rockets

UNSCOM inspectors and many Intelligence Community analysts thought Iraq had placed these chemical munitions there after US forces left Khamisiyah, sometime between mid-April and October 1991. UNSCOM’s report of its inspection in October stated, "It was evident that ammunition had been moved to its current location well after the end of the Gulf War. The reason for this is not clear."[156] This suspicion of Iraq’s motives would continue to hamper the Khamisiyah investigation for years to come.

By November 1991, the Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS) recognized the error in confusing Khamisiyah and An Nasiriyah ASP SW. During the Gulf War, ACIS was an interagency organization that was the Intelligence Community’s focal point supporting US government efforts in Iraq. Using Global Positioning System receivers and a better description of the facility, ACIS determined that Iraq’s October declaration referred to the Khamisiyah ASP, not An Nasiriyah ASP SW.[157,158] Unfortunately, the DoD did not make this connection at this time.

On Nov. 12, 1991, the Joint Staff disseminated an ACIS report including Iraq’s claims that the Coalition destroyed chemical munitions at Khamisiyah:

The Iraqis claimed the buildings and munitions were destroyed by occupying Coalition forces. In the team’s estimation, the destruction occurred as a result of locally-placed explosives as opposed to bombing.[159]

The report was widely disseminated within the Intelligence Community and DoD. On the same day, an internal ACIS administrative cable, distributed within the CIA only, suggested US forces could have conducted demolition operations in the area UNSCOM inspected and could have been exposed to "chemical contamination."

The inspectors also noted that the buildings [at Khamisiyah] were destroyed by demolitions as opposed to aerial bombardment. They also found an empty U.S. crate labeled as M48, which are shape charges used by the U.S. military. [We] notified Army Central Command (ARCENT) of the location and evidence found at Tall al Lahm. We received information from ARCENT to the fact that 24th Mechanized Infantry Division was located in the vicinity of Tall al Lahm, but we are unable to confirm if U.S. troops did in fact destroy buildings at this particular site. We are sending this information to you in order to take appropriate action as you see fit as the risk of chemical contamination by 24th ID personnel is a possibility.[160]

ACIS queried the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, about the division’s presence at Khamisiyah. CIA documents indicate ACIS contacted a 24th Infantry Division staff officer on Nov. 20, 1991.[161,162] In February 1997, the Office of the Special Assistant investigated this contact and spoke with the person who received the ACIS telephone call. We also contacted the division intelligence officer, division operations officer, and deputy intelligence officer, all of whom did not recall or vaguely recalled the message about their presence at Khamisiyah. They recalled 24th Infantry Division troops were further east, but nothing else. We found no evidence of any additional action taken on this telephone call.[163]

February - March 1992: UNSCOM continued inspections in Iraq, which repeated its claim that Coalition forces had destroyed chemical munitions in 1991. UNSCOM again inspected Khamisiyah from February 21 through March 24, when the team destroyed 463 122mm rockets. The inspection team described these munitions as "fully-, partially-, and un-filled rockets."[164] During the inspection, Iraq repeated its claim that Coalition forces had caused all the damage to the area.[165]

UNSCOM interest grew in Coalition occupation activities. After leaving Iraq, an UNSCOM inspector informally asked the CIA for information on Coalition activities at Khamisiyah: "who was there, what actions they took, when they were there, how long they stayed, etc."[166] UNSCOM never made a formal request, nor have we found any documentation indicating that CIA took any action. In February 1996, the CIA discovered an undated working paper, drafted in May 1992, in the Iraq chemical weapons inspections file in the Nonproliferation Center.[167] In the paper, the author suggests the possibility that US forces unwittingly destroyed chemical weapons at Khamisiyah. He does not recall, nor is there any indication, that any further action was taken on the draft.[168]

By the middle of 1993, Gulf War veterans’ complaints of undiagnosed illnesses had gained the attention of the public and government. Figure 37 shows government agencies and Congress creating panels, holding Congressional hearings, and increasing its emphasis on federally funded medical research. Highlights of 1993 include:

• May - The Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) Blue Ribbon Panel met to discuss the mystery illness.
• June - The House Committee on Veterans Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation held hearings on Health Care Issues of Persian Gulf Veterans.
• August - President Clinton designated the DVA as the lead agency for all federally funded Gulf War research.
• August - The staff of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (known as the Riegle Committee) interviewed Brian Martin, a former member of the 37th Engineer Battalion and vehicle operator for the battalion commander. Interviewed by phone, he recounted his numerous illnesses but did not mention the demolition activities at Khamisiyah.
• November - The House and Senate Committees on Veterans Affairs held three hearings.
• November - Brian Martin testified in person before the Riegle Committee; again he did not discuss the demolition activities at Khamisiyah.
• December - John Deutch, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, established the Defense Science Board Task Force on Chemical Weapons.[169]

Figure 37. Governmental and Congressional events, 1993-1994

1994

In February 1994, Congressman Browder requested the UN to provide any reports about the disposition of Iraq’s chemical weapons and biological warfare research. The UN response, dated April 5, 1994, listed sites where UNSCOM had found chemical warfare agents and weapons. In Table 2, "CW Munition Storage Sites," UNSCOM listed 122mm rockets filled with sarin nerve agent at two sets of coordinates as destroyed at "Khamisiyah Stores."[170]

Senior DOD officials’ testimony to Congress indicated a general state of confusion about activities at An Nasiriyah ASP SW and Khamisiyah. On May 25, 1994, senior DOD officials testified before the Riegle Committee about Iraq’s chemical, biological, and radiological warfare programs and their effect on Gulf War veterans’ health. Among those who testified were Dr. Edwin Dorn, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Dr. Theodore M. Prociv, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Weapons; and Dr. John Kriese, Chief Officer for Ground Forces, DIA. The government’s lack of knowledge about the presence of chemical weapons near US troop units and the continuing confusion over the location of Khamisiyah (Tall al Lahm) versus An Nasiriyah ASP SW were particularly noteworthy. In his opening statement, Under Secretary Dorn testified, "All of the chemical agents and related equipment were found stored at locations a great distance from the Kuwait theater of operations."[171]

Undersecretary Dorn’s statement referred to known chemical storage sites located in Iraq’s interior and not to the Khamisiyah ASP, which was located in the KTO. Later in the hearing, the Chairman of the committee questioned Drs. Dorn and Kriese about chemical weapons located at An Nasiriyah SW and US troops’ proximity to that location:

Chairman: Now, earlier, you made a statement or a statement was made by one of the three of you that all of the chemical agents and related equipment that was discovered was found stored far from the Kuwait field of operations….

Dr [Kriese]:…I’ll say frankly the word, far, got in the last draft of Dr. Dorn’s testimony this morning. I thought we had that fixed to be stricken from the draft testimony that he was given. It is not correct to say that all munitions were found far from the KTL [sic], sir.

Chairman: Well, that’s an important clarification. So there were instances, then, where some of the munitions were found close to where we had troop deployments?

Dr. [Kriese]: That’s correct.

Chairman: But in terms of An Nasiriyah here, we did find them there. Do I assume that we continued to use our forces to secure that area as the War went along? We would not have just been in that area and then left, would we?

Dr. [Kriese]: I don’t know those details of how long we were in that area. My understanding is that munitions were found not at the site we bombed [referring to An Nasiriyah ASP SW], but some 15 nautical miles away from where we attacked [referring to the Khamisiyah ASP].

Chairman: How close would US forces have been stationed to that?

Dr. [Kriese]: I think they were across the river. Not stationed, but during the ground force phase of the campaign, that’s as close as we got.

Chairman: Our troops were right across the narrow river from where we found these things. Is that right?

Dr. [Kriese]: They got that close but I don’t know how long they were there.[172]

Questions submitted for the record by DOD in September and October 1994 revealed continued confusion over the location of Khamisiyah and its proximity to US forces. DOD’s answer to Question 19 perpetuated this confusion:

Question: Were chemical munitions or binary precursor materials capable of being used in chemical warfare discovered in any area of Iraq, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia before, during, or after the war by US forces, civilian personnel, or other Coalition participants?

Answer: The Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) includes southern Iraq south of 31�00'N [Latitude], Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. This was the area eventually occupied by Coalition ground forces before, during and after Operation Desert Storm. No chemical munitions, bulk agent, or binary precursors were discovered in the KTO before, during, or after the war by U.S. Forces, civilian personnel, or Coalition participants.... Finally, it has been widely circulated that UN inspection teams found thousands of destroyed and intact chemical rounds in an ammunition depot at Nasiriyah, and that this discovery contradicts our statement in paragraph one of this answer. Nasiriyah technically is outside the KTO, being north of 31�00'N and the Euphrates River. More importantly, it was not in the territory occupied by Coalition Forces after the war. Moreover, the following points are relevant because UN inspectors did not really "find" the subject munitions. In reality, the Iraqis declared the munitions to the UN and the inspectors eventually went to that location to check what the Iraqis had reported:

1. The UN inspection occurred at least eight months after the war;
2. The location of the "found" chemical rounds was 15 miles from the widely discussed CBW bunkers bombed at Nasiriyah (the site which was originally expected to be inspected). The bombed bunkers were not inspected until one year later in October 1991 and found to contain no chemical or biological weapons.[173]

Several inaccuracies in these testimonies are evident today

• DOD stated no chemical munitions were south of 31� north, which was incorrect, since both An Nasiriyah and Khamisiyah are south of 31� north.
• DOD stated thousands of chemical munitions had been found at An Nasiriyah, but did not mention Khamisiyah.
• DOD stated no U.S. troops were in that area after the war, which was incorrect, since elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps both operated in the area in March and April, 1991.

These inaccuracies distorted the history of events at Khamisiyah since, in June 1994, these beliefs formed the basis of information DoD provided to the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects. The Task Force report stated in part:

There were also reports of damage by the United Nations Special Commission inspection team that visited a different location [referring to Khamisiyah] in the general vicinity of An Nasiriyah several months after the cessation of hostilities. There are indications that the site visited by the UNSCOM team was not a site targeted during the air war but may have been specially constructed for the UN inspectors.

It appeared this was a separate site constructed by Iraq after the war to show to the UN inspectors. The Iraqis claimed that munitions containing 16 tons of Sarin were destroyed in the bombing….There was also some indication that the munitions were only destroyed subsequent to the ground war by the Iraqis. The uncertainty stems from the fact that it is not clear whether the site the UN inspection team was shown was in fact this subject of bomb damage.[174]

The information reflected DOD’s, UNSCOM’s, and the Intelligence Community’s suspicion Iraq had fabricated the entire incident at Khamisiyah to try to conceal their weapons of mass destruction from UNSCOM inspectors.

In June, DOD established the Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program (CCEP) to provide an in-depth medical evaluation for all eligible beneficiaries who had health concerns after service in the Gulf and a toll-free information line whose operators assist veterans with care and benefits questions and scheduling examinations for either DOD or DVA hospitals.

Among other efforts of 1995 (Figure 38), with President Clinton’s strong support, DOD announced the opening of two specialized care centers whose major focus was diagnosing and treating illnesses unique to service in the Gulf War, and the addition of $10 million for research to the 1995 Defense budget.[175]

Figure 38. US government efforts in 1995

In March 1995, Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch directed the creation of the Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team (later the Persian Gulf Investigation Team (PGIT)), which opened in July. PGIT’s mission was to focus on the causes of Gulf War veterans’ illnesses. During the same month, the CIA’s Acting Director, called for a comprehensive review of relevant intelligence information. The CIA focused on identifying and quantifying Iraq’s chemical, biological, or radiological releases during and after the war that could have affected U.S. forces.[176] As part of the President’s initiative, the DOD and CIA began new efforts to collect and review operational, intelligence, and medical records from the Gulf War. In April, declassification of DOD health-related documents started.

In August 1995, the President established the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses (PAC) to review government activities in determining the health effects of service in the Gulf War.

While these agencies worked closely to identify possible chemical releases through demolition or Coalition bombings, DOD took additional steps to gain more information from veterans.

• In May, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry announced the creation of a toll-free telephone hotline on which all military and civilian personnel who served in the Persian Gulf region could report details of incidents they believed may have contributed to a medical problem they or others had experienced.[177]
• In August, DOD announced the opening of its official internet World Wide Web homepage, GulfLINK, which provides immediate, on-line computer access to declassified medical, operational, and intelligence documents, as well as current events and narratives of important events from the Gulf War.[178]
• Before September, during their re-examination of thousands of intelligence documents, CIA analysts found the UNSCOM Khamisiyah site visit report of October 1991.
• In September, among the three sites—Al Muthanna, Muhammadiyat, and Khamisiyah—it had identified as potential chemical warfare agent release sites, the CIA raised Khamisiyah as a concern because of its more southerly location and its proximity to US troops. In addition, 1991 reporting found by CIA analysts indicated Iraq told UNSCOM that Coalition forces had destroyed Khamisiyah. One week later, the CIA informed PGIT of its concerns and asked what US forces had been at that location and when.[179]
• In October, DOD researched the newly established Environmental Support Group (ESG) unit locator database[180] and identified to CIA that some U.S. units were in the area. Specifically, the data had indicated that the 37th Engineer Battalion and other units had reported location coordinates near Khamisiyah, but no information on their mission (which CIA had requested) was available.

Figure 39 shows the events from January to September leading to and immediately after the DOD’s public announcement that the 37th Engineer Battalion probably destroyed bunkers containing chemical weapons.

Figure 39. Investigation results through September 1996

CIA mentioned the possibility of agent release at Khamisiyah. In January, in a preliminary briefing to the National Security Council (NSC), the CIA mentioned the possibility of agent release at Khamisiyah.[181] The NSC directed the CIA and DoD to aggressively pursue this matter.

On March 5, the CIA informed a PAC staff member that U.S. troops had been in the vicinity of a probable release of chemical warfare agent. On March 10, a CIA analyst heard a radio talk show on which a 37th Engineer Battalion veteran described demolition activities at a facility the analyst recognized as Khamisiyah. The CIA informed the PAC that week.

On May 1, at a PAC hearing in Washington, DC, the CIA and PGIT acknowledged that the 37th Engineer Battalion destroyed munitions at Khamisiyah and the agencies were working together to determine if chemical warfare agents were among the munitions destroyed.

In the spring of 1996, the PAC requested the CIA to examine the potential dispersion of nerve agent from the March 1991 demolition of Bunker 73 at Khamisiyah and at two other sites in Iraq (Al Muthanna and Muhammadiyat).[182,183] Among other models, the CIA used the US Army’s Chemical and Biological Defense Command’s Non-uniform Simple Surface Evaporations 4 (NUSSE4) transport and diffusion model.[184]

On May 14, UNSCOM inspectors documented the presence of burster tubes, fill plugs, plastic inserts, and other items characteristic of chemical weapons in Bunker 73 at Khamisiyah. Iraq reiterated its declaration that US forces had destroyed chemical munitions in Bunker 73, and for the first time claimed that US forces destroyed chemical munitions stored in the Pit.[185]

DOD publicly announced U.S. forces had probably destroyed bunkers containing chemical weapons

UNSCOM has informed us that, as part of its ongoing effort to verify Iraqi declarations, it inspected the Khamisiyah ammunition storage area last month [May 1996]. During that inspection, UNSCOM concluded that one bunker had contained rockets with chemical agents. US soldiers from the 37th Engineer Battalion destroyed ammunition bunkers at this site in early March 1991, shortly after the war ended. Based on a new review of the available information, it now appears that one of these destroyed bunkers contained chemical weapons.[186]

After the June 21, 1996, announcement, the investigation’s focus shifted to better understand two questions:

• First, what was the potential for exposure to chemical agents from the demolition operations at Khamisiyah?
• Second, who might have been exposed?

PGIT began interviewing US soldiers directly involved in the demolition of Bunker 73 to reconstruct such information as the exact dates of the demolition, amount and type of munitions destroyed, and weather and wind direction on the dates of demolition. This information was provided to the CIA to assist in their dispersion modeling of the Bunker 73 demolition.

In July, the CIA briefed the results of its Bunker 73 modeling effort to the PAC and, on Aug. 2, 1996, published their report, "Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses," which identified their modeling assumptions and concluded that any hazard area resulting from the demolition of Bunker 73 moved east and northeast. Among the CIA’s more significant assumptions in modeling the demolition of Bunker 73 were:

• Bunker 73 contained approximately 1,060 nerve agent-filled rockets;
• Each rocket was filled with 8 kilograms of a 2:1 ratio of sarin to cyclosarin nerve agent;
• The demolition ejected 10 percent of the rockets from the bunker;
• Based on US tests, heat from the explosion and burning motors and crates degraded 2.5 percent of the agent in the bunker;
• Winds were light to the northeast to east; and
• The modeling did not include the effect of thermal energy released by the simultaneous burning and detonation of the other 32 to 37 bunkers.[187]

In August and September DOD attempted a telephone survey of Khamisiyah participants. Because of the uncertainty whether US forces had been exposed to chemical warfare agents, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs designed and conducted a telephone outreach program to contact veterans who may have participated in the Khamisiyah operation. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) attempted to contact more than 1,100 veterans of units PGIT had determined were in the Khamisiyah area during early March 1991. The DMDC was able to contact 575 of them and asked them to call the DOD hotline to report any medical problems they were experiencing and provide any information they believed pertinent to the Khamisiyah incident. Deputy Secretary of Defense White wrote the approximately 525 veterans not contacted by telephone to urge them to call the Persian Gulf Incident Hotline. This particular telephone outreach effort concluded in October 1996.

The Secretary of Defense widened DOD’s investigation. In September 1996, DOD dramatically increased its investigative efforts. As announced in a news release, Secretary of Defense White:

• Ordered the establishment of a DOD Persian Gulf Illness Action Team "to look across all the activities ongoing in the Department related to Persian Gulf veterans’ illnesses, reassess whether we’re in the right direction with the right amount of resources and level of effort, and asking the right questions."
• Directed the Army to conduct an Inspector General inquiry into events surrounding Khamisiyah and supplement the efforts of the DOD investigation where possible.
• Directed the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight to investigate U.S. intelligence on Khamisiyah, including how the information was handled.[188]

On Oct. 2, 1996, the Secretary of Defense named Dr. Bernard D. Rostker, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, to head an action team to evaluate the activities of the DOD related to undiagnosed illnesses of Gulf War veterans.  He was to report his recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense."[189]  The Office of the Special Assistant assumed the team functions one month later.

Efforts continued from fall 1996 to late summer 1997 to resolve uncertainties and complete the initial modeling effort for the demolition at the Pit (Figure 40). Investigators had determined even less about the March 10, 1991, demolition in the Pit than they had about the March 4, 1991, destruction of Bunker 73. DOD and the CIA jointly continued to investigate the activities that occurred in the Pit. Critical uncertainties persisted about such facts as weather, amount and placement of charges, number of participants, and number of events. Accurately modeling the effects of the Pit demolition would be impossible without resolving these uncertainties. Also, since the two agencies knew little about how such an explosion would react, they decided they needed to conduct field tests to resolve some of these questions. Thus, DOD and the CIA delayed modeling the effects of the Pit demolition until the investigators could develop more information from ongoing veterans’ interviews, document research, and field tests.

Figure 40. Actions taken to resolve uncertainties and conclude initial modeling effort

Fall 1996

DOD announced its intent to survey U.S. troop units within 50 kilometers of the Khamisiyah ASP. After reviewing the CIA’s preliminary work to model the Pit demolition, DOD had considerable uncertainty concerning the fallout from the March 10, 1991, demolition. Therefore, in October 1996, DOD announced it would survey the estimated 20,000 veterans who had ben in units within 50 kilometers of the Khamisiyah ASP during the period March 1 - 15, 1991, according to a unit locator database maintained by ESG, now the U.S. Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research (USASCURR).[190] The survey would be an attachment included in Deputy Secretary of Defense White’s letter to the veterans that would indicate that chemical weapons had been present at Khamisiyah when the demolitions occurred. The letter urged veterans to call the Persian Gulf Incident Hotline with any additional information about the Khamisiyah incident or to report illnesses they attributed to their service in the Gulf War. The Deputy Secretary of Defense did not send the letter to the 1,100 veterans previously identified for the telephone survey. In preparing the survey distribution, DOD carefully selected the dates and distances to be sure to identify and notify units moving through the area between March 1 and 15. The potential exposure assumptions translated into three unit location zones for the survey participants:

• A 5-kilometer zone enclosing the area where chemical warfare agent exposure would have been lethal to any inhabitant;
• A 25-kilometer zone encompassing the area where chemical warfare agent exposure would have produced first noticeable effects, such as runny nose and blurry eyes; and
• A 50-kilometer zone containing an area that doubled the 25-kilometer zone as an added safety measure to ensure including in the survey all US forces in transit through the Khamisiyah area.

DOD also selected the wider range of transit dates for the veterans’ locations because conflicting information existed about the number and dates of the demolitions. An EOD log, dated March 12, 1991, had an entry of a possible demolition similar to the confirmed demolition of March 10, 1991. Since analysts were investigating the conflicting dates, DOD added three days following March 12 as a precaution, making the survey period March 1 - 15.[191]

The Institute for Defense Analyses recommended numerous changes in modeling the Pit. At DOD’s and CIA's request, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) convened an independent panel of experts in meteorology, physics, chemistry, and related disciplines. The panel reviewed CIA’s modeling methodology and analysis, which used the analytical linkage between the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Operational Multi-scale Environmental Model with Grid Adaptivity (OMEGA) weather model and the Naval Surface Warfare Center’s Vapor, Liquid, and Solid Tracking (VLSTRACK) dispersion model to drive the Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command’s NUSSE4 transport and diffusion model. [192] The IDA recommended using additional atmospheric models and data sources for modeling the demolition in the Pit.[193]

DOD established the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses. On Nov. 12, 1996, at the recommendation of the Persian Gulf illnesses action team, the Deputy Secretary of Defense created this office and named Dr. Bernard D. Rostker as the Special Assistant. He assumed responsibility for the PGIT, which was incorporated as the office’s Investigation and Analysis Directorate.[194]

1997

The Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses sent the Khamisiyah survey. The Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses sent the survey, dated January 1997, accompanied by a letter of explanation, to veterans whose units we determined from the then ESG unit locator database were to have been within the 50-kilometer circle around the Khamisiyah ASP between March 1 and March 15, 1991.[195]

President extended the PAC’s tenure. On Jan. 30, 1997, the President extended the PAC’s tenure until October 31, 1997, with tasking to provide a Supplemental Letter Report and Supplemental Final Report, the PAC’s "Special Report."

The Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses provided supplemental letter report. On April 30, 1997, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses provided details of its work in two areas: continuing oversight of the government’s investigation into Gulf War chemical and biological warfare incidents and implementing recommendations of the PAC’s Final Report. Reiterating its January 7, 1997, "Final Report," the PAC stated, "In the face of credible evidence of the presence or release of chemical warfare agents, low-level exposure must be presumed while efforts to develop more precise measures of exposure continue….Troops within the presumptive exposure area should be notified and encouraged to enroll in the CCEP or [VA] Registry." Hence the Committee noted:

DOD should move as quickly as possible toward conclusions about the incidents under investigation and, when in doubt, err in favor of targeted notification of troops about possible health risks and the availability of free diagnosis and treatment programs established by the government.[196]

Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses and the CIA continued cooperative investigations to reduce the uncertainties concerning demolition activities in the Pit. In his April 24, 1997, opening statement to the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, Robert D Walpole, Special Assistant to the Acting Director, CIA, stated:

However, when we turned to modeling demolitions at the Pit, we quickly realized we had significant uncertainties regarding how rockets with chemical warheads would have been affected by open-pit demolitions. We were also uncertain about the number of demolition events and the weather conditions at the time of the demolitions... CIA and DoD have devised a joint plan which will reduce some of these uncertainties in order to more accurately identify the extent of the release. [197]

• Subsequently, DoD and CIA worked aggressively to eliminate as many as possible of these uncertainties surrounding the events in the Pit:
• Very limited, often contradictory information from several soldiers;
• Questions on the demolition date(s);
• Uncertainties on the number of rockets, agent purity, and amount of agent aerosolized;
• Uncertainties on agent release and release mechanisms in an open-pit demolition;
• Limited weather data; and
• No single model that simultaneously ran weather and chemical warfare agent data.[198]

Interviews with soldiers reduced uncertainties. We located and, with the CIA, interviewed five soldiers who had key roles in the demolition activities in the Pit. These individuals included the 37th Engineer Battalion operations officer, who initially discovered the Pit and led engineers and EOD personnel to it; two 37th Engineer Battalion soldiers who placed demolition explosives on the stacks of rockets; the 60th EOD Detachment soldier who supervised the engineers;[199,200] and the 60th EOD Detachment executive officer who inspected the stacks before detonation.[201] They confirmed the number of stacks of rockets wired for demolition and other information, such as the amount and placement of explosives on the rockets, that proved invaluable to the DOD/CIA team’s field tests discussed in later paragraphs.

Soldier interviews clearly established two large-scale demolitions. An entry in a 60th EOD detachment field log had indicated a third demolition on March 12. Interviews of 60th EOD Detachment soldiers revealed the date was incorrect.[202] This clarification allowed the DOD/CIA team that would model the event to concentrate on one major explosion in the Pit and not two separate events.

The DOD/CIA team estimated the number of 122 millimeter rockets in the Pit to be 1,250. In May 1996, Iraq had declared to UNSCOM that 1,100 rockets were in the Pit at the demolition. The DOD/CIA team used personal interviews, estimates of the heights of the stacks of 122mm rockets, and known data, such as the size of the rocket crates, to develop the estimate of 1,250 122mm rockets. About six months after the demolition, UNSCOM found about 750 of the rockets still contained chemical warfare agent. UNSCOM assisted Iraq in disposing of these rockets. Therefore, 1997 assessments assumed that the demolition destroyed approximately 500 rockets on March 10, 1991.[203]

Test team determined the rockets’ nerve agent capacity. In preparing for the May field demolition testing on the rockets, the test team determined that a single rocket would hold only 6.3 kilograms of agent instead of the 8 kilograms used in the modeling of Bunker 73.[204] The previous estimate failed to account for the payload volume reduction caused by the presence of two plastic canister inserts whose total weight was 1.7 kilograms.

The DOD/CIA team estimated chemical agent ratio and purity. The DOD/CIA team estimated chemical agent purity at 50 percent and the ratio of sarin/cyclosarin to be 3:1, based on a combination of estimates taken from UNSCOM samples, Iraq’s chemical production records, and Iraq’s declarations. In their "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit" document, DOD/CIA stated:

Our best estimate of the agent purity at the time of the demolition is slightly less than 50 percent. Iraqi production records obtained by UNSCOM indicated that the sarin/cyclosarin (GB/GF) nerve agent produced and transported to Khamisiyah in early January 1991 was about 55 percent pure. The agent, subsequently, degraded to 10 percent purity by the time laboratory analysis had been completed on samples taken by UNSCOM from one of the rockets in October. On the basis of the sample purity and indications that the degradation rate for sarin and cyclosarin are similar, we assess that the ratio when the munitions were blown up in March 1991, was the same as that sampled in October 1991 - 3:1. Assuming a conservative, exponential degradation of the sarin/cyclosarin, the purity on the date of demolition two months after production can be calculated to be about 50 percent.[205]

The DOD/CIA team confirmed initial wind direction from existing records and photography. The DOD/CIA team used existing data and photography to determine the initial wind direction on March 10, 1991. Very little weather data was readily available for March 10th, so the team determined the weather by combining exact location coordinates of Khamisiyah, general weather conditions during March 1991, imagery from March 10 - 11, photography of soot patterns created by the bunker demolition on March 10th, and regional scale imagery showing the Kuwait oil field fire plumes for the days immediately following the demolitions. Using these sources, the DOD/CIA team determined the initial wind direction at Khamisiyah to be from the north-northwest, blowing any chemical release to the south-southeast.[206]

The DOD/CIA team conducted field demolition tests. Since the CIA used test information that did not apply to open-air demolitions to model Bunker 73, the test information could not be used to determine if agent would release quickly or would take a period of days. By April, the DOD/CIA team agreed that field demolition tests were necessary [207] to determine how chemical agents would behave in an open area similar to the Pit. The team arranged to conduct a series of tests at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah from May 15 to 31, 1997. The DOD/CIA design team developed the Dugway tests (Figure 41) to extrapolate the interaction between the explosives and rockets in an open environment similar to the Pit demolition. The tests determined:

• How the rockets reacted to explosives placed in various locations on them;
• How the nerve agent was released (e.g., aerosolized amount and evaporation rates of spilled agent on soil and wood); and
• How much nerve agent was released.[208]

Figure 41. Demolition test; picture courtesy of Dugway Proving Ground

For a thorough evaluation of the results of those tests, see "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," September 4, 1997.[209]

The Office of the Special Assistant continued efforts to identify troop unit locations. The Special Assistant sent the Khamisiyah survey to veterans identified through an existing database containing unit locations called the Persian Gulf Registry. USASCURR, formerly the Environmental Support Group, derived Gulf War unit locations by reviewing a large number of Gulf War unit records, including unit history data archives, operational logs, situation reports, and after action and historical reports. USASCURR began this review in mid-1994 and has repeatedly updated the database as it obtained additional unit locations.

USASCURR continued recording unit location data in conjunction with the Gulf War declassification initiative the Deputy Secretary of Defense established in March 1995. The declassification initiative decreed a DOD-wide effort to review Gulf War operational records, declassify them, and make them available to USASCURR and the Office of the Special Assistant.

To identify veterans who may have experienced low-level chemical exposure, we determined their units’ locations from the USASCURR unit location database during March 10 - 13, 1991. Although veterans were either assigned or attached to specific units during the Gulf War, a unit’s location on a specific day did not necessarily pinpoint where an individual soldier was on that day. For example, a precise location recording a soldier on patrol or in transit to another location does not exist.

In April 1997, the Office of the Special Assistant and Department of the Army began a coordinated effort to assemble former Gulf War brigade, divisional, and non-divisional units operations officers (G3s and S3s) to verify existing locations in the USASCURR unit location database and assist in identifying additional unit locations.

The DOD and CIA linked models to determine the downwind hazard area of the March 10, 1991, Pit demolition. To meet the IDA panel’s recommendations, the DOD/CIA asked other agencies with long-time modeling experience to participate in the modeling effort. The modeling team consisted of scientists from the Defense Special Warfare Agency (DSWA) (now the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)); the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL); Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC); and National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR); and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) supporting the CIA and DSWA. These agencies used existing sophisticated models to develop Khamisiyah-specific potential exposure areas. As IDA recommended, the team used different combinations of models to reduce model bias. Presenting a composite (union) of the different modeling simulations representing the overlay of the outermost perimeter of all models determines the hazard area.[210] A general discussion of the modeling process is at Tab E.

The DOD/CIA team announced no US troops were in the area predicted to have noticeable health effects during the time of the event. On July 24, 1997, DOD/CIA team announced the results of the potential hazard area modeling effort.[211] The results confirmed no US units were within the hazard area predicted to cause noticeable short-term health effects from demolition activity in the Pit. However, the modeling results did indicate that troops in Iraq and Saudi Arabia possibly were exposed to low levels of nerve agent over a four-day period from March 10 - 13, 1991. Using data on then-available unit locations, DOD identified 98,910 soldiers within the potential hazard area predicted by the models.[212]  From late July through September DOD sent written notices to two categories of veterans: those in the potential chemical agent hazard area (approximately 99,000) and those who had received the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s letter and survey but were not in the potential chemical agent hazard area (approximately 10,000). On September 4, 1997, the DOD/CIA team published the details of this modeling effort in the document: "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit."

In response to the announcement of the modeling results in July 1997, various scientific groups recommended refinements to the models and modeling process. After addressing these groups’ refinements, the team decided to generate a new set of Khamisiyah simulations. We have completed these simulations and are publishing the results in this paper (see Remodeling Pit Demolitions section) and in more detail later in a technical report.

The PAC issued Its Special Report. The PAC issued a Special Report on Oct. 31, 1997, to the Secretary of Defense, and its service ended in November 1997.

Figure 42. Activities surrounding the remodeling of the Khamisiyah Pit demolition

1998-1990

CIA released Inspector General report. On Feb. 5, 1998, the CIA Inspector General released its assessment of the CIA’s analysis and reporting of Khamisiyah information from the mid-80s, when Khamisiyah was first identified as a possible chemical weapons storage site, to June 1996, when DOD announced U.S. forces had destroyed bunkers possibly containing chemical weapons. The Inspector General came to two conclusions:

• Information obtained before, during, and after the Gulf War, was not compiled and comprehensively analyzed until the U.S. government focused on Gulf War illnesses in 1995.
• A more vigorous follow-up when questions arose about Khamisiyah might have brought about an earlier realization that U.S. troops may have been exposed to chemical agents.[213]

Senator Rudman appointed as Chair of Presidential Special Oversight Board. On Feb. 24, 1998, President Clinton named Senator Warren B. Rudman as Chair of the Special Oversight Board for DOD Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents (PSOB). President Clinton established the PSOB by Executive Order to provide recommendations based on its review of DOD’s investigation into possible Gulf War chemical and biological incidents that may have contributed to Gulf War veterans’ illnesses. The board reports to the President through the Secretary of Defense.[214] Following appointment, the full board met for the first time in July 1998 and received its first briefing from DOD on the history and background of Gulf War issues. The PSOB continues to review and approve the overall direction of the Special Assistant’s office.[215]

G3/S3 conferences concluded. From April 1997 through June 1998, the Office of the Special Assistant and the Department of the Army brought 163 former Gulf War corps, division, and brigade operations officers (G3/S3) to USASCURR to identify unit locations and verify their respective Gulf War units existing locations. Successively, Army operations officers from XVIII Airborne Corps, VII Corps, and Echelons-Above-Corps units returned to assist in this effort, which significantly enhanced KTO unit location information. Army operations officers added approximately 390,000 locations to the USASCURR database, more than doubling the Army locations known before the G3/S3 conferences. Currently the number of locations in the database for all services during the Gulf War period is more than 855,000. Tab F contains details of the development and results of the G3/S3 conferences.

Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee report released. The Senate Veterans Affairs Committee released its Special Investigation Unit’s report on Gulf War illnesses in August 1998. While the report complimented the Office of the Special Assistant for its direct approach in dealing with veterans, it also pointed out areas requiring improvement in both the DOD and VA. In addition, the Special Investigative Unit acknowledged the value of the Office:

Establishment of the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses in 1996 has increased the flow of information to veterans and the public about various events during the Gulf War that may have affected the health of veterans who served there. OSAGWI has also made efforts to solicit from Gulf War veterans their concerns about their health and possible exposures, and should continue these efforts.[216]

Panel recommended Remodeling Pit demolition. Following the 1997 Khamisiyah pit demolition modeling, a panel of modeling experts evaluated the modeling results. This panel approved the DOD/CIA modeling methodology but recommended a number of improvements including revisions to the computer models used. The Office of the Special Assistant initiated improvements to the 1997 model process to obtain the highest quality of hazard area definition possible. Modeling improvements continued throughout 1998 and 1999 and culminated in redefined potential hazard areas in January 2000.

2000

Independent peer review panel responded. The Office of the Special Assistant’s Feb. 23, 2000, report, "Methodology of Refined Modeling of the Khamisiyah Pit Demolition," to an independent peer review panel described the revised modeling methodology and improvements. The panel found the revised modeling procedures satisfactory but stated modeling results would "still be on the conservative side; i.e., they are very likely overestimates of the dosages actually received by personnel."[217] As we did in 1997, our 2000 modeling approach overlaid the outer boundaries of the various modeling results to develop the composite potential hazard area. Our fundamental modeling approach has not changed since 1997:

Remember that this plume [potential hazard area] is the composite of five models; the plumes from each individual model predicted smaller exposure areas. We used the composite approach to increase our confidence that the resulting plume would be our best estimate of the potential area covered, taking into account individual model biases. This approach was critical for notifications and for future epidemiological studies. However, we do not expect that everyone under the composite plume was exposed.[218]

We recognize that our composite approach methodology overstates veterans’ risk of exposure. Each of the four Khamisiyah model combinations yielded a distinct potential hazard area. However, we cannot say with any degree of certainty which particular model’s potential hazard area or which combination of potential hazard areas correctly identifies military units that may have been exposed. Hence, we used a composite of all four model combinations to reduce the possibility of missing potentially exposed military units. With this in mind, our goal remains the same as it was in 1997: if we err, we do so on the side of veteran notification. This is particularly important for those veterans who will receive notice of possible exposure to low levels of nerve agent. (See Tabs E and F.)

Modeling improvements. The 2000 modeling improvements include the following:

• Revised meterological models. Meterological model changes were made in: (1) modeling options and input data options for two models: Coupled Ocean-Atmospheric Mesoscale and Prediction System (COAMPS) and Mesoscale Model, Version 5 (MM5), and (2) modeling codes for Operational Multiscale Environmental Model with Grid Adaptivity (OMEGA).
• Reduced amount of nerve agent released. On Oct. 14, 1999, the Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues provided revised nerve agent release estimates for several Gulf War incidents to the Special Assistant. All-source intelligence information supported by UNSCOM data generated the revised nerve agent release estimates for number of rockets, quantity of agent, agent purity, and amount of agent aerosolized and evaporated for use in any future ensemble modeling. The CIA revised the Khamisiyah Pit source term data from the estimate used in their 1997 modeling. The CIA also revised source term data for the Bunker 73 although we did not remodel Bunker 73 in the 2000 effort.  The revised source term estimates, quoted from the CIA letter, are:

Khamisiyah Pit - Worst case estimate of agent release: 321 kg GB/GF [sarin /cyclosarin] with the added comment: "New value is 45 percent of the previous assessment based on re-evaluation of number of rockets stemming from UNSCOM excavation in 1998. The new lower release amount and inclusion of environmental degradation [which this document calls "chemical warfare agent decay"] will change exposure limits."

Khamisiyah Bunker "73" - Worst case estimate of agent release: 51 kg GB/GF [sarin/cyclosarin] with the comment: "New value is lower based on reassessments of rockets and agent fill stemming from UNSCOM excavation in 1998. Winds blow away from troops and release is five percent of release modeled in 1996 that did not expose troops."[219]

The revised 2000 modeling indicated a release of 321 kilograms of nerve agent from the Pit instead of the 1997 release of 715 kilograms (a 55 percent reduction.) Likewise, the 2000 modeling revised the total as 51 kilograms instead of the 1997 figure of 1,040 kilograms of nerve agent released from Bunker 73.

According to the Oct. 14, 1999, CIA estimate, the number of 122mm rockets damaged during the Khamisiyah Pit demolition was 225, instead of the previously estimated 500. Thus, the 2000 source term was 45 percent of the 1997 source term.

• Combined toxicity of sarin and cyclosarin included. The 1997 model treated the source term as totally sarin (GB) because toxicity data on cyclosarin (GF) was not available then. In the 2000 model, we modeled the toxicity of both nerve agents using newly determined cyclosarin toxicity data. Although the amount of sarin was three times that of cyclosarin, the toxicity of cyclosarin is nearly three times that of sarin. Equally important, cyclosarin is less volatile than sarin (i.e., it evaporates more slowly). Modeling the toxicity of both nerve agents produced more accurate hazard areas. As mentioned, the 2000 estimate of agent released was less than half the 1997 estimate. However, the 2000 hazard area did not correspondingly decrease to half the size because of the relative increased toxicity of GF.[220]
• Atmospheric Removal Mechanisms - deposition and degradation included. We included deposition, i.e., settling to the surface, and degradation, often used synonymously with "decay," in the 2000 model. Both agent removal mechanisms more accurately depict the potential hazard area. Tab E explains in more detail the effects of removal mechanisms on the modeling process.
• Updated unit location and personnel data used. The USASCURR, with more than 855,000 unit locations in its database, maintains two data sets essential for determining veterans potentially exposed to the Khamisiyah hazard area. The first is a registry of Gulf War veterans provided by DMDC and the second is a registry of daily unit locations during the war. The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine combined USASCURR’s troop locations with the 2000 modeling results to produce graphic representations of the hazard area for March 10 - 13, 1991. We refer to these graphics as the 2000 hazard area results, discussed in the following paragraphs.

2000 modeling estimates of the Pit demolitions that remain unchanged from 1997. These estimates remained the same for the 2000 modeling as the 1997 modeling of the Pit:

• the fraction of chemical warfare agent that entered the atmosphere through instant aerosolization, and the fraction of agent that spilled on wood and soil and evaporated over time;
• the chemical warfare agent evaporation rates from wood and soil;
• the initial ratio of sarin to cyclosarin (3:1) in the agent cloud; and
• agent purity (50 percent)

U.S. Forces Possibly Exposed. The 1997 possibly exposed troop population was 98,910, compared to the 2000 potentially affected troop population of 100,923. Of that number, approximately 66,103 personnel were in both the 1997 and 2000 modeling potential hazard areas. Table 6 compares the daily differences of those troops possibly exposed in 1997 and 2000. Some soldiers were in the potential hazard areas on multiple days, so the total number of possible exposures in Table 6 is not the same number of individual soldiers possibly exposed.

Table 6. Comparing the daily differences in possible exposures

Comparing the 2000 to the 1997 hazard areas. Figures 43 - 50 compare and contrast the results of the 2000 models’ and the 1997 models’ potential hazard areas by day for March 10-13, 1991. Figure 51 shows a smaller scale view of the first noticeable effects area for the 2000 model (applies to March 10 only).

Exposure thresholds. We used two exposure thresholds in both our 1997 and 2000 modeling efforts: first noticeable effects and general population limit. We also use these thresholds in our modeling to describe areas of potential exposure.

• First noticeable effects (FNE). This is the dosage expected to cause watery eyes, runny nose, tightness of chest, muscle twitching, sweating, and headache. Dosage is a cumulative exposure—a concentration of a chemical warfare agent over time.  Increasingly higher dosages would produce vision impairment, incapacitation, and death.
• General population limit (GPL). The GPL represents the limit below which any member of the general population could be exposed (e.g., inhale) seven days a week, every week, for a lifetime, without experiencing any adverse health effects.  Scientists performed exposure testing and computed the GPL from the results of that testing as modified by uncertainty factors such as short-term to long-term exposure, average human to sensitive human population, etc.

Areas of potential exposure. 

• Low-level Hazard area.  In 1997, we defined the area between the two thresholds as the low-level hazard area, an area where long-term effects from low-level exposure is possible, but symptoms would not exist.
• Potential Hazard area.  In 2000, we refer to the area that meets or exceeds the GPL as the potential hazard area, an area where long-term effects from low-level exposure are possible and where acute symptoms might show.

Since the possible chemical warfare agent releases occurred over a four-day period, our 2000 modeling used the GPL based on short-term exposures, as recommended by the US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine.[221]  Figures 43-50 shows the maximum size of the potential hazard inside which personnel may have been exposed to a nerve agent concentration equal to or exceeding this GPL.  Exposure of personnel outside this area did not reach hazardous levels.  The dots on each graphic represent a unit’s or part of a unit’s location. The number of units is greater in 2000 because our knowledge of unit locations improved since 1997 due to the G3/S3 conferences.

Comparing each day’s hazard area from March 10 to 13, 1991.

Day 1: March 10, 1991 (Figures 43 - 44)

The 1997 hazard area generally extended in a north-south direction. Based on the wind models, the hazard area extended south-southwest almost 300 kilometers into Saudi Arabia, east of the city of Hafir Al Batin. The 2000 hazard area is bifurcated due to slight differences in the wind patterns predicted by the meteorological models but generally follows a north-south axis. The hazard area extends approximately the same distance but to the northwest of Hafir Al Batin. However, the 2000 hazard area extended further to the east and south into Kuwait indicating possible exposure to US personnel not in the 1997 hazard area. Approximately 70 percent of the 321 kilograms of chemical warfare agent modeled in 2000 had been dispersed into the atmosphere by the end of Day 1.

Figure 43. 1997 Potential Hazard area for Day 1: March 10, 1991

Figure 44. 2000 Potential Hazard area for Day 1: March 10, 1991

Day 2: March 11, 1991 (Figures 45 - 46)

Both models’ hazard areas have similar shapes. However, for the 2000 hazard area, the dispersion modeling assumed ultraviolet light from sunlight decayed the chemical warfare agent and thus reduced the size of the 2000 hazard area. The 1997 model did not consider sunlight effects on the hazard area, but we added these effects for the 2000 modeling at the recommendation of the 1997 peer review panel. Improved 2000 weather models reflected a shift in the wind to the south, which kept the 2000 hazard area mainly to the north and west of King Kalid Military City (KKMC), unlike the 1997 hazard area, which included KKMC and a much larger area to the west. Later nerve agent emissions evaporating from the soaked wood and soil in the Pit generated the four small hazard areas in the vicinity of Al Bussayyah and around Khamisiyah in the 2000 model. Approximately 89 percent of the 321 kilograms of the chemical warfare agent modeled in 2000 had dispersed into the atmosphere by the end of Day 2.

Figure 45. 1997 Potential Hazard area for Day 2: March 11, 1991

Figure 46. 2000 Potential Hazard area for Day 2: March 11, 1991

Day 3: March 12, 1991 (Figures 47 - 48)

The 1997 model shows the hazard area included some of the Euphrates River valley. The 2000 model hazard area is much smaller, due to incorporating two full days of ultraviolet light reaction in the dispersion model. By the third day the chemical warfare agent remaining in the atmosphere, soil, and wood was below the general population limit. Approximately 97 percent of the 321 kilograms of the chemical warfare agent modeled in 2000 had dispersed into the atmosphere by the end of Day 3.

Figure 47. 1997 Potential Hazard area for Day 3: March 12, 1991

Figure 48. 2000 Potential Hazard area for Day 3: March 12, 1991

Day 4: March 13, 1991 (Figures 49 - 50)

A miniscule amount of agent evaporation generated a very small hazard area in both models. Approximately 100 percent of the 321 kilograms of the chemical warfare agent modeled in 2000 had dispersed into the atmosphere by the end of Day 4.

Figure 49. 1997 Potential Hazard area for Day 4: March 13, 1991

Figure 50. 2000 Potential Hazard area for Day 4: March 13, 1991

First noticeable effects 2000 hazard area: March 10, 1991 (Figure 51). The darker, smaller area on this figure is the 2000 FNE hazard area, and it is within the 2000 models’ M8 alarm hazard area (that area in which the concentration of a chemical warfare agent would be enough to cause an M8 chemical agent detector to detect and sound an alarm for the presence of a nerve agent). Any person in the FNE hazard area would experience immediate visible signs of nerve agent exposure, such as tearing eyes or shortness of breath, and the M8 chemical agent detectors would have sounded a warning to go to a protective posture. No US units were in the first noticeable effects area in either the 1997 or 2000 models.

Figure 51. 2000 First noticeable effects and M8 alarm detection areas

Modeling Khamisiyah. Our modeling does not represent what really happened, but rather what may have happened, given what we know. Our modeling efforts over the past three years have suffered from the passage of time and a fundamental lack of measured data. We overcame single-model biases by using ensemble modeling techniques—using two or more models to predict the potential hazard area. Though we gained better data on the source term and also had improved models with which to work, we still did not have the accuracy and depth of data the models required to produce an accurate hazard area. Given the limited data we had, we estimated variables such as temperature, moisture, wind speed and direction, and the exact size of the source term. In the end, we again used conservative modeling parameters to attempt to identify the majority of those who may have been exposed in order to protect veterans’ health. Servicemembers should consider their own particular health circumstances and evaluate the information in this narrative, given the uncertainties of modeling the Khamisiyah pit demolition activities. The individual veteran’s health is our utmost concern, and we will leave no stone unturned to protect it.

This investigation sought the answers to two important questions:

• Did U.S. forces destroy chemical weapons stored at Khamisiyah?
• Were U.S. forces exposed to nerve agents as a result of demolition activities?

To assess the likelihood U.S. forces destroyed chemical weapons stored at Khamisiyah, we wanted to establish that U.S. troops conducted demolition operations there and chemical warfare agents were present during the demolitions.

U.S. Army engineers and explosive ordnance disposal personnel conducted two large-scale demolitions at Khamisiyah: one on March 4, 1991, and a second on March 10, 1991. Only bunkers were destroyed on March 4, 1991. The Pit, warehouses, and most of the remaining bunkers were destroyed on March 10, 1991. Hundreds of personal interviews of commanders, operations officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and NBC specialists from the engineer and EOD units confirmed the demolition operations. The 37th Engineer Battalion videotape of March 4, 1991 bunker inventories and subsequent bunker explosions, narrated by an engineer unit commander, provides insight into the magnitude of the effort required to destroy the Khamisiyah ASP. Personal diaries added details to the daily events of U.S. units involved in destroying the bunkers and warehouses. Unit logs and records and declassified intelligence documents further identified US participants in the Khamisiyah demolition operations.

During this investigation, we discovered significant evidence to support the presence of chemical weapons at Khamisiyah. Although U.S. forces did not identify chemical weapons during their inventory or demolition activities, subsequent UNSCOM inspections from October 1991 through the summer of 1998 documented chemical weapons in Bunker 73, the Pit, and at an open storage location three kilometers west of the main storage area. At the open storage location, UNSCOM inspectors tested a leaking 155mm artillery shell with a CAM and determined it contained the blister agent mustard. They also tested the 122mm rockets in the Pit and found they contained a mixture of the nerve agents sarin and cyclosarin. In May 1996, UNSCOM inspectors determined that some damaged rockets in the remains of Bunker 73 were chemical weapons, based on the rockets’ physical characteristics (high-density polyethylene inserts, burster tubes, and fill plugs). UNSCOM inspectors found additional nerve agent-filled rockets during their 1998 excavation of Bunker 73 and the Pit.

Intelligence Community reports and photographs and UNSCOM information were crucial in assessing whether U.S. forces destroyed chemical weapons at Khamisiyah. Bunker 73’s debris contained whole and fragmentary 122mm rockets bearing characteristics of chemical weapons. The rockets were thoroughly mixed in the debris and it is unlikely Iraq placed them there after the demolition to discredit the U.S. or deceive UNSCOM inspectors. UNSCOM unearthed chemical rockets in Bunker 73’s location, leaving no doubt at least some of the munitions in the bunker were chemical weapons when U.S. Army engineers destroyed it. We are less certain about the existence of chemical weapons in the Pit. Iraq claimed that they moved chemical rockets from Al Muthanna to Bunker 73 and then moved them to the Pit when some began to leak. Iraq officials took UNSCOM inspectors to the Pit in October 1991 and showed them several piles of rockets, which UNSCOM tested and found chemical warfare agents. In February 1992, UNSCOM found additional chemical warfare weapons buried in the Pit’s sand walls. The inspectors also found chemical weapons in a 1998 excavation of the Pit. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for Iraq to have buried those chemical weapons in the Pit, either to embarrass the U.S. or deceive the UNSCOM inspectors.

We have assessed that chemical warfare agents were present at Khamisiyah and U.S. soldiers definitely destroyed many, but not all, of the chemical agent weapons in the Pit and Bunker 73.  It is likely that the demolition of rockets in the Pit exposed some US units to very low levels of chemical warfare agents. UNSCOM inspectors verified the presence of chemical warfare agent rockets in the Pit, and our own investigation, supported by other DOD organizations and Intelligence Community investigations, have left little doubt that US units damaged or destroyed some of these rockets on March 10, 1991.

It is unlikely that the destruction of Bunker 73 exposed any U.S. military units to a chemical warfare agent. Units in the area evacuated to a safe distance from the storage area before the explosion. The demolition virtually destroyed Bunker 73 and the rains that followed would effectively have dissipated any chemical warfare agent vapors that might have escaped the force of the demolition. Winds blew whatever chemical agent vapors were present in the atmosphere away from U.S. units. In 1999, the CIA's estimated amount of agent release was 5 percent of that estimated in 1996, further reducing the possibility for exposure.  No evidence exists any soldiers at Khamisiyah exhibited symptoms consistent with exposure to a chemical warfare agent.

At the time of the cease-fire, the Coalition ground campaign had proceeded at an unprecedented rate, without Iraq using chemical weapons and with relatively few Coalition forces’ combat deaths. USCENTCOM assigned both VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps the missions to establish security in their respective operating areas and quickly destroy as much enemy equipment and munitions as possible. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) detachments had the specific tasks of identifying and destroying munitions in the theater of operations. Unfortunately, the task of destroying the vast quantities of munitions and equipment captured during Desert Storm was too large for the small number of EOD personnel in the KTO in the time available, and therefore fell to those not fully technically equipped for the task—combat engineers, combat soldiers and support personnel. The limited time available in which to conduct the demolition operations and the shortages of explosives, such as C4, among units further complicated the demolition tasks. Consequently, some units handled or destroyed munitions using procedures that created additional hazards and even loss of life, such as occurred at As Salman.   At many locations, engineers destroyed bunkers full of munitions, conducted hurried inventories and used improper amounts of explosives, resulting in flyouts or ejection of partially destroyed munitions which created unsafe conditions for everyone.  Safe removal of ordnance from the battlefield requires technical expertise, time, and proper explosives, and should remain an EOD function. However, the EOD specialist community would require additional resources to conduct munitions destruction operations on a scale similar to those in the post-cease-fire KTO. The Army should review manpower requirements for future likely scenarios involving EOD. Combat engineer officer basic and NCO training should include enhanced EOD training to provide a supplemental force with the requisite technical expertise to assist the EOD in similar situations.

During the Gulf War, intelligence staffs at all echelons received many reports of Iraq’s chemical warfare agent munitions markings. Command and operations staffs included information from some of these intelligence reports in their messages, which were widely distributed among U.S. forces in the Gulf.

Since the Gulf War, the Army Declassification Office received and declassified most of these command and operational messages. The operational and command messages about Iraq’s chemical warfare munitions markings accurately reflect similar messages sent within intelligence channels. All these messages contained contradictory descriptions of how Iraq marked chemical warfare agent munitions:

• Iraq marked chemical weapons without specifying how; 
• Iraq used no marking; and 
• Iraq used a particular color, but the reported colors varied. 

The existence of contradictory information on a single topic is an inherent part of intelligence collection. It does not reflect poorly on intelligence collection operations. However, recognizing—and calling attention to—the existence of such contradictory information is the responsibility of intelligence analysis. After searching thousands of intelligence documents, we found none that informed staffs of the existence of contradictory information on Iraq’s chemical munitions markings. Some people may see this as calling undue attention to an information gap. However, identifying the existence of such a gap would have helped planners recognize the danger of destroying Iraq’s munitions in the absence of definitive munitions recognition data. Intelligence analysts need to seek out and call attention to information gaps. Ultimately, it is the commander's responsibility to ensure his or her command has accurate, timely intelligence to accomplish the mission. It is the intelligence staff officer that must provide that accurate, timely intelligence.

At the conclusion of the Gulf War, the UN created UNSCOM to identify and destroy Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. UNSCOM obtained Iraq’s weapons declarations and inspected nuclear, biological, and chemical production facilities. In October 1999, the United Nations discontinued UNSCOM inspections and weapons destruction missions.

Sections III E through H of this narrative and the CIA’s, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence" (posted on GulfLINK on April 9, 1997), recount in detail the events that led to the discovery of chemical weapons destruction at Khamisiyah. Analysis of historical documents indicates that DOD received and retransmitted messages containing details of UNSCOM inspections to USCENTCOM and other unified and specified commands. DOD, USCENTCOM, and the State Department did not recognize the significance of UNSCOM’s discovery of chemical munitions destruction at Khamisiyah. DOD, in conjunction with the Intelligence Community and State Department, should monitor events in US-occupied areas during deployments and after redeployments to prevent another incident like Khamisiyah.

In the Gulf War, soldiers’ training included identifying potential chemical weapons by their distinctive markings or physical characteristics. Not only was the information on markings confusing and misleading, but also the issued chemical warfare agent detection equipment had technical limitations that restricted their use. Design of the chemical warfare agent detection equipment, such as the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) used to detect vapors, required a leaking munition before a detection could occur. Although many groups—combat units, support personnel, engineer units, EOD detachments—had roles in destroying various sized munitions caches, CAM availability among those groups was limited by the total number of CAMs in the theater and the various types of units destroying munitions.  Many of those units simply were not issued a CAM.  Approximately 1,300 CAMs were deployed in the theater, not enough to support unit requirements down to the company level.  U.S. EOD personnel were well trained and had the best chemical warfare agent detection equipment at that time. However, U.S. forces did not have chemical warfare agent detection equipment that could distinguish intact chemical warfare agent-filled munitions. Properly employed, chemical warfare agent detection equipment possibly can prevent the accidental destruction of munitions containing chemical warfare agents. DOD should field state-of-the-art chemical warfare agent detection equipment for its forces.

This case is still being investigated. As additional information becomes available, it will be incorporated. If you have records, photographs, recollections, or find errors in the details reported, please contact my office at 1-800-497-6261.

Abn Airborne (type of unit)

ACIS Arms Control Intelligence Staff

ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment (Army unit)

ARCENT US Army Component, Central Command

ASP Ammunition supply point

BW biological warfare

C4 Compound 4 (an explosive)

CAM Chemical Agent Monitor

CBW chemical and biological warfare

CCEP Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program

CENTAF Air Force Component, Central Command

CHPPM US Army Center for Health Promotion and Prevention Medicine

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COAMPS Coupled Ocean-Atmosphere Mesoscale Prediction System

COMUSARCENT Commander, US Army Central Command

CW chemical warfare

CW/BW Chemical weapons/biological weapons

DCI Director, Central Intelligence

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

Div Division (type of unit)

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center

DOD Department of Defense

DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DVA Department of Veterans Affairs

ECMWF European Centre for Medium-Range Forecasts

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ESG Environmental Support Group

FRAGO fragmentary order

GDAS Global Data Assimilation System

HPAC Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability

IDA Institute for Defense Analyses

KKMC King Khalid Military City

KTO Kuwait Theater of Operations

MARCENT Marine Corps Component, Central Command

mm millimeter

MM5 Mesoscale Model, Version 5

NAVCENT  Navy Component, Central Command

NCAR National Center for Atmospheric Research

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NOGAPS Naval Operational Global Atmospheric Prediction System

NRL Naval Research Laboratory

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center

NUSSE4 Non-uniform Simple Surface Evaporation 4 transport and diffusion model

NW northwest

OMEGA Operational Multi-scale Environmental Model with Grid Adaptivity

OPLAN Operations Plan

OPORD Operations Order

OSD Office of the Security of Defense

PAC Presidential Advisory Commission on Gulfwar Veterans' Illnesses 

PGIT Persian Gulf Investigation Team

PSOB Presidential Special Oversight Board for the Department of Defense
Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents

RGFC Republican Guard Forces Command

SAIC Science Applications International Corporations

SCIPUFF Second Order Closer, Integrated Puff

SE southeast

US United States

USCENTCOM    US Central Command

UN United Nations

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commissions on Iraq

USASCURR US Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research

USCINCCENT Commander-in-Chief, US Central Command 

UTM Universal Transverse Mercator

UXO unexploded ordnance

VLSTRACK Vapor, Liquid, and Solid Tracking

Blister Agent 

A blister agent is a chemical warfare agent that produces local irritation and damage to the skin and mucous membranes, pain and injury to the eyes, reddening and blistering of the skin, and when inhaled, damage to the respiratory tract. Blister agents include mustards (HD, HN, HQ, HT, and Q), arsenicals like lewisite (L), and mustard and lewisite mixtures (HL). Blister agents are also called vesicants or vesicant agents.[223,224]

Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)

A CAM is a hand-held, soldier-operated device that is used to monitor chemical warfare agent contamination on individuals and equipment.[225]

Chemical warfare agent (CWA)

A CWA is a chemical substance excluding riot control agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame, used in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate through its physiological effects. Included are blood, nerve, blister, choking, and incapacitating agents.[226]

Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program (CCEP)

Developed by a multi-disciplinary team of DOD and DVA medical specialists, the Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program provides a two-phase, comprehensive medical evaluation. Phase I is conducted at the local medical treatment facility and consists of a history and medical examination comparable in scope and thoroughness to an in-patient hospital admissions evaluation. The medical review includes questions about family history, health, occupation, unique exposures in the Gulf War, and a structured review of symptoms.

Health care providers specifically inquire about the symptoms and Persian Gulf exposures listed on the CCEP Provider-Administered Patient Questionnaire. The medical examination focuses on patients' symptoms and health concerns and includes standard laboratory tests (complete blood count, urinalysis, serum chemistries) and other tests as clinically indicated.

Individuals who require additional evaluation after completing the Phase I evaluation and appropriate consultations may be referred to one of 14 Regional Medical Centers for Phase II evaluations. Regional Medical Centers are tertiary care medical centers that have representation from most major medical disciplines. Phase II evaluations consist of symptom-specific examinations, additional laboratory tests, and specialty consultations according to the prescribed protocol.[227]

Cyclosarin

A nerve agent known as GF. Chemical name: O-Cyclohexyl-methylfluorophosphonate[228]

Dosage

Dosage is a cumulative exposure. It is the concentration of a chemical warfare agent to which an individual is exposed over a specific period of time.[229]

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include removal of explosive ordnance that has become hazardous by damage or deterioration.[230]

First Noticeable Effect (FNE)

First noticeable effect (FNE). This is the dose expected to cause watery eyes, runny nose, tightness of chest, muscle twitching, sweating, and headache. Increasingly higher dosages would produce vision impairment, incapacitation, and death. (Dosage is a cumulative exposure. It is the concentration of a chemical warfare agent to which an individual is exposed over a specific period of time.)[231]

Fox Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance System

The Fox vehicle is a six-wheeled, light armored vehicle designed primarily for reconnaissance of liquid chemical warfare agent hazards. On-board chemical warfare agent detection capabilities include the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer, which is the primary detection device, the M43A1 chemical agent detector, which is an integral component of the M8 alarm system, and the M256A1 chemical agent detector kit. The Fox is also equipped with two radiation detectors. The Fox does not provide any biological warfare agent detection capability, but it does protect the crew from biological hazards, and it allows the crew to mark areas of potential hazard and safely take samples for laboratories to analyze for biological hazards.[232]

GA

A G-series nerve agent known as tabun. Chemical name:  Ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate[233]

GB

A G-series nerve agent known as sarin. Chemical name:  Isopropyl methyl phosphonofluoridate[234]

GD

A G-series nerve agent known as soman. Chemical name:  Pinacolyl methyl phosphonofluoridate[235]

GF

A G-series nerve agent known as cyclosarin. Chemical Name:  O-Cyclohexyl-methylfluorophosphonate[236]

G-series nerve agents

G-series nerve agents are lethal chemical warfare agents that work by inhibiting the proper functioning of the cholinesterase enzymes needed for the transmission of nerve impulses throughout the body. These agents affect the functioning of all bodily systems, including the eyes, nose, throat, lungs, and muscles. The G-series nerve agents include tabun (GA), sarin (GB), soman (GD), and cyclosarin (GF). The normal sequence of symptoms is a running nose, tightness of the chest, dimness of vision and pinpointing of the eye pupils, difficulty breathing, drooling and excessive sweating, nausea, vomiting, cramps, involuntary defecation and urination, twitching, jerking and staggering, headache, confusion, drowsiness, and coma. Cessation of breathing and death follow.[237]

General Population Limit

General population limit (GPL). The GPL represents the limit at or below which any member of the general population could be exposed (e.g., inhale) seven days a week, every week, for a lifetime, without experiencing any adverse health effects.  Since the potential nerve agent exposure releases at Khamisiyah would result in exposures for a brief period, in modeling our potential hazard area we used a short-term exposure limit, recommended by the US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, [238] and based on the lifetime GPL.

Global Positioning System

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a DoD developed, worldwide, satellite-based radionavigation system that will be the DoD’s primary radionavigation system well into the next century. The constellation consists of 24 operational satellites. The US Air Force Space Command formally declared the GPS satellite constellation as having met the requirement for full operational capability as of April 27, 1995.[239]

GulfLINK

A World Wide Web site maintained by the Office of the Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses (www.health.mil/GulfLINK).

HD

A blister agent known as distilled mustard. Chemical name: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide[240]

Intelligence Community

The Intelligence Community comprises the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State), National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, military services’ intelligence staffs and centers, and several other organizations within the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice, and Energy. Intelligence related to military efforts includes information at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.[241]

L

A blister agent known as lewisite. Chemical name:  L: Dichloro-(2-chlorovinyl)arsine[242]

M256 chemical warfare agent detector kit

In the field, the M256-series chemical warfare agent detector kit is referred to simply as the M256 kit. The M256 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of detecting and identifying hazardous concentrations of blister, blood, and nerve agents. The M256 kit is used after a chemical warfare agent warning to test for and confirm the presence and type of chemical warfare agent, and to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. US forces used both the M256 kit and the M256A1 kit were used during the Gulf War.

Some smokes, high temperatures, standard US decontamination solution number two (DS2), and petroleum products may cause false readings. Results may be inaccurate when sampling is performed in smoke from burning debris.[243]

M8A1 chemical alarm

The M8A1 is an automatic chemical agent detection and warning system designed to detect the presence of nerve agent vapors or inhalable aerosols. The M8A1 will automatically signal the presence of the nerve agent in the air with both an audible and visual warning. The US military fielded the M8A1 to replace the wet chemical M8 detector—which eliminated the M229 refill kit, the logistic burden, and associated costs. The M8A1 operates in a fixed, portable, or vehicle mounted configuration.[244]

Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)

Mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) is a flexible system used to direct the wearing of chemical protective garments and mask—a system that balances mission requirements with the chemical warfare agent threat. Wearing the chemical protective garments and mask provides individuals protection against most known chemical warfare agents, biological agents, and toxins.

At MOPP Level 0 individuals carry their protective mask while their remaining MOPP gear must be readily available (e.g., within the work area, fighting position, living space, etc). At MOPP Level 1, individuals wear their overgarment and carry the rest of their MOPP gear. At MOPP Level 2, individuals wear their overgarment and overboots while carrying the mask with hood and gloves. At MOPP Level 3, individuals wear their overgarment, overboots, and mask with hood, but not the gloves. At MOPP Level 4, individuals wear all their MOPP gear.[245] Commanders can raise or lower the amount of protection through five levels of MOPP. In addition, commanders, under certain situations, can exercise a mask-only option.[246]

Nerve agents

Nerve agents are the most toxic of the chemical warfare agents. Nerve agents are absorbed into the body through breathing, by injection, or absorption through the skin. They affect the nervous and the respiratory systems and various body functions. They include the G-series and V-series chemical warfare agents.[247]

Sarin

A nerve agent known as GB. Chemical name: Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate[248]

Soman

A nerve agent known as GD. Chemical name: Pinacolyl methyl phosphonofluoridate[249]

Tabun

A nerve agent known as GA. Chemical name: Ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate[250]

VX

V-series nerve agent
Chemical Name: O-ethyl-S-(2-diisopropylaminoethyl)methylphosphonothiolate[251]

• 1-319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment,
• 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment,
• 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment,
• 2-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment,
• 3-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment,
• 3-73rd Armor Battalion,
• 307th Engineer Battalion,
• 307th Medical Battalion,
• 313th Military Intelligence Battalion,
• 37th Engineer Battalion,
• 450th Civil Affairs Battalion,
• 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment,
• 82nd Engineer Battalion,
• 84th Engineer Company,
• 92nd Chemical Platoon
• HQ, 3/82nd Airborne Division,
• HQ, 82nd Airborne Division,
• Various direct support or attached units to the above.

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tactical command post journal, 28 MAR 91.

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment: "War Stories: Oral History," Date Received July 6, 1996.

VII Corps message, Subject: "FRAGO 189-91," 271500C MAR 91.

VII Corps message, Subject: "Response to [Redacted] Suspected Chem/Bio Weapons Storage Sites in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations prior to the Ground War," April 1991.

VII Corps, Tactical command post journal, 28 MAR 91.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Desert Shield Chronology for February 1991, 231630Z February 1991 entry.

XVIII Airborne Corps handbook, Subject: "Demilitarization of Iraqi Equipment," Feb. 20, 1991.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions," 270845Z FEB 91.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "Chem Munition Marking Colors," 280700Z FEB 91.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "Demilitarization of Iraqi Equipment," Feb. 20, 1991.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "Forces Capabilities in a Chemical Environment," 221455Z FEB 91.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "FRAGO 74 to XVIII Airborne Corps Operations Order Desert Storm," 271830Z FEB 91.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "FRAGO 78 to XVIII Airborne Corps Operations Order Desert Storm," February 28, 1991.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "FRAGO 81 to XVIII Airborne Corps Operations Order Desert Storm," MAR 3, 1991.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "Request for Technical Assistance," 181030Z FEB 91.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Agent Contamination," 031015ZFeb 91.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Situation report, 282200Z FEB 91.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Situation report, 0222000Z MAR 91.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Situation report, 052200Z MAR 91.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Tactical operations center journal, 1207020 MAR 91.

XVIII Airborne Corps, Tactical operations center log, February 26, 1991, and supporting handwritten action message form.

20th Engineer Brigade, Message, Subject: "FRAGO 27 to 20th Engineer Brigade Operations Order Desert Storm," 012330C MAR 91.

20th Engineer Brigade, Message, Subject: "Markings on Chemical Munitions," 280900Z Feb 91.

37th Engineer Battalion, Log, February 24 to Mar 10, 1991.

37th Engineer Battalion, Mission update, March 1991.

37th Engineer Battalion, Videotape, March 4, 1991.

82nd Airborne Division chemical officer's handwritten message, 230900Z MAR 91.

82nd Airborne Division engineer, Message, Subject: "307th Engineering Battalion Operations Summary," 230600Z MAR 91.

937th Engineer Group, Engineer situation report, 021212C MAR 91.

Anthes, Richard; Steve Hanna, Bruce Hicks, and Will Pendergrass, "Comments on Khamisiyah Modeling Document Entitled ‘Methodology of Refined Modeling of the Khamisiyah Pit Demolition’ dated 23 February 2000," March 22, 2000.

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The DOD requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community which had chemical weapons experience (e.g., the United Nations’ investigation of the chemical weapons used during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war). Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigation and validation protocols[252] to provide objective procedures for possible chemical weapons incidents. The methodology we are using is based on these international protocols and guidelines. The methodology includes:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation, or human or animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• The testimony of witnesses;=
• Multiple analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While the methodology used to investigate chemical incidents (Figure 52) is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. The major efforts in our methodology are:

• To substantiate the incident;
• To document available medical reports related to the incident;
• To interview appropriate people;
• To obtain information available to external organizations; and
• To assess the results.

Figure 52. Chemical Incident Investigation Methodology

A case usually starts with a report of a possible chemical warfare agent incident, often from a veteran. To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches for documentation from operational, intelligence, and environmental logs. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard," as well as anecdotal, evidence.

Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate a chemical warfare agent presence. The investigator looks for physical evidence collected at the time of the incident that might indicate that chemical agents were present in the vicinity of the incident. Such evidence might include tissue samples, body fluid samples, clothing, environmental samples of soil or vegetation, weapons parts, and Fox MM-1 tapes with properly documented spectrums.

The investigator searches available medical records to determine if anyone was injured by the incident. Deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc., near the time and location of an incident are noted and considered. Medical experts are asked to provide information about any alleged chemical warfare agent casualties.

Interviews of those involved in or near the incident (participants or witnesses) are conducted. First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of those involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. Nuclear, biological, and chemical officers or specialists trained in chemical testing, confirmation, and reporting are interviewed to identify the unit’s response, the tests that were run, the injuries sustained, and the reports submitted. Commanders are contacted to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made concerning the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of the incident. Where appropriate, subject matter experts also provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment, and submit their evaluations of selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to provide additional clarifying information about the case. These would include, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case;
• The clinical registries of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs which may provide data about the medical condition of those involved in the incident; and
• Agencies capable of computer modeling meteorological and source characterization data in cases where airborne dispersion of agent is suspected.

Once the investigation is complete, the investigator evaluates the available evidence in order to make a subjective assessment. The available evidence is often incomplete or contradictory and thus must be looked at in the total context of what is known about the incident being investigated. Physical evidence collected at the time of the incident, for example, can be of tremendous value to an investigation. Properly documented physical evidence would generally be given the greatest weight in any assessment. The testimony of witnesses and contemporaneous operational documentation is also significant when making an assessment. Testimony from witnesses who also happen to be subject matter experts is usually more meaningful than testimony from untrained observers. Typically, secondhand accounts are given less weight than witness testimony. When investigators are presented with conflicting witness testimony, they look for other pieces of information supporting the statements of the witnesses. Investigators evaluate the supporting information to determine how it corroborates any of the conflicting positions. Generally, such supporting information will fit into a pattern corroborating one of the conflicting accounts of the incident over the others. Where the bulk of corroborating evidence supports one witness more than another, that person’s information would be considered more compelling.

Our assessments rely on the investigators' evaluation of the available information for each investigation. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 53) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. The investigator will use this scale to make a tentative assessment based on facts available as of the date of the report publication. Each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 53. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: Do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence can be found.

In 1996, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported on computer modeling it had used to simulate possible releases of chemical warfare agents from several sites. However, because the CIA used only a single model approach, their results reflected the strengths and weaknesses of only that model. On November 2, 1996, to improve computer modeling over the earlier CIA results, the DOD asked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to convene an independent panel of experts in meteorology, physics, chemistry, and related disciplines.[253] The panel reviewed previous modeling analyses and recommended using multiple atmospheric models and data sources for future modeling to generate a more robust result than produced by a single model.[254]

Consequently, the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses agreed to new modeling to estimate the areas of possible exposure to chemical warfare agents that may have been released during Gulf War air operations and post-war demolitions.

The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses uses computer simulations because on-site measurements of chemical agent exposure were unavailable and the local weather conditions were not always measured or recorded. To implement the recommendations of the IDA panel, the DOD and CIA asked other agencies with extensive modeling experience to participate in the modeling process. The modeling team consists of scientists from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) (formerly the Defense Special Weapons Agency); the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL); the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC); the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR); and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) (supporting the CIA and DTRA). This team uses existing sophisticated computer models, as recommended by the IDA panel, to develop potential exposure areas specific to each incident under investigation. The team combines these models (referred to as an ensemble) to compensate for the bias that is inherent in each model, that is, to produce a more robust result by maximizing the strengths of each model and minimizing its weaknesses.

We adopted the IDA panel recommendation to use an ensemble of weather and dispersion models combined with global data sources to assess the possible dispersion of chemical warfare agents. The methodology for modeling the release of agent is a process that uses:

• A source characterization to describe the type and amount of agent released, and how rapidly it discharged;
• Data from global weather models to simulate global weather patterns;
• Regional weather models to simulate the weather in the vicinity of the suspected agent release;
• Transport and dispersion models (often simply called dispersion models) to project the possible spread of the agent as a result of the simulated regional weather; and
• A database of Gulf War unit locations to plot probable military unit locations in relation to the hazard area and estimate possible exposures.

Figure 54 depicts the methodology we use to estimate possible hazard areas and, in the process, possible exposures of military units.

Figure 54. Process for modeling possible chemical warfare agent releases

The methodology uses two types of models: weather models and dispersion models. The weather models allow us to simulate the weather conditions in specific areas of interest by approximating both global and regional weather patterns. Based on the weather generated by a global model, a regional weather model predicts the local weather conditions in the vicinity of a possible chemical warfare agent release. Both the global and regional weather modeling is supplemented by actual, although quite limited, weather measurements from the Persian Gulf and surrounding regions.

The dispersion models allow us to simulate how chemical warfare agents may move and diffuse in the atmosphere given the predicted local weather conditions. These models combine the source characteristics of the agent—including the amount of agent, the type of agent, the location of the release, and the release rate—with the local weather from the regional models to predict how the agent might disperse. Running one dispersion model with the weather conditions predicted by one regional model results in a prediction of a unique downwind hazard area. Running each dispersion model with the weather from each of the different regional weather models results in a set of unique hazard areas. We overlay all of these hazard areas to create a union, or composite, of the various projections. The resulting composite graphic provides the most credible array of potential agent vapor hazard areas for determining where military units might have been exposed.[255] This is the basic process for all of our modeling efforts.

The global weather models forecast atmospheric conditions over the globe. To perform calculations, the models mainly rely on observations collected from a global network of land-based weather stations, sea-based ships or buoys, and remote sensing satellites. Agencies such as the World Meteorological Organization distribute these data for the use of civilian agencies. Because of the vast domain (i.e., the whole globe), the global models can only provide general weather information.

We use three sources for global weather data:

• The Global Data Assimilation System (GDAS),[256] developed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in Washington, DC;
• The Naval Operational Global Atmospheric Prediction System (NOGAPS),[257] developed by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) in Monterey, California; and
• A database developed by the European Centre for Medium-Range Forecasts (ECMWF)[258] in Reading, United Kingdom.

These sources collect and process weather observations differently, and maintain historical archives. Consequently, their archives provided historical and simulated global weather data for our analyses. The only exception was that we reran the NOGAPS model specially for our applications.

Regional weather models, sometimes called mesoscale meteorological models, generate the estimated local weather conditions in the detail required by the dispersion models. To predict detailed local atmospheric conditions, regional models take the outputs from global models to yield weather estimates where the resolution can be reduced to a few kilometers.

We use three regional models: 

• The Coupled Ocean-Atmosphere Mesoscale Prediction System (COAMPS) developed and run by NRL;[259]
• The Operational Multi-scale Environmental Model with Grid Adaptivity (OMEGA) developed for the DTRA[260] and run by SAIC; and
• The Mesoscale Model, Version 5 (MM5),[261] developed by Pennsylvania State University and the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), a subordinate element of NOAA.

These models simulate atmospheric conditions for advanced, high-resolution weather forecasting. They have the ability to simulate local weather conditions to a few square kilometers. Although these models operate differently, they all produce the detailed meteorological data needed to run the dispersion models. Because of differences in input data, modeling processes, and the physical process assumptions, each regional model produces different results. However, careful analysis of each simulation has shown that the outputs among the regional models are generally consistent.

Dispersion models predict possible downwind hazard areas. These hazard areas indicate how the chemical warfare agent disperses over time due to prevailing local atmospheric conditions. Dispersion model results depend on both the local weather descriptions, created by the regional weather models, and other modeling assumptions, including:

• Source characterization. The dispersion models require detailed source information that characterizes the agents and their conditions and mechanisms of release. Such collective information is referred to as the source term or source characterization. Source characterization defines the quantity and characteristics of the possible chemical warfare agent release, including such technical details as the amount of agent in a weapon, total amount of agent released as a vapor or liquid, the purity of the agent, and how quickly it was released. It also identifies the date and time of release. For our modeling efforts, the CIA provides source characterization data, developed in coordination with our analysts. Data from publicly released reports by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq also contribute to the source characterization.
• Removal Mechanisms. Chemical warfare agents are highly reactive chemical compounds. The very chemical and physical properties that make them dangerous also make them susceptible to reacting with substances in the environment. These reactions, in turn, may result in significant reductions in the agent’s effectiveness. The overall effect of this interaction is an estimated reduction (or removal) of the agent available over time (sometimes called degradation) to create a potential exposure hazard. Earlier modeling did not consider this deterioration, but our current modeling includes degradation in the environment to be more realistic and better reflect what happens under real world conditions, making our current hazard area predictions more accurate.
• Exposure Thresholds. Chemical warfare agents are substances that are intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate through physiological effects. Therefore, a large body of scientific research and public health information is available that addresses thresholds such as exposure concentration, exposure duration, and exposure dosage (concentration accumulated over time). These thresholds include the General Population Limit (GPL) and the First Noticeable Effects (FNE)[262] values for chemical warfare agents. By incorporating these values into the simulation runs of the dispersion models, we are able to define the boundaries of the potential exposure hazard areas.

We use two dispersion models: 

• The Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC)[263] or, more specifically, the Second Order Closure, Integrated Puff (SCIPUFF) transport module of HPAC run by DTRA; and
• The Vapor, Liquid, and Solid Tracking (VLSTRACK)[264] model maintained by the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) in Dahlgren, VA.

Because of their different inherent assumptions, these two dispersion models generate slightly different results even with the same weather inputs and source characterization. An analogy would be different weather models produce different forecasts even when using the same observed data. As a result, combining all regional weather models with each dispersion model can create multiple distinct hazard areas.

The IDA technical review panel hypothesized that because of the uncertainty of modeling and because of the consistency of the simulations, the results of each simulation are equally likely to accurately reflect what may have really occurred.[265] Therefore, we combine all hazard projections generated by HPAC or VLSTRACK to create a single hazard area combining all exposure areas from all of the dispersion model runs. This approach provides a high probability that the exposure area included all units possibly exposed. Figure 55 depicts the process for creating a composite hazard projection.

Figure 55. Example of process for creating a composite hazard area

We send the hazard projection graphics derived from the dispersion models to the US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM.)[266] CHPPM overlays the hazard projection graphics with data on U.S. unit locations to create an exposure plot showing the areas and levels of possible exposure.

Two DOD organizations, the U.S. Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research (USASCURR) and the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), provide the databases used to determine unit locations during the Gulf War and who was in each unit in the possible exposure hazard areas. We cross-reference, validate, refine, and update the unit location data to ensure the accuracy of whether a unit was in an exposure area at a specific time.

Weather models represent our best attempts to approximate actual atmospheric conditions. They do not replicate reality with absolute certainty, but modern modeling techniques enable us to generate reasonably close approximations. We simulate regional weather conditions using weather modeling. Dispersion models then work with the simulated weather to project the overall agent distribution in the area. The composite hazard projection area represents an average picture. Since the atmosphere is inherently turbulent in nature, the actual concentration of agent within the hazard area might not be the same throughout the projected area. As a result, modeling predicts that the concentration of chemical warfare agent is at the exposure threshold throughout the hazard area, even though the agent may not necessarily be everywhere in the area. We can only conclude that individuals within the hazard projection area may have been exposed to the calculated concentration of agent multiplied by the time of exposure across the entire hazard area.

CIA estimated the quantity, type, and storage configuration of chemical warfare agents stored at the sites under investigation. The source characterizations tend to overstate the size of the release to minimize risk of failing to identify all of the agent that might have been released. Presenting a composite of the different modeling results is another method to minimize the risk of missing veterans who may have been in a hazard area. This is because if we are to err, we would prefer to identify a veteran incorrectly as possibly exposed rather than fail to recognize a veteran who was exposed.

The Khamisiyah narrative published in April 1997 and the DOD/CIA paper, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," published Sept. 4, 1997, described the methodology used to identify approximately 21,000 Gulf War veterans thought to be within a 50 kilometer radius of Khamisiyah during the first two weeks of March 1991. The Special Assistant sent a letter and a survey about the Khamisiyah events to the veterans. The US Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research (USASCURR) and the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provide the databases used to determine unit locations during the Gulf War and who was in each unit in the possible exposure hazard areas. USASCURR derived unit locations from a review of a large number of Gulf War unit records. USASCURR began the review in mid-1994, declared their database operational in Fall 1995, and has continually updated it as they obtained additional unit locations. USASCURR gathered unit location information from a wide range of sources, including unit history data archives, operational logs, situation reports, after action reports and historical reports. The initial effort to record unit location data received a big boost in March 1995 when the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Gulf War Declassification Project. The Services’ declassification offices led the DOD-wide effort to review Gulf War operational records, declassify them, and routinely make these documents available to USASCURR and to the Office of the Special Assistant.

In April 1997, the Office of the Special Assistant needed to have available improved unit locations to accurately identify veterans to complement the ongoing DOD/CIA modeling effort to better reflect the potential downwind hazard area. Specifically, the Office of the Special Assistant needed to determine the veterans’ unit locations during the period March 10 - 13, 1991. Although veterans were either assigned or attached to specific units during the Gulf War, a unit’s location on a specific day may not, necessarily, pinpoint where an individual soldier was on that day. For example, a precise record of a location for a soldier on patrol or in transit to another location would not exist.

To assist in identifying additional unit locations and to verify existing locations in the Persian Gulf Registry, the Office of the Special Assistant and the Department of the Army began a coordinated effort to assemble former Gulf War brigade, divisional, and non-divisional operations officers (G3s/S3s). Initially, the Office of the Special Assistant and the Department of the Army brought operations officers from the XVIII Airborne Corps—whose area of responsibility included Khamisiyah during March 10 - 13, 1991—to USASCURR to review, refine, and enhance their units’ location information. G3s and S3s from the 101st Airborne Division, 24th Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Division, XVIII Airborne Corps’ separate brigades, combat support and combat service support units, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Cavalry Division met in small groups for a week at a time to review the information contained in the unit locations registry. The productive results of this first series of conferences and the realization, in July 1997, that the Khamisiyah potential hazard area extended beyond the original estimate of a 50-kilometer radius convinced the Office of the Special Assistant and Department of the Army leadership that they needed to continue the conferences for other Army units that deployed during the Gulf War. Thus, the G3/S3 conferences for unit location database improvement continued from September 1997 through June 1998 as the Office of the Special Assistant and the Department of the Army brought back VII Corps and Echelons-Above-Corps operations officers to review their unit locations and to enhance the database. This effort significantly enhanced the USASCURR database and was the basis for reducing the uncertainties associated with locating U.S. units around Khamisiyah during the demolitions. While the G3/S3 conferences ended in June 1998, the Office of the Special Assistant and USASCURR continue to work together to improve the locations and personnel databases.

The USASCURR now has more than 855,000 unit locations in its database of daily unit locations during the war. The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine combined USASCURR’s unit locations with DMDC’s registry of Gulf War Veterans and the 1997 and 2000 modeling results to produce graphic representations of the potential hazard areas for March 10 - 13, 1991.

When we assisted DMDC to provide better linking of individual veterans to units, we filled in major gaps in identifying assigned and attached unit personnel. The combined improvements in unit location data with unit manpower information has resulted in Table 7:

Table 7. Unit location data and manpower information improvements

Center For Disease Control

"Background Document on Gulf War-Related Research," The Health Impact of Chemical Exposures During the Gulf War: A Research Planning Conference, February 28 - March 2, 1999, Atlanta, Georgia; web site www.cdc.gov/nceh/meetings/1999/gulfwar/Doc_chapters/toc.pdf (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

Central Intelligence Agency

"16 Suspect CW/BW Storage Sites Identified in 28 February 1991 CENTCOM Message: A Statement for the Record by Robert D Walpole Special Assistant to the DCI for Persian gulf War Illnesses Issues, Central Intelligence Agency to the President Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Sept. 4, 1997; web site www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gulfwar/208/marcent.html (as of November 22, 2000).

"17 Suspect CW/BW Storage Sites Identified in 28 February 1991 CENTCOM Message: A Statement for the Record by Robert D Walpole Special Assistant to the DCI for Persian gulf War Illnesses Issues, Central Intelligence Agency to the President Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses," Sept. 4, 1997; web site www.gwvi.ncr.gov/0730gulf.html (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

"CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses," August 2, 1996; web site www.gulflink.health.mil/cia_report/102496_war.html (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

"CIA Support to the US Military During the Persian Gulf War," June 16, 1997; web site www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gulfwar/061997/support.htm (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

"Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit (U)," September 4, 1997; web site www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gulfwar/555/425055597.html (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997; Web site www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gulfwar/whiteper/index.htm (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Statement of Robert D Walpole Special Assistant to the ADCI for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues Before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses," March 18,1997; web site www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gulfwar/walpole2/creation.htm (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

"Status of the Efforts of the DCI Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force: A Statement for the Record by Robert D Walpole Special Assistant to the DCI for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues, Central Intelligence Agency to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses," September 4, 1997; web site www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gulfwar/208/clos.html (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

Office of the Inspector General Special Assessment, "The Central Intelligence Agency’s Handling of Information Related to the Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Depot," issued Feb. 5, 1998. (Classified)

Department of Army Inspector General

"Inquiry into Demolition of Iraq Ammunition, September 1996 - October 1997," October 10, 1997; web site www.gulflink.health.mil/army_ig/ (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

Department of Defense Inspector General 

"Report Of Investigation Concerning The Missing U.S. Central Command Nuclear, Biological And Chemical Desk Logs," October 20, 1997; web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dodig/ (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee

Mitre Corporation, "Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DoD," (Draft), June 9, 1997. (Classified)

Mitre Corporation, Standalone Version of Chapter 11, "Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release;" web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mitre_report/1997254-0000139_0000001.html (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

Institute For Defense Analyses

"Report of the Panel Reviewing Analysis of the Khamisiyah Pit Release of Nerve Agent in March 1991," July 1997; web site www.gulflink.health.mil/ida_report/ (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

National Imagery And Mapping Agency

The Khamisiyah Depot: An Imagery Review of Chemical Weapons-Related Activity (U) June 1977. (Classified)

Office of Special Assistant To Deputy Secretary of Defense For Gulf War Illnesses

ARCENT Suspected Chemical Weapons Sites Investigation (Close-Out Report), March 14, 2000; web site www.gulflink.health.mil/arcent/ (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

Presidential Advisory Committee On Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses

"Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses Final Report," December 31, 1996; web site www.gwvi.ncr.gov/finalcvr.html (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

United Kingdom, Ministry of Defense

Reports and Memoranda, Review of Events Concerning 32 Field Hospital and the Release of Nerve Agent Arising from US Demolition of Iraqi Munitions at the Khamisiyah Depot in March 1991, December 1999; web site http://www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=996 (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

"Reports and Memoranda, A Review of UK Forces Chemical Warfare Agent Alerts during the 1990/1991 Gulf conflict July 2000 - A review of UK chemical warfare agent alerts from August 1990 to March 1991," January 2000; Web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=989 (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

"Research into Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Epidemiological Studies;" web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=967 (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

Reports and Memoranda, "Organophosphate Pesticide Investigation Team (OPPIT) - Substantive Report," December 6, 1996; Web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=979 (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

U.S. Senate Veteran's Affairs Committee Special Investigative Unit

Report Of The Special Investigation Unit On Gulf War Illnesses, Volume I, 1996; web site www.senate.gov/~veterans/siu.htm (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

Report Of The Special Investigation Unit On Gulf War Illnesses, Volume II, 1998;

web site www.gulflink.health.mil/library/senate/siu_index.html (as of Nov. 22, 2000).

We originally published this narrative on Feb. 21, 1997.  Since that time, we intensified our efforts to address the five questions that had remained unanswered in the first publication and to fully understand the effects of the demolition operations on US soldiers.  Hundreds of additional veteran's interviews provided answers to the remaining questions from the first publication.  Research added insight into Iraq's chemical munitions markings and the ambiguous information that existed among U.S. forces on the last day of the war.  We greatly expanded the discussion of the government's response to an increased number of unexplained illnesses among Gulf War veterans and the subsequent discovery of the Khamisiyah demolitions.  The intelligence community provided new details that enabled us to remodel the Pit demolition with greater confidence and publish refined potential hazard areas.  Improved source term data from the CIA, better unit location data, and revised modeling techniques contribute critical improvements to the revised modeling efforts, which we address in this updated narrative. 

We made the following additional changes to the paper: 

• Referenced new source documents to enhance the accuracy and level of detail;
• Added improved graphics to exemplify information; and
• Expanded the narrative with "Assessment," "Lessons Learned," and "Methodology for Modeling a Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release at Khamisiyah," sections to aid understanding.
• Revised the narrative to reflect the updated methodology and footnoting standards of the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses;

Version 2.1 

We revised the current narrative to correct editorial errors. 

1. Acronyms, abbreviations, and a glossary are at Tab A.
2. The Intelligence Community comprises the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State), National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, military services' intelligence staffs and centers, and several other organizations within the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice, and Energy. Intelligence related to military efforts includes information at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
3. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 3.
4. Database Query Log, Gulf War Air Planning Staff, undated (declassified on March 24, 1997).
5. Basic Target Graphic, Tall al Lahm Ammunition Storage Area, US Air Force, September 1990.
6. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Tallil Air Base, Iraq Final Report" (Case Narrative), May 22, 2000, web site http://www.gulflink.health.mil/tallil ii/.
7. Walpole, Robert D, Special Assistant to the Director Central Intelligence for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, "17 Suspect CW/BW Storage Sites Identified in 28 February 1991 CENTCOM Message," July 29-30, 1997, p. 10.
8. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "An Nasiriyah SW Ammunition Supply Point, Final Report" (Case Narrative), September 26, 2000, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/an_nasiriyah_iii/.
9. Defense Mapping Agency, "Gazetteer of Iraq," Washington, DC, Third Edition, August 1990, p. 275.
10. Walpole, Robert D, Special Assistant to the DCI for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, "17 Suspect CW/BW Storage Sites Identified in 28 February 1991 CENTCOM Message," July 29-30, 1997, p. 9.
11. XVIII Airborne Corps tactical operations center journal, 12 0720 MAR 91.
12. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 3-6.
13. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 5. Although translated differently, the terms "grenade" and "bombs" both refer to artillery shells.
14. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 5.
15. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 5.
16. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 6.
17. Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 234.
18. Transcript, Fort Leavenworth Press Conference: Gulf War Illnesses-Khamisiyah, November 15, 1996, p. 20.
19. Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, Appendix Q, p. 639.
20. Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 641.
21. XVIII Airborne Corps, Message. Subject: "Forces Capabilities in a Chemical Environment," 221455Z DEC 90.
22. Scales, Brigadier General Robert H., Certain Victory, Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army, 1993, p. 257-259.
23. Joint Staff, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0020 92/UNSCOM 20 (CW6) Inspection Results of Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Facility," 121212Z NOV 91.
24. Defense Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An-Nasiriyah Chemical Warfare Related Sites," May 1996 [redacted].
25. Database Query Log, Gulf War Air Planning Staff, undated, (declassified on March 24, 1997); United Kingdom Minister of Defence, Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses Unit facsimile [Restricted], Subject: "Draft OSAGWI Case Narrative Khamisiyah."
26. Transcript, Fort Leavenworth Press Conference: Gulf War Illnesses-Khamisiyah, November 15, 1996, p. 16.
27. Commander, US Army Central Command, Message, Subject: "COMUSARCENT Planning Guidance," 140900Z FEB 91.
28. [28] Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report 6 021 0196 96, Subject: "Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An-Nasiriyah Chemical Warfare Related Sites," May 1996, p. 3.
29. Joint Staff, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0020 92/UNSCOM 20 (CW6) Inspection Results of Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Facility," 121212Z NOV 91.
30. XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "Request for Technical Assistance," 181030Z FEB 91.
31. XVIII Airborne Corps Handbook, Subject: "Demilitarization of Iraqi Equipment," Feb. 20, 1991.
32. Lead Report 6664, Interview of XVIII Airborne Corps plans officer, Oct. 30, 1997.
33. XVIII Airborne Corps Handbook, Subject: "Demilitarization of Iraqi Equipment," Feb. 20, 1991, p. 12-13.
34. XVIII Airborne Corps Handbook, Subject: "Demilitarization of Iraqi Equipment," Feb. 20, 1991, p. 14.
35. Transcript of Proceedings, "Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991," Conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 6, 1997, p. 153-154.
36. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 6.
37. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 6.
38. Commander, US Army Central Command, Message, Subject: "Captured or Abandoned Chem/Bio Munitions," 232020Z FEB 91.
39. XVIII Airborne Corps, "Desert Shield Chronology for February 1991," 231630Z February 1991 entry.
40. US Commander-In-Chief Central Command, Message, Subject: "Commander's Guidance for Disposition of Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions," 241200Z FEB 91.
41. Lead Report 18591, Interview of US Central Command plans staff officer, Aug. 17, 1998.
42. US Central Command Staff Summary Sheet with supporting Bullet Paper, Subject: "Commander's Guidance for Disposition of Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions," Feb. 23, 1991.
43. Commander, US Army Central Command OPLAN, "The Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, ANNEX V: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support Plan," Feb. 25, 1991.
44. XVIII Airborne Corps, Handwritten action message form, Feb. 26, 1991; XVIII Airborne Corps tactical operations center log, Feb. 26, 1991.
45. Lead Report 6662, Interview of XVIII Airborne Corps operations officer, Oct. 30, 1997.
46. Joint Surveillance and Target Attack System is an aircraft with a radar onboard that can detect moving vehicles on the ground from very long distances.
47. Scales, Brigadier General Robert H., Certain Victory, Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army, 1993, p. 257-259.
48. Lead Report 6670, Interview of commander, 4-64 Armor, October 31, 1997.
49. XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions," 270845Z FEB 91.
50. XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "FRAGO 74 to XVIII Airborne Corps Operations Order Desert Storm," 271830Z FEB 91.
51. XVIII Airborne Corps, Situation report, 282200Z FEB 91.
52.  XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "FRAGO 78 to XVIII Airborne Corps Operations Order Desert Storm," Feb. 28, 1991.
53.  XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "Chem Munition Marking Colors," 280700Z FEB 91.
54.  20th Engineer Brigade, Message, Subject: "Markings on Chemical Munitions," 280700Z FEB 91.
55.  US Central Command, Message, Subject: "Suspected Chemical/Biological Weapons Storage Sites in the KTO Prior to the Ground War," 281800Z FEB 91.
56.  Lead Report 25537, Interview of US Central Command current order of battle analyst, Dec. 9, 1999.
57.  Lead Report 25537, Interview of US Central Command current order of battle analyst, Dec. 9, 1999.
58.  United Nations Special Commission, Press Release on Chemical Weapons Destruction, April 26, 1992, p. 1.
59.  Walpole, Robert D, Special Assistant to the Director Central Intelligence for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, "17 Suspect CW/BW Storage Sites Identified in 28 February 1991 CENTCOM Message," July 29-30, 1997.
60.  Defense Intelligence Agency, Message. Subject: "Response to Iraqi Storage bunkers (Addendum)," February 1991 [redacted].
61.  Lead Report 1094, Interviews of 37th Engineer Battalion chemical noncommissioned officer, June 3, 1996, p. 2.
62.  Lead Reports 1098, Interview of commander, Company B, 37th Engineer Battalion, July 2, 1996; and Lead Report 6931, Interview of commander, Company B, 37th engineer Battalion, November 7, 1997.
63.  82nd Airborne Division engineer, Message, Subject: "307th Engineer Battalion Operations Summary," 230600Z MAR 91.
64.  60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment Incident Journal (Desert Storm), April 1, 1991.
65.  82nd Airborne Division chemical officer's handwritten message, 230900C MAR 91.
66.  XVIII Airborne Corps, Message: "FRAGO 81 to XVIII Airborne Corps OPORD Desert Storm," March 1991.
67.  20th Engineer Brigade, Message, Subject: "FRAGO 27 to 20th Eng Bde OPLAN Desert Storm," 012330C MAR 91.
68.  937th Engineer Group, Message, Subject: "ENSITREP," 021212C MAR 91.
69.  Transcript of Proceedings, "Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991," Conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 6, 1997, p. 34.
70.  XVIII Airborne Corps, Situation report, 022200Z MAR 91, p. 3-4, 8.
71.  Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Reported Mustard Agent Exposure Operation Desert Storm," (Case Narrative), Oct. 24, 2000, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fisher_ii/.
72.  XVIII Airborne Corps, Message, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Agent Contamination," 031015Z FEB 91.
73.  37th Engineer Battalion log, February 24 to March 10, 1991.
74.  Lead Report 843, Interview of 37th Engineer Battalion first sergeant, July 12, 1996.
75.  Lead Report 1094, Interview of 37th Engineer Battalion chemical noncommissioned officer, June 3, 1996, p.3.
76.  US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corp Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," Feb. 21, 1996, chapter 2, p. 3-6.  Mission Oriented Protective Posture ensemble is worn at certain levels, from 0 (equipment available) to 4 (mask with hood, Battle Dress Overgarment, overshoes, and butyl rubber gloves).
77.  37th Engineer Battalion log, February 24 to March 10, 1991.
78.  Joint Staff, Message, Subject:, "IIR 6 021 0020 92/UNSCOM 20 (CW6) Inspection Results of Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Facility," 121212Z NOV 91.
79.  37th Engineer Battalion, Log, February 24 to March 10, 1991.
80.  Transcript, Fort Leavenworth Press Conference: "Gulf War Illnesses-Khamisiyah," November 15, 1996, p. 5.
81.  Transcript of Proceedings, "Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991," Conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 6, 1997, p. 165.
82.  Lead Report 11260, Interview of 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment executive officer, Dec. 20, 1997.
83.  Department of the Army Inspector General, "Inquiry into the Demolition of Iraq Ammunition," Oct 10, 1997, p. 3-1.
84.  Statement on CBS Evening News, MAJ Huber, February 12, 1997.
85.  Lead Report 11262, Interview of Company A, 37th Engineer Battalion platoon sergeant, Dec. 19, 1997.
86.  Central Intelligence Agency, Working paper, Subject: "Possible Chemical Warfare Exposure," 1992.
87.  Lead Report 822, Interview of 37th Engineer Battalion executive officer, July 5, 1996.
88.  VII Corps message, Subject: "Response to [Redacted], Suspected Chem/Bio Weapons Storage Sites in the KTO Prior to the Ground War," April 1, 1991.
89.  37th Engineer Battalion, Videotape, March 4, 1991. Portions of this video were shown on Cable News Network.
90.  Lead Report 1223, Interview of 37th Engineer Battalion noncommissioned officer, August 8, 1996. Reports indicate fragments fell in the area for 5 to 30 minutes, and secondary explosions of munitions continued for 24 hours.
91.  Transcript, Fort Leavenworth Press Conference: "Gulf War Illnesses-Khamisiyah," Nov. 15, 1996, p. 26-27.
92.  Transcript, Fort Leavenworth Press Conference: "Gulf War Illnesses-Khamisiyah," Nov. 15, 1996, p. 13-14.
93.  Lead Report 1077, Interview of 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment noncommissioned officer, Oct. 23, 1996.
94.  Transcript, Fort Leavenworth Press Conference: "Gulf War Illnesses-Khamisiyah," Nov. 15, 1996, p. 14.
95.  Lead Report 1077, Interview of 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment noncommissioned officer, Oct. 23, 1996.
96.  Lead Report 825, Interview of Company B, 37th Engineer Battalion chemical noncommissioned officer, June 30, 1996.
97.  Lead Report 832, Interview of commander, Company B, 37th Engineer Battalion, June 28, 1996.
98.  Lead Report 909, Interview of Company A, 37th Engineer Battalion chemical noncommissioned officer, Sept. 12, 1996.
99.  Statement by commander, 307th Medical Battalion, September 8, 1996.
100.  Department of the Army Inspector General, "Inquiry Into the Demolition of Iraq Ammunition," Oct. 10, 1997, p. 3-11.
101.  Lead Report 857, Interview of 37th Engineer Battalion intelligence staff noncommissioned officer, July 2, 1996.
102.  Lead Report 6930, Interview of 37th Engineer Battalion intelligence staff specialist, Nov. 7, 1997.
103.  Lead Report 909, Interview of Company A, 37th Engineer Battalion chemical noncommissioned officer, Sept. 12, 1996.
104.  37th Engineer Battalion, Log, February 24 to March 10, 1991.
105.  Transcript, Fort Leavenworth Press Conference: "Gulf War Illnesses-Khamisiyah," Nov. 15, 1996, p. 26-27.
106.  Lead Report 1266, Interview of commander, Company A, 307th Engineer Battalion, Jan. 27, 1997.
107.  37th Engineer Battalion, Mission update, March 1991.
108.  Transcript, Fort Leavenworth Press Conference: "Gulf War Illnesses-Khamisiyah," Nov. 15, 1996, p. 15-16. This unit, along with another team from the 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, arrived at Khamisiyah on March 4, 1991.
109.  XVIII Airborne Corps, Situation report, March 5, 1991, p. 4.
110.  Transcript, Fort Leavenworth Press Conference: "Gulf War Illnesses-Khamisiyah," Nov. 15, 1996, p. 9, 29.
111.  Transcript of Proceedings, "Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991," Conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 6, 1997, p. 89-90.
112.  Lead Report 1053, Interview of 37th Engineer Battalion operations officer, Aug. 20, 1996.
113.  Lead Report 1221, Interview of 307th Engineer Battalion liaison officer, Sept. 17, 1997.
114.  Lead Report 1077, Interview of 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment noncommissioned officer, Oct. 23, 1996.
115.  Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, p. 4.
116.  Lead Report 857, Interview of 37th Engineer Battalion intelligence staff noncommissioned officer, July 2, 1996.
117.  Joint Staff, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0020 92 UNSCOM 20 (CW6) Inspection Results of Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Facility," 121212Z NOV 91.
118.  37th Engineer Battalion, Log, February 24 to March 10, 1991.
119.  Bunkers filled with small caliber ammunition could not be destroyed with explosives, but had to be destroyed by burning them with large quantities of fuel. Transcript of Proceedings, "Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991," Conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 6, 1997, p. 150.
120.  Transcript, Fort Leavenworth Press Conference: "Gulf War Illnesses-Khamisiyah," Nov. 15, 1996, p. 15-16.
121.  Lead Report 6652, Interview of 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment executive officer, Oct. 24, 1997.
122.  Lead Report 6652, Interview of 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment executive officer, Oct. 24, 1997.
123.  Lead Report 6930, Interview of 37th Engineer Battalion intelligence staff specialist, November 7, 1997.
124.  Lead Report 1077, Interview of 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment noncommissioned officer, October 1996.
125.  Lead Report 857, Interview of 37th Engineer Battalion intelligence staff noncommissioned officer, Sept. 17,  1996.
126.  37th Engineer Battalion, Log, February 24 to March 10, 1991.
127.  60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment Incident Journal (Desert Storm), April 1, 1991.
128.  Transcript of Proceedings, Interviews, "Demolition at Khamisiyah," Conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, April 10, 1997, p. 65, 92, 99-100, 102.
129.  Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, p. 6-8.
130.  37th Engineer Battalion, Log, February 24 to March 10, 1991.
131.  XVIII Airborne Corps, Tactical operations center journal sheet, 12 0720 MAR 91.
132.  Transcript of Proceedings, "Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991," Conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 6, 1997, p. 112-114.
133.  Lead Report 6665, Interview of 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment operations center action officer, Oct. 30, 1997.
134. 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer's handwritten message, 230900C MAR 91.
135.  Lead Report 6665, Interview of 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment operations center action officer, Oct. 30, 1997.
136.  Transcript of Proceedings, "Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991," Conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 6, 1997, p. 166.
137.  Memorandum from 307th Engineer Battalion operations officer to 82nd Airborne Division commander, Subject: "307th Engineer Battalion Desert Storm Narrative," June 3, 1991.
138.  VII Corps, Message, Subject: "FRAGO 189-91," 271500C MAR 91.
139.  Lead Report 6665, Interview of 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment operations center action  officer, Oct. 30, 1997.
140.  Lead Report 6665, Interview of 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment operations center action officer, Oct. 30, 1997.
141.  VII Corps tactical command post journal, 28 MAR 91.
142.  2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tactical command post journal, 28 MAR 91.
143.  VII Corps, Message, Subject: "Response to [Redacted], Suspected Chem/Bio Weapons Storage Sites in KTO Prior to the Ground War," April 1, 1991.
144.  US Central Command, Message, Subject: "Suspected Chemical/Biological Weapons Storage Sites in the KTO Prior to the Ground War," Feb. 28, 1991.
145.  2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment,  "War Stories: Oral History," undated, date received July 6, 1996.
146.  Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 8.
147.  Lead Report 6663, Interview of commander, 84th Engineer Company, October 30, 1997.
148.  United Nations, Security Council Resolution 687, New York, NY: United Nations, April 3, 1991, p.3-4.
149.  [Redacted] message, Subject: "Iraqi Declaration," undated, p. 3.
150.  Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 5.
151.  Central Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "First Identification of Tall Al Lahm," 1976.
152.  Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 3.
153.  Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 8.
154.  Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses," August 2, 1996, p. 2.
155.  Joint Staff, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0020 92/UNSCOM 20 (CW6) Inspection Results of Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Facility," 121212Z NOV 91.
156.  United Nations Special Commission, Extract, Subject: "Site Descriptions from UNSCOM 20 Inspection Report," November 13, 1991, p. 3.
157.  Central Intelligence Agency, "Memorandum of Phone Call," November 15, 1991.
158.  Central Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "ACIS on Facility Identification and Tasking," November 15, 1991.
159.  Joint Staff, Message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0020 92/UNSCOM 20 (CW6) Inspection Results of Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Facility," 121212Z NOV 91.
160.  Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 11.
161.  Central Intelligence Agency, Subject: "Record of Phone Call, November 20, 1991," [redacted], p. 1.
162.  Central Intelligence Agency, Message, Subject: "Info on Tall Al Lahm Ammo," November 20, 1991, p. 1.
163.  Memorandum for Record, "Summary of Telephonic Interviews of 24th ID G2 Personnel," February 24, 1997.
164.  United Nations Special Commission, Press Release: "UNSCOM Press Statement on Chemical Weapons Destruction," April 1, 1992, p. 1.
165.  [Redacted] Intelligence Information Report 6 021 0099 92, Subject: "Chemical Rocket Destruction in Khamisiyah," June 1992.
166.  [Redacted] message, Subject: "UNSCOM Member Questions About Coalition Activity," April 1, 1992, p. 2.
167.  Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 11.
168.  Central Intelligence Agency, Working paper, Subject: "Possible Chemical Warfare Exposure," 1992, p. 2.
169.  Institute of Medicine, "Health Consequences of Service During the Persian Gulf War: Initial Findings and Recommendations for Immediate Action," National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1995, Appendix F, p. 89.
170.  United Nations Special Commission, Letter responding to Congressman Browder's request, April 5, 1994.
171.  Congressional Record, Hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, "United States Chemical and Biological Warfare Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," May 25, 1994, p. 16.
172.  Congressional Record, Hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, "United States Chemical and Biological Warfare Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," May 25, 1994, p.53. (NOTE: The testimony as printed attributed these remarks to Dr. Prociv, but according to the DIA, Dr. Kriese actually made them.)
173.  Congressional Record, Hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, "United States Chemical and Biological Warfare Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," May 25, 1994, p. 111.
174.  Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects, June 1994, p. 31-32.
175.  Office of the Secretary of Defense, News release, Subject: "President Expands Commitment to Persian Gulf Vets and DoD's Multimillion Dollar Research and Care Effort," March 9, 1995.
176.  Central Intelligence Agency Executive Director, "CIA Chronology of Khamisiyah Events," p. 1-2.
177.  Office of the Secretary of Defense, News release, Subject: "'Toll-Free' Gulf War Incident-Reporting Telephone Line Opened," May 24, 1995.
178.  Office of the Secretary of Defense, News release, Subject: "Department of Defense Gulf War Documents Disclosed Via 'GulfLINK' Internet Homepage," Aug. 3, 1995.
179.  Central Intelligence Agency, Internal memorandum, Subject: "Request for Information to Support Desert Storm Fallout Study," September 13, 1995.
180.  The ESG, now the US Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research (USASCURR), unit locator database incorporates all available coordinates (both latitude and longitude and universal transverse mercator indices) derived from unit logs, situation reports, etc.
181.  Central Intelligence Agency, Briefing to National Security Council, Subject: "Study of Potential Exposures," January 26, 1996.
182.  Computer modeling is the science and art of using interconnected mathematical equations to describe the activities of an actual event, in this case the direction and extent of the hazard area of chemical agent resulting from demolition activities in March 1991. In modeling Khamisiyah, the Central Intelligence Agency used available data, such as number of rockets and weather, to develop a best estimate of the extent of the hazard area.
183. Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Director news briefing, Subject: "Persian Gulf Veterans Illnesses," Nov. 1, 1996, p. 3.
184. Institute for Defense Analyses, "Report of the Panel Reviewing Analysis of the Khamisiyah Pit Release of Nerve Agent," July 9, 1997.
185. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report 6 021 0196 96, Subject: "Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An-Nasiriyah Chemical Warfare Related Sites," May 1996, p. 2.
186. Office of the Secretary of Defense, News briefing by Kenneth Bacon and Dr. Stephen Joseph, June 21, 1996, p. 1.
187. Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses," Aug. 2, 1996, p. 4.
188. Office of the Secretary of Defense, News release, Subject: "Deputy Secretary of Defense Broadens DoD Investigative Actions on Persian Gulf Veterans Illnesses," Sept. 25, 1996.
189. Office of the Secretary of Defense, News briefing, Subject: "Gulf War Illness," Oct. 2, 1996.
190. Office of the Secretary of Defense, News release, Subject: "DoD Expands Outreach to and Seeks Help From Gulf War Veterans," Oct. 22, 1996.
191. Office of the Secretary of Defense, News briefing, Subject: "Gulf War Illness," Oct. 22, 1996.
192. Office of the Secretary of Defense, News release, Subject: "Pentagon Receives Computer Modeling Progress Report," Dec. 20, 1996.
193. Institute for Defense Analyses, "Report of the Panel Reviewing Analysis of the Khamisiyah Pit Release of Nerve Agent," July 9, 1997.
194. Office of the Secretary of Defense, News release, Subject: "Gulf War Illnesses Team Expands - New Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary White Named," Nov. 12, 1996.
195. Letter of Transmittal with Attached Survey, Special Assistant for Persian Gulf Illnesses, January 1997.
196. Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses, Supplemental Letter Report, April 30, 1997, p. 4.
197. Walpole, Robert D, Special Assistant to the Director, Central Intelligence for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues, "Statement for the Record to the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations," Central Intelligence Agency, April 16, 1997, p. 2.
198. Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, p. 2.
199. Transcript of Proceedings, Interviews, "Demolition at Khamisiyah," Conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, April 10, 1997, p. 1.
200. Lead Report 6930, Interview of 37th Engineering Battalion intelligence staff specialist, Nov. 7, 1997.
201. Lead Report 6652, Interview of 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment Executive Officer, Oct. 24, 1997.
202. Transcript of Proceedings, Interviews, "Demolition at Khamisiyah," Conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, April 10, 1997, p. 90-91.
203. Office of the Secretary of Defense, News briefing, Subject: "GWI Report on Plume Analysis," July 24, 1997, p. 3.
204. Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, p. 6-8.
205.  Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, p. 5-6.
206.  Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, p. 6-8.
207.  Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, p. 9.
208.  Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, p. 9-11
209.  Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, especially p. 9-11.
210.  The Special Assistant is preparing a separate technical report to explain the details of the Khamisiyah modeling.
211.  Office of the Secretary of Defense, News briefing, Subject: "GWI Report on Plume Analysis," July 24, 1997.
212.  Office of the Secretary of Defense, News release, Subject: "Troops Not Exposed to Dangerous Levels of Chemical Agent," July 24, 1997, p. 1.
213.  Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General, Special Assessment: "The Central Intelligence Agency's Handling of Information Related to the Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Depot (U)," SECRET, Feb. 5, 1998.
214.  The White House, News release, Subject: "President Clinton Names Senator Warren B. Rudman as Chair of the Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents," Feb. 24, 1998.
215.  Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Annual Report," Nov. 1998, p. 8.
216.  United States Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, "Report of the Special Investigation Unit on Gulf War Illnesses," Aug. 1998, p. 8.
217.  Anthes, Richard, Steve Hanna, Bruce Hicks, and Will Pendergrass, "Comments on Khamisiyah Modeling Document Entitled 'Methodology of Refined Modeling of the Khamisiyah Pit Demolition' prepared by the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses and dated 23 February 2000," March 22, 2000, p. 2.
218.  Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, p. 24.
219.  Letter from Walpole, Robert D, Special Assistant to the Director Central Intelligence for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues, with attachment, Subject: "Assessment of Releases of Chemical Agents from Iraq," October 14, 1999. Bunker 73 will not be remodeled because the source term is significantly reduced and no US troops were potentially exposed.
220. We considered data indicating cyclosarin was less toxic.  We chose the toxicity ratio of three-to-one because the US Army Center for Health and Promotion and Preventive Medicine stated three-to-one is the appropriate choice for low-level vapor exposure.
221.  Memorandum from US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine to the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Subject: "Recommendations of Vapor and Inhalation Toxicity Estimates to be Used in Khamisiyah Modeling," Aug. 5, 1999, p.2.
222.  Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Lessons Learned: Intelligence Support on Chemical and Biological Warfare During the Gulf War and on Veterans' Illnesses Issues," Dec. 1997.
223.  US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, Dec. 22, 1995, p.5.
224.  US Army Material Safety Data Sheet, "HQ Sulfur-Mustard/Sesqui-Mustard (Vesicant)," Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, June 30, 1995, p.1.
225.  US Army Material Data Safety Sheet, "Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)," December 2, 1999.
226.  US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, Dec. 22, 1995, p.6.
227.  Department of Defense, Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program for Persian Gulf War Veterans, "CCEP Report on 18,598 Participants," April 2, 1996.
228.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 23.
229.  Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, p. 20.
230.  Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,", April 6, 1999, p. 162.
231. Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, "Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit," Sept. 4, 1997, p. 20.
232.  Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 3-4, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
233.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 18.
234.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 19.
235.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 21.
236.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 23.
237.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual No 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC: December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 17-18; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Publication P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties And Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Washington, DC: December 22, 1995, p. 2-1, web site http://www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/.
238.  Memorandum from US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine to Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Subject: "Recommendations of Vapor and Inhalation Toxicity Estimates to be Used in Khamisiyah Modeling," August 5, 1999, p. 2.
239. US Naval Observatory, NAVSTAR Global Positioning System web site http:tycho.usno.navy.mil/gpsinfo.html (as of June 20, 2000).
240. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 31.
241. Central Intelligence Agency, "The Intelligence Community," Factbook on Intelligence, 1997.
242. US Army Field Manaual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 40, 31, 39.
243. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 430-431. The Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased by contacting the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or web site www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of October 19, 1999). See also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.
244. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 412.
245. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.
246. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corp Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," Feb. 21, 1996, chapter 2, p. 4.
247.  US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Part I, Chapter 2, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/chapter2.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
248.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 19.
249. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 21.
250. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 18.
251. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p.23.
252. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified by 103 States (as of February 1998). It was signed by the U.S. on Jan 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. Other protocols and guidelines were found in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland: 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation Of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army Field Manual 3-4, , US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, NBC Protection, May 1992; Army FM 8-285, US NAVY NAVMED P-5041, Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995, US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," November 25, 1985, and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for the development of this DoD methodology.
253. Office of the Secretary of Defense, News release, Subject: "Pentagon Receives Computer Modeling Progress Report," Dec. 20, 1996.
254.  Institute for Defense Analyses, "Report of the Panel Reviewing Analysis of the Khamisiyah Pit Release of Nerve Agent," July 9, 1997.
255.  Anthes, Richard, Steve Hanna, Bruce Hicks, and Will Pendergrass, Subject: "Comments by Peer Review Panel on Khamisiyah Modeling Report and Presentations on November 4-5, 1997," December 11, 1997, p. 7.
256.  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration web site sgi62.wwb.noaa.gov:8080/research/ global2.html (as of March 1, 1999).
257.  Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanographic Center, web site metoc-u1.fnmoc.navy.mil/ (Select: Public, Performance, NOGAPS)  (as of Dec. 5, 2000).
258.  European Center for Medium Range Weather Forecasts, web site www.ecmwf.int/about (as of March 1, 2000).
259.  Naval Research Laboratory Master Events Library, web site www-mel.nrlmry.navy.mil/briefs/EOGEO/slides/meta.htm (as of March 1, 1999).
260.  Science Applications International Corporations Advanced Physics Operation Omega, web site www.apo.saic.com/omega/doc/overview/overview.html (as of March 1, 2000).
261.  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Center for Atmospheric Research, "Mesoscale Model, Version 5 Modeling System Overview," web site www.mmm.ucar.edu/mm5/overview.html (as of March 1, 2000).
262.  See Tab A - Glossary.
263.  Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Promotional brochure, "HPAC, Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability," undated.
264.  Navy Modeling and Simulation Management Office, "Vapor, Liquid and Solid Tracking," web site http://navmsmo.hq.navy.mil/nmsiscat (Search for VLSTRACK) (as of Dec. 5, 2000).
265.  Report of the Panel Reviewing Analysis of the Khamisiyah Pit Release of Nerve Agent, March 1991, "Summary of Findings," July 1997, p. 7, 8.
266.  US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine web site chppm-www.apgea.army.mil (as of March 1, 2000).