On Feb. 28, 1991, the day the Gulf War cease-fire order was given, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) tasked the U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) to survey suspected chemical and biological warfare weapons storage sites in their area of operations. They were to survey 17 sites in their area of operations because "these sites were suspected to have possibly contained special munitions prior to the ground war."[1] Figure 1nbsp;shows the locations of the suspected sites. The USCENTCOM message included a justification for the survey: "The threat of special munitions may still pose a hazard to Coalition forces and access to suspected chemical/biological sites may offer an opportunity to clarify the extent of the Iraqi CW/BW threat."[2]

Figure 1. Suspected Chemical Sites

The Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC), tasked to oversee the investigation of issues related to illnesses of Gulf War veterans, was especially interested in the USCENTCOM requests for site surveys. The PAC requested an investigation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In July 1997, the CIA’s report concluded that there had been no chemical munitions at any of the 17 ARCENT sites, with the exception of the previously identified sites of Khamisiyah and An Nasiriyah.

The Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense began its investigation of the USCENTCOM message to ARCENT in late 1997, though preliminary investigation had begun as early as July 1996 by the Persian Gulf War Illnesses Investigation Team (PGIIT). However, we are no longer pursuing the investigation for the following reasons:

• In July 1997, the Central Intelligence Agency published the results of their investigation into the ARCENT suspected chemical sites and assessed: … that Khamisiyah and An Nasiriyah are the only two sites within the Kuwait theater of operations at which chemical weapons were stored during Desert Storm.[3]
• United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors have confirmed that Iraq’s chemical warfare agent munitions, although carefully controlled, were not marked as US forces had been told during their training, making it virtually impossible for Coalition soldiers to determine the presence of chemical warfare munitions on the battlefield without specialized equipment and training.[4]
• Despite numerous reports from soldiers of chemical munitions on the battlefield based on particular color stripes on the munitions, the preponderance of evidence in our investigations and interviews, and information provided by the intelligence community and UNSCOM, suggests that there were no chemical warfare agents at these sites.
• With the exception of the "Reported Mustard Agent Exposure Operation Desert Storm" case,[5] there have been no reliable reports of soldiers suffering symptoms of chemical or biological warfare agent exposure at or near any of the ARCENT suspected chemical weapons sites. The reported mustard agent exposure site was not one of the 17 ARCENT sites.

From July through December 1996 investigators concentrated on the USCENTCOM message sent to ARCENT, looking into the origin of the message, determining how Iraq marked their chemical warfare agent munitions, and locating key participants. They found no office of origin for the USCENTCOM message but they did locate many of the 17 ARCENT suspected chemical warfare agent storage sites on air target lists. Four sites were listed as suspected chemical or biological weapons storage sites—Tallil, An Nasiriyah, Ash Shuaybah, and Ar Rumaylah.[6] The investigation team also determined that some evidence indicated that Iraq did not mark its chemical warfare agent weapons in any particular manner.[7]

The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses resumed the investigation in the spring of 1999. Our investigation concentrated on three areas: USCENTCOM and ARCENT staff responsibilities, location of U.S. forces, and activities at each of the 17 sites.

The first step in the investigation was to determine which staff had the responsibility and capability to generate a suspected chemical weapons storage site list. This involved identifying principal personnel, organizations, and roles and responsibilities in the nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) arena. The U.S. Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research database was used to identify U.S. units within five kilometers of each site [Tab C].

Figure 2. G-Day Force Locations

Once these units were identified (see unit symbols in Figure 2), we searched records to determine the extent of movement and activity of each unit at each of the 17 sites (Figure 3), e.g., reconnaissance, search and destroy, demolition, secure and inventory, bivouac only, medical treatment and evacuation, etc.

Figure 3. Ground War Movement

Finally, we identified and interviewed decision makers and key participants from the VII and the XVIII Corps (commanders, operations officers, intelligence, medical and NBC specialists, and selected members of maneuver units, medical, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and engineer units). Results from these interviews validated our information. The interviews were also beneficial to the investigators in developing new lists of potential contacts and additional avenues of inquiry.

Eventually, the investigation focused on the likelihood of chemical warfare agent exposure of Coalition forces at each of the sites. We also examined the possibility of the release of chemical warfare agents resulting from the air campaign or from demolition operations.

The investigation began with two working assumptions. First, the message may have been produced by a U.S. military intelligence organization belonging to USCENTCOM. The Central Intelligence Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency typically did not focus on sites such as those on this list that held little U.S. national and strategic interest. U.S. national-level intelligence agencies concentrated on finding and destroying Iraqi facilities that were of high strategic and national importance—nuclear, biological and chemical weapons production facilities, national communications facilities, war production facilities, etc. Typically found deep inside Iraq, these strategic facilities were far north of the area where ground combat between Iraqi and Coalition forces occurred.[8]

The sites on the ARCENT list held more interest for lower-level intelligence collection operations that were conducted in the Kuwait theater of operations. This includes intelligence operations conducted by USCENTCOM and ARCENT. The sites on the ARCENT message were all located in southeastern Iraq, inside the area occupied by Iraq’s ground combat forces. Facilities within this area were of more immediate interest to intelligence units located in the theater.[9]

The second assumption was that this particular list of sites may originally have been compiled for targeting purposes, i.e., for subsequent bombing or destruction. The ARCENT message contains descriptions derived from analysis of each of the 17 sites.[10] Information derived in this fashion is typically the basis for creating targeting lists. Furthermore, as the ARCENT message indicated, the information on these sites was generated before the ground war began, when identifying such sites for targeting purposes was a high priority.

Our investigation included visits to several locations in the United States, research of multiple databases, interviews, and development of spreadsheets and graphics, efforts focused on determining the origin of the USCENTCOM message and activities at each of the 17 sites. We determined that, without a knowledge of who wrote this message, and why it identified these sites, there could be no assessment of the reliability of the intelligence that was used to create the message. Nor could we assess the danger to US forces posed by these potential chemical weapons storage sites.

We researched and reviewed an array of Gulf War documents to clarify the origin of the ARCENT message and to find information on the presence of chemical warfare agents at any of the 17 sites. Documentation included operations plans and intelligence documents, orders and reports, and general information.

We reviewed approximately 13,500 pages of Gulf War-related documents from USCENTCOM. We examined the complete records of the 52nd Ordnance Disposal Group, whose records included daily logs and destruction logs with descriptions and locations of munitions destroyed during and after the Gulf War.[11] Situation reports, intelligence summaries and information reports clarified a great deal of information.[12] 

We also examined after-action reports and unit histories to identify unit affiliations and missions and activities before, during, and after the war.[13] Iraq’s declarations to the United Nations and the publicly-available reports of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq were also used to support the investigation. For example, in Buffalo, New York, UNSCOM inspectors stated in a public meeting that they had inspected four of the 17 sites and had found no evidence of chemical warfare agents.[14]

Information contained in three OSAGWI narratives—the Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Point,[15] the An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point,[16] and Tallil Air Base,[17] all on the ARCENT list, provided leads and information. Interviews with eye-witnesses and key participants provided first hand knowledge of activities at each of the seventeen sites. Interviews with commanders, intelligence officers, and NBC, engineer, medical, and explosive ordnance disposal specialists yielded no evidence that chemical warfare weapons were present at any of the sites.[18]

The following analysis is based on the interview with the US Army intelligence officer who drafted the USCENTCOM message to ARCENT, and our own investigation:

• The intelligence officer used all available sources to make an assessment of the sites as possible chemical or biological weapons storage sites before the ground war began.[19]
• USCENTCOM did not transmit this message until four days after the ground war began, after US forces had already passed by or through nearly all of these sites.
• This message was not written or transmitted as a warning to U.S. forces that these sites could possibly contain chemical weapons, but simply as a "request for information," with responses due by noon of March 4, 1991.There was no indication that XVIII Airborne Corps, a major subordinate command of ARCENT, or any of its subordinate units received the ARCENT 17-site message.
• There was no indication of any reply to the request for information by the March 4th deadline. In fact, there is no indication of any response to this message for another 23 days, until March 27, 1991.
• There was no indication, until March 27, 1991, that the information in this message ever came to the attention of any commander or key staff who were responsible for the security of their forces.[20]
• The message was transmitted via special communications links between National Military Intelligence Support Teams (NMIST) within the Kuwait theater of operations. As the name implies, these teams were specially-created intelligence units that typically focused on items of national and strategic interest. They were collocated with USCENTCOM units but actually reported to the Joint Staff. The intelligence officer stated he did not specify the priority of the message nor that NMIST channels be used to transmit the request. Those decisions were made by others in his chain of command.[21]

Analysis of unit location data [Tab C] showed that every one of the sites had at least one US unit within five kilometers of it. Some siteshad numerous units nearby throughout the ground war and during the post-cease-fire period. For example, two sites that were within a few kilometers of each other had elements of two US armored divisions, two engineer battalions, and one EOD detachment in their immediate vicinity. Another large ammunition storage area, the Rumaylah Ammunition Storage Area, Southwest, had elements of three US Army divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, two engineer battalions, and four EOD detachments either passing through it, conducting inventory, doing demolition work, or bivouacked. We used troop movement information to identify key individuals to be interviewed. Those interviewed stated that during their operations at these sites there were no symptoms, illnesses, or injuries that could be attributed to chemical warfare agent exposure.[22]

The purpose of this investigation was to determine if chemical warfare agents were present at any of the 17 sites listed on the Feb. 28, 1991, USCENTCOM message to ARCENT, and to determine if there was a release of a chemical warfare agent, resulting from the air or ground campaigns or from demolition operations after the cease-fire.

There are no validated reports of U.S. soldiers with chemical warfare agent injuries or who suffered symptoms consistent with exposure to a chemical warfare agent (with the exception of the reported mustard agent exposure as noted earlier.)[23] Records of the Army and Navy revealed no injuries caused by a chemical warfare agent. We found no record of medical evacuation to Navy ships for chemical warfare agent exposure. The investigation was terminated before we investigated Air Force medical evacuation records..

The Central Intelligence Agency assessed in 1997 that chemical warfare agents were only stored at two locations in the Kuwait theater of operations—An Nasiriyah and Khamisiyah (also known as Tall al Lahm).[24] Both of these locations are among the 17 sites listed in the message to ARCENT.  Although there were many reports by veterans that they saw chemical weapons, our research provided no conclusive evidence of chemical warfare agents at any of the 17 sites (excluding Khamisiyah and An Nasiriyah). The fact that U.S. troops were erroneously identifying particular markings on munitions as chemical weapons contributed heavily to anecdotal reports of chemical weapons at sites other than Khamisiyah and An Nasiriyah. Iraq did not consistently mark its chemical weapons. Without distinguishing or unique markings, chemical warfare agent weapons could not be recognized easily and would have required special training and hands-on inspection, such as that given the EOD teams.

Explosive ordnance disposal and engineer specialists who were interviewed – those principally responsible for the destruction of major ammunition supply points – confirmed the absence of symptoms or casualties associated with chemical warfare agent exposure during their demolition operations.

The Presidential Special Oversight Board requested that we provide a summary of this investigation, which we did at a public hearing on September 16, 1999. Based on that summary, the Board concluded that the information obtained to date, the emerging results, and the anticipated outcomes from continued investigation are not likely to improve our understanding of any unexplained illnesses. Consequently, the Presidential Special Oversight Board recommended terminating further investigation; therefore, this investigation is discontinued.

This investigation is closed. However, if you believe you have information that would change this report, please contact my office by calling 1-800-497-6261.

ARCENT U.S. Army Central Command

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CW/BW chemical warfare and biological warfare

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

G-Day Feb. 24, 1991, first day of the ground war

IZ Iraq

KTO Kuwait theater of operations

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NMIST National Military Intelligence Support Team

PAC Presidential Advisory Committee

PGIIT Persian Gulf Illness Investigation Team

U.S. United States

USCENTCOM U.S. Central Command

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

Chemical warfare agent

A chemical warfare agent is chemical substance used in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate through its physiological effects. Excluded are riot control agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame. Included are blood, nerve, blister, choking, and incapacitation agents.[25]

1^st Armored Division Enemy Equipment Destruction Update for March 9, March 9, 1991.

1^st EOD Group Daily Journal, March 1-15, 1991.

3^rd Armored Division History of Operation Desert Storm and Spear, Feb. 24-28, 1991.

7^th Engineer Brigade Command Report, undated.

24^th Mechanized Infantry Division Operation Desert Storm After Action Report, June 17,1991.

After Action Report, 1^st EOD Group, June 14,199, p. 8.

Defense Intelligence Agency message, subject: "Iraqi Chemical Warfare (CW) Facilities and Storage Areas," Dec. 28, 1990, p. 5-6.

Department of Defense, "Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April, 1993, p. 95-98.

Email from Mr. E. G. Zimmerman, Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Subject: Reference to Fox disposition, Sept. 30, 1998.

Intelligence Information Report 6 064 3089 91, Subject: "Estimate of Iraq’s Tactical Chemical Weapons," Feb. 15, 1991.

Intelligence Information Report 2 340 2921 91, Subject: " IZ Forces in Albasrah, Iraq and Iraq Chemical Munitions," March 20, 1991.

Lead Report 7834, Interview with 513^th Military Intelligence Brigade NBC officer, Dec. 10, 1997.

Lead Report 15520, Interview with executive officer of the Joint Materiel Exploitation Center (Technical Escort Unit), Dec. 19, 1997.

Lead Report 16125, Interview with brigade surgeon, 1^st Brigade, 82^nd Airborne Division, April 20, 1998.

Lead Report 17261, Interview with commander, 1^st EOD Group, Oct. 24, 1996.

Lead Report 18201, Interview with operations officer, 512^th EOD Control Team, July 20, 1998.

Lead Report 21634, Interview with brigade surgeon, 197^th Infantry Brigade, 24^th Infantry Division, Feb. 22, 1999.

Lead Report 21693, Interview with division surgeon, 82^nd Airborne Division, Aug. 23, 1999.

Lead Report 24174, Interview of the commander, 19^th Engineer Battalion, July 2, 1999.

Lead Report 24245, Interview of engineer company commander, 3^rd Engineer Battalion, July 8, 1999.

Lead Report 24493, Interview of commander of Company C, 54^th Engineer Battalion, July 26, 1999.

Lead Report 25390, Interview with chairman of the Chemical Biological Agent Technical Evaluation Board, Nov. 17, 1999.

Lead Sheet 1276, Interview of Fox platoon leader, 12^th Chemical Company, May 27, 1998.

Lead Sheet 17482, Interview of squad leader, 87^th Chemical Company, July 23, 1998.

Lead Sheet 25537, Interview with USCENTCOM current order of battle analyst, Dec. 9, 1999.

Operation Desert Shield Storm Diary, 807^th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, undated.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point" (Case Narrative), August 4, 1998, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/an_nasiriyah_ii/.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Reported Mustard Agent Exposure Operation Desert Storm" (Case Narrative), August 27, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fisher.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "U.S. Demolition Operations at Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Point" (Case Narrative), April 14, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Tallil Air Base, Iraq" (Case Narrative), November 13, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/tallil.

Testimony of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veteran’s Illnesses, July 29-30, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil.

U.S. Army Center of Military History XVIII Airborne Corps in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: An Annotated Chronology, dated August 1990 to June 1991.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-4, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992.

U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Publication P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Field Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Washington DC, December 22, 1995.

U.S. Central Command message, subject: "Suspected Chemical/Biological Weapons Storage Sites in the KTO Prior to the Ground War," Feb. 28, 1991.

U.S. Commander in Chief operations plan, subject: "US OPLAN Desert Storm (S), HQ, US Central Command," Dec. 16,1990.

VII Corps Commander’s Situation Report 80, March 22-May 6, 1991.

VII Corps message, subject: "FRAGO 189-91," March 27, 1991.

Walpole, Robert D, Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Intelligence for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues, "17 Suspect CW/BW Storage Sites Identified in 28 February 1991 CENTCOM Message. A Statement for the Record," Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, July 29-30, 1997.

Tables 1-10 depict units that were located within five kilometers of one of the 17 ARCENT suspected chemical warfare agent storage sites. Sites 1 and 15-17 are not included because they correspond to An Nasiriyah and Khamisiyah and are covered in separate reports.

Table 11 depicts the daily movement of ARCENT maneuver and engineer units for the period Feb. 24 – 28, 1991. These tables highlight the days when individual units were within 10 kilometers of any of the suspected chemical warfare agent storage sites by identifying the site(s) with a number(s) corresponding to the locations shown on Figure 4 (e.g., the fourth entry for Table 11 shows Company A, 16th Engineer Battalion of the 1st Armored Division was at ARCENT suspected chemical warfare agent sites 2 and 3 between Feb. 27-28, 1991.)

Table 1. Units within 5 kilometers of Sites 2 and 3

Table 2. Units within 5 kilometers of Site 4

Table 3. Units within 5 kilometers of Sites 5, 6, and 7

Table 4. Units within 5 kilometers of Site 8

Table 5. Units within 5 kilometers of Site 9

Table 6. Units within 5 kilometers of Site 10

Table 7. Units within 5 kilometers of Site 11

Table 8. Units within 5 kilometers of Site 12

Table 9. Units within 5 kilometers of Site 13

Table 10. Units within 5 kilometers of Site 14

Table 11. Unit Movement, Feb. 24-28, 1991 

[1] US Central Command message, Subject: "Suspected Chemical/Biological Weapons Storage Sites in the KTO Prior to the Ground War," Feb. 28, 1991.

[2] US Central Command message, Subject: "Suspected Chemical/Biological Weapons Storage Sites in the KTO Prior to the Ground War," Feb. 28, 1991.

[3] Walpole, Robert D, Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Intelligence for Persian Gulf War Illnesses Issues, "17 Suspect CW/BW Storage Sites Identified in Feb. 28, 1991 CENTCOM Message. A Statement for the Record," Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, July 29-30, 1997.

[4] United Nations Special Commission Press Statement on Chemical Weapons Destruction, April 26, 1992, p. 3.

[5] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Reported Mustard Agent Exposure Operation Desert Storm" (Case Narrative), Aug. 27, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fisher/.

[6] Defense Intelligence Agency message, subject: "Iraqi Chemical Warfare (CW) Facilities and Storage Areas," Dec. 28, 1990, p. 5-6.

[7] United Nations Special Commission Press Statement on Chemical Weapons Destruction, April 26, 1992, p. 3.

[8] Department of Defense, "Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April, 1993, p. 95-98.

[9] Lead Sheet 25537, Interview with USCENTCOM current order of battle analyst, Dec. 9, 1999.

[10] Lead Sheet 25537, Interview with USCENTCOM current order of battle analyst, Dec. 9, 1999.

[11] After Action Report, 1st EOD Group, June 14,199, p. 8.; 1st EOD Group Daily Journal, March 1-15, 1991; 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Operation Desert Storm After Action Report, June 17,1991.

[12] VII Corps Commander's Situation Report 80, March 22-May 6, 1991.

[13] Operation Desert Shield Storm Diary, 807th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, undated; 3rd Armored Division History of Operation Desert Storm and Spear, undated; 1st Armored Division Enemy Equipment Destruction Update for March 9, 1991; U.S. Army Center of Military History XVIII Airborne Corps in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: An Annotated Chronology, dated August 1990 to June 1991; 7th Engineer Brigade Command Report, undated.

[14] "Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veteran's Illnesses Public Meeting," Testimonies of the Honorable Charles Duelfer and Mr. Igor A. Mitrokhin, July 29-30, 1997.

[15] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "U.S. Demolition Operations at Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Point" (Narrative), April 14, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/khamisiyah/.

[16] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point" (Narrative), Jan. 10, 2000, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/an_nasiriyah_ii/.

[17] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Tallil Air Base, Iraq" (Narrative), Nov. 13, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/tallil/.

[18] Lead Report 7834, Interview with 513th Military Intelligence Brigade NBC officer, Dec. 10, 1997; Lead Report 15520, Interview with executive officer of the Joint Materiel Exploitation Center (Technical Escort Unit), Dec. 19, 1997; Lead Report 16125, Interview with brigade surgeon, 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, April 20, 1998; Lead Report 17261, Interview with commander, 1st EOD Group, Oct. 24, 1996; Lead Report 18201, Interview with operations officer, 512th EOD Control Team, July 20, 1998; Lead Report 25390, Interview with chairman of the Chemical Biological Agent Technical Evaluation Board, November 17, 1999.

[19] Lead Sheet 25537, Interview with USCENTCOM current order of battle analyst, Dec. 9, 1999.

[20] VII Corps message, Subject: "FRAGO 189-91," March 27, 1991.

[21] Lead Sheet 25537, Interview with USCENTCOM current order of battle analyst, Dec. 9, 1999.

[22] Lead Report 21634, Interview with brigade surgeon, 197th Infantry Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, February 22, 1999; Lead Report 21693, Interview with division surgeon, 82nd Airborne Division, August 23, 1999; Lead Report 24174, Interview of the commander, 19th Engineer Battalion, July 2, 1999; Lead Report 24245, Interview of engineer company commander, 3rd Engineer Battalion, July 8, 1999; Lead Report 24493, Interview of commander of Company C, 54th Engineer Battalion, July 26,1999.

[23] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Reported Mustard Agent Exposure Operation Desert Storm" (Case Narrative), August 27, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fisher/.[24] Khamisiyah (otherwise know as Tall al Lahm) and An Nasiriyah correspond to Sites A1 and A15-17 on Figure 2.[25] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Field Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Washington DC, Dec. 22, 1995, p. Glossary-6.