The purpose of this investigation was to determine if Iraq used chemical warfare agents to suppress the Shiia rebellion in southern Iraq after the Gulf War and if U.S. forces were exposed to these agents as a result of any such use.

This investigation was prompted by reports from Gulf War veterans who, after the cease-fire, saw what they believed was evidence of Iraq’s use of blister agents—one category of chemical warfare agent—against Iraqi civilians. The reports, combined with Iraq’s long history of chemical warfare agent use, suggested that Iraq might have used these agents to suppress the post-war rebellion, possibly exposing U..S forces. These reports provided the impetus to begin this investigation.

We analyzed veterans’ reports, as well as refugee and military reports of possible post-war use of chemical warfare agents. We also interviewed numerous medical specialists, including doctors, nurses, and physician assistants, as well as chemical warfare experts. However, none of these specialists and professionals witnessed incidents that they believed indicated the use of chemical warfare agents. Nevertheless, many of them also emphasized the difficulty of determining whether these agents were used. Compounding the difficulties in determining whether such agents were used is the fact the locations of suspected use were, and still are, off-limits to US personnel.

We were unable to obtain definitive evidence of Iraq's post-war use of blister agents or any other kind of chemical warfare agent. Nor does it appear continued investigation is likely to yield such evidence or shed further light on this issue. With this report, we terminate this investigation but do not dismiss the possibility Iraq used chemical warfare agents against its own people. Rather, this report describes what has been learned and why continued investigation is not likely to yield evidence beneficial to our interest in the unexplained illnesses of Gulf War veterans.

This investigation focused on the Shiia rebellion immediately following the Gulf War cease-fire and related events in southern Iraq. Specifically, it focused on the area along the cease-fire line, also known as the military demarcation line, which was established to separate Coalition from Iraqi forces. This investigation did not address the Kurdish rebellion that simultaneously took place in northern Iraq. The exclusion of northern Iraq from this investigation does not dismiss the possibility that Iraq may have used chemical warfare agents (CWA) there. Instead, it was done to limit the investigation to events related to the Gulf War to be consistent with our charter. The time period covered in this investigation is March through April 1991, when US ground forces were positioned along the demarcation line, closest to the locations of the Shiia rebellion. By the end of March 1991, Iraq had almost completely suppressed the Shiia rebellion.

What constitutes a chemical weapon is outlined in the Chemical Weapons Convention[2] and includes toxic chemicals and their precursors (defined in accompanying schedules), munitions and devices specifically designed to deliver those chemicals, and equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions. The toxic chemicals include nerve agents, such as sarin, soman, and VX; blister agents like mustards and lewisite; and other less well known agents. However, the difference between these chemical warfare agents and other substances not classified as chemical warfare agents (e.g., white phosphorous and napalm) is largely technical and legalistic. Of particular concern to this investigation were blister agents because the reports from refugees and veterans, and the injuries observed, mostly related to blister injuries.

Unfortunately, determining whether a weapon is delivering a blister agent or not, or determining whether an injury resulted from exposure to a blister agent or another caustic substance is not easy. Bombs, artillery shells, and aircraft can deliver either conventional weapons and chemical weapons.[3, 4] Blisters result from exposure to blister chemical warfare agents as well as contact with acids or incendiaries such as napalm or white phosphorous. Even before the Shiia rebellion began, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pointed out the similarities between injuries caused by certain types of chemical and conventional weapons.

Many conventional weapons may produce chemical warfare agent-like injuries. Even observers who are knowledgeable of the effects of CW agents may mistakenly use the effects of nonchemical weapons to report chemical weapons use. The conventional weapons most likely to produce CW-agent-like injuries include flame (napalm), incendiaries, obscurants, smokes, riot-control agents, fuel-air explosives, and special military explosive mixtures.[5]

Consequently, soldiers needed additional information to determine whether Iraq used chemical warfare agents. This additional information could have come from medical testing of those thought to have been exposed to CWA. Alternatively, chemical warfare agent detection equipment such as alarms, monitors, and testing kits could have provided valuable information. The use of these technical means generally required specialized training and procedures. In our investigation, we sought out and interviewed individuals with this training and expertise who were stationed in proximity to the rebel activities. These individuals included doctors and physician assistants, who were able to comment authoritatively on the likelihood of agent use or exposure. We also interviewed nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) specialists who were trained to monitor for and identify the presence of CWA within their areas of operation.

The post-war cease-fire began on Feb. 28, 1991.[6] At that time, Coalition and Iraqi forces began to separate themselves along the military demarcation line. Coalition forces that had advanced into Iraq remained in place and conducted security and surveillance operations while waiting for orders to withdraw to the south. Meanwhile, surviving Iraqi forces withdrew from southern Iraq north toward Baghdad, regrouped, and reassembled near the southern Iraqi city of Basrah before redeploying north during the first week of March 1991.[7]

As the retreating Iraqi army regrouped, Shiia opposition groups saw the post-war chaos as an opportunity to overthrow the existing regime. During the first week of March, Shiia rebellions spontaneously broke out in several major cities in southern Iraq, including Al Hillah, An Najaf, Karballa, An Nasiriyah, and Basrah.[8] The Iraqi government responded immediately to suppress this activity. By the end of March, Shiia rebel activity had all but ceased. However, during the rebellion, accounts from several sources emerged that suggested the Iraqi government had used chemical warfare agents against the Shiias. These accounts came from Shiia refugees, U.S. intelligence activities, and U.S. soldiers stationed along the demarcation line.

Soon after the cease-fire, U.S. forces began to receive reports from Shiia refugees that described Iraqi government attacks on their cities. Some reports indicated that the government used mustard (a blister agent), as well as napalm and white phosphorus against the Shiias.[9] Other reports denied that government forces had used chemical warfare agents against their city, but claimed they had used weapons containing napalm and white phosphorus.[10] One refugee report provides a compilation of accounts from 150 Shiia refugees and alleges the use of all these substances, as well as hydrochloric and sulfuric acid.[11] Unfortunately, none of the refugees provided a technical or otherwise accurate identification of the weapons that were used by the Iraqi government, whether they contained a chemical warfare agent or not. In addition, many of the refugees had no training or technical understanding of weapons. As the compilation report indicates, these refugees generally categorized the weapons as "chemical."[12] This fact, coupled with the difficulty of accurately translating these reports, complicated our attempts to determine the accuracy of the allegations of chemical warfare agent use by the Iraqi government.

By the end of the first week of the cease-fire, U.S. forces had begun receiving reports of the Iraqi government suppression of the rebellions. A U.S. intelligence report dated March 8, 1991, indicated that Iraq considered dropping special ordnance on Al Hillah. A senior Iraqi leader—possibly Saddam Hussein—may have sanctioned this attack.[13] In response to this and other reports, the Defense Intelligence Agency issued a Desert Storm Bulletin concerning the possible intent of the Iraqi military to use CWA:

With the continuing unrest in Iraq, Iraqi forces may resort to the use of chemical weapons to quell the disturbances. Specific term used … was "burning the skin aircraft" to employ "special ordnance," a term frequently used to refer to chemical munitions.[14]

Another US intelligence source reported the possible decision to employ chemical weapons at An Najaf in early March, 1991. Previous attempts to suppress insurgents in this area had failed, and a stronger response was required. The use of aircraft armed with liquid munitions was planned, but whether these liquid munitions were CWA is unknown:

The employment of aircraft armed with missiles, as well as the use of unspecified "liquids" (possibly chemical weapons), was proposed as part of an attack scenario. … There is no evidence that this proposal, especially as regards the use of "liquids," was ever specifically approved. … Likewise, although several references were made to the use in An Najaf of "special munitions," a term previously used to designate chemical munitions, no evidence was available to indicate that such weapons were actually used.[15]

The references to special ordnance, liquids, and special munitions suggest the use of chemical warfare agents, but might also mean the use of other substances. For example, refugees also reported that in early March, the Iraqi government conducted aerial attacks on the city of An Najaf and the city of Karbala with "Dizab," a mixture of hydrochloric and sulfuric acid.[16] The indirect references and speculation in these messages and reports make a positive identification impossible without additional evidence. Such evidence was simply not available to U.S. forces, including U.S. intelligence officers, nor is it available to us.

Another obstacle to U..S forces in determining whether chemical warfare agents were used against the Shiias was the distance between U.S. forces and the locations of the attacks. With the exception of An Nasiriyah, the Shiia rebellion took place in cities that were too far from the military demarcation line for US forces to directly observe or analyze activities.

Only at An Nasiriyah—five kilometers from the demarcation line—were U.S. forces close enough to witness the rebellion and the Iraqi government response. Consequently, most reports by US soldiers of the post-war rebellion are from the area around An Nasiriyah. Given its proximity to the demarcation line, An Nasiriyah is also the most likely location where US forces could have been exposed to blister agents, if Iraq used them to quell the rebellion.

The city of An Nasiriyah is in southern Iraq on the Euphrates River. At the cease-fire on February 28, 1991, the nearest major U.S. unit to An Nasiriyah was the 82nd Airborne Division. In late March the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment replaced the 82nd Airborne Division in that area and remained there until early April.[17]

Most of the 82nd Airborne Division soldiers were aware of the rebellion and the Iraqi government’s response. The third brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division documented this activity in their unit history, "The brigade continued to provide humanitarian support for people injured in the fighting.... These medical teams treated over 1000 wounded civilians."[18]

One 82nd Airborne Division soldier reported that he saw an Iraqi helicopter dropping large canisters that emitted a yellow substance. U.S. soldiers nearby increased their mission oriented protective posture to level 4 (the highest level) for several hours, and no one in his unit reported any illness resulting from the incident.[19]

The Gannett News Service interviewed another soldier in the 82nd Airborne Division who witnessed this type of activity. The article, which ran in the Potomac News, stated:

[An] anti-tank gunner … in late March, 1991 observed four Iraqi helicopters… two of them Russian-made and equipped with extended sprayers…. [He] saw the two … release spray over the rebel-held city of Nasiriyah, about 2 1/2 miles away … and he recalled that a few hours later a stream of civilian casualties with "grotesque blisters all over them" started pouring into the 82nd Airborne area.[20]

Still another soldier reported similar activity—possibly even the same attack. He too witnessed a helicopter spraying near An Nasiriyah. The next day he noticed an Iraqi woman with large blisters on her face and hands. He believed these injuries were caused by exposure to blister agent.[21]

The potential for confusion arising from similarities among injuries, delivery means, and nomenclature compelled us to rely on experts for authoritative medical diagnoses and CWA detection. This expertise is found among medical specialists who diagnose injuries, and NBC-trained experts who can determine the presence of CWA within their environment.

Many medical personnel, including doctors, physician assistants, and nurses, are trained to diagnose and treat CWA injuries. However, their ability to do so effectively can vary widely with the degree of training they receive. To ensure medical personnel received the best, most current training available on this subject, the US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) developed the Medical Management of Chemical Casualties course. This course is normally taught at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. However, in September 1990, USAMRICD began to teach this course to medical personnel deployed in the Gulf region. By the start of the ground war, more than 90 percent of the doctors and physician assistants assigned to front-line Army units were graduates of this course.[22]

Laboratory testing of blood, urine, tissue, or other materials can positively identify chemical warfare agent presence. However, front-line medical units—such as the ones that treated the vast majority of Iraqi refugees—did not have the equipment to conduct such chemical warfare agent tests.[23] If exposure to CWA was suspected, these units were able only to take samples of blood, urine, or other items and send them elsewhere for testing.[24] Nevertheless, the doctors interviewed in the course of this investigation stated that—with one exception—they did not even suspect that any of the US or Iraqi patients they treated had been exposed to CWA.[25] This single exception is addressed in a separate investigation and was not the result of any Iraqi post-war use of chemical weapons.[26]

NBC specialists using standard US systems could detect the presence of chemical warfare agents only by direct contact with an agent in its liquid or vapor form. However, post-war rebellion activity took place in areas outside of Coalition control and, in most cases, many kilometers from any Coalition military unit.

With an understanding of these factors, we interviewed medical and NBC personnel in this investigation. The next two subsections summarize the findings of these interviews.

1.  Statements of Army Medical Specialists

In the course of this investigation, we interviewed more than 100 front-line Army doctors, physician assistants, and nurses who provided medical care to U.S. soldiers and Iraqi refugees after the cease-fire. These soldiers were responsible for providing medical care to the first several echelons of Army combat units deployed along the demarcation line and would have been the first to treat any U.S. soldiers or Iraqi refugees exposed to CWA used by Iraq. In our interviews, none of these medical personnel reported treating or hearing of any U.S. soldier or Iraqi with suspected chemical warfare agent injures.[27] It is important to note that we have also interviewed more than 600 other medical specialists from Gulf War-deployed medical units in conjunction with other investigations. None of these reports indicated that Iraqi refugees or U.S. soldiers were exposed to CWA due to post-war use.

Because of their proximity to An Nasiriyah, medical providers from the 82nd Airborne treated many Iraqis who had been injured because of rebel activity. Nevertheless, none of the 82nd Airborne medical personnel reported they saw or treated anyone they believed was a CWA casualty. The 82nd Airborne division surgeon—a graduate of the Medical Management of Chemical Casualties course and responsible for all division medical activities—knows of no U.S. or Iraqi CWA casualties that his medical personnel saw or treated.[28] A commander of a forward support medical company estimated that his unit, the 307th Medical Battalion, treated approximately 600 refugees who had various combat-type wounds. He remembers seeing burns and blisters, but did not know their specific cause. However, there were no cases for which he thought someone needed chemical decontamination before triage and treatment.[29]

We also interviewed medical personnel from other Army divisions deployed along the demarcation line. These included nearly all of the senior staff surgeons from every division, armored cavalry regiment, and separate brigade that participated in the Gulf War, as well as dozens of other doctors assigned to these units. None of these doctors said they treated any US soldiers or Iraqis who they suspected as having injuries resulting from use of chemical warfare agents during the post-war fighting in Iraq.[30]

Four mobile army surgical hospital (MASH) units—the 159th, 475th, 807th, and 912th—were located in Kuwait and southern Iraq after the cease-fire. These MASHs were reserve units, staffed in large part with soldiers who were medical professionals in their civilian occupations. These units provided advanced trauma care to Iraqi refugees from central and southern Iraq, including the cities of An Nasiriyah and Basrah. While some of these refugees were injured or became ill during the post-war cease-fire, many had pre-existing medical conditions that had not been treated properly, if at all. Some of the more seriously injured refugees were airlifted to MASH units by helicopter from positions near the demarcation line. Others either walked to these units or arrived by vehicle.

The 159th MASH reported two incidents after the war that resembled chemical warfare agent injuries to US soldiers. In the first incident, the 159th MASH executive officer stated that two visiting US Army doctors, whose names he could not recall, examined two US combat engineers treated at this MASH. These visiting doctors were specifically trained to treat CWA casualties. According to the 159th MASH executive officer, these visiting doctors indicated the engineers most likely incurred the injuries from exposure to mustard blister agent while destroying Iraqi ammunition bunkers.[31]

The two visiting doctors, who were members of USAMRICD, deployed from the US to identify and treat possible CWA casualties. One of these doctors was also the commander of USAMRICD. Contrary to the statement by the MASH executive officer, the USAMRICD commander stated they treated no one at this hospital with CWA injuries. He also told investigators that—apart from the one exception already mentioned—they did not identify any CWA casualties during the Gulf War.[32]

In another incident, a nurse from the 159th MASH recalled treating a US soldier injured by an exploding shell and who complained of burns to his eyes and face. His (unknown) unit treated him as a potential chemical warfare casualty due to his injury and because their chemical alarms went off after the incident. While at the 159th MASH, this soldier developed pneumonia.[33] One of the two visiting USAMRICD doctors told investigators that the soldier with the burning eyes and face did indeed develop a life-threatening case of pneumonia, but his injury occurred when he was inside an Iraqi tank and was splashed in the face with ammonia, which was there for cleaning the main gun.[34]

The 475th MASH commander, a doctor, said his unit treated a large number of Iraqis, many of whom were transported to the unit from areas outside the immediate vicinity. Their injuries included blunt force trauma, fragmentation, blast, and some burn injuries. Most of the burns were usually associated with exploding munitions or tent fires. At no time did he suspect any post-war injuries were from exposure to chemical warfare agents.[35] The non-commissioned officer in charge of the triage section of the 475th MASH stated that he saw many Iraqi civilians with burn injuries. He was told, through interpreters, that the burns were thermal burns caused by mishandling gasoline or kerosene. This soldier, a fire fighter and paramedic in his civilian job, stated that the wounds he saw were consistent with someone burned by gasoline or kerosene. He also noted that many of these patients had burns that had become infected, which significantly changed the appearance and treatment of the injury. However, he did not believe any of the burns he saw were caused by CWA.[36] Another soldier in the 475th, a surgical nurse in the intensive care unit, thought that the burns on some of the Iraqis he saw could have been caused by chemical warfare agents. However, he also stated that he was never trained to recognize chemical warfare agent injuries.[37]

The 807th MASH commander, an emergency room doctor in his civilian job, stated he is not aware that his unit treated any Iraqis with injuries resulting from exposure to chemical warfare agents. He also stated that the unit received classes on chemical warfare defense and medical treatment before deployment. Despite his extensive medical experience, which includes treating burn victims, he stated he did not think he could visually distinguish between a chemical warfare wound (i.e., blisters) and one from other causes.[38]

None of the medical personnel assigned to the 912th MASH recalled treating any U.S. soldiers or Iraqis with injuries caused by CWA. One doctor stated although he received a chemical warfare orientation at Ft. Sam Houston, Texas, he thought the training was inadequate and he did not have a lot of confidence in it. He did not know of any CWA-related medical laboratory testing or any chemical warfare injuries during his deployment.[39] An orthopedic surgeon of the 912th MASH recalled that he was very busy for about six weeks after the war providing care to Iraqi nationals. The casualties he treated were primarily mechanical and blast traumas, and did not exhibit any of the symptoms associated with exposure to blister agents (e.g., burns and blisters). He did not know of any chemical warfare injuries—civilian or military—during his deployment.[40]

USAMRICD sent eight people (four doctors, three clinical scientists, and one non-commissioned officer) to provide high-level CWA medical expertise during Desert Storm. During the cease-fire, the USAMRICD team visited Army medical facilities in southern Iraq for indications of possible chemical warfare injuries. Investigators interviewed six members of this team, including three of the doctors. In these interviews the USAMRICD team members stated that they saw no indications of injuries attributable to post-war CWA use—most of the casualties the USAMRICD team saw were US or Iraqi soldiers injured during combat. The USAMRICD team left southern Iraq within 7-10 days of the cease-fire and returned to the US by the third week of March 1991.[41] Consequently, these doctors saw relatively few of the refugees who were treated by US medical personnel during the post-war period.

2. Statements of NBC Specialists

In the course of our many investigations, we have interviewed hundreds of NBC personnel. Those interviewed include senior NBC officers of the US Army divisions that were deployed along the military demarcation line. None of these soldiers are aware of any detection of CWA because of Iraqi post-war military activity against Shiia rebels.[42]

Of the senior NBC officers we interviewed, the 82nd Airborne Division NBC officer was probably in the best position to make a first-hand assessment of Iraq’s possible post-war CWA use because of his location near An Nasiriyah. In a message, he sent to the commander of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment—which replaced the 82nd Airborne Division in this area on March 24, 1991—he assessed the likelihood of CWA use

If there was actual chemical agent use in the area, I think Fox [chemical reconnaissance vehicles] or the M8’s [chemical alarms] would have picked it up. I believe that we would have seen casualties if nerve or blister agents were used. I think that they (Iraqi government) are using WP [white phosphorous] and CS [tear gas] on the resistance & civilians. I do not believe, at this time, that they are using nerve, blister, or blood agent in this area.[43]

During the post-Gulf War period there were reports of possible chemical warfare agent use,[44] but in 1991 the reports were unconfirmed because of the difficulty in corroboration.[45] More recently, United States intelligence agencies have assessed it is unlikely that Iraq used chemical warfare agents against civilians in southern Iraq immediately after the Gulf War. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) each made this assessment independently based on in-depth, long-term analyses of available information on this subject. On July 13, 1999, the senior CIA official assisting Gulf War illness investigations stated, "It is unlikely that Iraq used chemical warfare agents against Shiite rebels in areas near Coalition forces immediately following Desert Storm."[46] A DIA message was more succinct: "There is no confirmed evidence that Iraq used either mustard [i.e., blister] or nerve agents during the Shiia rebellion in March 1991."[47]

We have been unable to obtain definitive evidence to verify refugee descriptions of government attacks using blister agents, napalm, white phosphorus, or acids. Conventional weapons can cause injuries that resemble the blisters caused by blister agents. The refugees had no means to positively identify the weapons as chemical. Language barriers and the refugees’ lack of understanding of what constitutes a chemical weapon also inhibited our ability to come to a positive conclusion.

U.S. forces received many reports—from refugees and other sources—that indicated Iraq may have been planning to use chemical weapons, or had indeed used these weapons. However, U.S. forces lacked the ability to corroborate these reports. US forces had no access to any of the cities where the attacks took place. Only one of these cities—An Nasiriyah—was close to U.S. forces near the demarcation line. Soldiers described injuries to Iraqis that may have been caused by chemical warfare agents, but such injuries are difficult to distinguish from those caused by other means, including white phosphorous and acids, both of which Iraq is either known or suspected to have used. Furthermore, the possibility for these injuries to have been caused by chemical warfare agents is not corroborated by accounts of medical or NBC personnel who were also in that area.

Front-line doctors stated they did not see or treat any US or Iraqi casualties believed to be exposed to chemical warfare agents, nor were they aware of the occurrence of such injuries. However, even doctors well-trained in diagnosing chemical warfare agent injuries emphasized the difficulty in assessing the cause of such injuries based on visual observation alone.

The NBC experts stated they know of no confirmed or even possible detection of chemical warfare agents in their area of operations. This is most notably the case for the 82nd Airborne Division NBC officer. It was in the 82nd Airborne Division sector that soldiers witnessed Iraq’s attacks against civilians in An Nasiriyah. The absence of chemical warfare agent detection by U.S. units raises doubts these agents were used in nearby areas under Iraqi attack. However, it does not eliminate the possibility that Iraq used chemical warfare agents in these areas because U.S. forces were not able to enter these areas to employ detection systems that could confirm or deny the presence of these agents.

Both the CIA and the DIA concluded independently that Iraqi post-war use of chemical warfare agents against civilians was unlikely.

This investigation sought to determine if Iraq might have used chemical warfare agents to suppress the post-war Shiia rebellion, and whether such use exposed US forces to chemical warfare agents. In the process, we hoped to obtain more information that would help us better understand possible causes of the unexplained illnesses of Gulf War veterans. Despite veterans’ reports of incidents that indicated the possible use of chemical warfare agents, this investigation found no evidence that confirms such use. We interviewed both medical and NBC specialists who had been near the military demarcation line and who were in positions to observe or detect chemical warfare agent use. However, none of the front-line medical unit doctors, whom we interviewed and who treated Iraqi refugees, believe that chemical warfare agents caused the injuries they treated, and we found no other medical evidence that suggests post-war use of these agents. Similarly, our interviews with NBC specialists from front-line units revealed no one who knew of any detections of post-war chemical warfare agent use. Finally, our discussions with intelligence officers and review of U.S. intelligence agency documents yielded similar results—Iraqi post-war chemical warfare agent use is unlikely.

Nevertheless, this information is tempered with a degree of uncertainty that further investigation is not likely to erase. Doctors have stated that their ability to diagnose chemical warfare agent injuries is not foolproof. U.S. forces were limited in their ability to use NBC detection systems because the incidents occurred in territory that Coalition forces did not occupy. In addition, we did not have access to suspected Iraqi victims or their medical records. These limitations prevented us from confirming or refuting allegations of possible Iraqi post-war use of CWA.

This investigation has been unable to obtain definitive evidence to enable us to attain our goals: determine if Iraq used chemical warfare agents to suppress the post-war Shiia rebellion, determine whether such use exposed U.S. forces to chemical warfare agents, and obtain more information that would help us better understand possible causes of the unexplained illnesses of Gulf War veterans. Nor does it appear likely that continued investigation into this area will yield such evidence. Based on this and other considerations, the Presidential Special Oversight Board recommended that we discontinue and close this investigation. This close-out report complies with that recommendation.

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CW chemical warfare

CWA chemical warfare agent

MASH mobile army surgical hospital

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

SITREP situation report

U.S. United States

USAMRICD United States Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

Blister agent

A blister agent is a chemical warfare agent that produces local irritation and damage to the skin and mucous membranes, pain and injury to the eyes, reddening and blistering of the skin, and when inhaled, damage to the respiratory tract. Blister agents include mustards, arsenicals like lewisite, and mustard and lewisite mixtures. Blister agents are also called vesicants or vesicant agents.[48]

Blood agent

A blood agent is a chemical warfare agent that is inhaled and absorbed into the blood, carrying the agent to all body tissues where it interferes with the tissue oxygenation process. The brain is especially affected. The effect on the brain leads to cessation of respiration followed by cardiovascular collapse.[49]

Chemical warfare agent

A chemical warfare agent is a chemical substance, excluding riot control agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame, used in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate though its physiological effects. Included are blood, nerve, blister, choking, and incapacitating agents.[50]

Conventional weapon

A conventional weapon is a weapon that is neither nuclear, biological, nor chemical.[51]

Mustard

A mustard agent is a blister chemical warfare agent that produces local irritation and damage to the skin and mucous membranes, pain and injury to the eyes, reddening and blistering of the skin, and when inhaled, damage to the respiratory tract.[52]

Napalm

Napalm is a powdered aluminum soap or similar compound used to gelatinize oil or gasoline for use in napalm bombs or flame throwers, or the resultant gelatinized substance.[53]

Nerve agents

Nerve agents are the most toxic of the chemical warfare agents. Nerve agents are absorbed into the body through breathing, by injection, or absorption through the skin. They affect the nervous and the respiratory systems and various body functions.[54]

Riot control agent

A riot control agent is a chemical that produces transient effects that disappear within minutes after exposure and rarely require medical treatment. Riot control agents are effective in quelling civil disturbances and in preventing unnecessary loss of life.[55]

White phosphorous

White phosphorus is a form of phosphorus which creates spectacular bursts when used in artillery shells and is very damaging to the skin since it burns on exposure to oxygen.[56]

2^nd Armored Cavalry Regiment message, Subject "Ground Activity 28 MAR 91," March 28, 1991.

307^th Engineer Battalion Desert Storm Narrative, June 3, 1991.

"505^th Parachute Infantry Regimental History, Operation Desert Shield/Storm," undated.

"Conventional Weapons Producing Chemical-Warfare-Agent-Like Injuries," US Government, February 1990.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, U.S. State Department web site www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/cwctext.html (as of March 17, 2000).

Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "(U) Composite IR Evaluation," (Secret) 131400Z MAY 91.

Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update," March 8, 1991.

Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Possible Intent of Iraqi Military to use Chemical Weapons," March 7, 1991.

Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Possible Proposal to Use Chemical Weapons," date unknown.

Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Response to Tasker A026-99-0003," Sept. 28, 1999.

Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992.

Director of Central Intelligence, "Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq’s Capability," December 1990.

Handwritten message, 82^nd Airborne Division chemical officer, March 23, 1991.

Joint Staff message, Subject: "Chemical Weapons Used Against Anti-Saddam Uprising," March 15, 1991.

Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," Department of Defense, April 6, 1999, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/02287.html (as of Sept. 2, 1999).

Joint Staff message, Subject: "IIR 2 340 2929 91, Government Attacks on Rebel Controled [sic] Cities," March 28, 1991.

Joint Staff message, Subject: "IIR 2-340-2796-91/Burning Compounds, Methods of Reaching Targets, and Protection from Burning Compounds," March 9, 1991.

Lead Sheet #10310, Interview of the surgical nurse, 475^th MASH, April 3, 1998.

Lead Sheet #12224, Interview of sergeant major, 3-505^th Parachute Infantry Regiment, July 8, 1997.

Lead Sheet #12474, Interview of soldier, 319^th Field Artillery Brigade, Aug. 20, 1997.

Lead Sheet #14518, Interview of the commander, 475^th MASH, Aug. 18, 1998.

Lead Sheet #14945, Interview of a surgeon, 912^th MASH, May 5, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16404, Interview of the commander, 307^th Medical Battalion Company, May 28, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16710, Interview of the commander, 807^th MASH, June 4, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16964, Interview of the executive officer, 159^th MASH, June 30, 1998.

Lead Sheet #17119, Interview of a nurse, 159^th MASH, June 17, 1998.

Lead Sheet #17135, Interview of orthopedic surgeon, 912^th MASH, June 17, 1998.

Lead Sheet #17872, Interview of the NCOIC, 475^th MASH Triage Section, July 8, 1998.

Lead Sheet #18491, Interview of the commander, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug. 2, 1998.

Lead Sheet #18558, Interview of XVIII Airborne Corps team member, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug. 12, 1998.

Lead Sheet #18572, Interview of Marine team leader, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug. 14, 1998.

Lead Sheet #18585, Interview of VII Corps team member, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug. 17, 1998.

Lead Sheet #18810, Interview of USCENTCOM staff liaison, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug. 24, 1998.

Lead Sheet #21600, Interview of division surgeon, 1^st Armored Division, March 5, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21602, Interview of brigade surgeon, 3^rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Feb. 10, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21634, Interview of brigade surgeon, 197^th Infantry Brigade, Feb. 22, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21670, Interview of the division surgeon, 3^rd Armored Division, Feb. 22, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21687, Interview of regimental surgeon, 2^nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Feb. 19, 1999.

Lead Sheet #21693, Interview of the division surgeon, 82^nd Airborne Division, Aug. 18, 1999.

Lead Sheet #24533, Interview of division NBC officer, 3^rd Armored Division, Sept. 16, 1999.

Lead Sheet #24837, Interview of division NBC officer, 1^st Armored Division, Sept. 9, 1999.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Reported Mustard Agent Exposure Operation Desert Storm" (Case Narrative), August 27, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fisher/.

"Standalone Version of Chapter 11 – Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release – From 9 June 1997 Draft of Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DoD," September 3, 1997, web site http://www.gulflink.health.mil/mitre_report/1997254-0000139_0000001.html.

U.S. Army Central Command message, Subject: "SITREP 13 Mar 91," March 13, 1991.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-4, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-4, U.S. Marine Corp Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," Feb. 21, 1996.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990.

U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I (as of Aug. 23, 1999).

U.S. Army Materiel Safety Data Sheet, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.

VII Corps message, Subject: "Commander’s SITREP 62," March 20, 1991.

VII Corps message, Subject: "Commander’s SITREP 70," March 28, 1991.

VII Corps message, Subject: "Commander’s SITREP 78," April 5, 1991.

Wade, LTC John, MAJ Robert Gum, and COL Michael Dunn, "Medical Chemical Defense in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," The Journal of US Army Medical Department, January/February 1992.

Walpole, Robert D., Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Gulf War Illnesses Issues, "Status of the Intelligence Community’s Study of Potential Exposure of Coalition Soldiers to Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents. A Statement for the Record," July 13, 1999.

"Were Troops Exposed?" Potomac News, April 29, 1998, Copyright, Gannett Co., Inc., Reprinted with permission.

1. An acronym and abbreviation listing, and a glossary are at Tab A.
2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use Of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction, U.S. State Department web site www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/cwctext.html (as of March 17, 2000).
3. Director of Central Intelligence, "Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq's Capability," December 1990.
4. Joint Staff message, Subject: "IIR 2-340-2796-91/Burning Compounds, Methods of Reaching Targets, and Protection from Burning Compounds," March 9, 1991.
5. Director of Central Intelligence, "Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq's Capability," Appendix C, "Conventional Weapons Producing Chemical Warfare Agent-Like Injuries," December 1990.
6. Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 290.
7. U.S. Army Central Command message, Subject: "SITREP 13 Mar 91," March 13, 1991.
8. U.S. Army Central Command message, Subject: "SITREP 13 Mar 91," March 13, 1991. VII Corps message, Subject: "Commander's SITREP 62," March 20, 1991; VII Corps message, Subject: "Commander's SITREP 70," March 28, 1991.
9. VII Corps message, Subject: "Commander's SITREP 78," April 5, 1991.
10. 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment message, Subject "Ground Activity 28 MAR 91," March 28, 1991.
11. Joint Staff message, Subject: "IIR 2 340 2929 91, Government Attacks on Rebel Controled [sic] Cities," March 28, 1991.
12. Joint Staff message, Subject: "IIR 2 340 2929 91, Government Attacks on Rebel Controled [sic] Cities," March 28, 1991.
13. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update," March 8, 1991.
14. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Possible Intent of Iraqi Military to Use Chemical Weapons," March 7, 1991.
15. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Possible Proposal to Use Chemical Weapons," date unknown.
16. Joint Staff message, Subject: "IIR 2 340 2929 91, Government Attacks on Rebel Controled [sic] Cities," March 28, 1991.
17. 307th Engineer Battalion Desert Storm Narrative, June 3, 1991.
18. "505th Parachute Infantry Regimental History, Operation Desert Shield/Storm," undated, p. K-6, K-7.
19. Lead Sheet #12474, Interview of soldier, 319th Field Artillery Brigade, Aug. 20, 1997.
20. "Were Troops Exposed?" Potomac News, April 29, 1998, Copyright, Gannett Co., Inc. Reprinted with permission.
21. Lead Sheet #12224, Interview of sergeant major, 3-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, July 8, 1997.
22. Wade, LTC John, MAJ Robert Gum, and COL Michael Dunn, "Medical Chemical Defense in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," The Journal of US Army Medical Department, January/February 1992, p. 34-36.
23. Lead Sheet #16710, Interview of the commander, 807th MASH, June 4, 1998.
24. Lead Sheet #16710, Interview of the commander, 807th MASH, June 4, 1998.
25. For example, see Lead Sheet #21670, Interview of the division surgeon, 3rd Armored Division, Feb. 22, 1999, and Lead Sheet #14518, Interview of the commander, 475th MASH, Aug. 18, 1998.
26. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Reported Mustard Agent Exposure Operation Desert Storm" (Case Narrative), August 27, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fisher/.
27. For example, Lead Sheet #21602, Interview of brigade surgeon, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, February 10, 1999, and Lead Sheet #21634, Interview of brigade surgeon, 197th Infantry Brigade, Feb. 22, 1999.
28. Lead Sheet #21693, Interview of the division surgeon, 82nd Airborne Division, Aug. 18, 1999.
29. Lead Sheet #16404, Interview of the commander, 307th Medical Battalion Company, May 28, 1998.
30. For example, Lead Sheet #21600, Interview of division surgeon, 1st Armored Division, March 5, 1999, and Lead Sheet #21687, Interview of regimental surgeon, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Feb. 19, 1999.
31. Lead Sheet #16964, Interview of the executive officer, 159th MASH, June 30, 1998.
32. Lead Sheet #18491, Interview of the commander, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug. 2, 1998.
33. Lead Sheet #17119, Interview of a nurse, 159th MASH, June 17, 1998.
34. Lead Sheet #18585, Interview of VII Corps team member, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug.17, 1998.
35. Lead Sheet #14518, Interview of the commander, 475th MASH, Aug. 18, 1998.
36. Lead Sheet #17872, Interview with the NCOIC, 475th MASH Triage Section, July 8, 1998.
37. Lead Sheet #10310, Interview of the surgical nurse, 475th MASH, April 3, 1998.
38. Lead Sheet #16710, Interview of the commander, 807th MASH, June 4, 1998.
39. Lead Sheet #14945, Interview of a surgeon, 912th MASH, May 5, 1998.
40. Lead Sheet #17135, Interview of an orthopedic surgeon, 912th MASH, June 17, 1998.
41. Lead Sheet #18491, Interview of the commander, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug. 2, 1998; Lead Sheet #18558, Interview of XVIII Airborne Corps team member, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug, 12, 1998; Lead Sheet #18572, Interview of Marine team leader, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug. 14, 1998; Lead Sheet #18585, Interview of VII Corps team member, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug. 17, 1998; Lead Sheet #18810, Interview of USCENTCOM staff liaison, USAMRICD-Deployed, Aug. 24, 1998.
42. For example, Lead Sheet #24533, Interview of 3rd Armored Division NBC officer, Sept.16, 1999, and Lead Sheet #24837, Interview of 1st Armored Division NBC officer, Sept. 9, 1999.
43. Handwritten message, 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer, March 23, 1991.
44. For example, Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update," March 8, 1991; Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Possible Intent of Iraqi Military to Use Chemical Weapons," March 7, 1991.
45. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "(U) Composite IR Evaluation," (Secret), 131400Z MAY 91.
46. Walpole, Robert D., Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Gulf War Illnesses Issues, "Status of the Intelligence Community's Study of Potential Exposure of Coalition Soldiers to Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents. A Statement for the Record," July 13, 1999, p. 2.
47. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Response to Tasker A026-99-0003," Sept. 28, 1999.
48. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," Dec. 22, 1995.
49. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, "Definitions And Terms," Dec. 22, 1995.
50. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," Dec. 22, 1995.
51. Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," Department of Defense, April 6, 1999, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/02287.html (as of Sept. 2, 1999).
52. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," Dec. 22, 1995.
53. Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," Department of Defense, April 6, 1999, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/02287.html (as of Sept. 2, 1999).
54. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," Dec. 22, 1995.
55. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," Dec. 22, 1995.
56. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," Dec. 22, 1995.