Joint Publication 3-08

Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I

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1. Scope

Volume I discusses the interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) environment and provides fundamental principles and guidance to facilitate coordination between the Department of Defense, and other US Government agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and regional organizations. Volume II describes key US Government departments and agencies, IGOs and NGOs — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should
follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WALTER L. SHARP
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-08, DATED 9 OCTOBER 1996

- Expands coverage of intergovernmental and nongovernmental coordination
- Includes details of the Department of Homeland Security’s role in civil support
- Explains the role of the Homeland Security Council
- Adds discussion of the Department of Defense’s role in homeland security
- Explains the new relationships for Federal interagency coordination during homeland defense and civil support
- Revises the discussion on organizing for successful interagency, intergovernmental organization, and nongovernmental organization coordination
- Adds coverage on forming a joint task force
- Updates descriptions of Federal Agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations
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COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Provides an Introduction to Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination
- Discusses Established Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Relationships
- Covers Organizing for Successful Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

The Purpose of Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

Attaining our national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, economic, and military instruments of national power supported by and coordinated with those of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional organizations.

Interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between agencies of the US Government (USG), including the Department of Defense (DOD), for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. Similarly, in the context of DOD involvement, intergovernmental organization (IGO) and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination refer to coordination between elements of DOD and IGOs or NGOs to achieve an objective.

The integration of US political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. Military operations must be coordinated with the activities of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various host nation (HN) agencies. Sometimes the joint force commander (JFC) draws on the capabilities of other organizations; sometimes the JFC provides capabilities to other organizations; and sometimes the JFC merely deconflicts his activities with those of others. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power of the USG. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination enables the USG to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared international goals.
Command Relationships

During combat operations such as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM or in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations such as PROVIDE COMFORT, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide military support to civil authorities, its forces perform in a supporting role. Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between the military and other non-DOD agencies is a key to successful interagency coordination.

USG agencies — including DOD — may be placed in supported or supporting relationships with IGOs. Even when placed in a supporting role, however, US military forces always remain under the command authority of the President. In many operations though, USG agencies’ relationship with IGOs is neither supported nor supporting. In such cases, cooperation is voluntary and will be based upon shared goals and good will. NGOs do not operate within military, governmental, or IGO hierarchies. Therefore, the relationship between the Armed Forces and NGOs is neither supported nor supporting.

Coordinating and integrating efforts between the joint force and other government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the command and control of a military operation. Military operations depend upon a command structure that is often very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to coordination efforts. The various USG agencies’ different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make unity of effort a challenge. Still more difficult, some IGOs and NGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG and particularly the US military.

Building Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

Harnessing the power of disparate organizations with competing priorities and procedures is a daunting task.

The following basic steps support an orderly and systematic approach to building and maintaining coordination:

Forge a collective definition of the problem in clear and unambiguous terms. Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can often cloud a clear understanding of the problem.
Understand the overall USG strategic goal in addition to the Objectives, End State, and Transition Criteria for each involved organization or agency. Commanders and decision makers should seek a clearly defined military end state supported by attainable objectives and transition criteria.

Understand the Differences Between US National Objectives, End State and Transition Criteria and those of IGOs and NGOs. Although appropriate IGOs and NGOs may participate in some level in defining the problem, ultimately their goals and objectives are independent of those of the US military.

Establish a Common Frame of Reference. Differences in terminology and — in the case of foreign organizations — the use of English as a second language complicates coordination.

Capitalize on Experience. Review the after-action reports and lessons learned using the Joint and Services Lessons Learned Systems, including the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Essential Task Matrix, and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to assess proposed courses of action (COAs) and to reduce the requirement to relearn on the job.

Develop COAs or Options. Commanders and their staffs should focus on the military enabling capabilities that contribute to national security policy objective attainment and are part of the interagency plan of action.

Establish Responsibility. A common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution is achievable when all participants understand what needs to be done and agree upon the means to accomplish it.

Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Functions. In most multiagency operations, civilian organizations will remain engaged long after the military has accomplished its assigned tasks and departed the operational area. Therefore, prior to employing military forces, it is imperative to plan for the transition of responsibility for specific actions or tasks from military to nonmilitary entities.

Direct All Means Toward Unity of Effort. Lead agency responsibility is situationally dependent, with the National Security Council (NSC) staff setting the agenda for and normally designating the lead agency for situations in which DOD will participate. While
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not immutable, the principle of lead agency is applied to a variety of functions requiring interagency coordination.

The National Security Council System

The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal forum to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The NSC System is the process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.

The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy — domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council). Together with supporting interagency working groups (some permanent and others ad hoc), high-level steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, the National Security Council System (NSCS) provides the foundation for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of national security policy. The NSC is the President’s principal forum for coordinating discussion of national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The council also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

NSC Organization. The members of the NSC constitute the President’s personal and principal staff for national security issues. The council tracks and directs the development, execution, and implementation of national security policies for the President but does not normally implement policy. Rather, it takes a central coordinating or monitoring role in the development of policy and options depending on the desires of the President and the National Security Advisor. National Security Presidential Directive-1 establishes three levels of formal interagency committees for coordinating and making decisions on national security issues. The advisory bodies include the following:

The NSC/Principals Committee is the senior Cabinet level interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security.

The NSC/Deputies Committee is the senior sub-Cabinet-level (deputy secretary level) interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security.

The NSC Policy Coordination Committees are the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy.
Federal Interagency Coordination: Civil Support

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) whose mission is to lead the unified national effort to secure America by preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation. As such, DHS is the lead federal agency for homeland security.

The Armed Forces of the United States are authorized under certain conditions to provide assistance to US civil authorities.

While the most visible support occurs during domestic emergencies or major disasters, the majority of DOD’s efforts are directed toward civilian law enforcement or intelligence agencies. This assistance is known as civil support within the defense community because the assistance will always be in support of a lead federal agency. Requests for assistance from another agency may be predicated on mutual agreements between agencies or stem from a Presidential designation of a Federal Disaster Area or a Federal State of Emergency. DOD typically only responds after the resources of other federal agencies, state and local governments to include National Guard, and NGOs have been exhausted or when military assets are required.

The Department of Defense works closely with other Federal agencies in various domestic arenas. In addition to participating in interagency steering groups and councils, DOD is a partner in several national level incident management and emergency response plans such as the Federal Response Plan (as modified by the Initial National Response Plan), the National Contingency Plan, the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, Mass Immigration Emergency Plan, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. Additionally, the National Response Plan will integrate Federal government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan.

In exceptional circumstances and with appropriate authorization, military forces may also conduct missions to help the Department of Justice or other Federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) assist Federal, state, or local LEAs. Military support to civilian law enforcement agencies includes military assistance for civil disturbances. Other types of these operations include counterdrug, combating terrorism, general support such as training civilian law enforcement officials, and critical infrastructure protection.
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Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination: Foreign Operations

Within the Executive Branch, the Department of State is the lead US foreign affairs agency. The Department of State (DOS) advises and assists the President in planning and implementing the foreign policy of the United States. DOD coordinates with DOS to carry out foreign policy objectives, which include bilateral and multilateral military relationships; treaties and agreements involving other DOD activities or interests such as: technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, FHA, peace operations (including those conducted under United Nations auspices), and other contingencies.

The combatant commander’s regional focus is paralleled in DOS in its geographic bureaus. Similarly, many other USG agencies are regionally organized. Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater military strategies that require interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination.

The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the JIACG provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the NSCS.

The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations

Intergovernmental organizations may be established on a global or regional basis and may have general or specialized purposes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are regional security organizations, while the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity) and the Organization of American States are general regional organizations. A new trend toward subregional organizations is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency coordination.
The Nongovernmental Organizations’ Connection to Joint Operations

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers.

Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the US military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation.

NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in the international arena.

Working alone, alongside the US military, or with other US agencies, NGOs are assisting in all the world’s trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster.

Whereas the military’s initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces, NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state which they had no part in determining. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably.

Organizing for Success

To the extent feasible, joint planning should include key participants from the outset.

When campaign, deliberate, or crisis action planning is required, the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized will bear directly on the efficiency and success of the collective effort. The combatant commander, through a commander’s strategic concept, builds the framework for integration of interagency, IGO, and NGO activities into Annex V of the operation plan. Subordinate JFCs integrates interagency, IGO, and NGO activities into their options. Within the area of responsibility and the joint operations area, appropriate decision-making structures are established at combatant command, joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ), and tactical levels in order to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues.
Forming a Joint Task Force

When it is necessary to engage the military instrument of national power, and to establish a joint task force (JTF), the JTF establishing authority will normally be a combatant commander.

The combatant commander develops the mission statement and concept of operations based upon direction from the Secretary of Defense as communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If developed, the NSC’s interagency political/military plan may affect the mission statement.

The JFC may establish a joint civil-military operations task force to meet a specific contingency mission or to support humanitarian, nation assistance operations, or a theater campaign of limited duration. There may be a requirement for civil affairs representation because of their professional knowledge of the issues involved, as well as their expertise in dealing with other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs.

Unlike the military, most USG agencies and NGOs are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, with the result that JTF personnel interface with individuals who are coordinating their organization’s activities at more than one level. The complex aspects of the interagency, IGO, and NGO process require the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of US agencies, IGOs, the HN, and NGOs. Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency, IGO, and NGO involvement, the focal point for operational and tactical level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the civil-military operations center, or the humanitarian operations center.

CONCLUSION

Volume I discusses the interagency, IGO, and NGO environment and provides fundamental principles and guidance to facilitate coordination between the Department of Defense, and other USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and regional organizations. Volume II describes key USG departments and agencies and IGOs and NGOs — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COORDINATION

“When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving all instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a number of Federal departments and agencies. In certain operations, agencies of states, localities, or foreign countries may also be involved. The President establishes guidelines for civil-military integration and normally disseminates decisions and monitors execution through the NSC [National Security Council].”

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Purpose

a. Interagency coordination is the interaction that occurs between agencies of the US Government (USG), including the Department of Defense (DOD), for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. Similarly, in the context of DOD involvement, intergovernmental organization (IGO) and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination refer to coordination between elements of DOD and IGOs or NGOs to achieve an objective.

b. The integration of US political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. The global environment that is characterized by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and unconventional threats to US citizens, interests, and territories, requires even greater cooperation. Attaining our national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by and coordinated with that of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional security organizations.

c. Military operations must be strategically integrated and operational and tactically coordinated with the activities of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various host nation (HN) agencies. Sometimes the joint force commander (JFC) draws on the capabilities of other organizations; sometimes the JFC provides capabilities to other organizations; and sometimes the JFC merely deconflicts his activities with those of others. These same organizations may be involved in prehostilities operations, activities during combat, and in the transition to posthostilities activities. Roles and relationships among agencies and organizations, combatant commands, US state and local governments, and overseas with the US chief of mission (COM), and country team in a US embassy, must be clearly understood. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination helps enable the USG to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals.
2. Coordinating Efforts

a. A common thread throughout the range of military operations, is the involvement of a large number of agencies and organizations — many with indispensable practical competencies and significant legal responsibilities — that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States and our multinational counterparts.

b. The Military Component. Military forces have long coordinated with the headquarters (HQ) or operating elements of USG departments and agencies to include the Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of Transportation, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the adjutants general of the 50 states and four territories. Increasingly, participants include state and local agencies, additional USG agencies and departments (e.g., Department of Homeland Security [DHS]), coalition partners, IGOs such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, the United Nations (UN), and agencies of the HN.

(1) Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency, campaign and operation plans (OPLANs) must be crafted to recognize the core competencies of the myriad agencies, coordinating military activities and resources with those of other agencies to achieve the desired end state.

(2) In a national emergency, civil support (CS) operation, or complex contingency operation (CCO), DOD and the military often serve in a supporting role to other agencies and organizations. Commanders and their staffs should develop an understanding of how military operations and capabilities can be coordinated with those of other agencies and organizations to focus and optimize the military’s contributions to accomplish the desired end state.

c. A Forum of Expertise. Each US, federal, state or local agency, IGO, and NGO brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the task of coordination. The military also brings its own organizational dynamics, characteristics, ideas, and values. This diversity is a strength of the interagency, IGO, and NGO process. In one collective forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.

d. Gathering the Right Resources. During this period of great instability and uncertainty the challenge to our nation’s leadership, commanders at all levels, and the civilian leadership of agencies and organizations is to recognize what resources are available and how to work together to effectively apply them. Despite potential philosophical and operational differences, all efforts must be coordinated to create an atmosphere of cooperation that ultimately contributes to national unity of effort. Therefore, pursuit of interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and cooperation as a process should be viewed as a means to mission accomplishment, not an end in itself. While some loss of organizational freedom of action is often necessary to attain full cooperation, a zeal for consensus should not compromise the authority, roles, or core competencies of individual agencies.
Within the USG, the National Security Strategy (NSS) guides the development, integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power to accomplish national objectives. The President signs the NSS, and the National Security Council (NSC) is the principal policy-making forum responsible for the strategic-level implementation of the NSS. This coordination sets the stage for strategic guidance provided to the combatant commands, Services, and various DOD agencies, and forms the foundation for operational and tactical level guidance.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security seeks a coordinated and focused approach from our entire society — the Federal government, state and local governments, the private sector, and the American public to mobilize and organize our nation to secure the US homeland. Achieving this entails DOD-led homeland defense and non-DOD-led CS missions. Within the CS arena federal law, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) (as modified by the Initial National Response Plan), and its Terrorism Incident Annex, other federal plans, legislation, and directives give DOD key roles in providing support to civil authorities for disasters, catastrophes, infrastructure protection, and other emergencies. These will expand the military’s requirement to integrate and coordinate with state and local agencies as well as USG agencies like the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), CIA, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

In accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, a National Incident Management System (NIMS) and a National Response Plan (NRP) are the responsibility of the Secretary of the DHS.

1. NIMS. This system provides a consistent, nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents.

2. NRP. While the Initial NRP provides, on an interim basis, the domestic incident management authorities, roles, and responsibilities of the Secretary DHS, as defined in HSPD-5, the NRP will integrate USG domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan.

For additional information see the National Strategy for Homeland Security and Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security.

The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represents one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States today. Additionally, it states that the United States must pursue a comprehensive interagency strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions.

Focus of Theater Operations. Joint force operations typically involve close coordination with forces and agencies outside the military chain of command. According to guidance in JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, JFCs should: “... ensure that their joint operations are integrated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces (multinational operations) and nonmilitary organizations ([US] government agencies
such as the Agency for International Development, NGOs, and the UN). Activities and operations with such nonmilitary organizations can be complex and may require considerable effort by JFCs, their staffs, and subordinate commanders, especially during military operations other than war.” The extent of IGO and NGO cooperation and coordination with the military will vary and will be contingent on the nature of the mission and US military’s role in that operation (belligerent, peacekeeper, provider of aid.)

3. The Growing Requirement for Close Coordination

a. The number of ongoing and potential operations requiring integrated US interagency, IGO, and NGO activities has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Moreover, given the nature of the challenges facing the US and the international community, this trend is likely to continue. Several factors contribute to this.

b. During the Cold War, ideological divisions prevented the UN and other actors from stepping in to prevent or end conflicts that were often proxies for superpower competition. With the end of this bipolar world system, however, the UN and other organizations have instituted record numbers of peace operations (PO) and CCOs. In order to resolve these crises, such operations inevitably require close cooperation between various organizations that contribute military, humanitarian, political, economic, and other forms of expertise and resources.

c. The National Security Strategy of September 2002 notes that the US is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones that willingly or unwittingly provide a haven for terrorists. The terrorist threat is further compounded by state sponsors of terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them over long distances. Meeting these challenges requires the integration of all instruments of US national power – economic measures to cut off terrorist financing, diplomatic initiatives to eliminate terrorists’ political support, informational activities to combat extremist ideologies, and military operations to take action against identified threats.

4. Command Relationships

a. Within the USG, the Armed Forces and other USG agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles with other commands and agencies. However, this is not the support command relationship as described in joint doctrine. Relationships between the Armed Forces and other government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the command and control (C2) of a military operation. During combat operations such as DESERT STORM or in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations such as PROVIDE COMFORT, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide CS, its forces perform in a supporting role. Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between the military and other non-DOD agencies is key.

b. NGOs do not operate within military, governmental, or IGO hierarchies. If formed, the civil-military operations center (CMOC) is the focal point where US military forces coordinate any support to NGOs. As private organizations, NGOs are very unlikely to place themselves in a supporting role to the military. They may, however, accept grant funding from IGOs or...
USG agencies like United States Agency for International Development (USAID), thereby taking the role of “implementing partners.” While this relationship is not as strong as command authority or even a contract, it does give the granting agency oversight authority over how the funds are spent.

For additional information on the CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

5. Considerations for Effective Cooperation

a. Coordination and integration among the joint force and other government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. Military operations depend upon a command structure that is often very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to coordination efforts. The various USG agencies’ different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make unity of effort a challenge. Still more difficult, some IGOs and NGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG, and particularly the US military.

b. The military tends to rely on structured decision-making processes, detailed planning, the use of standardized techniques and procedures, and sophisticated C2 systems to coordinate and synchronize operations. Civilian agencies may employ similar principles but may not have the same degree of internal C2 as the US military. Across agency lines, IGO and NGOs tend to coordinate because there is a perceived mutually supportive interest, not because of any formalized C2. Close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations. Action will follow understanding.

c. As USG involvement in PO and CCOs increased during the 1990s, the Executive Branch responded by promulgating two Presidential decision directives (PDDs) that have significantly shaped subsequent interagency coordination.

(1) PDD-25, US Policy – Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, was signed in May 1994 as the result of an interagency review of our nation’s peacekeeping policies and programs. This review aimed to develop a comprehensive peace operations policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period. PDD–25 addressed six major issues of reform and improvement. One in particular defined interagency policy, lines of authority, roles, and missions for DOD and DOS when coordinating peace operations. Described in PDD–25 as “improving the way the USG manages and funds peace operations,” supporting direction follows:

(a) The policy directive created a new “shared responsibility” approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the USG. Under this approach, DOD took lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involved US combat units and those that are likely to involve combat (e.g., UN Charter Chapter VII). This approach ensured that military expertise was brought to bear on those operations with a significant military component. DOS retained lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that did not involve US
combat units. In all cases, DOS remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN mission in New York.

(b) PDD–25 therefore, elevated DOD to the status of lead federal agency (LFA) for certain PO, thereby requiring it to lead the planning and management of operations that have combat units and for peace enforcement missions, in coordination with operations with other nonmilitary organizations.

(2) Managing Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

(a) The current administration recently issued NSPD-44 “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization”, which gives responsibility to the Department of State to coordinate, lead, and strengthen USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization missions and to harmonize efforts with US military plans and operations.

(b) DOD Directive 3000.05 “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations” outlines how Department of Defense will fulfill its role as defined under NSPD-44. It notes that integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operation and charges Department of Defense to work closely with USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, global and regional interational organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. USD(P), with CJCS support, is responsible for representing the Secretary in discussions on stability operations policy and strategy with other USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, IOs, NGOs, and the private sector. COCOMs are responsible for engaging relevant partners in coordination with USD(P) and CJCS.

6. Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures

a. One difficulty of coordinating operations among US agencies is determining counterparts among them. Another significant difficulty is the determination of the LFA for a given interagency activity. Organizational differences exist between the military hierarchy and other USG departments and agencies, particularly at the operational level where counterparts to the geographic combatant commander seldom exist. Further, overall lead authority in a CCO is likely to be exercised not by the geographic combatant commander, but by a US ambassador or other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all USG agencies and military organizations in the operation.

b. Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently thwarted because field coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent agencies, departments, or organizations. Figure I-1 depicts comparative organizational structures using the three “levels of war.”

7. Organizational Environments

a. In order for the interagency process to be successful, it should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. This cohesion is even more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations. When the other instruments of national power
The executive branch of the Federal government is organized by function with each department performing bureaucratic and diffused, inhibiting the concentration of power within a small or select group of agencies. Integration of multiple agencies with their diverse perspectives and agendas.

b. The Nature of Interagency Bureaucracy. Interagency coordination processes tend to be bureaucratic and diffused, inhibiting the concentration of power within a small or select group of agencies. The executive branch of the Federal government is organized by function with each department performing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>Chairman, Joint Task Force (CJTF) (2)</td>
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<td>Defense Coordinating Officer/Defense Coordinating Element</td>
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<td>Service</td>
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<td>Functional</td>
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</table>

1. The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, United States Government (USG) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional organizations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and corporations toward theater strategic objectives.

2. The CJTF, within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs, regional organizations, IGOs, and corporations toward theater operational objectives.

3. The Ambassador and Embassy (which includes the country team) function at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and may support joint operation planning conducted by a combatant commander or CJTF.

4. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Foreign Policy Advisor or Political Advisor assigned to the combatant commander by the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency liaison officer, or any other US agency representative assigned to the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group or otherwise assigned to the combatant commander’s staff.

5. USAID’s OFDA provides its rapidly deployable DART in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of USG response to disasters.

Figure I-1. Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures
certain core tasks. In executing national security policy, the NSC plays a critical role in overcoming bureaucracy and orchestrating interagency cooperation.

(1) Core Values and Requirements. Each agency has core values and legal requirements that it will not compromise. These values form the foundation upon which key functions of the agency grow. In any interaction, all participants must be constantly aware that each agency will continuously cultivate and create external sources of support and maneuver to protect its core values.

(2) Insular Vision. Individual agency perspective and agendas complicate policy development. Protection of their institutional prerogatives is oftentimes an important driver of the various USG agencies’ position, which may not always coincide with a common approach to international security issues.

(3) Reduction of Uncertainty. Many bureaucracies try to standardize their operations but often fail to prepare for crisis management. Uncertainty increases in a crisis and it is likely that compromises will be made. Compromise may bring the sacrifice of power, security, or prestige. Uncertainty allows for the coexistence of varying views about the likely outcomes of a given action; these differences in viewpoint often lead to conflicting interests. An organization will seek to reduce uncertainty and lessen the threat to its own stability. Information can reduce uncertainty and increase an organization’s power. Thus, information equates to power in interagency coordination, as it provides those who possess it a decided advantage in the decision-making process.

c. Consensus Within the Department of Defense. Before attempting to gain consensus in the interagency arena, it must first be attained within DOD. The various elements — Office of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, Defense agencies and DOD field activities, Military Departments, and combatant commands — should develop a common position on the appropriate military role in interagency coordination before broadening the discussion to include other agencies, departments, and organizations. DOD has a common culture, procedures, and a hierarchical structure.

THE VALUE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

General Jacob Devers, US Army commander of the 6th Army Group in World War II, wrote that in coalition operations the personalities and the ambitions of the senior commanders of each of the Armed Services of the Allied Powers under his command were critical toward making the coalition work.

General Schwarzkopf and Saudi Arabia’s Lieutenant General Khaled were able to forge the bonds of mutual respect and create an atmosphere that permeated both of their staffs and impacted on every action and every decision.

The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, which assisted in the reconstruction of Kuwait after the Gulf War, was able to obtain interagency cooperation
and establish subordinate interagency support based largely on personal relationships. Colonel Randall Elliot, USAR, who put the organization together, was also the senior analyst in the Near East Division of the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He knew the US Ambassador-designate to Kuwait, Edward “Skip” Gnehm, and was able to recruit Major Andrew Natsios, USAR, whose civilian job was Director of United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance. Major Natsios brought Mr. Fred Cuny from INTERTEC, a contractor specializing in disaster relief, into the task force. Thus, USAID and its contractors were integrated into the operation based on these personal relationships.

Successful interagency cooperation rests in no small part on the ability of the Ambassador, the geographic combatant commander, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the US Government departments and agencies to personally work together.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

d. Establishing Unifying Goals. Reaching consensus on unifying goals is an important prerequisite for success. Consensus must be constantly nurtured, which is much more difficult if the goals are not clear or change over time. At the national level, this consensus is usually attained by the NSC staff and usually results in an NSC committee meeting Statement of Conclusions, a nation security Presidential directive (NSPD), or a political-military (POLMIL) plan establishing the goals of an operation and establishing interagency responsibilities. The objective is to ensure all USG agencies clearly understand NSC policy objectives and subsequent responsibilities. Some compromise that limits the freedom of individual agencies may be required to gain consensus. The greater the number of agencies and the more diverse the goals, the more difficult it is to reach consensus. A crisis — such as the acts of terrorism of September 11, 2001 — increases the likelihood that compromises will be made and a consensus can be reached. Because a common unifying goal is so important, a great deal of time is spent on clarifying and restating the goals. Because a common threat brings a coalition together, the differences often revolve around ways and means. Many techniques that have been developed in previous coalition operations may be useful in facilitating interagency, IGO, and NGO cooperation.

e. Mutual Needs and Interdependence. After developing an understanding of other agencies, determine the mutual needs of all participating agencies. All organizations will strive to maintain their interests, policies, and core values. These must be considered to facilitate interagency cooperation. Functional interdependence means that one organization relies upon another to attain the objective. This interdependence is a strong and potentially lasting bond between agencies, departments, and organizations. IGOs and NGOs effectively conducted relief operations in Somalia and the early evolutions in the Balkans in the 1990s with the security provided by the Armed Forces of the United States. The Armed Forces of the United States cannot conduct a long-range deployment without DOS securing overflight and en route basing agreements. Resource interdependence is based on one organization providing certain capabilities that another organization lacks. This support includes such resources as manpower, logistics, training augmentation, communication, and money and establishes
a framework for cooperation. These interdependencies can develop over time and lead the way to true interagency cooperation. Ensuring that all organizations share the responsibility for the job and receive appropriate recognition strengthens these bonds of interdependence. The purpose of such recognition is to wed all of the engaged agencies to the process by validating and reinforcing their positive participation. Appendixes in Vol II of this publication describe the authority, responsibilities, organization, capabilities and core competencies, and pertinent contact information for many of these agencies, departments, and organizations.

f. Consider Long-Term and Short-Term Objectives. Long- and short-term objectives should be considered separately. At the strategic level of war, the combatant commander may work with policy coordinating committees through the SecDef (in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS]) who participates in NSC and ministerial-level discussions, setting long-term policy goals. The combatant commander will also confront short-term operational objectives and coordinate with ambassadors, their country teams, multinational and interagency staffs, and task forces.

BUILDING AN UNDERSTANDING IS NECESSARY

“Not only do UN, international organizations, and nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations not understand the military organization, we likewise do not understand them. They often have exaggerated impressions as to our capabilities, and little or no understanding of our limitations and restrictions. On the other hand, the US military personnel did not realize that those organizations do not have a real chain of command as we are used to — we simply never had any idea who to listen to . . . and they lacked one voice that could speak for all subordinates.”

SOURCE: Operation SUPPORT HOPE After Action Review, Headquarters, United States European Command

8. Building Coordination

Harnessing the power of disparate organizations with competing priorities and procedures is a daunting task. The following basic steps support an orderly and systematic approach to building and maintaining coordination:

a. Forge a Collective Definition of the Problem in Clear and Unambiguous Terms. Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can often cloud a clear understanding of the problem. Appropriate representatives from relevant agencies, departments, and organizations, to include field offices, should be involved in planning from the outset. This may include the deployment of an interagency assessment team.

b. Understand the Objectives, End State, and Transition Criteria for Each Involved Organization or Agency. Commanders and decision makers should seek a clearly defined end state supported by attainable objectives and transition criteria. Not all agencies and organizations
Introduction to Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

will necessarily understand or agree to clearly define the objective with the same sense of urgency or specificity of military planners.

c. **Understand the Differences Between US National Objectives, End State and Transition Criteria and Those of IGOs and NGOs.** Although appropriate IGOs and NGOs may participate at some level in defining the problem, ultimately their goals and objectives are independent of our own.

d. **Establish a Common Frame of Reference.** Differences in terminology and — in the case of foreign organizations — the use of English as a second language complicate coordination. The meaning of the terms “safe zone” or “neutral” to a JFC may have completely different connotations to another agency representative. The operational impact of this potential for misunderstanding is grave. The semantic differences commonly experienced among the Services grows markedly in the interagency, IGO, and NGO arenas. To mitigate this problem, commanders and their staffs must anticipate confusion and take measures to clarify and establish common terms with clear and specific usage. A good start is to provide common access to JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. This clarification is particularly important for the establishment of military objectives.

e. **Develop Courses of Action (COAs) or Options.** These should address the problem and achieve the objectives. **Commanders and their staffs should focus on the military enabling capabilities that contribute to national security policy objective attainment and are part of the interagency plan of action.** Resource-sensitive problems require flexible and viable options to lead to good solutions. Providing too few or clearly impractical options or recommending the “middle of the road” approach merely for the sake of achieving consensus is of little service to decision makers. Open debate within the interagency, IGO, and NGO community facilitates the formulation of viable options. Cooperation and synchronization are achieved when interagency coordination allows consideration of all positions. The military planner or commander’s voice will be but one among many at the interagency, IGO, and NGO table.

f. **Capitalize on Experience.** Review the after-action reports and lessons learned using the joint and Services lessons learned systems, and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Essential Task Matrix, and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to assess proposed COAs. Although usually less formal, agencies outside Department of Defense frequently have their own systems in place, which should be reviewed whenever possible to capitalize on operational experience.

g. **Establish Responsibility. A common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution is achievable when all participants understand what needs to be done and agree upon the means to accomplish it.** The resources required for a mission must be painstakingly identified, with specific and agreed upon responsibility assigned to the agencies that will provide them. To receive proper reimbursement from other USG agencies or IGOs for materiel support, careful responsibility and accounting procedures should be established.
h. **Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Functions.** In most multiagency operations, civilian organizations will remain engaged long after the military has accomplished its assigned tasks and departed the operational area. Therefore, prior to employing military forces, it is imperative to plan for the transition of responsibility for specific actions or tasks from military to nonmilitary entities. This process must begin at the national level. When interagency, IGO, and NGO transition planning does not occur, military involvement may be needlessly protracted. As campaign and operation plans and orders are developed, effective transition planning should also be a primary consideration. Commanders and their staffs should anticipate the impact of transition on the local populace and other organizations.

**THE NEED FOR TRANSITION PLANNING**

In Rwanda, after the 1994 genocide, the provision of potable water was critical to saving thousands of lives. While the Armed Forces of the United States perhaps have the greatest capacity to purify water, this service could not be provided indefinitely. Effective interagency coordination enabled the identification of other sources of reverse osmosis water purification units, associated equipment, support funding, and mutually agreed-upon timelines and procedures for transitioning from military support to IGO and NGO control. Also in 1994, in Haiti the well-conceived transition planning, performed as part of overall interagency coordination, provided for superb transition execution and management. This transition enabled the Armed Forces of the United States to hand over responsibility for key tasks to other agencies, departments, and organizations in a virtually seamless manner.

**Various Sources**

i. **Direct All Means Toward Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort in an operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose. Because DOD will often be in a supporting role in this process, it may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies. Appropriate organization, C2, and most importantly an understanding of the objectives of the organizations involved are all means to build consensus and achieve unity of effort, regardless of role. The reciprocal exchange of information is also a critical enabler in ensuring unity of effort.

9. **Media Impact on Coordination**

The media can be a powerful force in shaping public attitudes and policy development. The media often has a dramatic influence on the interagency, IGO, and NGO process — whether at the strategic decision-making level of the NSC or in the field as IGOs and NGOs vie for public attention and necessary charitable contributions. Commanders and their staffs should consider the impact that public affairs (PA) and media relations have on the operation and in the interagency process. The White House Office of Global Communications is the lead
agency for developing the national communication strategy. The State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs is the strategic international communications service for the US foreign affairs community. Commanders and their staffs should plan for PA activities to function in coordination with national-level communication initiatives. All participating agencies and organizations need to establish and agree early in the planning process on procedures for media access, issuing and verifying credentials, and briefing, escorting, and transporting of media members and their equipment. Planners must include the development of PA guidance as part of the interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination before executing the plan. This guidance provides a common reference for all military and other governmental organizations. Responsibility for interaction with the media should be established clearly so that, to the extent possible, the media hears a constant theme. Commanders should identify appropriate spokespersons, and plans should include when, how, and from which locations they will address media.
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CHAPTER II
ESTABLISHED INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION,
AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION RELATIONSHIPS

“What’s the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGOs and PVOs [private volunteer organizations] that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.”

General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Connectivity

Responding to the challenges facing the nation almost inevitably requires a multiagency, interdisciplinary approach that brings to bear the many diverse skills and resources of the Federal government and other public and private organizations. The requirement for coordination between these agencies and organizations is not new. The continually changing global security environment requires increased and improved communications and coordination among the numerous agencies and organizations working to achieve established national security objectives. This cooperation is best achieved through active interagency involvement, building on the core competencies and successful experiences of each. What follows is a discussion of the foundation and beginnings of the interagency process within the Federal government, flowing downward and outward to the state and local governments, and combatant commands. The discussion then addresses coordination with national and international IGOs and NGOs. While portions of this chapter are described in other JPs, this material is brought together here to provide a common frame of reference that reflects all levels of interagency involvement.

2. Historical Basis of the Interagency Process

a. DOD participation in the interagency process is grounded within the Constitution and established by law in the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47). The NSC is a product of NSA 47. NSA 47 codified and refined the interagency process used during World War II, modeled in part on Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1919 proposal for a “Joint Plan-Making Body” to deal with the overlapping authorities of the Departments of State, War, and Navy.

b. Due to the diverse interests of individual agencies, previous attempts at interagency coordination failed for lack of national-level perspectives, a staff for continuity, and adequate appreciation of the need for an institutionalized coordination process. Evolving from the World War II experience (during which the Secretary of State was not invited to War Council meetings), the first State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was formed in 1945.

c. From the earliest days of this nation, the President has had the primary responsibility for national security stemming from his constitutional powers both as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces and his authority to make treaties and appoint cabinet members and ambassadors. The intent of NSA 47 was to assist the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. Most current USG interagency actions flow from these beginnings.

d. Within the constitutional and statutory system, interagency actions at the national level may be based on both personality and process, consisting of persuasion, negotiation, and consensus building, as well as adherence to bureaucratic procedure.

3. The National Security Council System

a. The functions, membership, and responsibilities of the NSC and its advisory bodies set forth in NSA 47 (as amended) were updated most recently on February 13, 2001 in NSPD-1, Subject: Organization of the National Security Council System. These documents establish the National Security Council as the principal forum to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and the National Security Council System (NSCS) as the process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.

b. NSC Functions. The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council). Together with supporting interagency working groups (some permanent and others ad hoc), high-level steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, the NSCS provides the foundation for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of national security policy. The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with the administration’s senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The Council also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

c. NSC Membership. The President chairs the NSC. As prescribed in NSPD-1, the NSC shall have as its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the SecDef, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Director of Central Intelligence and the CJCS, as statutory advisors to the NSC, shall also attend NSC meetings. The Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Counsel to the President shall be consulted regarding the agenda of NSC meetings, and shall attend any meeting when, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, he deems it appropriate. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. For the Attorney General, this includes matters both within the jurisdiction of the Justice Department and concerning questions of law. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.
d. **NSC Organization.** The members of the NSC constitute the President’s personal and principal staff for national security issues. The council tracks and directs the development, execution, and implementation of national security policies for the President but does not normally implement policy. Rather, it takes a central coordinating or monitoring role in the development of policy and options depending on the desires of the President and the National Security Advisor. **NSPD-1 establishes three levels of formal interagency committees** for coordinating and making decisions on national security issues. Participation among USG agencies in the NSCS and these advisory bodies is depicted in Figure II-1. The advisory bodies include:

1. **The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) is the senior Cabinet-level interagency forum** for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The Principals Committee meets at the call of and is chaired by the National Security Advisor.

2. **The NSC/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) is the senior sub-Cabinet-level (deputy secretary-level) interagency forum** for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC prescribes and reviews the work of the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/DC ensures that NSC/PC issues have been properly analyzed and prepared for discussion. The Deputies Committee meets at the call of and is chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor.

3. **NSC/PCCs are the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy.** NSC/PCCs manage the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the USG, provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSCS, and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. The oversight of ongoing operations assigned by the Deputies Committee is performed by the appropriate NSC/PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups. Each NSC/PCC is chaired by an official of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank. Each NSC/PCC includes representatives from the executive departments, and offices and agencies represented in the NSC/DC. Additional NSC/PCCs may be established as appropriate by the President or the National Security Advisor.

   a. **Six Regional NSC/PCCs are established:** Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa.

   b. **Functional NSC/PCCs are established for specific purposes as issues or crises arise and to develop long-term strategies.** Currently there are 11 functional NSC/PCCs (see Figure II-1). Of particular significance in CCOs is the NSC/PCC for Contingency Planning, which manages the interagency process for preparation and review of POLMIL plans. Functional NSC/PCCs have an Executive Secretary from the staff of the NSC. The functional NSC/PCC may invite representatives of other executive departments and agencies (see Figure II-1).

   c. **During a rapidly developing crisis,** the President may request the National Security Advisor to convene the NSC. The NSC reviews the situation, determines a preliminary COA, and tasks the Principals and Deputies Committees.
### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ORGANIZATION

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<th>Joint Staff</th>
<th>Department of State</th>
<th>Other Executive Branch</th>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>President, Vice President, Secretary of the Treasury, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence, Chief of Staff to the President, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, Attorney General, Director OMB, Counsel to the President</td>
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<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>Secretary of the Treasury, Director of Central Intelligence, Chief of Staff to the President, Attorney General, Director OMB, Counsel to the President, Chief of Staff to the Vice President, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor, et al.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense or Undersecretary for Policy</td>
<td>Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of State</td>
<td>Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and other deputies of Principals</td>
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#### POLICY COORDINATION COMMITTEES (PCCs)

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<td>Records Access and Information Security</td>
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*Figure II-1. National Security Council Organization*
(d) Under more routine conditions, concerns focus on broader aspects of national policy and long-term strategy perspectives. NSPDs outline specific national interests, overall national policy objectives, and tasks for the appropriate components of the executive branch.

e. DOD Role in the NSCS

(1) Key DOD players in the NSCS come from within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. The SecDef is a regular member of the NSC and the NSC/PC. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is a member of the NSC/DC. In addition to membership, an Under Secretary of Defense may chair a NSC/PCC.

(2) The NSCS is the channel for the CJCS to discharge substantial statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President, the SecDef, and the NSC. The CJCS regularly attends NSC meetings and provides advice and views in this capacity. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement with that of the CJCS or advice or an opinion in addition to the advice provided by the CJCS.

(3) The Military Departments which implement but do not participate directly in national security policy-making activities of the interagency process are represented by the CJCS.

f. The Joint Staff Role in the NSCS

(1) The Joint Staff provides operational input and staff support through the CJCS (or designee) for policy decisions made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It coordinates with the combatant commands, Services, and other agencies and prepares appropriate directives, such as warning, alert, and execute orders, for SecDef approval. This preparation includes definition of command and interagency relationships.

(2) When combatant commands require interagency coordination, the Joint Staff, in concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, routinely accomplishes that coordination.

(3) Within the Joint Staff, the offices of the CJCS, Secretary of the Joint Staff, and the Operations (J-3), Logistics (J-4), Plans and Policy (J-5), and Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorates are focal points for NSC-related actions. The J-3 provides advice on execution of military operations, the J-4 assesses logistic implications of contemplated operations, and the J-5 often serves to focus DOD on a particular NSC matter for policy and planning purposes. Each of the Joint Staff directorates coordinates with the Military Departments to solicit Service input in the planning process. The SecDef may also designate one of the Services as the executive agent for direction and coordination of DOD activities in support of specific mission areas.

g. The Combatant Commanders’ Role in the NSCS. Although combatant commanders sometimes participate directly in the interagency process by directly communicating with
committees and groups of the NSC system and by working to integrate the military with
diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power, the normal conduit for
information between the President, SecDef, NSC, and a combatant command is the CJCSC.
Combatant commanders may communicate with the Deputies Committee during development
of the POLMIL plan with the Joint Staff in a coordinating role.


The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the DHS whose mission is to lead the
unified national effort to secure America by preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and
protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation. As such, **DHS is the LFA
for homeland security (HS)**. Within DOD, the **Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland
Defense) (ASD(HD)) was established** within the office of the Under Secretary for Policy to
provide overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and
allocation of DOD resources for homeland defense (HD) and CS. Responsibilities include:
strategic planning; employment policy, guidance and oversight; support to civil authorities in
accordance with the FRP; assistance to civilian agencies conducting HS missions; and serving
as the principal staff assistant delegated the authority to manage and coordinate HS and CS
functions at the SecDef level. **The establishment of ASD(HD) was followed closely by a
change in the Unified Command Plan that created the United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM)**. USNORTHCOM’s missions include conducting operations to deter,
prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interest
within the assigned area of responsibility (AOR); and, as directed by the President or SecDef,
provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management (CM)
operations.

*For further guidance on CS and HD, see JP 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security.*

a. While the NSC serves as the principal forum for considering national security policy
issues requiring Presidential determination, the **Homeland Security Council (HSC) provides
a parallel forum for considering unique homeland security matters**, especially those
concerning terrorism within the United States. The HSC ensures coordination of all HS-related
activities among executive departments and agencies and promotes the effective development
and implementation of all homeland security policies.

(1) **The Homeland Security Council Principals Committee (HSC/PC)** membership
includes the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Treasury, the SecDef, the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation,
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, the Chief of Staff to the President, and the Chief of Staff to the Vice
President. The National Security Advisor is invited to attend all meetings of the HSC/PC. The
following are invited to HSC/PC meetings when issues pertaining to their responsibilities and
expertise are discussed: the Secretary of State; the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of
Agriculture; the Secretary of Commerce; the Secretary of Labor; the Secretary of Energy; the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and the Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism.

(2) **Homeland Security Council Policy Coordination Committees.** HSC Policy Coordination Committees (HSC/PCCs) manage the development and implementation of HS policies by multiple departments and agencies throughout the Federal government, and coordinate those policies with State and local government. The HSC/PCCs are the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of HS policy. There are eleven HSC/PCCs:

(a) Detection, Surveillance, and Intelligence.

(b) Plans, Training, Exercises, and Evaluation.

(c) Law Enforcement and Investigation.

(d) Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management.

(e) Key Asset, Border, Territorial Waters, and Airspace Security.

(f) Domestic Transportation Security.

(g) Research and Development.

(h) Medical and Public Health Preparedness.

(i) Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management.

(j) Economic Consequence.

(k) Public Affairs.

b. **Homeland Defense.** Under the DOD HD mission area, military capabilities are used to counter threats and aggression against the United States. Normally, DOD is the lead, supported by other agencies, in defending against traditional threats/aggression. When ordered to conduct HD operations, DOD will often have to maintain close coordination of operations with other federal agencies or departments.

c. **Civil Support.** The Armed Forces of the United States are authorized under certain conditions to provide assistance to US civil authorities. This assistance is known as CS within the defense community because the assistance will always be in support of an LFA. Requests for assistance from another agency may be predicated on mutual agreements between agencies or stem from a Presidential designation of a federal disaster area or a federal state of emergency. The military typically only responds after the resources of other federal agencies, state and local governments, and NGOs have been exhausted or when specialized military assets are required.
d. DOD works closely with other Federal agencies, in particular DHS and its subordinate organizations, in various domestic arenas. In addition to participating in interagency steering groups and councils, DOD is a partner in several national-level incident management and emergency response plans such as the FRP, the National Contingency Plan, the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN), Mass Immigration Emergency Plan, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). Over time, these plans will be consolidated into a NRP.

(1) The Federal Response Plan, January 2003, invokes the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, which provides the authority for the Federal government to respond to emergencies and major disasters. The Act gives the President the authority to establish a program for disaster preparedness and response support, which is delegated to DHS.

(2) In accordance with HSPD-5, a NRP is under development by the Secretary DHS that will integrate USG domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan. HSPD-5 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a NIMS. Under NIMS, federal, state, and local governments prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, irrespective of incident cause, size, or complexity. NIMS incorporates the Incident Command System (ICS) as the standard incident management organization with five functional areas — command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration — for management of all major incidents. NIMS is not an operational management or resource allocation plan.

See DHS Pamphlet titled “National Incident Management System” dated 1 March 2004 for more information on NIMS and ICS.

(3) The FRERP, May 1, 1996, established an organized and integrated capability for timely, coordinated response by Federal agencies to peacetime radiological emergencies. The LFA is responsible for coordinating all aspects of the Federal response. DOD is the LFA for emergencies at DOD-owned or operated facilities, involving DOD material in transit, or involving DOD spacecraft missions. Additionally, DOD provides radiological resources to include trained response personnel, specialized radiation instruments, mobile instrument calibration, repair capabilities, expertise in site restoration and performs special sampling of airborne contamination on request.

(4) Under the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism CONPLAN, January 2001, DOD provides military assistance to the LFA and/or the CONPLAN primary agencies during all aspects of a terrorist incident when requested by the appropriate authority and approved by the SecDef.

(5) Operation Distant Shore, Mass Immigration Emergency Plan, June 1994, presents guidelines for coordinated actions by the Federal government, at the national, regional, and local level, to enforce Federal laws to deter, interdict, and control massive illegal immigration
to the United States. DOD will provide facilities, logistics, medical support, transportation and personnel support to agencies involved in the implementation of the plan.

(6) The NCP, September 15, 1994 provides the organizational structure and procedures for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants. In the case of a release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, where the release is on, or the sole source of the release is from, any facility or vessel under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of DOD, then DOD will be the lead agency.

e. Military forces may also conduct missions to help DOJ or other Federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) assist Federal, state, or local LEAs. This includes military assistance in response to civil disturbances. Other types of operations include counterdrug, combating terrorism, general support such as training civilian law enforcement officials, and infrastructure protection. However, the Constitution of the United States, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues all affect the employment of the military in domestic operations. For this reason, requests should be coordinated with the supporting organization’s legal counsel or staff judge advocate (SJA). Examples of laws that may impact this type of support include:

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Authorities, provide the authority and define the conditions under which military forces can be employed, as well as criminal penalties and the legal constraints intended to prevent misuse of military force. With the exception of members of the US Coast Guard (USCG) and members of the National Guard in state service, military personnel are normally prohibited under either the Posse Comitatus Act or DOD policy from direct participation in the execution of civil laws in the United States. Under the provisions of this act and DOD policy, military personnel are prohibited from:

(a) Participating in the arrest, search and seizure, and stopping and frisking of personnel, or domestic interdiction of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles.

(b) Conducting domestic surveillance or pursuit.

(c) Operating as informants, undercover agents, or investigators in civilian legal cases or in any other civilian law enforcement activity.

(2) Preplanned national events may be perceived by adversaries as terrorist targets. In accordance with HSPD-7, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the HSC, has the authority to designate important public events, such as the Olympic games or the President’s Inauguration, as national security special events. Once so designated, an event becomes the focal point for interagency planning and the LFA may request support from DOD.

(3) DOD capabilities may also be requested in support of civil law enforcement. DOD’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as other advanced capabilities like chemical detection, may likely result in increased requests for DOD assistance in the future,
particularly to fight terrorism. (See DODD 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*.)

f. In most situations, the Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) or the Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) will be designated as the supported combatant commander.

1. The supported combatant commanders are DOD principal planning agents and have the responsibility to provide joint planning and execution directives for peacetime assistance rendered by DOD within their assigned AORs.

2. Once a decision to employ military assets is made, the supported combatant commander uses the capabilities of each component to accomplish the mission. The organization of the joint force will be based on the capabilities required for the optimum response. Frequently, the response will require nontraditional or innovative uses of military resources.

3. During disaster operations, the supported combatant commander normally designates a defense coordinating officer (DCO) upon receipt of a request for assistance from the LFA sent through the Executive Secretary (EXECSEC) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The DCO works with the federal coordinating officer (FCO) or principal federal official (PFO) to integrate DOD efforts in support of the operation and serves as the on-scene military point of contact (POC) for the FCO or PFO and principal representatives of other USG agencies and NGOs.

4. DHS provides supporting combatant commanders with interface to Federal agencies through regional interagency steering committees for planning, coordinating, and supporting relief efforts. Figure II-2 depicts the ICS, a standard model for managing domestic events, and widely used by the civilian sector and DHS to establish roles and responsibilities when working within the interagency community. The USCG has adopted ICS as its standard response system for nonmilitary incident management. US military forces that might be involved in emergency or major disaster operations may benefit by becoming familiar with the ICS system.

Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA) was formed following a Presidential Executive Order on the evening of 1 May 1992. The Executive Order federalized units of the California National Guard (CANG) and authorized active military forces to assist in the restoration of law and order. JTF-LA formed and deployed within twenty-four hours, assembled from US Army and Marine Forces. It operated in a domestic disturbance environment, while working with city, county, state, federal agencies, and the CANG.

VARIOUS SOURCES

g. In addition to emergency or disaster assistance, DOD assistance may be requested from other agencies as part of HS. Such assistance may be in the form of information and intelligence sharing, mapping, or damage assessment assistance.
h. While DOD response to domestic emergencies is normally coordinated through the SecDef, **the military may also respond when an interdepartmental memorandum of agreement (MOA) is in effect.** For example, the USCG, under an interdepartmental MOA, is assured of a rapid deployment of oil containment and recovery equipment from the US Navy. The MOA bypasses negotiations at the HQ level and sets forth procedures for deployment and employment of equipment and personnel and for reimbursement of operational costs.

i. Because of America’s unrivaled military superiority, **adversaries of the United States may be more likely to resort to terror and the use of WMD instead of conventional military methods.** Supporting incidents involving WMD may take many forms, to include operations associated with crisis management (CrM) and CM.

(1) **CrM support** occurs under the primary jurisdiction of the Federal government with the DOJ, exercised through the FBI, as the LFA assuming primary responsibility in a domestic terrorist threat or incident. DOD support to LFA crisis management involving the
employment of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives (CBRNE) devices includes measures to identify, acquire, and employ resources to anticipate, prevent, or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. When a terrorist incident develops having a potential for military involvement, the DOD executive agent may dispatch military observers to the incident site, on mutual agreement between DOD and the FBI, to appraise the situation before any decision is made to commit military forces. The SecDef through the CJCS shall specifically authorize any dispatch of US counterterrorism forces as observers. (See DODD 3025.12, Military Support for Civil Disturbance.)

(2) CM involves actions that comprise those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Such services may include transportation, communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy. Support occurs under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government with the Federal government providing assistance when required. DOD support to CM involving the employment of CBRNE devices comprises USG interagency assistance to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a CBRNE accident or incident.

j. The US military has acquired experience and developed expertise in protecting its members from CBRNE devices and in operating in a contaminated environment. With the threat now reaching into the domestic arena, this experience and expertise is available to domestic civil authorities.

k. Military commanders should scrutinize, with the assistance of legal counsel when appropriate, each request for domestic aid to ensure that it conforms with statutory limitations, especially in law enforcement assistance to civil authorities. The SecDef must personally approve any request to assist LEAs in preplanned national events. Increased demand for DOD assets in support of law enforcement will require careful review during the planning phase to ensure that DOD support conforms to legal guidelines and does not degrade the mission capability of combatant commanders.

5. Department of Defense Coordination of Civil Support with State and Local Authorities

a. When a disaster threatens or occurs, and the assets of local and state governments are fully committed, a governor may request federal assistance. DOD may support local and state authorities in a variety of tasks.

b. Army and Air National Guard forces have primary responsibility for providing military assistance in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia in civil emergencies, and are under the command of the state or territory adjutant general. Reserve personnel may be employed for civil emergencies in a volunteer status, be ordered to active duty for annual training, or be called to active duty. DOD support is generally provided in the
Established Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Relationships

form of assistance or augmentation of skills and resources to the Federal agency field office or to a state or local agency having responsibility for a particular activity.

c. The Domestic Preparedness Program was established in 1997 and provided funding for DOD to train state and local first responders in 120 US cities in CBRNE training, access to federal assistance, and exercises.

d. Each US state, territory, and possession has an office of emergency services (OES) or an equivalent office responsible for preparedness planning and assisting the governor in directing responses to emergencies. The OES coordinates provision of state or territorial assistance to its local governments through authority of the governor or adjutant general. The OES operates the state emergency operations center during a disaster or emergency and coordinates with Federal officials for support, if required. The state will usually designate a state coordinating officer (SCO), with similar authorities to the FCO or PFO, to coordinate and integrate Federal and state activities. States may also assist other states through the use of interstate compacts.

e. DOD counterpart relationships to those of DCO, FCO or PFO, and SCO are established at lower echelons to facilitate coordination. Installation commanders may respond immediately to a request from local or state governments to an emergency which may not be at the level to be a Presidentially declared emergency. Installation commanders may respond to support for public fire, search and rescue services, public works, police protection, social services, public health, and hospitals. DOD support for local environmental operations can begin immediately within the authority delegated to installation commanders. This immediate response by commanders will not take precedence over their primary mission. Commanders should seek guidance through the chain of command regarding continuing assistance whenever DOD resources are committed under immediate response circumstances. When providing assistance in response to a Presidentially-declared disaster or emergency, emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs) represent the DOD executive agent, the supported commander, and their own Service.

6. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination: Foreign Operations

a. The Political-Military Domain. Within the Executive Branch, DOS is the lead foreign affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. As such, DOS oversees the coordination of DOD external POLMIL relationships with overall US foreign policy. External POLMIL relationships of DOD include:

(1) Bilateral military relationships.

(2) Coalition military forces.

(3) Multilateral mutual defense alliances.
(4) Treaties and agreements involving DOD activities or interests, such as technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, international aviation, law of the sea, nuclear regulation, and environmental pollution.

(5) Use of US military assets for humanitarian or peace operations (including those conducted under UN auspices).

b. Theater Focus. The geographic combatant commander implements DOD external POLMIL relationships within the AOR. The combatant commander’s regional focus is similar to the regional focus of DOS’s geographic bureaus, though the geographic boundaries differ. Most other USG foreign affairs agencies are regionally organized as well, again with varying geographic boundaries. Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater military strategies that require interagency coordination. In contrast, the DOS focal point for formulation and implementation of regional foreign policy strategies requiring interagency coordination is the geographic bureau at DOS headquarters in Washington, DC. Although the geographic combatant commander will often find it more expeditious to approach the US bilateral COMs for approval of an activity in regional HNs, often the political effect of the proposed US military activity goes far beyond the boundaries of the HN. In such cases, the combatant commander should not assume that the approval of the COM corresponds to region-wide approval of DOS, but instead should ascertain that the COM has received instructions from DOS to give region-wide approval.

c. In a CCO, coordination between DOD and other USG agencies will normally occur within the NSC/PCC and, if directed, during development of the POLMIL plan. During lesser operations and operations not involving armed conflict, the combatant commander’s staff may deal directly with a COM or members of the country team regarding issues that do not transcend the boundaries of the HN. In some operations, a special envoy of the President or a special representative of the UN Secretary General may be involved.

d. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the JIACG provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the NSCS. Members participate in deliberate, crisis, and transition planning, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize joint task force (JTF) operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments.
“Interaction with the US Department of State and the United Nations was critical throughout the operation. Ambassador Oakley and I spoke regularly to coordinate the efforts of the DOS and our military operations in the ARFOR [Army forces] sector. His support for our operation was superb and he played a key role in communicating with the leadership of the Somali clans. We followed his lead in operations, just as we fully supported the operations of the DOS.”

Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA
Operations Other Than War in a Power Projection Army: Lessons From Operation RESTORE HOPE and Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994

e. **Campaign Planning and Interagency Coordination.** Campaign planning generally applies to the conduct of combat operations, but combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs may be required to develop campaign plans across the range of military operations. A joint campaign plan is based on the commander’s concept, which presents a broad vision of the required military aim or end state, and how operations will be conducted to achieve objectives. Thus, a campaign plan is an essential tool for laying out a clear, definable path linking the mission to the desired end state. Such a plan enables commanders to help political leaders visualize operational requirements for achieving objectives. Given the systematic military approach to problem solving and the usual predominance of resources, it is often the combatant commander who formally or informally functions as the lead organizer of many operations.

(1) **Strategic Guidance.** The President and/or SecDef will promulgate strategic guidance to provide long-term, intermediate, or ancillary objectives. The combatant commander will determine how to implement guidance at the theater or operational level to achieve strategic objectives. Theater-level campaign planning is linked to operational art, which provides a framework to assist commanders in using resources efficiently and effectively, including interagency assets, when producing campaign plans. Among the many operational considerations, the combatant commander’s guidance must define the following:

(a) What military or related political and social conditions (objectives) must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)

(b) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)

(c) How should resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)

(d) What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing a particular sequence of actions? (Considered during COA analysis).

(e) What organizational/command arrangements will be established for the joint or Service forces tasked to accomplish the mission (unity of command)?
To frame a campaign plan involving interagency coordination, the commander must address this area within the context of all the instruments of national power. The commander will be guided by the interagency provisions of the POLMIL plan, when provided, and will disseminate that guidance to the joint force in Annex V, the Interagency Coordination Annex of the combatant commander’s OPLAN. Developed in December 1999, Appendix V (Planning Guidance, Annex V - Interagency Coordination) to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.03A, Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance, remains an essential ingredient at the NSC and policy coordinating committee in producing POLMIL plans. For interagency transition and exit criteria Annex V lays out to the greatest degree possible what the combatant commander desires as the entry and exit conditions for the USG civilian agencies during the operation. It notes that interagency participation could be involved at the earliest phases of the operation or campaign starting with flexible deterrent options. Linking the interagency actions with the phases of the operation assists in the scheduling and coordination. Crucially important to the plan is the orderly flow of operations to the desired end state and an efficient end of direct US military involvement. The development of Annex C should enhance early operational coordination with planners from the other USG agencies that will be involved in the operation’s execution or its policy context. During deliberate interagency planning, heavy combatant command involvement, participation, and coordination will be critical to success.

f. Plan Development and Coordination. Although deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there may be situations which call for an immediate US military response, e.g., noncombatant evacuation operation or FHA. Combatant commanders frequently develop COAs based on recommendations and considerations originating in one or more US embassies. In this regard, the country team is an invaluable resource because of its interagency experience and links to Washington. The JIACG can provide additional collaboration with operational planners and USG agencies. Emergency action plans in force at every embassy cover a wide range of anticipated contingencies and crises and can assist the commanders in identifying COAs, options, and constraints to military actions and support activities. The staffs of geographic combatant commands also consult with the Joint Staff and other key agencies not represented on the country team or a JIACG to coordinate military operations and support activities. Initial concepts of military operations may require revision based on feasibility analysis and consideration of related activities by IGOs or NGOs, particularly regarding logistics. For example, primitive seaport and airport facilities may limit the ability to move massive amounts of supplies and constrain operations. Such information is frequently provided the country team that, in turn, may be in contact with relief organizations in country. Directly or indirectly, refinement of the military mission should be coordinated with other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs to identify and minimize mutual interference.

(1) Mission planning conducted by the geographic combatant commander should be coordinated with the DOS, DOJ, and Department of Energy, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to facilitate definition and clarification of strategic aims, end state, and the means to achieve them. Commanders and planners should consider specific conditions that could produce mission failure, as well as those that mark success.
Commanders must ensure that unity of effort with other agencies contributes to the USG’s overall strategic aims and objectives.

INTEGRATING INTERAGENCY PLANNING

Our experiences in Kosovo and elsewhere have demonstrated the necessity to ensure that all concerned government agencies conduct comprehensive planning to encompass the full range of instruments available to decision makers. We all must move forward with our efforts to achieve increased levels of integrated interagency planning now. To better support other agencies, DOD needs to give greater consideration to political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, information, and other nonmilitary activities in defense planning. In addition, the US Government must establish dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes to ensure rapid, effective, well-structured, multi-agency efforts in response to crises. Finally, we must continue to emphasize that our senior officials routinely participate in rehearsals, gaming, exercises, and simulations, as well as the CP IWG [Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group] - which has become a genuine leap forward in the effort to establish a sound system to incorporate crisis and deliberate planning across the interagency.

SOURCE: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Posture Statement before the 106th Congress Committee On Armed Services, United States Senate, 8 February 2000

7. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Structure in Foreign Countries

   a. The Mission. The US has bilateral diplomatic relations with some 180 of the world’s 191 countries. The US bilateral representation in the foreign country, known as the diplomatic mission, is established in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of which the US is a signatory. DOS provides the core staff of a mission and administers the presence of representatives of other USG agencies in the country. A mission is led by a COM, usually the ambassador, but at times the chargé des affaires, ad interim (the chargé), when no US ambassador is accredited to the country or the ambassador is absent from the country. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is second in charge of the mission and usually assumes the role of chargé in the absence of the COM. For countries with which the
US has no diplomatic relations, the embassy of a friendly country often accepts the duty of watching out for US affairs in the country and at times houses an interests section staffed with USG employees. In countries where an IGO is headquartered, the US has a multilateral mission to the IGO in addition to the bilateral mission to the foreign country.

(1) **The Ambassador.** The ambassador is the personal representative of the President to the government of the foreign country or to the IGO to which he or she is accredited and, as such, is the COM, responsible for recommending and implementing national policy regarding the foreign country or IGO and for overseeing the activities of USG employees in the mission. The President with the advice and consent of the Senate appoints the ambassador. The ambassador has extraordinary decision making authority as the senior USG official on the ground during crises.

(2) **The Deputy Chief of Mission.** The DCM is chosen from the ranks of career foreign service officers through a rigorous selection process to be the principal deputy to the ambassador. Although not appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, the DCM wields considerable power, especially when acting as the COM while in chargé status.

(3) **The Embassy.** The headquarters of the mission is the embassy, located in the political capital city of the HN to have regular access to the HN leadership. Although the various USG agencies that make up the mission may have individual headquarters elsewhere in the country, the embassy is the focal point for interagency coordination. The main building of the embassy is termed the chancery; the ambassador’s house is known as the residence. Each embassy has an associated consular section, frequently located in the chancery, to provide services to US citizens and to issue visas to foreigners wishing to travel to the US.

(4) **Consulates.** The size or principal location of commercial activity in some countries necessitates the establishment of one or more consulates — branch offices of the mission located at a distance from the embassy. A consulate is headed by a principal officer. In addition to providing consular services, the consulate is the focal point of interagency coordination for the assigned consular district.

b. **The Chief of Mission.** The bilateral COM has authority over all USG personnel in country, except for those assigned to a combatant command, a USG multilateral mission, or an IGO. The COM may be accredited to more than one country. The COM interacts daily with DOS’s strategic-level planners and decision makers. The COM provides recommendations and considerations for crisis action planning directly to the geographic combatant commander and commander of a JTF. While forces in the field under a geographic combatant commander are exempt from the COM’s statutory authority, the COM confers with the combatant commander regularly to coordinate US military activities with the foreign policy direction being taken by the USG toward the host country. The COM’s political role is important to the success of military operations involving the Armed Forces of the United States. Each COM as a formal agreement with the geographic combatant commander as to which DOD personnel fall under the force protection responsibility of each.
c. **The Country Team.** The country team, headed by the COM, is the senior in-country interagency coordinating body. It is composed of the COM, DCM, the senior member of each US department or agency in country, and other USG personnel as determined by the COM. Each member presents the position of his or her parent organization to the country team and conveys country team considerations back to the parent organization. The COM confers with the country team to develop foreign policy toward the host country and to disseminate decisions to the members of the mission.

1. The country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US programs and policies. Under the country team concept, agencies are required to coordinate their plans and operations and keep one another and the COM informed of their activities. Country team members who represent agencies other than the State Department are routinely in contact with their parent agencies. Issues arising within the country team can become interagency issues at the national level if they are not resolved locally or when they have broader national implications.

2. **In almost all bilateral missions, DOD is represented on the country team by the US Defense Attaché’s Office (USDAO) and the security assistance organization (SAO)** (called by various specific names, such as the Office of Defense Cooperation, the Security Assistance Office, the Military Group, etc., largely governed by the preference of the receiving country). The USDAO and the SAO are key military sources of information for interagency coordination in foreign countries.

(a) **USDAO.** The USDAO is an office of Service attachés managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. A US defense attaché (DATT) heads the defense attaché office in country and is a member of the country team. The DATT is normally the senior Service attaché assigned to the mission. The attaches serve as liaisons with their HN counterparts and are valuable sources of information for the COM and combatant commander on the military affairs of the HN. The DATT may be accredited to more that one country. The Service attachés report to the ambassador, but coordinate with and represent their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attaches assist in the foreign internal defense (FID) program by exchanging information with the combatant commander’s staff on HN military, political, humanitarian, religious, social, and economic conditions and interagency coordination.

(b) **SAO.** The SAO, the most important FID-related military activity under the supervision of the COM, oversees the provision of US military assistance to the HN. The SAO — which may comprise a military assistance advisory group, another military activity, or a security assistance officer — operates under the direction of the COM but reports administratively to the combatant commander and is funded by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The SAO assists HN security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the security assistance program. The SAO also helps the country team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the USG. In addition, the SAO provides oversight of training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to the HN. The SAO is prohibited by law from giving direct training assistance. Instead, training is normally provided through special teams and organizations assigned to limited tasks for specific periods (e.g., mobile training teams, technical assistance teams, quality assurance teams).
(c) **US Defense Representative (USDR).** The USDR will normally be the senior military official assigned to permanent duty with the mission. The USDR is the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, and executing support to USG officials for in-country US defense issues and activities that are not under the purview of the parent DOD components. The USDR is also the in-country representative of the SecDef, the CJCS, and the geographic combatant commander and is responsible (under the direction of the COM) for coordinating administrative and security matters for all DOD elements assigned to the country, except those under the control of a combatant commander.

**d. Geographic Combatant Commands.** To effectively bring all instruments of national power to theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and operation plans, **combatant commanders are augmented with representatives from other USG agencies.**

(1) The JIACG participates in deliberate, crisis, and transition planning. Representing USG agencies at the HQ of the geographic and selected functional combatant commands, each JIACG is a multi-functional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day support for planning, coordination, preparation, and implementation of interagency activities (see Figure II-3). Specific objectives are to:

   (a) Improve operational interagency campaign planning and execution.

   (b) Exercise secure collaboration processes and procedures with participating agencies.

   (c) Promote habitual relationships among interagency planners.

(2) Geographic combatant commanders and, increasingly, JTF commanders are assigned a political advisor (POLAD) by DOS. The POLAD provides USG foreign policy perspectives and diplomatic considerations and establishes linkages with US embassies in the AOR or joint operations area (JOA) and with DOS. The POLAD supplies information regarding objectives of DOS that are relevant to the geographic combatant commander’s theater strategy or commander, joint task force’s (CJTF’s) plans. The POLAD is directly responsible to the combatant commander or CJTF and can be of great assistance in interagency coordination.

(3) Other USG agencies may detail liaison personnel to combatant command staffs to improve interagency coordination. For example, intelligence representatives may be assigned to staffs of geographic combatant commands to facilitate intelligence and antiterrorism support.

8. **The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations**

IGOs may be established on a global or regional basis and may have general or specialized purposes. NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are regional security organizations, while the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity) and the
Established Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Relationships

Figure II-3. Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure
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Organization of American States are general regional organizations. A new trend toward subregional organizations is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. The following describes formal or informal ties between the United States and some of the largest of these regional and IGO security organizations.

a. The United Nations. Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with DOS, through the US permanent representative (PERMREP) to the UN, who shall have the rank and status of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. The US PERMREP is assisted at the US Mission to the UN by a military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).

(1) The UN normally conducts peace operations or FHA under the provisions of a resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. Mandates are developed through a political process which generally requires compromise, and sometimes results in ambiguity. As with all military operations, UN mandates are implemented by US forces through orders issued by the SecDef through the CJCS. During such implementation, the political mandates are converted to workable military orders.

(2) UN Peace and Humanitarian Organizational Structure. The UN HQ coordinates PO and FHA around the world. It does not, however, have a system for planning and executing these operations that is comparable to that of the United States. The UN organizational structure consists of the HQ and the operational field elements. Thus, there is a strategic and tactical-level equivalent to the Armed Forces of the United States, but no operational counterpart.

(a) At the HQ, the Secretariat plans and directs missions. Normally, the UNDPKO serves as the HQ component during contingencies involving substantial troop deployments. Some ‘peace building’ missions with small numbers of military observers are directed by UNOCHA. UNOCHA is a coordinating body that pulls together the efforts of numerous humanitarian/relief organizations and is the vehicle through which official requests for military assistance are normally made.
Supplemental US support by temporary augmentation from the Joint Staff and Service HQ staffs may be provided for specific requirements. UN special missions, such as the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, operate under the direction of the UN Secretary General (SYG).

(b) **Field level coordination is normally determined on an ad hoc basis, depending on which relief organization is playing the major role.** The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and UNDPKO are often the logical candidates. UNOCHA may deploy a field team to coordinate FHA or the Emergency Relief Coordinator may designate the resident UN coordinator as Humanitarian Coordinator. Coordination with the UN Resident Coordinator may be degraded if UN personnel are pulled out in the face of increased threats.

(c) **In certain situations the UN SYG may appoint a Special Representative who reports directly to the SYG but also advises UNDPKO and UNOCHA at UN HQ.** The Special Representative may direct day-to-day operations, as was the case in the UN operation in Cambodia.

(3) **United States Military Support.** The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206 (Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes) authorize various types of US military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.

(a) US military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI (Peaceful Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter.


(b) UN-sponsored peace operations normally employ a multinational force (MNF) under a single commander. The MNF commander is appointed by the SYG with the consent of the UN Security Council and reports directly to the SYG’s Special Representative or to the SYG. **When the United States provides support to a UN-sponsored peace operation, the US military structure that is used to conduct multinational operations normally is a JTF.** The CJTF should expect to conduct operations as part of an MNF. US forces may participate across a range of military operations in concert with a variety of USG agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities, IGOs, and NGOs.

(c) **The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in the field remains inviolate.** On a case-by-case basis, the President may place US forces participating in multilateral peace operations under UN auspices under the operational control (OPCON) (with modifications) of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security...
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Council. The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over US forces. The greater the US military role, the less likely it will be that the United States will agree to have a UN commander exercise OPCON over US forces. OPCON for UN multilateral peace operations is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the President and to US units led by US officers. Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign UN commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the operational area agreed to by the President. Nor may the foreign UN commander separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.

b. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The NATO experience exemplifies the interagency process on a regional level. Its evolution has been propelled, often in the face of crisis, by the demands for cooperation that characterize every regional effort. The durability of NATO is testament to its success in interagency coordination.

(1) NATO membership presently consists of 26 nations.

(2) Coordination of US efforts within NATO begins with the Presidential appointment of a PERMREP, who has the rank and status of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary and is a COM under the Foreign Service Act of 1980. As with any treaty, US commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty reflects the balance between the power of the President to conduct foreign policy and Congress’ power of the purse. Congress has authorized and regularly funds logistic support for elements of the armed forces deployed to NATO outside the United States and permits cross-servicing agreements in return for reciprocal support. Beyond day-to-day operations, training exercises, and logistics authorized by statute, employment of US military force with NATO requires Presidential action and may be subject to congressional review, including those employments authorized and limited by the War Powers Act.

c. Public Affairs Planning with Intergovernmental Organizations. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)) provides overall PA guidance and coordinates PA actions affecting IGOs. Planning for support to UN missions will normally include coordination with UN press office personnel through OASD(PA). JTF PA efforts should include the identification of POCs and authorized spokespersons within each IGO.

See Vol II of this publication, Appendix C for a detailed discussion of these and other “Regional and Intergovernmental Organizations.”

9. The Nongovernmental Organizations’ Connection to Joint Operations

a. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the US military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers.

b. NGOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a
commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Although philosophical differences may exist between military forces and NGOs, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. Discovering this common ground is essential. A very important issue to keep in mind when dealing with NGOs is that they will likely object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement of military objectives. Their mission is one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives. Ultimately, activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected COA.

c. The Role of NGOs. NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in the international arena. Working alone, alongside the US military, or with other US agencies, NGOs are assisting in all the world’s trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. The capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. The sheer number of lives they affect, the resources they provide, and the moral authority conferred by their humanitarian focus enable NGOs to wield a great deal of influence within the interagency and international communities. In fact, individual organizations are often funded by national and international donor agencies as implementing partners to carry out specific functions. Similarly, internationally active NGOs may employ indigenous groups, such as the Mother Teresa Society in Kosovo, as local implementing partners.
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d. The Increasing Number of NGOs. AJTF or MNF may encounter scores of NGOs in a JOA. In 1999 in Kosovo, more than 150 IGOs and NGOs had applied to be registered in the province. Over 350 such agencies are registered with the USAID. InterAction, a US-based consortium of NGOs has a membership of over 160 private agencies that operate in 180 countries. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies has a predominantly European membership numbering in the hundreds. Over 1,500 NGOs around the world are registered with the UN’s Department of Public Information, while over 2,400 have ‘consultative status’ with its Economic and Social Council. It is important to note that NGOs may not vet their members as thoroughly as government and military organizations. Some NGOs have had involvement in funding and facilitating the travel of terrorist elements. While this is not the norm, it is an issue that merits consideration in the interagency, IGO, and NGO operations environment.

e. Military and Nongovernmental Organization Relations. Whereas the military’s initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces, NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state which they had no part in determining. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably. NGOs desire to preserve the impartial character of their operations, accept only minimal necessary assistance from the military, and ensure that military actions in the relief and civic action are consistent with the standards and priorities agreed on within the civilian relief community.

(1) The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make private organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes, and they are sometimes willing to share such information on the basis of collegiality. Virtually all IGO and NGO operations interact with military operations in some way — they use the same (normally limited) lines of communications; they draw on the same sources for local interpreters and translators; and they compete for buildings and storage space. Thus, sharing of operational information in both directions is an essential element of successful civil-military operations (CMO).

(2) While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the use of military transport to move relief supplies to, or sometimes within, the operational area, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous, impartial operations. This is particularly the case if US military forces are a belligerent to a conflict in the operational area. Most NGOs are outfitted with very little, if any, equipment for personal security, preferring instead to rely upon the good will of the local populace for their safety. Any activity that strips an NGO’s appearance of impartiality, such as close collaboration with one particular military force, may well eliminate that organization’s primary source of security. NGOs may also avoid cooperation with the military out of suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. Commanders and their staffs should be sensitive to these concerns and consult these organizations, along with the competent national or international authorities, to identify local conditions that may impact effective military-NGO cooperation.

(3) PA planning should include the identification of POCs with NGOs that will operate in the JOA. Military spokespersons should comment on NGO operations based on approved PA guidance and make referrals of media queries to the appropriate organization’s spokesperson.
f. **Military Support of NGOs.** The SecDef may determine that it is in the national interest to task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) IGOs and NGOs. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all participants. A climate of cooperation between IGOs, NGOs, and military forces should be the goal. The creation of a framework for structured civil-military interaction, such as a CMOC, allows the military and NGOs to meet and work together in advancing common goals. Taskings to support IGOs and NGOs are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary events. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most needed. It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role of the armed forces should be to enable, not perform, IGO and NGO tasks. Military commanders and other decision makers should also understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the armed forces and other organizations may be critical to the success of the campaign or operation plan.

*See Vol II, Appendix B of this publication, “Nongovernmental Organizations.” Annex A of Appendix B contains “InterAction’s Geographic Index of NGOs.”*
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERAGENCY,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COORDINATION

“We must recognize that the Department of Defense contribution to interagency operations is often more that of enabler (versus decisive force, a function we are institutionally more comfortable with). For example, in Rwanda, the military served as an enabling force which allowed the NGOs and PVOs to execute their function of humanitarian relief. A key component to our success in Rwanda was the fact that we consciously stayed in the background and withdrew our forces as soon as the enabling function was complete.”

General George A. Joulwan, USA
Commander, US European Command
21 October 1993 – 10 July 1997

1. Organizing for Success

a. When campaign, deliberate, or crisis action planning is required, the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized will bear directly on its efficiency and success. To the extent feasible, joint planning should include key participants from the outset. The combatant commander through his strategic concept builds the interagency, IGO, and NGO activities into Annex V of the OPLAN. Subordinate JFCs build interagency, IGO, and NGO participation into their operations. Within the AOR and the JOA, appropriate decision-making structures are established at combatant command, JTF HQ, and tactical levels in order to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. This chapter will suggest meaningful tools for the commander to organize for successful interagency coordination, whether in domestic or foreign operations, and focus on the operational level and below.

b. In concert with the NSC, DOD, and Joint Staff, combatant commanders should:

(1) **Recognize all USG agencies, departments, IGOs, and NGOs that are or should be involved in the operation.** In most cases, initial planning and coordination with USG agencies will have occurred within the NSC, DOD, the Military Services, and the Joint Staff.

(2) Understand the authoritative interagency, IGO, and NGO hierarchy, to include the lead agency identified at the national level, and determine the agency of primary responsibility. Understand the differences between roles and responsibilities of DOD, the CJCS, the Joint Staff, and the Services in domestic and foreign operations. Understand the different command arrangements in domestic and foreign operations.

(3) **Define the objectives of the response.** These should be broadly outlined in the statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC meetings that authorized the overall USG participation. Within the military chain of command, they are further elaborated in tasking orders that include the commander’s intent.
“In Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the US military and the UN and NGO community in-theater literally ‘met on the dance floor.’ Given that a JTF commander’s concern will be to ensure unity of effort (not command!), too brief a time to establish relationships can exacerbate the tensions that exist naturally between and among so many disparate agencies with their own internal agenda and outside sponsors. The commander, therefore, will find that, short of insuring the protection of his force, his most pressing requirement will be to meet his counterparts in the US government, UN, and NGO hierarchies and take whatever steps he thinks appropriate to insure the smooth integration of military support . . .”

Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder, USA
Commander, JTF SUPPORT HOPE

(4) Define COAs for the assigned military tasks, while striving for operational compatibility with other USG agencies.

(5) Cooperate with each agency, department, or organization and obtain a clear definition of the role that each plays. In many situations, participating agencies, departments, and organizations may not have representatives either in theater or collocated with the combatant command’s staff. It is then advisable for the combatant commander to request temporary assignment of liaison officers (LNOs) from the participating agencies, departments, and organizations to the combatant command or JTF HQ. In some cases, it may be useful or even necessary for the military to send LNOs to selected other organizations.

(6) Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities. Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence as to solutions by all participants is the first step toward resolution. Too often these obstacles are assumed to have been addressed by another agency, department, or organization. If the obstacles cannot be resolved they must immediately be forwarded up the chain of command for resolution.

(7) Military and civilian planners should identify resources relevant to the situation. Determine which agencies, departments, or organizations are committed to provide these resources in order to reduce duplication, increase coherence in the collective effort, and identify what additional resources are needed.

(8) Define the desired military end states, plan for transition from military to civil authority, and recommend exit criteria.

(9) Maximize the joint force assets to support long-term goals. The military’s contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and support the broader, long-range objectives of the local, national or international response to a crisis.
(10) **Coordinate the establishment of interagency assessment teams** that can rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation. These can include ad hoc multilateral teams or teams organized under the auspices of an IGO such as the UN or OSCE.

(11) **Implement crisis action planning (CAP)** for incidents or situations involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that may require interagency coordination to achieve US objectives.

2. **Interagency and Nongovernmental Organization Crisis Response: Domestic Operations**

   a. Military operations inside the US and its territories, though limited in many respects, fall into two mission areas HD — for which DOD serves as the LFA and military forces are used to conduct military operations in defense of the homeland; and CS — for which DOD serves in a supporting role to other agencies by providing military support to civil authorities at the federal, state, and local level (see Figure III-1). The President and SecDef define the circumstances under which DOD will be involved in the HD and CS missions.

   (1) For HD missions the President, exercising his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, authorizes military action to counter threats to and within the United States.

   (2) When conducting CS missions, DOD will be in support of an LFA. The domestic operating environment for military CS presents unique challenges to the JFC. It is imperative that commanders and staffs at all levels understand the relationships, both statutory and operational, among all federal agencies involved in the operation. Moreover, it is equally important to understand DOD’s role in supporting these other federal agencies. **DOD will provide military assistance to the LFA upon request by the appropriate authority and approval by SecDef.** There are various national level plans, such as the Initial National Response Plan (INRP)/FRP, which detail the roles and missions of various federal departments and agencies in the event of a domestic crisis. [Note: the provisions of the FRP continue to provide guidance for all activities not specifically subsumed in the INRP but will eventually be integrated into a NRP.]

   (3) Within the CS mission area, circumstances may arise that fall into the realm of emergency and temporary non-emergency incidents. **In emergency circumstances, such as managing the consequences of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, critical infrastructure protection, or other events, DOD could be asked to provide capabilities that other agencies do not possess or that have been exhausted or overwhelmed.**

   b. **Command and Control Relationships and Responsibilities**

   (1) **For HD missions, DOD is in the lead with other federal agencies in support.** DOD’s capability to respond quickly to any threat or situation places a high demand on the same resources. For example, the same trained and ready force constituted to achieve strategic objectives
outside the homeland may also be required to execute HD missions within the homeland. Guidelines for C2, as depicted in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Force (UNAAF)*, are equally applicable to HD operations.
(2) Under certain circumstances, military commanders are allowed to take necessary action under immediate response authority. Responses to requests from civil authorities prior to receiving authority from the President or chain of command are made when immediate support is critical to save lives, prevent human suffering, or to mitigate great property damage. Under these circumstances, support elements must advise the DOD EXECSEC through command channels by the most expeditious means available and seek approval or additional authorizations. The EXECSEC will notify SecDef, the CJCS, and any other appropriate officials.

(3) Principal and supporting DOD participants involved in the execution of HD or CS mission areas may include: SecDef, ASD(HD), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict [ASD(SO/LIC)], Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [ASD(RA)], CJCS, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CDRNORAD), CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM, Commander, US Strategic Command, Commander, US Special Operations Command, Commander, US Transportation Command, Commander, US Joint Forces Command, Commander, US Southern Command, and the Services. Reserve component forces and the USCG are included in this grouping when under Title 10 status.

(4) Secretary of Defense. SecDef has overall authority for DOD and is the President’s principal advisor on military matters concerning HS. Authority for the conduct and execution of the HD mission resides with SecDef. For CS missions, SecDef retains approval authority for the use of forces, personnel, units, and equipment. SecDef has the primary responsibility within DOD to provide the overall policy and oversight for CS in the event of a domestic incident.

(5) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. The Office of the ASD(HD) is established within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. ASD(HD) is responsible for the overall supervision of all DOD HD and CS activities. ASD(HD) ensures internal coordination of DOD policy direction, assists SecDef in providing guidance, through CJCS, to combatant commanders for HD and CS missions and conducts coordination with the DHS.

(6) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. ASD(SO/LIC) provides civilian oversight for combating terrorism. This oversight includes supervision of policy, program planning, and allocation and the use of resources. ASD(SO/LIC) also represents SecDef on combating terrorism matters outside the DOD.

(7) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. ASD(RA) is responsible for monitoring Reserve Component readiness. ASD(RA) provides policy regarding the appropriate integration of Reserve and National Guard (NG) forces into HS response efforts. In coordination with ASD (HD), the Joint Staff, the Services, and the National Guard Bureau, ASD(RA) ensures appropriate reserve and NG forces are integrated into HS response operations.

(8) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS has numerous responsibilities relating to HS. These include advising the President and SecDef on operational policies, responsibilities, and programs; assisting SecDef in implementing operational responses to threats
or an act of terrorism; and translating SecDef guidance into operation orders to provide assistance
to the LFA. CJCS ensures that HD and CS plans and operations are compatible with other
military plans. CJCS also assists combatant commanders in meeting their operational requirements
for executing HD missions and for providing CS that has been approved by SecDef. In the CS
area, CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to SecDef and the President in preparing for
and responding to CBRNE situations, ensures that military planning is accomplished to support
the LFA for CrM and CM, and provides strategic guidance to the combatant commanders for the
conduct of counterdrug operations.

(9) Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). By
international agreement (The NORAD Agreement and Terms of Reference, and the Canadian/
US Basic Security Document 100/35), CDRNORAD leads a bi-national command composed
of Canadian and US forces responsible for aerospace control and aerospace warning for North
America. NORAD’s relationship with USNORTHCOM is unusual in that while they have
separate missions defined by separate sources, a majority of USNORTHCOM’s AOR overlaps
with NORAD’s operational area. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are two separate commands,
and neither command is subordinate to the other or a part of the other, but they work very closely
together.

(10) Commander, US Northern Command. CDRUSNORTHCOM has specific
responsibilities for HD and for assisting civil authorities. USNORTHCOM’s mission is to conduct
operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its
territories, and interests within the assigned AOR and as directed by the President or SecDef,
provide military assistance to civil authorities including CM operations. USNORTHCOM
embodies the principles of unity of effort and unity of command as the single, responsible,
designated DOD commander for overall C2 of DOD support to civil authorities within the
USNORTHCOM AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM takes all operational orders from and is
responsible to the President through SecDef.

(11) Commander, US Pacific Command. CDRUSPACOM serves as DOD principal
planning agent and supported commander for military HS activities in Hawaii, Territory of
Guam, Territory of American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, US
administrative entities, and US territorial waters within Pacific Command. CDRUSPACOM is
the supported commander within the designated AOR for HD missions. CDRUSPACOM is
also responsible for combating terrorism actions, force protection (FP) and performing defense
critical infrastructure protection. When directed by the President, CDRUSPACOM is responsible
for conducting combat operations within the AOR to deter, prevent and defeat an incursion of
sovereign territory. CDRUSPACOM is also responsible for planning for CS operations within
the AOR.

c. The appropriate geographic combatant commander is designated as the supported
commander, depending on the location of the event. As necessary, the supported combatant
commander activates and deploys an initial C2 element and follow-on JTF to serve as the C2
node for the designated DOD CM forces responding to the event. The commander of the JTF
exercises OPCON over designated DOD forces.
d. **The DCO is likely the initial DOD representative on-site.** The DCO coordinates DOD support to civilian agencies through the FCO or PFO at the disaster field office (DFO). FEMA sets up a DFO in or near the affected area to coordinate federal recovery activities with those of state and local governments upon federal declaration of a disaster. When the DOD C2 HQ is deployed, it accepts OPCON of the DCO. However, the DCO remains the POC for the FCO or PFO in accordance with the FRP. Once DOD forces have been deployed, requests from civilian agencies are coordinated through the DCO under the procedures delineated in the FRP.

e. **The JTF provides personnel, equipment, and supplies to a disaster area.** Through the DCO, the JTF is oriented on identifying tasks, generating forces, prioritizing assets against requirements, assisting federal and private agencies, and providing disaster response support to the local government based on FEMA mission assignments.

f. **Organizational tools that may assist interagency support of civil authorities include:**

(1) **Interagency Planning Cell (IPC).** The IPC is activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the combatant commander. The IPC is established to provide timely advice to the supported combatant commander about the resources of other agencies in the relief effort. An IPC will enable a coherent and efficient planning and coordination effort through the participation of interagency subject-matter experts. Moreover, the burden of coordination at the JTF level could also be lightened. Consideration should also be given to establishment of IPCs on the staffs of supporting combatant commanders, such as Commander, United States Transportation Command.

(2) **Liaison Section.** Liaisons provided to the LFA and other USG agencies, as necessary, act as spokespersons for the combatant commander, to clarify operational concepts and terminology, and to assist in the assessment of military requirements. The intrinsic capabilities of military units to perform in nontraditional roles are important in describing the military contribution to the Federal response. Conversely, agency liaisons working with the military can assist the commander to maximize agency core competencies and concentrate the resources of engaged agencies.

   (a) **Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers.** EPLOs are directed by the Military Services and selected DOD agencies to coordinate the use of DOD resources to support civil authorities through the DCO during Presidentially-declared disasters and emergencies. EPLOs serve in major civil and military HQs that have primary responsibility for planning, coordinating, and executing military operations during disasters.

   (b) Supported commanders, such as CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM, are responsible for a liaison structure at the state level within their respective AORs.

(3) **Interagency Information Bureau (IIB).** An IIB at each echelon of command provides information to the public. Emphasis should be placed on describing and promoting the federal effort. Any friction between agencies should be resolved internally.
Standing Joint Force Headquarters. The standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) is a full-time, trained and equipped, joint C2 staff element. The SJFHQ is fully integrated into a combatant commander’s planning and operations. SJFHQ enhances the combatant command’s options to quickly deter or mitigate a crisis and reduces the time required to establish a fully functional JTF HQ within a combatant command’s AOR.

3. Crisis Response: Foreign Operations

a. The geographic combatant commander and staff should be continuously engaged in interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination by establishing working relationships with relevant organizations and agencies long before CAP and military resources are required. As situations requiring CAP develop, the normal flow of the State Department and other agencies reporting from the field will increase significantly. This will be amplified by informal contacts between the combatant commander’s staff (including the POLAD and JIACG) and appropriate embassies as well as the relevant bureaus at the State Department. Such informal communications greatly facilitate the development of viable COAs, but should not be used to circumvent established, authoritative planning and direction processes (see Figure III-2).

b. Crisis Action Organization. The combatant command crisis action organization is activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the combatant commander. Activation of other crisis action cells to administer the specific requirements of task force operations may be directed shortly thereafter. These cells support not only functional requirements of the JTF such as logistics, but also coordination of military and nonmilitary activities and the establishment of a temporary framework for interagency coordination. When establishing a JTF, the combatant commander will select a CJTF, assign a JOA, specify a mission, provide planning guidance, and, in coordination with the CJTF, allocate forces to the JTF from the Service and functional component forces assigned to the combatant command and request forces from supporting combatant commands, as required. In contrast, NGOs in the operational area may not have a similarly defined structure for controlling activities. Further, many of these organizations may be present in the operational area at the invitation and funding of the host country. As such, they may be structured to conform with HN regulations or restrictions which may conflict with military operations. Liaison and coordinating mechanisms that the combatant commander may elect to establish to facilitate the synchronization of military and nonmilitary activities include:

1. Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). Early in a developing CCO, an assessment may be required to determine what resources are immediately required to stabilize a humanitarian crisis. The supported combatant commander may deploy a HAST to acquire information for operation order development, to determine the capability of the agencies and organizations already operating in the crisis area, and to what extent military assistance is needed until humanitarian relief organizations or peacekeeping elements can marshal their resources. In addition to members of the combatant commander’s staff, HAST membership may include key US agency and NGO representatives. Before deployment, the HAST should be provided with the current threat assessment, operational intelligence, and geospatial intelligence. Upon arrival in country, the HAST should:
(a) Establish liaison and coordinate assessment efforts with the US Embassy or Consulate to help gain access to the appropriate HN officials and to facilitate additional interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. Integration of the resources provided by these contacts
will reduce the potential for duplication of effort and enhance calculations of logistics required
to support the collective effort.

(b) Establish liaison with the HN, NGOs, UN organizations, supported
commanders or their representatives, and other national teams.

(c) Define coordinating relationships and lines of authority among the military,
the embassy or consulate, USAID, and other USG and non-USG organizations. This action
helps identify specific support arrangements required for the collective logistic effort.

(2) Agencies providing support services include USAID and its Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) disaster assistance response team (DART). DART provides
rapid response field presence to international disasters with specialists trained in a variety of
disaster relief skills. In concert with the country team, the DART can determine the full range of
services necessary in cases of natural disaster. Figure III-3 depicts the organization of the DART.

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**Figure III-3. United States Government Foreign Disaster Assistance Response Team**
For further guidance on FHA, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(3) **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC).** The supported combatant commander may establish a HACC to assist with interagency coordination and planning. The HACC provides the critical link between the combatant commander and other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs that may participate in an FHA operation. Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or civilian humanitarian operations center (HOC) has been established by the lead relief agency, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the combatant commander’s staff.

(4) **Logistics Readiness Center (LRC).** Combatant commanders exercise directive authority for logistics within the AOR. The combatant commander reviews requirements of the joint forces and establishes priorities through the CAP process to use supplies, facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively. The combatant commander may also be responsible for provision of supplies for certain interagency personnel. A LRC functions as the single POC for coordinating the timely and flexible logistic response into the AOR, relieving the JTF of as much of this burden as possible. Other actions that the LRC may perform or coordinate include:

(a) Continuous coordination with strategic-level providers such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the United States Transportation Command, the Services, and the combatant commander’s staff to ensure the required flow of support to the JTF.

(b) Determining the appropriate common-user logistic support responsibilities and organizational structure, to include the appointment of lead Service or agency support. Lead agents may include non-DOD agencies, HN, or multinational partners.

(5) **Liaison Section.** As in domestic operations, the liaison section in foreign operations is crucial to coordination with USG, nongovernmental, and intergovernmental organizations. A liaison section assists the combatant commander by providing a single forum for the coordination of military activities among MNFs, other USG agencies, engaged IGOs and NGOs, the HN and indigenous population. As in domestic operations, military forces, engaged agencies, and the HN should consider providing liaison personnel to the combatant commander’s staff in order to maximize information flow and interagency coordination. Alternatively, as in Albania during Operation ALLIED HARBOR, the HN may establish a coordination center around which the activities of external actors are organized and to which they provide liaison personnel.

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**CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION**

“The Albanian Government showed considerable vision in establishing an Emergency Management Group (EMG) to coordinate the activities of the key actors in resolving the humanitarian crisis. The Albanian Force (AFOR)
was able to reinforce the EMG with staff at the shelter, medical, security and logistic coordination desks. This provided much needed assistance and developed a mutually supportive and trusting relationship, which proved most effective. In addition, an AFOR help desk was established in the NGO information center, based in the pyramid building in the center of Tirana, to provide advice to some 178 registered (and some 50-60 unregistered) NGOs.”

**SOURCE:** Operation ALLIED HARBOR: NATO’s Humanitarian Mission to Albania

**c. USG Agencies and NGO Relationships.** Interagency, IGO, and NGO preparation, planning, and participation in a CCO should occur at the earliest phases of an anticipated operation. Coordinating the actions of USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs throughout all phases of an operation assists in the integration and coordination of the overall operation.

1. The USG, via the NSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC, may develop and promulgate a POLMIL plan for CCOs. The NSC, either through the interagency committee system or via the POLMIL plan, designate a lead government agency for the mission to ensure coordination among the various USG agencies. Combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs participate in the development of the POLMIL plan through the Joint Staff.

2. Within the theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional military strategies that require interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. Combatant commanders may also (and on all CJCS approved plans are directed to) utilize Annex V, “Interagency Coordination,” of OPLANs to request/consider interagency, IGO, and NGO activities and to provide guidance for incorporating the interagency, IGO, and NGO community into military operations. Combatant commanders should coordinate Annex V with the relevant USG agencies via the Joint Staff. COAs developed by the combatant command staff should consider and incorporate relationships that have been developed with USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs.

**4. Forming a Joint Task Force**

a. **When it is necessary to engage the military instrument of national power, and to establish a JTF, the JTF establishing authority is normally a combatant commander.** Figure III-4 outlines key JTF establishing authority responsibilities. The combatant commander develops the mission statement and concept of operations based upon direction from the SecDef as communicated through the CJCS. If developed, the NSC’s interagency POLMIL plan may affect the mission statement. The combatant commander appoints a CJTF and, in conjunction with the CJTF, determines the necessary military capabilities required to accomplish military objectives. A CJTF has the authority to organize forces and the JTF HQ as necessary to accomplish the objectives.

b. **The JFC may establish a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) to meet a specific contingency mission or to support humanitarian, nation assistance operations, or**
Organizing for Successful Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

Appointing the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assigning the mission and forces, and exercising command and control of the joint task force (JTF).

- In coordination with the CJTF, determining the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission.

- Allocating or requesting forces required.

- Defining the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography and/or time. (Note: The JOA should be assigned through the appropriate combatant commander and activated at the date and time specified.)

- Ensuring the development and approval of rules of engagement tailored to the situation.

- Monitoring the operational situation and keeping superiors informed through periodic reports.

- Providing guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable end state, situation, concepts, tasks, execution orders, administration, logistics, media releases, and organizational requirements).

- Promulgating changes in plans and modifying mission and forces as necessary.

- Ensuring administrative and logistic support.

- Recommending to higher authority which organizations should be responsible for funding various aspects of the JTF.

- Establishing or assisting in establishing liaison with US embassies and foreign governments involved in the operation.

- Determining supporting force requirements.

- Preparing a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of the support; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation of support).

- Approving CJTF plans.

- Delegating the directive authority for common support capabilities (if required).

**Figure III-4. Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities**

a theater campaign of limited duration. There may be a requirement for civil affairs representation because of their professional knowledge of the functional issues involved, as well as their expertise in dealing with other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs.
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For additional information on the JCMOTF, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

c. **JTF Attributes.** The JTF organization resembles traditional military organizations with a commander, command element, and the forces required to execute the mission. The JTF concept provides for organizational flexibility, is task organized, reflects the mission’s requirements and the unique and necessary capabilities of the Service and functional components, and provides for the phased introduction of forces and the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment. A JTF is normally designated when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. **The mission assigned to a JTF will require not only the execution of responsibilities involving two or more Military Departments but, increasingly, the mutual support of numerous US agencies, and collaboration with IGOs and NGOs.** Normally, a JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved. The JTF HQ commands and controls the joint force and coordinates military operations with the activities of other government agencies, MNFs, IGOs, NGOs, and the HN forces and agencies.

d. **JTFs in the Interagency, IGO, and NGO Process.** Unlike the military, most USG agencies and NGOs are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, with the result that JTF personnel interface with individuals who are coordinating their organization’s activities at more than one level. The interagency, IGO, and NGO process requires the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of US agencies, IGOs, the HN, and NGOs. During CCOs, the JTF HQ provide an important basis for a unified effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. **Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency, IGO, and NGO involvement, the focal point for operational- and tactical-level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the CMOC, or the HOC.** JTF personnel may also participate actively or as observers in a civilian-led functional coordinating group concentrating on a specific issue or project.

For further guidance on the forming and composition of a JTF, refer to JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

5. **Joint Task Force Mission Analysis**

a. **Assessment Team.** A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the deployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected JOA. The purpose of the assessment team is to establish liaison with the ambassador or COM, country team, HN, and, if present, multinational members, UN representatives, and IGO and NGO representatives. **The JTF assessment team is similar in composition to the HAST and, if provided early warning of pending operations, may be able to conduct assessment in association with the HAST.** The CJTF determines the composition of the assessment team and should include staff members who are subject matter experts and representatives from Service and functional components expected to participate in the actual operation. USG agency representation may include the USAID/OFDA DART for purposes of FHA operations. Special operations force personnel who possess necessary cultural,
Clear goals and the personnel required to complete them are vital to progress and good host-nation relations.

language, and technical skills may be included. The assessment team may also assist in clarifying the mission and determining force requirements and force deployment sequences for the JTF.

b. **Coordinated Operations.** Operations by other USG agencies, the equivalent agencies of other national governments, IGOs and NGOs, in concert with or supplementing those of host country entities, will normally be in progress when US forces arrive in a JOA.

c. **Priority Task.** This may be a military action, a humanitarian task, or a combination of both. **In certain situations, interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination must be a top priority of the CJTF.** It is especially important to not allow the situation to deteriorate.

d. **Regional Strategy.** In further analyzing the mission, **consider how the regional strategy will affect joint force planning and operations in the projected JOA.** The NSC, DOS, and the combatant commander will provide the regional strategy and an appreciation for how the regional strategy affects the countries involved in projected operations. A well-defined regional strategy will legitimize the military mission and assist in determining force requirements and defining the end state.

e. **Political Considerations.** The assessment team should include sufficient expertise to realistically evaluate the political situation. **The JFC should quickly establish a relationship with the US ambassador, the country team, and other US agency representatives in country.** To the extent that other USG agencies are not present, consideration should be given to placing representatives of relevant USG agencies on the assessment team.
(1) Situation permitting, the JFC and key staff members should meet with the regional and functional elements of the US agencies involved, the Joint Staff, and embassies of the nations involved. Establishing an effective working relationship with the US ambassador to the HN will help in any foreign endeavor. Each US mission, as well as the various State Department geographic and functional bureaus involved, will likely bring different concerns to light.

(2) Information-sharing relationships between the JTF, local and national authorities, the country team, USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs must be established at the earliest stages of planning. One of the most important ways to facilitate mutually beneficial information exchange with non-USG agencies is to establish clear guidelines to avoid over-classification of information and to declassify information as early as operational conditions permit. Commanders should consider local and organizational sensitivities to information-gathering activities by joint forces — especially those that may be interpreted as ‘intelligence collection.’ Additionally, commanders may consider providing communication equipment to IGOs and NGOs to allow for better information sharing.

f. JTF HQ. The location of the JTF HQ, whether afloat or ashore, is important. Not only should it be defensible, it should be geographically positioned to work with the HN political and private sectors, relief organizations, the media, and MNFs, if present. Proximity to the American embassy or US diplomatic mission may enhance interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. The JTF HQ requires a sufficient power supply and communication lines to support operations and should provide a secure site for storage of classified information.

6. Organizational Tools for the Joint Task Force

a. The CJTF should consider the establishment of C2 structures that take account of and provide coherence to the activities of all elements in the JOA. In addition to military operations, these structures should include the political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian elements as well as IGOs, NGOs, and the media. The CJTF should ultimately consider how joint force actions and those of engaged organizations contribute toward the desired end state. This consideration requires extensive liaison with all involved parties as well as reliable communications. An assessment team’s mission analysis will assist the CJTF in the establishment of an executive steering group (ESG), CMOC, and liaison teams (see Figure III-2).

b. Executive Steering Group. The ESG is composed of senior military representatives from the JTF, principals of the embassy, the HN, IGOs, and NGOs present in the JOA. It is the high-level outlet for the exchange of information about operational policies and for resolution of difficulties arising among the various organizations. The ESG is charged with interpreting and coordinating strategic policy as defined by the POLMIL plan or other agreed POLMIL policy objectives. The ESG should either be co-chaired by the CJTF and ambassador or assigned outright to either individual, depending on the nature of the US mission. A commander at any echelon may establish an ESG to serve as a conduit through which to provide information and policy guidance to engaged agencies.
“Our relations with the UN/NGO community was furthered greatly by the operations of our three Civil-Military Operations Cells (CMOCs). A CMOC gives a deployed commander great flexibility. At Entebbe the CMOC became essentially a part of the JTF staff: in Kigali, the CMOC was a separate command, and in Goma it was a part of the JTF staff once more. A CMOC gives a US unit an invaluable asset in opening relations with the relief community, which, at least in our experience, is extensive. Parts of the NGOs, notably the World Food Program and the International Community of the Red Cross (and others) are well organized and experienced in working in this kind of environment. A CMOC gives the JTF commander the capability to coordinate and work with these agencies.”

Headquarters, United States European Command

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c. **Civil-Military Coordination Board.** This board is the CJTF’s vehicle for coordinating civil-military support. Membership is typically restricted to key representatives from the JTF staff sections involved in CMO. Under certain conditions, the CJTF may include representatives from key IGOs and NGOs.

d. **Civil-Military Operations Center.** The ability of the JTF to work with all organizations and groups is essential to mission accomplishment. A relationship must be developed between military forces, USG agencies, civilian authorities, IGOs, NGOs, and the population.

(1) A CMOC is formed to:

   (a) Carry out guidance and institute JFC decisions regarding CMO.

   (b) Perform liaison and coordination between military organizations and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace.

   (c) Provide a partnership forum for military and other participating organizations. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC merely as a venue for informal discussions.

   (d) Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for routine and emergency military support from the IGOs and NGOs. Forward these requests to the joint force HQ for action.

(2) **CMOCs are tailored for each mission.** When a CMOC is established, the CJTF should invite representatives of other agencies, which may include the following:

   (a) USAID/OFDA representatives.

   (b) DOS, country team, and other USG representatives.

   (c) Military liaison personnel from participating countries.
(d) Host country or local government agency representatives.

(e) Representatives of IGOs and NGOs.

(3) The CMOC is the way US forces generally organize for this purpose (see Figure III-5). Despite its name, the CMOC is a coordinating body and generally neither sets policy nor conducts operations. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent — flexible in size and composition. During large scale FHA operations, if a HOC is formed by the host country or UN, the CMOC becomes the focal point for coordination between the military and civilian agencies involved in the operation. When possible, the CMOC should collocate with the HOC to facilitate operations and assist in later transition of any CMOC operations to the HOC. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC to facilitate coordination with other agencies, departments, organizations, and the HN. More than one CMOC may be established in an AOR or JOA (such as occurred in Rwanda), and each is task-organized based on the mission.

(4) During Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, the UN deployed an organization called the On-Site Operations Coordination Center, which had essentially the same functions as a CMOC and provided a clearinghouse for exchanging information between agencies and with the UN.

![Figure III-5. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center](image)
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(5) **The CJTF must carefully consider where to locate the CMOC.** Security, FP, and easy access for agencies and organizations are all valid considerations. The location must be distinct and separate from the joint force operations center, regardless if geographically collocated. If security conditions permit, every effort should be made to locate the CMOC “outside the wire” in order to maximize participation by IGOs and NGOs that want to minimize the appearance of close association with military operations.

(6) **Political representatives in the CMOC may provide the CJTF with avenues to satisfy operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and political actions.** Additionally, the CMOC forum appeals to NGOs because it avoids guesswork by providing these organizations a single point of coordination with the military for their needs.

(a) To obtain the necessary interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and international cooperation needed to meet mission objectives, CMOC players must rely upon trust, shared visions, common interests, and capabilities.

(b) **A JFC cannot dictate cooperation among engaged agencies.** However, working together at the CMOC on issues of security, logistic support, information sharing, communications, and other items, can build a cooperative spirit among all participants.

**CMOC IN PROVIDE COMFORT**

Humanitarian relief organizations operating in southern Turkey and northern Iraq coordinated their activities with those of the JTF through the CMOC. The CMOC was collocated with the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) that coordinated the activities of the UN and other humanitarian relief organizations. The CMOC was coequal with the traditional J-staff sections. CMOC military officers coordinated activities with both State Department officials and relief workers. The CMOC in Turkey demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of the concept. It provided a focal point for coordination of common civil-military needs and competing demands for services and infrastructure, rather than relying on random encounters between relief workers and staff officers.

**SOURCE:** Operations Other Than War, Vol. 1, Humanitarian Assistance, Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1992

(7) **A CMOC conducts meetings as required** to highlight requirements — especially humanitarian requirements of the population — and to identify organizations able and willing to meet these needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate JTF or agency representative for action. Figure III-6 depicts some of the CMOC functions.

*For further guidance on CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.*
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CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER FUNCTIONS

- Providing nonmilitary agencies with a coordinating point and information exchange for activities and matters that are civilian-related.
- Coordinating relief activities with US and/or multinational commands, United Nations, host-nation, and other nonmilitary agencies.
- Providing interface with State Department public affairs officers, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the country team.
- Assisting in the transfer of operational responsibility to nonmilitary agencies.
- Facilitating and coordinating activities of the joint force, other on-scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command.
- Receiving, validating, coordinating, and monitoring requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support.
- Coordinating the response to requests for military support with Service components.
- Coordinating requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support.
- Coordinating with disaster assistance response teams deployed by USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
- Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers.
- Convening follow-on assessment groups.

Figure III-6. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions

(8) Liaison Teams. Once established in the JOA and operating primarily from the CMOO, or HOC, if established, liaison teams work to foster a better understanding of mission and tactics with other forces, facilitate transfer of vital information, enhance mutual trust, and develop an increased level of teamwork.

(a) Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. In multinational operations, liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces.

“Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil-military operations center — CMOO — to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire support operations center.”

General A. C. Zinni, USMC
Commander, US Central Command

(b) The need for effective liaison is vital when a JTF is deployed and operating in a CCO in conjunction with MNFs. The likelihood that a JTF may operate with not only
traditional allies, but also with nations with whom the US does not have a long history of formal military cooperation, requires the CJTF to plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements.

(c) Qualifications of a JTF LNO assigned to a national or multinational operation include a solid knowledge of doctrine, force capabilities, language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness. Civil affairs or coalition support teams may be available to serve as LNOs. The use of contracted interpreters to augment a liaison team may be another option.

(9) Humanitarian Operations Center. During large-scale FHA operations, when it becomes apparent that the magnitude of a disaster will exceed a HN’s capacity to manage it unilaterally, the HN may want to establish a HOC to facilitate the coordination of international aid.

(a) Although the functions of the HOC and CMOC are similar, there is a significant difference. The CMOC is established by and works for the CJTF. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or possibly OFDA during a US unilateral operation. HOCs, especially those established by the UN, are horizontally structured organizations with no command or control authority, where all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries. The US ambassador or designated representative will have a lead role in the HOC.

(b) The HOC membership should consist of representatives from the affected country, the US embassy or consulate, joint force (most likely from the CMOC), OFDA, UN, IGOs, NGOs, and any other major players.

(c) The HOC coordinates the overall US relief strategy, identifies logistic requirements for the various organizations, and identifies, prioritizes and submits requests for military support to appropriate agencies. Requests for military support may be submitted to the JTF through the CMOC.

(d) An end state goal of the HOC should be to create an environment in which the HN is self-sufficient in providing for the population’s humanitarian needs, and no longer requires external assistance.

For further information on HOC, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

7. Other Joint Task Force Interagency Considerations

a. Intelligence Gathering and Control. Intelligence support provides the JFC with a timely, complete, and accurate understanding of the environment and potential adversaries.

(1) The combatant command’s staff, if required, should request a national intelligence support team (NIST) to support the JTF during a crisis or contingency operation. NIST is a nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from Defense Intelligence
Agency, CIA, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence community agencies as required. The interagency, IGO, and NGO support provided by a NIST allows JTF access to national-level databases and to agency-unique information and analysis.

(2) The method for collecting intelligence during a CCO is generally the same as that for any other military operation and is conducted in accordance with JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*. Managing the intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination for a JTF may be complicated by non-USG civilians, especially members of IGOs and NGOs, who may be sensitive to the perception that they are being used to gather intelligence. This sensitivity may be based on the viewpoint that intelligence gathering is a provocative act and damages an individual’s claim to impartiality. However, general information provided by personnel from IGOs and NGOs may corroborate intelligence gained from other sources. Generally, the best approach to information sharing with the NGOs and international civilian community is to keep the focus on complete transparency in sharing operational information and developing a shared situational awareness and understanding of the objectives to achieve the mission. However, classified information will only be shared with or released to individuals with the appropriate security clearance and need to know.

(3) Procedures for control and disclosure of classified information, as practiced by DOD and other USG agencies, normally do not exist with IGOs and NGOs. Under United States Code, it is unlawful to disclose classified information to foreign governments without proper authorization. Classified military information shall not be disclosed to foreign nationals until the appropriate designated disclosure authority receives a security assurance from the recipient foreign government on the individuals who are to receive the information. Guidance for the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and international organizations is contained in DODD 5230.11, *Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*.

(a) In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinate the receipt of intelligence from those forces. Release procedures should be established in advance, and the JFC participating in the coalition or alliance must tailor the policy and procedures for that particular operation based on national and theater guidance.

(b) Consideration must also be given to control of sensitive or classified information in fora such as the CMOC that include representatives of non-USG agencies.

b. **Force Protection.** FP planning considerations during complex contingency and multinational operations are similar to US-only operations. However, because of the specifics of the operation or area, the multinational nature of the operation, and the nonmilitary organizations operating in an operational area, there are certain aspects of FP that the CJTF must consider.

(1) **Other nations do not necessarily execute FP in the same manner as the US military.** If a joint force is under the OPCON of a multinational or coalition force, the JFC must still implement the appropriate force protection measures in accordance with combatant commander directives.
(2) **Special measures may be required for joint force personnel who must interact with local populations and NGOs.** Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and differing operational terms of reference increase the risk to these joint force personnel.

(3) Because US forces often assume the leadership role in multinational operations, joint force personnel can potentially be a greater target.

(4) In addition to actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against the joint force, the JFC may provide security for other personnel and assets. These requirements must be clearly stated in the mission, to include protection of:

(a) Personnel and equipment belonging to USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs.

(b) Affected country personnel and assets.

(c) Relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes.

(d) Relief distribution centers.

(e) Stocks of supplies.

(f) Ports and airfields.

*For further information on FP, refer to JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.*

c. **Logistic Support.** Logistic requirements and resource availability coordination are vital to sustain a joint force operation.

(1) **The US military has unique logistic capabilities that are relevant to CCOs.** These include the rapid capability to plan, deploy, employ and redeploy; a robust C2 capability; a sustained logistic capability, and security throughout operations. US agencies, the UN, IGOs, NGOs, and MNFs provide for their own logistic support. However, US military logistic capabilities are frequently requested and provided to these organizations. The JTF may be asked to assume all or part of the burden of logistics for these organizations after arrival. This support may include intertheater and intratheater airlift, ground transportation of personnel, equipment and supplies, airfield control groups, and port and railhead operations groups.

(2) Unity of effort is essential to coordinate logistic operations in joint and multinational environments, requiring coordination not only between Services and US agencies, but also among all relief and humanitarian organizations in theater. The JTF must establish movement priorities between JTF requirements and those of other USG agencies, the country team, coalition or UN forces, NGOs, and any international joint logistic center, e.g., United Nations Joint Logistic Center, that may be established. The joint movement center is the primary organization
for coordinating movements, including that provided by HNs or MNFs, to support joint operations in theater. Close communications should be established with all elements to ensure that their movement requirements are fully understood by the JTF to enable effective planning and security for materiel movement.

(3) Normally, joint forces are supported through a combination of scheduled US resupply, contingency contracting, HN support, and UN logistic support.

(4) When joint forces participate in a UN operation, many of the costs incurred by the US are reimbursable by the UN.

(5) In a multinational, non-UN sponsored operation, a single nation may be responsible for planning and coordinating logistic support for all forces on a reimbursable basis.

d. **Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Support.** The JFC must have access to accurate advance knowledge of METOC conditions to successfully conduct military operations. **The effective understanding of meteorology and oceanography and the application of that knowledge could contribute significantly to the success of a JTF mission.**

e. **Legal Issues.** Legal services are provided to the JFC and staff by the SJA. The SJA should possess a comprehensive understanding of the regulations and laws applicable to military forces and other agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental, domestic and international, and be a POC with IGOs and NGOs, a negotiator with foreign officials, and a draftsman for command policies, orders, and international agreements. **The SJA must be an active participant in the interagency mechanisms to obtain the firsthand knowledge necessary to identify and resolve interagency and multinational legal issues involving:**

(1) Legal authority for US military and USG agency participation and support.

(2) International law.

(a) Dislocated civilians, refugees, immunity and asylum, arrests and detentions.

(b) War crimes, status-of-forces agreements, law of armed conflict, military justice system, Geneva Conventions.

(c) Environmental law.

(3) Intelligence oversight.

(4) Disaster relief and claims.

(5) Contract and fiscal law.

(7) Authorization for, and limitations on, use of military forces to support civilian authorities.

f. Public Affairs and Media Support. It is essential that all agencies of the USG work toward a common goal during CCOs by speaking with one voice and sending a consistent message to the audience. At the national level, OASD(PA) interfaces with USG agencies in the NSC/DC and passes the information down through PA guidance.

(1) At the theater level, PA planning in a CCO or multinational operation includes coordination with USG agencies, NGOs, the ambassador, the country team (particularly the embassy public affairs officer), the HN, national and international media, and media elements of member forces. It is essential that a public affairs and media plan be in place before the operation begins and integrated into the overall OPLAN. **The joint information bureau (JIB) is the focal point for the interface between the military and the media.** When a JIB is established by the JFC to promote coordination and responsiveness, it is often appropriate to include representatives from the aforementioned organizations. The JFC’s PAO plays a major role in keeping USG agencies and NGOs informed on the capability and intent of the joint force.

(2) In the NATO or multinational environment, media consideration will be channeled through JIB equivalents designated as a press information center, combined information bureau, allied press information center, or coalition press information center.

8. Information Management

a. All military operations, including CCOs, are information intensive. **Other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs on scene are an important source of information that may contribute to the success of the military operation or transition to a desired end state.** However, the cultures of non-USG organizations, in particular, differ markedly from the military and there may be a desire on their part to maintain a distance from military activities. By attempting to accommodate these concerns and sharing useful information and resources, the CJTF can help encourage active IGO and NGO cooperation in resolving the crisis. Locally-stationed IGO and NGO personnel are usually well-qualified individuals who understand the local culture and practices and have a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the people. The relief community is an important source of information regarding the following:

(1) Historical perspective and insights into factors contributing to the situation at hand.

(2) Local cultural practices that will bear on the relationship of military forces to the populace.

(3) Local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key leaders.

(4) Security situation.

(5) Role and capabilities of the host-nation government.
Chapter III

THE INTERAGENCY BATTLEFIELD

The simulated conflict area was dotted with soldiers, civilians, and representatives from the same nongovernmental organizations that we have seen in Somalia and Bosnia. Representatives from the International Red Cross, Save the Children, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, a USAID Disaster Assistance Relief Team, CARE, World Vision, media representatives, and others all went to Fort Polk, Louisiana. They were there to work with us, to simulate their roles in these kinds of operations, and to learn with us how we all can accomplish our missions as part of a team.


b. This kind of information is frequently not available through military channels. Therefore, it is important to not compromise the neutrality of the IGOs and NGOs and to avoid the perception by their workers that their organizations are part of an intelligence gathering mechanism. Handled improperly, the relief community can be alienated by a perception that, contrary to its philosophical ideals, it is considered no more than an intelligence source by the military.

9. Training and Readiness

“It is imperative that our Joint Forces also enhance their ability to operate in consonance with other US Government agencies, and with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) [and] international organizations (IO) . . . in a variety of settings. The specialized access and knowledge these organizations possess can facilitate prompt, efficient action to prevent conflict, resolve a crisis, mitigate suffering, and restore civil government upon conflict termination. Achieving interagency and civil interoperability through the continuing development of our doctrine and interagency participation in our training exercises is important to the unity of effort upon which success in many missions depends.”


a. While numerous humanitarian and complex crises during the previous several years have provided opportunities for military and civilian agencies to exercise their mission skills, there is a clear requirement for continuous integrated interagency, IGO, and NGO planning and training in order to synchronize all components of a US response to a CCO. Interagency, IGO, and NGO training should provide for individual military and civilian instruction, military unit and civilian agency instruction, and combined military and civilian agency training in a formal joint program.
b. **Combatant commanders should schedule interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination training** as a part of routine training and exercise participation and as training for a specific CCO. The training audience should include members of the HACC, CMOC, logistics operations center, the liaison section, NGOs, the UN, and USG agencies. This training before deployment will greatly enhance operational capability. Commanders may also avail their commands to the training offered by some government agencies, IGOs, and the FHA community. Interagency, IGO, and NGO training should focus on identifying and assessing military and agency capabilities and core competencies, and identifying procedural disconnects.

c. USAID is the USG agency that maintains the most direct relationship with NGOs, many of which receive USAID funding to carry out programs. First, it maintains an Advisory Committee of Private Voluntary Aid, established after WWII by Presidential directive to serve as a link between the USG and NGOs engaged in economic development or relief efforts. Also, with some exceptions, most NGOs must register to receive USAID funding to assure they meet certain standards; currently 514 US and 62 international NGOs are registered with USAID.

d. **Interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination is also available to US NGOs through a consortium called InterAction** which helps represent NGO interests at the national level. InterAction coordinates with various USG agencies and involves NGOs in realistic PO simulation conducted by the Joint Readiness Training Center. The military and participating NGOs benefit from this training by gaining a better understanding of each organization’s culture, capabilities, and procedures. InterAction has also briefed civil affairs units and US military schools to improve their understanding of NGO activities.

e. Increasingly, interagency, IGO, and NGO training is also available through the senior Service schools (including the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute) and other civilian institutions. Interagency training is also provided on the job through exchange programs between DOD and other USG agencies. National Defense University, as directed by the CJCS, is responsible for providing interagency, IGO, and NGO training for civilian and military personnel assigned or pending assignment to combatant command joint interagency coordination groups.

f. **The United Nations conducts training and education at various levels** to improve the responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency of international humanitarian relief operations. Training is available to leaders of the military, civil defense, and civilian relief organizations, or for personnel of countries and organizations with no prior experience in international emergency and disaster response situations. One example is the UN-Civil-Military Cooperation Course that trains individuals in interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and how to effectively manage the employment of military and civilian resources.

g. **PDD-56 and its successor NSPD (not yet approved) recommend** that a POLMIL plan be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating USG actions in a CCO. The POLMIL plan will include a situation assessment and will specify the concept of operations for all agencies, synchronize agency actions, and provide a game plan for individual agencies to follow. DOD has designated the National Defense University as the lead agent for POLMIL planning education, training and after-action reviews (AARs) related to complex foreign crises.
### GLOSSARY

#### PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>after action review</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(HD)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)</td>
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<td>ASD(RA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(SO/LIC)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>crisis action planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCO</td>
<td>complex contingency operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDRNORAD</td>
<td>Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<td>CDRUSPACOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>CDRUSNORTHCOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Northern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>commander, joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>consequence management</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>chief of mission</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>concept of operations plan</td>
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<td>CrM</td>
<td>crisis management</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>civil support</td>
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<td>DART</td>
<td>disaster assistance response team</td>
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<td>DATT</td>
<td>defense attaché</td>
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<td>DCM</td>
<td>deputy chief of mission</td>
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<td>DCO</td>
<td>defense coordinating officer</td>
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<td>DFO</td>
<td>disaster field office</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
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<td>EPLO</td>
<td>emergency preparedness liaison officer</td>
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<td>ESG</td>
<td>executive steering group</td>
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<td>EXECSEC</td>
<td>Executive Secretary (OSD)</td>
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### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>federal coordinating officer</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>FREREP</td>
<td>Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRP</td>
<td>Federal response plan (USG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HACC</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance coordination center</td>
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<td>HAST</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance survey team</td>
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<td>HD</td>
<td>homeland defense</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HOC</td>
<td>humanitarian operations center</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>HS</td>
<td>homeland security</td>
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<td>HSC</td>
<td>Homeland Security Council</td>
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<td>HSC/PC</td>
<td>Homeland Security Council Principals Committee</td>
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<td>HSC/PCC</td>
<td>Homeland Security Council Policy Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>HSPD</td>
<td>homeland security Presidential directive</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>incident command system</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
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<td>IIB</td>
<td>interagency information bureau</td>
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<td>INRP</td>
<td>Initial National Response Plan</td>
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<td>IPC</td>
<td>interagency planning cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-5</td>
<td>plans and policy directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCMOTF</td>
<td>joint civil-military operations task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>joint interagency coordination group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>joint information bureau</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEA</td>
<td>law enforcement agency</td>
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<td>LFA</td>
<td>lead federal agency</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>LRC</td>
<td>logistics readiness center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>METOC</td>
<td>meteorological and oceanographic</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>multinational force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>memorandum of agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan</td>
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<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<td>NIST</td>
<td>national intelligence support team</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Response Plan</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>national security act</td>
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<tr>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSC/DC</td>
<td>National Security Council/Deputies Committee</td>
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<td>NSC/PC</td>
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<td>NSC/PCC</td>
<td>National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>NSCS</td>
<td>National Security Council System</td>
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<tr>
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<td>national security Presidential directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>national security strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OASD(PA)</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OES</td>
<td>office of emergency services</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
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<td>public affairs officer</td>
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<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential decision directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERMREP</td>
<td>permanent representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFO</td>
<td>principal federal officer</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>peace operations</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>point of contact</td>
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<td>POLAD</td>
<td>political advisor</td>
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<td>POLMIL</td>
<td>political-military</td>
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<td>SAO</td>
<td>security assistance organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>state coordinating officer</td>
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<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
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<tr>
<td>SJFHQ</td>
<td>standing joint force headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>SYG</td>
<td>Secretary General (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDAO</td>
<td>United States Defense Attaché Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDR</td>
<td>United States defense representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

chain of command. The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center. An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil support. Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Also called CS. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary
of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. See also combatant commander, operational control. (JP 1-02)

**combatant commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)

**combating terrorism.** Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

**combat support.** Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. Also called CS. (JP 1-02)

**combined.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies.) (JP 1-02)

**complex contingency operations.** Large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that involve one or more of the elements of peace operations that include one or more elements of other types of operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency. Also called CCO. See also peace operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**consequence management.** Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 1-02)

**Continental United States Army.** A regionally-oriented command with geographic boundaries under the command of United States Army Forces Command. The Continental United States Army is a numbered Army and is the Forces Command agent for mobilization, deployment, and domestic emergency planning and execution. Also called CONUSA. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this pub and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)
counterdrug.  Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (JP 1-02)

counterintelligence.  Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

counterterrorism.  Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

country team.  The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

course of action.  1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow.  2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission.  3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission.  4. A line of conduct in an engagement.  5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. Also called COA. (JP 1-02)

crisis management.  Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or an act of terrorism. It is predominately a law enforcement response, normally executed under federal law. Also called CrM. (JP 1-02)

developmental assistance.  US Agency for International Development function chartered under chapter one of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, primarily designed to promote economic growth and the equitable distribution of its benefits. (JP 1-02)

disaster assistance response team.  United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance provides this rapidly deployable team in response to international disasters. A disaster assistance response team provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of US Government response to disasters. Also called DART. (JP 1-02)

displaced person.  A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. See also refugee. (JP 1-02)

doctrine.  Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

domestic emergencies.  Emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions and territories, or any
political subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or other public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt the usual process of government. The term “domestic emergencies” includes any or all of the emergency conditions defined below: a. civil defense emergency — A domestic emergency disaster situation resulting from devastation created by an enemy attack and requiring emergency operations during and following that attack. It may be proclaimed by appropriate authority in anticipation of an attack. b. civil disturbances — Riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring or likely to require the use of Federal Armed Forces pursuant to the provisions of 10, USC 15. c. major disaster — Any flood, fire, hurricane, tornado, earthquake, or other catastrophe which, in the determination of the President, is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant disaster assistance by the Federal Government under Public Law 606, 91st Congress (42 USC 58) to supplement the efforts and available resources of State and local governments in alleviating the damage, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. d. natural disaster — All domestic emergencies except those created as a result of enemy attack or civil disturbance. (JP 1-02)

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 1-02)

federal coordinating officer. Appointed by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, on behalf of the President, to coordinate federal assistance to a state affected by a disaster or emergency. The source and level of the federal coordinating officer will likely depend on the nature of the federal response. Also called FCO. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02)

foreign assistance. Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters; US assistance takes three forms — development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. See also foreign disaster; foreign humanitarian assistance; security assistance. (JP 1-02)

foreign disaster. An act of nature (such as a flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or to an intergovernmental organization. See also foreign disaster relief. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
foreign disaster relief. Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel, and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. See also foreign disaster. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. See also foreign assistance. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian operations center. An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a United States Government agency during a United States unilateral operation. The humanitarian operations center should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the United Nations,
nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other major players in the operation. Also called HOC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**intelligence.** 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02)

**interagency.** United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**interagency coordination.** The coordination that occurs between agencies of the US Government, including the Department of Defense, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. See also intergovernmental organization; nongovernmental organization. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**intergovernmental organization.** An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**internal defense and development.** The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (JP 1-02)

**international organization.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

**joint interagency coordination group.** An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
joint staff. 1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), that includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. (capitalized as Joint Staff). The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. Also called JS. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

lead agency. Designated among US Government agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions. (JP 1-02)

letter of assist. A contractual document issued by the United Nations (UN) to a government authorizing it to provide goods or services to a peacekeeping operation; the UN agrees either to purchase the goods or services or authorizes the government to supply them subject to reimbursement by the UN. A letter of assist typically details specifically what is to be provided by the contributing government and establishes a funding limit that cannot be exceeded. Also called LOA. See also peacekeeping (JP 1-02)

liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 1-02)

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (JP 1-02)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social
development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

**Military Department.** One of the departments within the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Also called MILDEP. (JP 1-02)

**military options.** A range of military force responses that can be projected to accomplish assigned tasks. Options include one or a combination of the following: civic action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military activities to develop positive relationships with other countries; confidence building and other measures to reduce military tensions; military presence; activities to convey threats to adversaries as well as truth projections; military deceptions and psychological operations; quarantines, blockades, and harassment operations; raids; intervention operations; armed conflict involving air, land, maritime, and strategic warfare operations; support for law enforcement authorities to counter international criminal activities (terrorism, narcotics trafficking, slavery, and piracy); support for law enforcement authorities to suppress domestic rebellion; and support for insurgency, counterinsurgency, and civil war in foreign countries. See also civil affairs; foreign humanitarian assistance; military civic action. (JP 1-02)

**multinational force.** A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02)

**multinational operations.** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

**nation assistance.** Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs may include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other United States Code title 10 programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**noncombatant evacuation operations.** Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEOs. (JP 1-02)

**nongovernmental organization.** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
**Operational Control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. See also combatant command (command authority). (JP 1-02)

**Peace Enforcement.** Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 1-02)

**Peacekeeping.** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. See also peace operations. (JP 1-02)

**Peace Operations.** A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Also called PO. See also complex contingency operations; peacekeeping. (JP 1-02)

**Preventive Diplomacy.** Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. (JP 1-02)

**Psychological Operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

**Refugee.** A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (JP 1-02)

**Regional Organizations.** A sub-type of intergovernmental organization. Regional domestic organizations can cover a particular administrative area, division, or district. For the purpose of discussion in this
text, regional organizations are included with intergovernmental organizations unless specifically noted as a regional security organizations, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (This term and definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

**rules of engagement.** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

**security assistance.** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. See also foreign assistance. (JP 1-02)

**special operations.** Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

**status-of-forces agreement.** An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-02)

**strategy.** The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02)

**supported commander.** 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02)

**supporting commander.** 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

**unified command.** A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1-02)
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All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 Project Proposal**
- Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and combatant commands
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2 Program Directive**
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and combatant commands
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, combatant command or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3 Two Drafts**
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4 CJCS Approval**
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and combatant commands
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

**STEP #5 Assessments/Revision**
- The combatant commands receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7 will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised