Armed Forces Health Surveillance Branch
H7N9 Surveillance Summary
(6 JUL 2016)

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APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

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CASE REPORT: As of 6 JUL 2016, according to WHO, China’s National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC), and provincial governments within China, there have been 854 (+9) human cases of avian influenza A (H7N9), including 312 (+2) deaths, in China (+9), Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Canada. The cases in Taiwan (4), Hong Kong (14), Malaysia (1), and Canada (2) are thought to have been imported from mainland China. It is unusual for H7N9 transmission to continue in the summer; in previous years transmission has dropped off towards the end of MAY. It is unclear if this is an artifact in reporting due to the batching of cases or an actual continuation in transmission. On 17 MAY, the NHFPC released a batch of 11 cases (included in the above case count), all of whom had contact with poultry. However, due to limited demographic information it is difficult to determine if these cases were previously reported. The overall case-fatality proportion among known cases is 37%, the average age of those affected is 53 years, and at least 176 (+5) of the cases reported have been female. The most recent known date of onset was 10 MAY 2016. Cases have been reported in 15 (+1) provinces of China: Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hebei, Henan, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, and Xinjiang; and three (+1) municipalities, Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin.

TRANSMISSION: In a study published in CDC’s APR 2015 EID Journal, H7N9 antibodies were found among 6.7% of case contacts identified between MAR 2013 and MAY 2014 in China, suggesting that human-to-human transmission does occur and could cause mild or asymptomatic infections. AFHSB notes that since much of the reporting out of China occurs in monthly batches, with limited information on age, gender, and location, it is possible that only the most severe cases and fatalities are being reported by China. It is unknown how many mild or asymptomatic cases have occurred and how many cases have occurred without laboratory testing. This lack of information coupled with the infrequent reporting makes spatial and temporal cluster analysis difficult. However, CDC reports there have been 23 known disease clusters since the beginning of the outbreak in 2013, and that cluster-associated cases account for only 5.9% of the total reported cases. A study published in the International Journal of Infectious Diseases determined that H7N9 presentation in primary cases in family clusters (with exposure to poultry) was much more severe than presentation in secondary cases. On 20 MAR, FAO reported that the circulation of H7N9 remains confined to China due to consumer preference for chickens of the yellow-feather breed, the species primarily involved in H7N9 transmission. The high, but exclusive, local demand for this species within China and the associated higher prices for this particular type of poultry could explain why the virus has yet to take hold in border countries.

BIRD MARKET CLOSURES: A study published in the Journal of One Health on 22 MAR reinforced previous findings that prolonged closure of live poultry markets in China can reduce bird-to-human and bird-to-bird transmission of H7N9. The study also found that interventions in live poultry markets, such as incorporating “periodic rest days” during which the markets would be closed, overnight depopulation of birds, and banning the sale of certain bird species could significantly and sustainably reduce the circulation of avian influenza viruses in the market. A recent study published in the Journal of Virology found that an infected chicken was able to transmit H7N9 to a quail housed in a cage directly below the chicken cage in a simulated live bird market. The quail’s oral shedding of the virus was greater than ten-fold that of the directly inoculated chickens, resulting in the authors recommendation for alternative cage-stacking practices for live animal markets. A recent study in the Journal of Wildlife Diseases found that infected peridomestic birds (such as European Starlings) excrete sufficient amounts of virus to infect other birds to suggest that peridomestic birds may be a source of the virus in live bird markets and could play a role in the transmission to poultry and humans.

On 24 JUN, Hong Kong resumed live poultry trading after a follow-up investigation of the poultry droppings from a stall holding chickens and pigeons that initially tested positive for H7N9 on 5 JUN yielded no positive results. On 22 JUN, Macao suspended all poultry sales for three days following the detection of avian influenza A (H7) in three environmental samples from bird stalls in the Iao Hon Market. This is the second reported detection of avian influenza A (H7) in Macao this year; the other detection was reported in FEB 2016. On 7 JUN, the HK Agriculture, Fisheries, and Conservationist Department (AFCD) reported the poultry culling operation at Tuen Mun Market was complete; altogether, 5,643 birds were culled. The Cheung Sha Wan Temporary Wholesale Poultry Market has also been disinfected and all local farms had been inspected. On 16 MAY, multiple Vietnamese media networks reported an increased risk of avian influenza in Lang Son province, which borders with Guangxi province, China, due to the recent discovery of a poultry smuggling ring. This smuggling ring illegally imported unvaccinated poultry from China and sold it to local markets in Lang Son province.
BACKGROUND: On 1 APR 2013, WHO reported three human cases of infection with a novel influenza A (H7N9) virus in China. This was the first time human infection with H7N9 had been detected. CDC believes the H7N9 virus is likely a reassortment of H7N3 viruses from domestic ducks and H9N2 viruses from other domestic poultry. Seasonality has been observed since the beginning of this outbreak with a consistent pattern of declining incidence through the summer months followed by a spike in cases in the winter months. The FAO reports a “fourth wave” of the outbreak has begun and notes this follows the trend from previous years of an uptick in human cases each winter. A new CDC study compared the severity of human H7N9 infections associated with each of the three epidemic waves of H7N9 occurring in China from 2013-2015. The study found hospitalized patients in waves 2 and 3 had a higher risk of death than their cohorts in wave 1; the authors hypothesized this variation in mortality risk “might be associated with differences in case ascertainment, changes in clinical management, or virus genetic diversity.” The study found this mortality risk continued to increase over time despite shorter times to admission and to laboratory confirmation. On 10 MAR, a study funded by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council and the National Natural Science Foundation of China concluded that “secular changes” (such as bird market closures) and environmental exposures have both contributed to transmission in the three previously identified waves of H7N9 in China.

Confirmed avian H7N9 has been rare and subclinical but has been previously identified. As H7N9 is usually asymptomatic in birds, many bird owners are likely unaware of the risk of transmission. FAO reports over 2,000 virus samples from the environment and chickens, pigeons, ducks, and wild birds have tested positive for H7N9 since the beginning of the outbreak. Most of the positive samples were from live bird markets, vendors, and commercial poultry farms.

INTERAGENCY/GLOBAL ACTIONS: Taiwan CDC is maintaining its travel notice level for Beijing City to Level 2: Alert for Avian Influenza and raised the travel notice for Liaoning Province, Tianjin City, and Hebei Province, to Level 2. CDC removed their Level 1: Practice Usual Precautions travel advisory for China in APR 2016. CDC and WHO advise no special screenings at points of entry, and no trade or travel restrictions. On 15 OCT 2015, FAO released guidelines for biosecurity improvements in live bird markets and risk communication regarding H7N9. On 20 APR, the Hong Kong Center for Health Protection (CHP) released updated criteria for H7N9 case classification to now include contact with a live bird market as possible exposure criteria.

SURVEILLANCE: Reagents for surveillance testing purposes are available via the CDC website. NMRC has produced amplicon H7N9 positive testing control material using the published WHO primers/probes. Kits have been sent to AFRIMS, NAMRU-3, NAMRU-6, NAMRU-2 Phnom Penh, NMRC-A and NHRC for surveillance. Nineteen DoD laboratories have been sent diagnostic kits, as have all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and more than 60 international labs.
Source: FAO H7N9 Situation Update 22 JUN 2016
This map illustrates the geographic distribution of human H7N9 cases and H7N9-positive samples in birds or the environment in China since OCT 2014. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location where they were reported; for some cases, exposure may have occurred in a different geographic location. Precise location of 56 human cases in Fujian (28), Jiangsu (12), Zhejiang (12), Guangdong (1), Hunan (1), Hubei (1), and Xinjiang (1) are currently not known. These cases are therefore not shown on the map. Imported cases in Canada (2) and Malaysia (1) are also not represented.

Legend: Text updated from the previous report will be printed in red; items in (±xx) represent the change in number from the previous map (19 MAY 2016). All information has been verified unless noted otherwise.
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Cumulative Human Cases of Avian Influenza A (H7N9)  
01 APR 2013 - 06 JUL 2016

Cumulative Cases*  
(N=854)

- 0
- 1 - 9
- 10 - 29
- 30 - 62
- 63 - 228

*45 additional cases from China were reported without location information in 2015 and 2016.

Wave 1  
APR 2013-SEP 2013

Wave 2  
OCT 2013-SEP 2014

Wave 3  
OCT 2014-SEP 2015

Wave 4  
OCT 2015-JUL 2016

Since the beginning of the avian influenza A (H7N9) outbreak, spikes in cases have been associated with seasonality. These "waves" of cases typically span 1 OCT to 30 SEP of the following year, see the above maps. These "wave" maps only illustrate autochthonous cases in China, not imported cases.

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Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Cases by Estimated Week of Onset
As of 6 JUL 2016 (N = 854)