Members of NMCB-24 testified before the U.S. Senate’s Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (known as the Riegle Committee). Their testimony underscored the need to fully explain the unexplained or under-explained events which did occur at Al Jubayl. Our investigation has identified three separate events that are discussed in the following section.
1. Loud Noise
Early reports tended to associate the "loud noise" event[4] with a second incident commonly referred to as the "purple T-shirt" event. But investigators have determined that these two events are unrelated and occurred approximately two months apart.[5] The "loud noise" event occurred during the period of January 19-21, 1991, and the "purple T-shirt" event occurred on March 19, 1991. Consequently, the "purple T-shirt" event is discussed separately in this report.
The investigation has also revealed that the events referred to as the "loud noise" of January 19-21, 1991, were actually two separate events -- the first, occurring in the early morning hours of January 19, 1991, and the second during the late evening-early morning of January 20-21, 1991. The events of January 19 and 20-21, 1991 involved air-raid sirens, loud noises, and unit alerts. The M-8 chemical detectors issued to NMCB-24 did not detect any chemical agents at Camp 13 during January 19-21, 1991, or at any time during ODS/DS.[6]
Sixty-seven NMCB-24 personnel were interviewed, including the command staff, NBC team members, medical personnel, and unit personnel. Seven of these individuals also testified before Congress. Their recollections differed. Some recalled a mist in the air, which would have indicated the presence of a significant concentration of an airborne substance,[7] while others recalled a wind blowing and no mist.[8] Some recalled immediate symptoms (burning eyes and skin) while others did not experience any symptoms. The symptoms that were described are not consistent with symptoms associated with exposure to chemical warfare agents.
January 19, 1991 Chronology
At approximately 0332 hours local time on January 19, 1991, a very loud noise was heard at Camp 13 and in the entire Al Jubayl area. General Quarters was sounded.[9] At 0325 hours, Security Post 5 reported that two blasts had occurred west of Camp 13. A second security post reported that a white cloud was moving towards Camp 13 from the south.[10] At 0407 hours, the NMCB-24 NBC Warfare officer had an NBC team member check for the presence of chemical/biological agents at Camp 13 using a M-256A1 detection kit (see glossary). The results of these tests were negative.[11] A second check using the M256A1 kit was conducted at 0459 hours (local).[12] This test was also negative for chemical agents. At 0501 hours (local), a log entry notes that a test for chemical agents in the port area was conducted with negative results.[13] At 0541, Camp 13 returned to MOPP level 0+ and secured from General Quarters at 0545 hours.[14] The NMCB-24 "Air Det" log at KAANB contains entries denoting a sonic boom at 0330 hours, an air raid at 0400 hours, and at 0500 hours the detachment was secured from the air raid. There is no record of any chemical detection tests being run by NMCB-24 Air Detachment personnel.[15]
However, a member of NMCB-24’s Air Detachment reported during congressional testimony and in interviews conducted by investigators that he conducted several M256A1 tests which were positive for mustard/blister agent two out of three times. He also claimed that one individual, a member of the Air Detachment, developed a blister on his wrist under his wristwatch.[16] These detections were not recorded in either the NMCB-24 Command log or "Air Det" logs, nor are there any records of such an event being reported to higher headquarters. This individual testified that he informed the air detachment leaders of the positive results of his M256A1 tests. An officer who was the assistant Officer in Charge of the Air Detachment stated he was in a position to receive such a report and was never informed of these positive tests.[17] In an interview with investigators, the NMCB-24 Air Detachment OIC stated that the person who reported the positive tests had been detailed by the Air Detachment to the Marine Chemical Biological Radiological element at KAANB. The Air Det OIC stated that during attack alerts, this individual was under the control and direction of the Marine’s Defense Operations. The Air Det OIC emphasized that he and his personnel (the Air Detachment) were under the control of the KAANB Commander who was a Marine Colonel. Any CBR monitoring, surveying, reporting, or decontamination operations took place under the direction and control of the KAANB Commander. He further stated that the Marines (MAG-13) ran a "tight ship" and were very sensitive to the timely flow of information up and down the chain of command. The Air Det OIC does not remember anyone reporting to him that blister agent had been detected. He stated that he "would have remembered such a report. The talk about a chemical detection during the early morning hours was exactly that, talk." He stated that he and all the rest of the tenant unit commanders were "out and about" during the loud noise event and that there were no reports from any unit or the MAG-13 CBR team that any agent had been detected or that there were any injuries suffered or treated.[18] No one in the Air Det was a sick bay casualty during or after the 19th of January as a result of the attack alert. During an interview, a Hospital Corpsman Senior Chief, who was the senior medical corpsman for NMCB-40 and Camp 13, stated that he does not remember the individual from the Air Detachment who developed a blister, but added that he treated a lot of similar cases at Camp 13. He said the blister was most likely caused by ringworm or other fungus that grew under a person’s wristwatch. He explained that if a watch was worn too tightly, heat and humidity built up under the watch, allowing the fungus to grow.[19]
During this time period, a Central Command NBC log entry at 0430 hours noted that there was an earlier report of a chemical attack at Al Jubayl. A British unit (not identified in the log) had a "slight" Chemical Agent Monitor reading for mustard. British NBC control sent an NBC team to the site of the reading to conduct further tests. They did not receive a positive indication for a chemical agent and reported "All Clear" to CENTCOM NBC. At 0440 hours, the British reported that another one of their units was getting a positive reading for mustard using M9 detection paper (see glossary) and that a propeller driven aircraft was heard in the area. At 0510 hours, CENTCOM NBC contacted the British NBC team that was sent out to verify the earlier report and found they were at MOPP 0 and did not have any positive M9 paper readings. Because of the conflicting reports, CENTCOM NBC teams were dispatched at 0518 hours to the sites where the British detections occurred (near Camp 5 in the industrial zone) to recheck the area. At 0615 hours, a CENTCOM NBC team lead by a Chief Warrant Officer Three performed a reconnaissance of the area between the two British detections. At 0748 hours, log entries report that no positive readings were taken and that two separate sweeps found no chemicals or debris in the area. This entry does make note of a large diesel fuel spill in the middle of the suspect area.[20]
Eyewitnesses at Camp 13 describe a large fireball that illuminated the sky, a concussion wave, and a mist in the air.[21] Interview quotes include: "I remember getting woke up by this huge explosion -- it almost knocked us out of our bunks."[22] "I am a Viet Nam War Vet, and my thoughts were that it was a rocket."[23] "I initially thought it was incoming artillery rounds."[24] Several personnel experienced acute symptoms such as runny noses, numbness and burning sensations on their lips, eyes, and skin following this explosion. "Right after I got into the bunker, my lips started turning numb and the numbness lasted for several days." "Nobody believed it was a sonic boom -- nobody. I’ve been in the military most of my life and I know that a sonic boom doesn’t leave a flash of red light in the damn sky." "We washed down and that seemed to help, but people started coming up with blisters."[25] Eyewitnesses also stated that those experiencing symptoms reported for medical attention within the next few days. Investigators interviewed the NMCB-24 commander, medical personnel, and senior non-commissioned officers assigned to Camp 13 and reviewed the unit’s sick-call logs. Investigators found no record indicating that any individual sought medical attention on January 19th or the following few days for the types of symptoms that were reported.[26]
Several eyewitnesses, who were located at Camp 13, stated that they smelled an ammonia-like odor, while others do not recall any significant odor or smell. NMCB-24 (for Camp 13) logs do not mention the presence of any odor during the time of the loud noise. Some personnel have stated that they were unprotected during that time and exhibited no symptoms that would have indicated exposure to a chemical agent. A Builder 2nd Class assigned to NMCB-24 stated that during the alert he volunteered to leave the bunker, located at Camp 13, to conduct a M256A1 chemical test. Once outside, he became aware that he had forgotten his MOPP gloves in the bunker. He elected not to return to the bunker for his gloves and continued to test for the presence of chemical agents. He stated that he did not develop any symptom related to an exposure to a chemical agent.[27]
Records of other units stationed in Al Jubayl describe a series of loud explosions occurring on January 19, 1991. For example, the NMCB-24 Air Detachment Log contains an entry reporting the sonic boom at 0330 hours.[28] The command history of Critical Facility Force describes the British positive blister agent reading.[29] The IMEF journals also contain entries that discuss the British detections.[30] The Logistics Operations Center’s daily update states that the reported mustard gas attack at Al Jubayl was actually an ammonia plant setting off alarms and that the booms were from aircraft.[31] The KAANB Commander (a Marine aviator) has also stated the loud noise was caused by two aircraft. He said it was the loudest sonic boom he had ever heard. He said that he immediately called the command center and was told by the duty watch that the Marine Tactical Air Control Center had informed them that the source of the loud noise was two Tornadoes heading towards the north.[32] Finally, what is believed to be a radio station log from an unknown Marine unit gives some insight into the level of confusion that existed in Al Jubayl from the loud noise and initial reports of positive test results for chemical agents.[33]
January 20-21, 1991 Chronology
Late in the evening of January 20th (between 2140-2150 hours), a SCUD alert was issued and air raid sirens sounded throughout Al Jubayl. As a result, units in the area went to MOPP 4. At 2230 hours, units secured from General Quarters and went to MOPP 0. At 0046 hours on January 21, 1991, the air raid sirens were activated once again.[34] NMCB-24 security logs note two explosions occurring at 15-20 second intervals southeast of Camp 13 at 0054 hours. At 0115, units secured from the alert. NMCB-24 security logs also note that Saudi sirens sounded at 0142 hours.[35] The NMCB-24 "Air Det" log notes SCUD alerts occurring at 2200 hours on January 20th, and also at 0330 hours and 0445 hours on January 21, 1991. Approximately twenty minutes after each alert, the "All Clear" was given.
CENTCOM NBC logs for January 20-21, 1991 note that at 2147 hours two SCUD missiles were fired towards Jubayl-Dhahran and four Patriot missiles were fired -- destroying the SCUDs in the air. Additionally, CENTCOM logs contain no entries to indicate the presence of chemical or biological agents in the Al Jubayl area during January 20-21, 1991. At 2200 local, a third SCUD was fired and was also destroyed in the air. [36]
Finding of the Loud Noise Event (January 19, 1991)
Thus far we have discussed information obtained from unit logs and personal interviews. Certainly there can be no doubt that a loud noise was heard during the early morning hours of January 19, 1991. What is debated, however, is the source of the loud noise. Many people who were interviewed believe the loud noise was caused by an incoming SCUD missile. Others believe the loud noise was caused by aircraft.
Based upon the information that has been reviewed to date, investigators have determined the loud noise was a sonic boom caused by coalition aircraft. Records reviewed to date show that no SCUDs were launched towards the vicinity of Al Jubayl on January 19, 1991.[37] However, as this was the third day of the air war, the skies were full of aircraft either flying to their assigned targets or on their way back to their home station. Many aircraft had to be refueled while airborne in order to complete their mission. To maintain a steady flow of aircraft and fuel, as well as prevent a mid-air disaster, refueling aircraft (both tankers and the aircraft to be refueled) were required to fly assigned routes or orbits. The sheer size of the air campaign required many refueling routes over Saudi Arabia, including over the port city of Al Jubayl.
To identify aircraft as the source for the loud noise, investigators reviewed the Air Force Central Command (CENTAF) Air Tasking Order for the air campaign. The ATO shows that several sorties were scheduled during the early morning hours of January 19, 1991, which would have overflown Al Jubayl.[38] To further isolate and identify the aircraft most likely to have caused the sonic boom, data recorded by Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft was analyzed by the Department of the Air Force’s 552d Computer Group (ACC) located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma.[39] This data shows that two coalition aircraft (aircraft "A" and "B" shown in Figure 5) were exceeding the speed of sound[40] as they flew over Al Jubayl at approximately the same time the "loud noise" was heard and reported (approximately 0332 hours local time). Aircraft "A" flew the closest to Camp 13 and was accelerating through 638 knots (733.7 mph) to 652 knots (749.8 mph) while flying over the city at 0327 hours plus nine seconds local time. Aircraft "A" continued to accelerate out over the gulf achieving a top speed of 924 knots (1062 mph) at 0333 hours local time. Aircraft "B" flew a course that led it over the outskirts, south of Al Jubayl. Aircraft "B" approached Al Jubayl at 0327 hours and 16 seconds local time at a speed of 700 knots (805 mph). Aircraft "B" accelerated as it passed by the city and achieved a top speed of 873 knots (1003.95 mph) at 0327 hours and 57 seconds local time.
Figure 5. Flight Paths of Aircraft Suspected of Causing the "Sonic Boom"
Assessment of the Loud Noise Event (January 19, 1991)
Based on the information that is available to date, the presence of a chemical or biological warfare agent in the Al Jubayl area during the Loud Noise Event is judged to be "Unlikely." This assessment is based upon the following information:
- knowledge that there were no SCUD missiles launched in the direction of Saudi Arabia on January 19, 1991.
- there were no verifiable tests conducted in the Al Jubayl area that tested positive for chemical warfare agents.
- no records have been found of any individual receiving medical treatment of symptoms associated with exposure to chemical or biological warfare agents.
Findings of Events That Occurred on January 20-21, 1991
The January 20-21, 1991, incident involved air raid sirens and a reference to "two explosions southeast of camp." Available records indicate that chemical detection tests were negative. The time of this event corresponds approximately to the time that a SCUD missile was launched towards Dhahran and was most likely intercepted by a Patriot air defense missile at very high altitude. Although there is no record of a reported impact site, this event is confirmed by numerous command log entries and the SCUD launch database.
Assessment of Events That Occurred on January 20-21, 1991
Based on the information that is available to date, the presence of a chemical or biological warfare agent in the Al Jubayl area during the events of January 20-21, 1991 is judged to be "Unlikely." This assessment is based upon the following information:
- that events recorded in numerous command log entries and the SCUD launch database show that a SCUD missile was launched and intercepted at approximately the same time as the events recorded in logs of units located in Al Jubayl.
- that there is no record of an impact site in the Al Jubayl area.
- no records have been found of any individual receiving medical treatment of symptoms associated with exposure to chemical or biological warfare agents.
Through the early stages of the war, Al Jubayl was spared from direct missile attack. This did not keep units within the Al Jubayl area from having to respond to air raid warnings and increase the MOPP level each and every time a SCUD alert was issued. The SCUD missiles that could be seen from Al Jubayl were those flying over the city -- apparently targeted against Dhahran or other targets located south of the city. This all changed on February 16, 1991, when a SCUD impacted in Al Jubayl harbor.
2. SCUD Impact
During the Gulf War, the Iraqis fired a total of 88 SCUD missiles. A brief discussion of SCUD history and characteristics is contained at Tab D. The attack against Al Jubayl occurred a little over a month into the war and was the 66th missile the Iraqis launched.[41]
The Iraqis launched the 66th missile at approximately 0200 hours local on February 16, 1991. U.S. National sensors detected the missile early in flight and provided prompt warning of the launch. The incoming missile was the Al Hussein variant of the SCUD. It impacted in the harbor, approximately 150 meters from the commercial pier where an ammunition storage area was located and approximately 1000 meters from the USS Tarawa. Other ships that were in the harbor at the time of the SCUD impact included the USS Button, the USS Cleveland, and a Merchant Marine vessel--the Santa Adele.[42] The missile’s warhead did not explode and it caused no damage. The U.S. Navy’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment 33 recovered most of the missile, including the warhead, from the harbor floor.
Marine vessel--the Santa Adele.[42] The missile’s warhead did not explode and it caused no damage. The U.S. Navy’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment 33 recovered most of the missile, including the warhead, from the harbor floor.
A Patriot missile battery was defending Al Jubayl. Although it received the launch warning, the Patriot battery was not-operational for maintenance reasons and was not able to engage the incoming missile.
According to excerpts from the U.S. Navy’s EOD Detachment 33 log, air raid sirens sounded in the city; the Harbor Defense Command went to condition "Red", and the Rear Area Operations Center went to condition "Yellow."[43] The PSU 301 Command Duty Officer heard an explosion outside of the command tent -- "something in the air and to the west." He recalls seeing "white hot luminescent objects still in the air." He then alerted the unit to General Quarters and contacted Harbor Defense Command.[44] Standard Operating Procedures required 3 Raider boats underway at all times. When General Quarters was sounded, PSU 301’s three remaining Raiders got underway.[45] Other eyewitness accounts from PSU 301 personnel indicate that there may have been an airborne explosion; some accounts indicate two explosions.
PSU 301 and EOD boat crews responded rapidly to the SCUD impact. By 0230 hours, an EOD boat and a PSU 301 Raider had arrived at the scene of the SCUD impact. However, due to smoke and the strong smell of what was thought to be missile fuel,[46] the accompanying PSU 301 boat backed off. The EOD team surveyed the harbor’s surface near the reported impact and located an area of major bubble activity and a strong smell of fumes. Approximately twenty minutes later, the EOD team marked the area with a surface buoy and returned to base.
At 0720 hours on February 16, 1991, the EOD team returned to the site in order to check the status of the marked area. Bubbles were still rising to the surface and the same smell of missile fuel remained in the area. At approximately 0930 hours an EOD boat equipped with an Underwater Damage Assessment Television System conducted a survey of the harbor bottom. After lowering the UDATS and surveying the area around the buoy, the team located missile debris, including an item which resembled a warhead. At 1450 hours, the EOD team conducted its first dive at the impact site. The divers confirmed the location of an intact SCUD warhead, along with the guidance section, rocket motor, and miscellaneous components. All major components were separated from each other, confirming that the missile had broken apart.[47]
The Recovery Operation
In preparation for recovery operations, EOD personnel spent February 17th in consultation with their technical information center at Indian Head, MD. EOD personnel also made the requisite notifications to their command in Bahrain as well as other command entities located in the immediate port area. As expected, they also spent time responding to numerous requests for more detailed information.
On February 18th , the detachment’s divers continued their survey of the harbor floor, and mapped the site using the UDATS. At 1500 hours, the Operational Commander of the Harbor Defense Command visited the EOD camp and received an update on the situation.
During the period February 19 -21, the EOD team conducted extensive searches of the harbor bottom and recovered smaller SCUD components with the aid of an underwater camera system. Divers also located and marked a fuel tank for retrieval.
The EOD team began salvage operations on February 22, 1991, at 0800 hours. Using lifting balloons, they retrieved three major non-explosive components: the fuel tank (Figure 6), the guidance section, and the rocket motor (Figure 7). The missile pieces were hoisted out of the water using a crane. While the components were suspended, they were sprayed with a fire hose to flush out sea water and any caustic substances that could have remained. The EOD crew flushed out the pieces for a second time once they were on the pier. Later, the components were taken to the EOD base camp for temporary storage.
Figure 6. The Recovered SCUD's Fuel Tank
Figure 7. The Recovered SCUD's Guidance Section & Rocket Motor (rocket motor is in the foreground)
After the EOD team finished examining the recovered SCUD components, custody was transferred to the Joint Captured Material Exploitation Center on February 23, 1991. JCMEC was a coalition entity responsible for collecting captured foreign military equipment throughout the Kuwait Theater of Operations.
Recovery of the warhead began on March 2, 1991, at 0600 hours. During an interview it was reported that EOD divers collected sediment samples from the area near the warhead prior to its recovery from the harbor.[48] However, investigators found no record that confirms soil samples were taken. By 1320 hours the warhead had been safely removed from the water and operations to render it harmless had begun. During the operation, EOD personnel used an M18 chemical detection kit to check for the presence of chemical warfare agents. The operation ended at 1715 hours. During the entire recovery operation, EOD members found no evidence of chemical or biological agents.
On March 3rd, the disarmed warhead was loaded onto a barge for shipment back to the EOD base camp in Al Jubayl (Figure 8). JCMEC personnel took custody of the warhead on March 8, 1991. JCMEC shipped the missile components to the Army Missile Command in Huntsville, AL.
Figure 8. The Recovered SCUD's Warhead
Findings of the SCUD Impact Event
A SCUD missile did impact in the waters of Al Jubayl harbor on February 16, 1991. Eyewitnesses have reported the missile was intercepted and shot down by a Patriot missile. However, the Patriot battery that was located at Al Jubayl was not operational at the time and could not have shot down the SCUD. The SCUD did not detonate upon impact with the water. There were no injuries to personnel or damage to equipment as the result of this incident. This missile was subsequently recovered from the harbor floor by Navy EOD personnel. Testing conducted at the time of recovery for chemical warfare agents were negative.
Assessment of the SCUD Impact Event
Initially, as could be expected, this event received a considerable amount of attention. The opportunity to recover a SCUD nearly intact was not an everyday occurrence. The initial surge of interest diminished over time -- largely because no one was injured and no equipment was damaged at any time from the missile’s impact to its recovery.
Based on the information that is available to date, our assessment is that the SCUD missile was "Definitely Not" armed with chemical warfare agents. This assessment is based upon the following information:
- that testing conducted for chemical warfare agents during recovery operations were negative.
- chemical agents were not found when the warhead was rendered "safe."
3. Purple T-Shirt Event
On March 19, 1991, following the cease fire, personnel from NMCB-24 required medical attention after becoming exposed to unidentified airborne noxious fumes. These fumes resulted in acute symptoms, such a burning throats, eyes and noses, and difficulty in breathing. In addition, portions of their brown T-shirts turned purple. It was also reported that portions of some of these same individuals’ combat boots also turned purple.[49]
The incident occurred at approximately 1415 hours local and involved three separate groups of NMCB-24 personnel. Five individuals composed the first group, which was working on equipment in the Alpha Yard (a motor pool located adjacent to Camp 13).[50] Group two was two medical personnel, who were emptying sand bags inside Camp 13.[51] A third group was identified through eyewitness interviews and was composed of two other NMCB-24 personnel.[52] This third group experienced the same incident, but did not report it to the safety officer and did not report to the medical department for treatment. Both of these individuals have been interviewed. One individual could not remember the incident. The second individual remembers donning his mask and continuing to work.
The position of each of the three groups was such that if one drew a line connecting their locations, the axis would be oriented roughly North to South as shown in Figure 9. Each group was separated from the adjacent group by about 0.25 km for a total spread of about 0.5 km from North to South. Figure 9 depicts the relative positions of the three "purple T-shirt" groups, the prevailing wind direction, and the location of air monitoring station number 1.[53]
Figure 9. Purple T-Shirt Groups
The NMCB 24 personnel who were involved in the incident stated they experienced a choking sensation when a "noxious" cloud enveloped them. None of the affected personnel saw the origin of the gas cloud, but all believed the cloud came from one of the industrial plants located near Camp 13 as shown in Figure 10. Although they all agreed that the odor was not ammonia, each person described the odor differently -- chlorine, battery acid, nitric acid, methyl ethyl ketone. All experienced the same symptoms; all had their T-shirts change color. According to one eyewitness, "the areas of our T-shirts that were soaked with sweat slowly began to turn the most beautiful shade of purple I ever saw."[54] All personnel, except for those in group 3, immediately sought medical attention and, after showering and changing clothes, returned to work with no further symptoms.
Figure 10. Camp 13 and Surrounding Industries
As stated earlier, none of individuals who were exposed to the noxious gas cloud saw where it came from. A Master Chief Equipment Operator (EQCM) from NMCB-24 was interviewed by telephone. This individual supervised the construction of Fleet Hospital-15, and worked on earth stabilization projects at KAANB. To date, the Chief is the only eyewitness that has positively identified the source of the noxious cloud. His comments concerning the purple T-shirt incident are summarized as follows:
There was an industrial accident connected with the purple T-shirt incident. The wind blew from the NW to the SE all of the time. It almost never changed. NMCB-24 studied the wind patterns, as they were concerned about gas attacks. The day of the purple T-shirt incident, the Chief was working at a site that was north of Al Jubayl. He returned to Camp 13 to check on equipment that had broken down. Immediately after stepping out of his vehicle at the Alpha yard, he saw purple dust falling everywhere. He could see it coming from a smokestack at the fertilizer plant. The winds changed 180 degrees when it dumped it on him. There were nose bleeds and there was gagging. He had a nose bleed. Although acid was stored in the Alpha yard, he does not recall a battery explosion at any time.[55]
When interviewed, NMCB-24 medical personnel stated that the contaminated clothing was bagged and turned over to the Marines (either 3d NCR or IMEF personnel), and a group of Saudi Arabian officials. Those individuals conducted an environmental/occupational hazard investigation after the incident. NMCB-24 medical personnel stated they were not aware of any official report that was prepared upon completion -- of the investigation. But they were aware that the unit received a telephone report supposedly from the same individuals who conducted the study -- to inform the unit that there were no problems and nothing to worry about. [56] Investigators are attempting to locate any report generated by either U.S. or Saudi Arabian officials relating to the analysis of the purple T-shirts. However, because a chain of custody for the T-shirts cannot be identified, it is unlikely that investigators will be able to determine the identity of the Marines or Saudi officials who took possession of the T-shirts, or to locate any reports that may have been prepared. A request for information concerning this event has been transmitted to the United States Defense Attach� Office, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
This incident has been associated with the possible release of fumes from a nearby industry or a localized chemical spill in the Alpha Yard that could have caused the T-shirts to turn purple. The U.S. Navy's Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit No. 2 conducted an environmental/occupational hazard investigation and site visit of Al Jubayl in 1994. [57] EPMU-2 personnel toured Camp 13 and local industries, as well as meeting with members of the Royal Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health and managers of the local industries. This study noted that the air quality in Al Jubayl was monitored throughout ODS/DS. Records from the Saudi Arabian government indicate that the air quality of Al Jubayl was maintained within acceptable limits throughout ODS/DS. In addition, records from Air Monitoring Station No. 1 for March 19, 1991, do not indicate the detection of any noxious airborne fumes that exceeded normal parameters acceptable for this area (see Tab E).
The EPMU-2 study could not determine the source of the irritant. However, their report did note that the camp was located in a heavily industrialized area. It stated that emissions from a petrochemical plant or from the motor park itself may have been the source of the irritant. Eyewitnesses stated that at the time of this incident, the winds were blowing out of the North, from the direction of the fertilizer plant.
In July 1993, the U.S. Army Material Test Directorate, White Sands Missile Range, conducted tests on a T-shirt in an attempt to identify the cause of damage to the shirt.[58] The rationale for this second test and the requesting agency is not known at this time. The T-shirt was believed to be similar to the ones that turned purple but its actual origin is not known. The T-shirt had numerous small holes on its front and back. A Scanning Electron Microscope was used to analyze damage to the shirt's fibers. The SEM analysis could not determine what specifically caused the damage to the T-shirt in question. However, the cause of the damage appeared to be chemical in nature. The test directorate had conducted a similar study in 1988. During this earlier study, fabric was exposed to various concentrations of sulfuric acid. The damaged fiber ends of the current T-shirt sample exhibit similar damage to those fibers exposed to sulfuric acid in the 1988 study.
A third study was done by Natick Research Development and Engineering Center in Natick, MA, at the request of the Defense Science Board. Natick conducted analyses of T-shirts that were similar to those that had turned purple at Camp 13. The T-shirts were furnished by one of the NMCB-24 members whose T-shirt turned purple. It is not known whether these shirts were actually worn during ODS/DS. These tests showed that brown military T-shirts of the type worn during ODS/DS do turn purple when exposed to acids, such as sulfuric (battery) acid and nitric/nitrous oxides from nitric acid.[59]
Findings of the Purple T-Shirt Event
On March 19, 1991, nine personnel from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 were working at Camp 13 and were exposed to unidentified airborne noxious fumes. Although it has not been verified, the source of the fumes appears to be a fertilizer plant located near Camp 13. This exposure caused acute medical symptoms and caused portions of these individuals' T-Shirts and combat boots to turn purple in color.
At least seven of the nine personnel reported to the medical facility for treatment. After showering and changing their clothes all five returned to duty with no further symptoms. the two individuals who did not report to the medical facility simply continued to work and did experience the acute medical symptoms as the others. The shirts and boots that changed color were given to unnamed U.S. and Saudi officials and have never been recovered. Analyses of T-Shirts that are similar to those worn during the war show that the shirts can change color when exposed to acids, such as sulfuric (battery) acid and nitric/nitrous oxides from nitric acid.
Assessment of the Purple T-Shirt Event
Based on the information that is available to date, our assessment is that chemical warfare agents were "Definitely Not" involved in the Purple T-Shirt event. This assessment is based upon the following information:
- this event occurred after the cessation of hostilities.
- there is no record of hostile attacks occurring during this time period.
- the medical problems reported by the individuals involved and their rapid recovery is not consistent with exposure to chemical warfare agents.
The Purple T-shirt event served to highlight that Al Jubayl was a heavily industrialized city. This heavy concentration of industries meant that personnel who lived and worked in Al Jubayl could possibly have been exposed to a variety of industrial chemicals. During interviews of personnel who were stationed in Al Jubayl, investigators asked for each person’s impression of Al Jubayl’s environment. As might be expected, investigators received both positive and negative comments. To provide as clear a picture as possible of Al Jubayl and the surrounding area, the last section of this case narrative discusses Al Jubayl’s environment.
4. Environmental Factors & Other Related Topics
Eyewitness accounts from numerous personnel, as well as notations in NMCB-24 command logs, relate the presence of ammonia and sulfur odors in the air and give a general impression of Al Jubayl's environment. Some of these accounts are cited below:
A Boatswain’s Mate Third Class assigned to Port Security Unit 301-B said that Al Jubayl was the dirtiest port he had ever seen. He attributed this to smoke from the oil well fires in Kuwait, crude oil floating in the water, and the various industrial plants located in the area.[60]
A Port Security man Second Class, assigned to PSU-301-B, recalls the heavy concentration of black smoke from the oil well fires: "Sometimes the smoke layer was so heavy it would obliterate the sun." When asked about the general conditions of Al Jubayl, he indicated that the port was as clean or cleaner than many ports he has seen in the United States.[61]
A Chief Builder (BUC) assigned to NMCB-24 stated that the "Camp 13 area smelled like a giant Port-O-Let (portable toilet)."[62]
During the pre-deployment phase of ODS/DS, military planners became aware of the heavy concentration of industry in Al Jubayl. The large number of industrial complexes located within a relatively small geographic area was of special concern. Many of these facilities used, produced, or stored industrial chemicals that could pose a serious health risk to military personnel, if they were exposed. The large number of personnel and equipment that were scheduled to deploy and redeploy through Al Jubayl compounded the problem.
Beginning early in the deployment phase of Desert Shield and continuing through the post Gulf War period, the issue of exposure to toxic industrial chemicals in the city of Al Jubayl was an item of concern to the IMEF command element. As a result, several studies (which are cited throughout this section) were conducted to determine the state of day-to-day environmental protective actions taken by the Saudi government; to identify the chemicals involved; and to determine what action(s), if any, could be taken to reduce the likelihood of a large scale chemical exposure.
Despite its heavy industrialization, studies have confirmed that the Saudi Arabian Government had stringent environmental standards in place long before the commencement of ODS/DS. The city of Al Jubayl, together with Yanbu, "are believed to be among the most environmentally clean of any comparable urban concentrations in the world."[63] Within the Kingdom, environmental protection standards were developed by the Saudi Meteorological and Environmental Protection Agency. Enforcement of these standards was the responsibility of a Royal Commission that was established to oversee operations within Al Jubayl and the surrounding area (see Tab F). It has been reported that the Saudi environmental standards parallel those of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.[64] A comparison of a small portion of U.S. EPA and Saudi (the Royal Commission) Air Quality Standards are provided in Table 1.[65]
Table 1. Comparison of a Cross-section of U.S. and Saudi Environmental Standards
- No Federal Standard has been established. However, the State of California established an individual state standard of .03.
- No Federal Standard has been established. However, the State of New York established an individual state standard of .24.
- Standards are expressed in micrograms per cubic meter.
The Saudi Arabian Government strictly monitored and enforced environmental standards and closely controlled the licensing of businesses within the Kingdom. This was done mainly for social and religious reasons, but the Saudis also recognized the need to maintain a strong environmental protection program.
Before any business could establish an industrial operation in Al Jubayl, it had to prove that its facility could adhere to established environmental and pollution control standards. The Saudi government required businesses to submit an Environmental Evaluation Report.
For example, the applications for several paper mills were rejected because the applicants could not demonstrate the ability to comply with environmental and pollution regulations. Obtaining a license did not signify an end to a business’s compliance responsibilities -- it was only the beginning. In order to ensure compliance, businesses that established operations were subject to continuous monitoring.
As a result of their efforts, the United Nations awarded the Saudi Royal Commission for Jubayl and Yanbu the "Sasakawa Award" in 1988 for their "excellent planning and implementation of environmentally sound management of the two industrial complexes."[66]
Analysis of Industries Located in Al Jubayl
Prior to the Gulf War, the Center for Naval Analysis conducted for IMEF a detailed analysis of every industry located in Al Jubayl.[67] The study identified each industrial plant that produced, used, or stored potentially dangerous chemicals, as well as the names of the individual chemicals involved. The location of these industrial plants is shown in Figure 11. This study also included the development of several exposure scenarios simulating the leakage of chemicals due to sabotage or direct destruction. Table 2 identifies the primary industrial complexes and the industrial chemicals they use or produce.[68]
Figure 11. Identification of Industrial Plants Located in Al Jubayl
Table 2. List of the Primary Industrial Chemicals Found in Al Jubayl
After the industrial chemicals were identified, they were grouped into three different classifications. Flammable substances, which encompassed the majority of the chemicals identified, were classified as Petrochemicals; ammonia and chlorine were classified as Toxic gases; and the remaining chemicals were classified as Corrosive liquids. Corrosive liquids received no further attention.
Petrochemicals
The petrochemical companies located in Al Jubayl had disaster plans in place, and possessed varying capabilities to deal with explosions, leaks, etc. It was reported, however, that an explosion of a petroleum storage tank would have had serious consequences. Due to the percussion or impact of the explosion itself, extreme heat generated by the ensuing fire, and the rapid consumption of oxygen at ground level by the fireball, anyone within 500 feet of the blast would not have survived. Beyond the 500 foot zone the danger would have come from smoke, sulfur compounds, and airborne acids. In addition to explosion, a second danger would have been direct exposure to the petrochemicals themselves. This hazard would most likely have been the result of a major liquid petrochemical spill. [69]
Toxic Gases
Toxic chemicals (gaseous forms) were the second category of hazardous substances to be studied. As with their petrochemical company counterparts, each company that dealt with toxic chemicals reportedly had disaster preparedness plans. Three toxic substances were studied: ammonia, chlorine, and hydrogen sulfide. Each is discussed separately in the following paragraphs.
Ammonia was stored at facilities located in both the city and at the port. Two companies stored ammonia in the city -- Fertilizer 1 and the Al Jubayl Fertilizer Company. Both companies reportedly reduced their holdings at the beginning of the Gulf crisis. For example, before the crisis Fertilizer 1 normally stored 22,000 metric tons of ammonia but reduced their holdings to 1,000-8,000 MT as the crisis progressed. The Al Jubayl Fertilizer Company stored up to 5,000 MT. When the quantity being stored reached 5,000 MT, the excess would be transferred to Fertilizer 1’s tanks. The largest ammonia storage facility, operated by Fertilizer 1, was located in the port area. Their holdings at the port ranged between 5,000 to 20,000 MT between shipments, which normally occurred every two or three weeks.
Chlorine was located only within the industrial area of the city. The Saudi Petrochemical Company stored most of the chlorine. They voluntarily reduced their holdings to 110,000 MT at the beginning of the crisis.
Hydrogen Sulfide was the third toxic gas that could have been injurious to coalition forces. H2S could have emanated from any one of the numerous oil wells that dotted the area, or any one of the many oil pipelines that crisscrossed the area. If a pipeline or well head developed a leak or burst, H2S could have been released into the environment.
Individual Protection from Petrochemicals and Toxic Gases
Would the M17A1 mask and MOPP suit have protected individuals if they had been exposed to petrochemicals or any of the aforementioned toxic gases? According to the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 3-4, the M17A1 mask, when properly fitted, would have protected individuals against field concentrations of all known chemical and biological agents in vapor or aerosol form. The M17A1 mask would not have protected individuals from ammonia. When the oxygen level in the air is displaced by another gas (e.g., the air becomes saturated with chlorine after a rupture in a chlorine storage tank), the mask would not have protected the wearer. The MOPP suit, more commonly referred to as a Battledress Overgarment, would have protected the wearer against contact with chemical agent vapors, aerosols, and droplets of liquids. It was noted, however, that neither the mask nor MOPP suit could have provided protection if the air became saturated with either gas. Finally, both the mask and MOPP suit would have provided protection from exposure to hydrogen sulfide.[70]
Considering the findings of the original studies, contacts between representatives of IMEF and local officials were made in order to determine what actions could be taken to reduce the risk of exposure. At that time, IMEF representatives learned that businesses in Al Jubayl had voluntarily reduced their holdings of toxic substances at the beginning of ODS/DS. These meetings were also useful because they provided a forum to build a spirit of cooperation among the various parties involved. As a result, plans were developed that ensured proper notification of military authorities in the event of a disaster. These plans also included mutual aid agreements which would have involved military resources should the need arise.
Many Gulf War Veterans deployed in Al Jubayl have expressed concern about the substances they could have been exposed to in such a heavily industrialized environment. The environmental data included in this narrative indicates that Al Jubayl is no worse (or better) than comparable industrialized sites in the United States. Environmental standards were in place in Al Jubayl, but chemical substances could have been inadvertanlty released-- causing the T-Shirts to turn purple and causing the Seabees to seek medical attention. That noxious could reported at Camp 13 could well have been such a release. The release could have come from the fertilizer plant (or some other nearby factory). We continue to search for information that will shed light on its origin.
5. Summary
This case narrative focuses on three major events that took place in Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, during Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield. These events are the "Loud Noise" event, the "SCUD Impact" event, and the "Purple T-shirt" event. A general discussion of Al Jubayl’s environment is also included because some veterans expressed concern over what hazardous materials they could have been exposed to while they were in Al Jubayl.
The information reported in this case narrative and the assessments made by investigators are based upon information that we have been able to uncover. We need to hear from you -- not only about your experiences in the vicinity of Al Jubayl, but also about any health problems you are experiencing which you think may be a result of your service during Operations Desert Shield /Desert Storm. If you have information that you believe would be of immediate value to us about the events at Al Jubayl, please call the DOD Incident Reporting Line at 1-800-472-6719.
If you are experiencing health problems you believe to be a result of your service in Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield and you are eligible for health benefits through the Department of Defense, please call the COMPREHENSIVE CLINICAL EVALUATION PROGRAM at 1-800-796-9699.
If you are eligible for benefits provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs system, please call the PERSIAN GULF HELPLINE at 1-800-PGW-VETS.