Hypotheses about illnesses among Gulf War veterans include that some reported physical symptoms may have resulted from exposure to chemical warfare agents. During and after the Gulf War, some veterans reported they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents and assess the likelihood of chemical warfare agents' presence in the Gulf, the Department of Defense developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work of the United Nations and international community. The investigation examines these factors:

A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;

• Physical evidence from the site, e.g., weapons fragments and soil, water, vegetation, human, or animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• Testimony of witnesses;
• Several analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by experts.

While our investigative methodology (more fully described in Tab D) is based on these factors, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected when an event occurred. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents and must tailor each investigation to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our investigative methodology to thoroughly define each incident's circumstances and determine what happened. Alarms alone are not certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate the presence of a chemical warfare agent.

Following our methodology, we accumulate anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence; interview witnesses and key servicemembers; and analyze the results of all available information. We then assess the possibility of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. This assessment is our best judgment, based on facts available on the report publication date; we reassess each case over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of Chemical Warfare Agent Presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were present or not? If insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence emerges.

On February 28, 1991, an XM93 Fox Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (commonly called the Fox vehicle or the Fox) inspected an ammunition supply point located approximately eight miles west of Kuwait International Airport. Equipped with an MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer to analyze samples for chemical warfare agents, the Fox vehicle provided Army and Marine units with a sophisticated detection capability. While inspecting the ammunition supply point, one Fox commander, Gunnery Sergeant George Grass, reported that his MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer detected three chemical warfare agents within 100 meters of each other. Gunnery Sergeant Grass gave his MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer's tapes (paper printouts of the detections) to the Task Force Ripper nuclear, biological, and chemical officer. Reports of these detections traveled up the chain of command, through the 1st Marine Division to the United States Central Command. In response, an explosive ordnance disposal team arrived the next day, March 1, and thoroughly inspected the ammunition supply point. The team did not find any chemical weapons or evidence of chemical warfare agents. In addition, no one who entered the ammunition supply point reported any symptoms of chemical warfare agent exposure. Word that the ammunition supply point did not contain chemical weapons or chemical warfare agents traveled up the chain of command, through the 1st Marine Division to the United States Central Command, whose nuclear, biological, and chemical desk logs documented this information.

After the war, Kuwait's government contracted ordnance-clearing services to rid the country of munitions left by Iraq's occupying army. Teams of explosive ordnance experts dismantled the ammunition supply point during cleanup operations and found no chemical weapons or chemical warfare agents.

We assess it is unlikely that chemical weapons were stored in the ammunition supply point. Our assessment is based on an examination of the available evidence related to these events, interviews of key Marines and civilian personnel involved, and information from the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq and the US intelligence community that they found no evidence that Iraq moved chemical warfare agents or chemical weapons into Kuwait. The MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer alerts most probably were caused by contaminants from the battlefield, the orchard, and/or a nearby industrial facility.

In 1993 a Marine veteran of Desert Storm believed exposures to chemical warfare agents during the Gulf War caused the severe medical problems he was experiencing.[2] He asked several Marine nuclear, biological, and chemical defense specialists to make statements about any wartime chemical warfare agent detections or exposures they suspected. In 1993 and 1994 several Marines testified before Congressional committees and in 1994 the Marine Corps initiated an investigation to examine the circumstances surrounding this veteran's possible exposures. The investigation concluded the Marine was not exposed to chemical or biological warfare agents during Operation Desert Storm.[3]

Gunnery Sergeant George Grass provided a statement for the Marine Corps' investigation on behalf of the ill Marine. During the war GySgt Grass served as a US Marine Corps NBC defense specialist and commander of an XM93 Fox Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle, hereafter referred to as the Fox (Figure 2). He also testified before the House of Representatives Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee (December 1996) and the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses (May 1996 and May 1997) about several suspected chemical weapons incidents during the Gulf War about which he personally knew. On each occasion GySgt Grass discussed several specific MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer (MM-1) alerts for chemical warfare agents, including three at an ammunition supply point located southwest of Kuwait City, Kuwait (Figure 3).[4] The MM-1 is the primary chemical warfare agent detector in the Fox vehicle. Information about these incidents also appeared in the June 1997 MITRE Corporation draft report, "Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DOD,"[5] and in at least one book about the Gulf War.[6]

Figure 2. A Fox Vehicle

The Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team, the office supporting the Special Assistant's predecessor, initiated an investigation of these incidents. We completed the investigation and published an interim narrative on September 23, 1997.[7] The Presidential Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents reviewed the interim report, agreed with our assessment, and in July 2000 recommended that we consider the investigation complete. We amended the interim narrative to address issues the PSOB raised (see Tab E) and now publish this narrative as a final report.[8]

On February 24, 1991, US Marines launched an offensive into Kuwait to dislodge Iraq's occupying forces. The 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, ground maneuver elements of the I Marine Expeditionary Force, were to attack through (breach) two heavily defended minefield belts,[9] advance past Al Jaber Air Base, taking key sites along the way, and converge on Kuwait City to liberate the capital (Figure 3). The 1st Marine Division consisted of units from the 1st Marine, 3d Marine, 7th Marine, and 11th Marine regiments, as well as units from other Marine regiments attached to the 1st MARDIV. For the ground war, the 1st MARDIV was further organized into Task Forces (e.g., Task Forces Ripper and Papa Bear), tailored or task-organized collections of forces drawn from various units and built around a core combat team (e.g., an infantry regiment).[10]

Figure 3. Key locations in the 1st MARDIV area of responsibility

The 7th Marine Regiment was the core of Task Force Ripper (Ripper), which consisted of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (the 1/7); the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (the 1/5); and the 3d Tank Battalion. Forces from the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, the 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, and the 3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment (the 3/11) augmented and supported Ripper.[11] In addition, the 1st MARDIV assigned one of its four Fox vehicles, commanded by GySgt Grass, to Ripper.[12] Ripper, the Fox, and the 1/5 are highlighted in the organizational chart (Figure 4) because unit personnel directly participated in operations at the ASP.

Figure 4. Task Force Ripper organization and the chain of command up to I MEF

At approximately 7:00 AM on February 28, 1991, the 1st MARDIV's commanding general ordered his units to cease all offensive operations. By then, the 1st MARDIV had captured its objectives around Kuwait City, among them Kuwait International Airport, to the west of which Ripper established positions.[13]

According to GySgt Grass, During the intelligence briefing that morning, it was stated by the S-2 [Ripper's intelligence officer] that the Iraqi's [sic] had established the 3d Armored Corps Ammunition Supply Point just outside of Kuwait City and that sources (Iraqi prisoners) have stated there were chemical weapons stored somewhere within the ammo storage area. I was informed that my task was to do a complete survey of the entire ASP and locate any chemical weapons that may be stored there.[14]

Suspicions of Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities were well founded. Ripper's NBC officer noted that he wouldn't have been surprised to find chemical weapons in the ASP.[15] According to the 1st MARDIV NBC officer, it was standard operating procedure to assume the possibility of chemical weapons in any of Iraq's ASPs.[16]

In post-war testimony before congress, Lieutenant General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., who as a colonel commanded Task Force Ripper, testified:

We took this threat of chemical involvement very seriously. We had intelligence ... that the Iraqi forces had the potential, had the capability. We [had] the very best NBC equipment that the Marine Corps had in its inventory at that time. And throughout many months in Saudi Arabia, we trained very, very hard on the detection, protection, and decontamination of our forces.[17]

Before the Gulf War, the US intelligence community[18] warned that Iraq had a chemical weapons capability and had used chemical weapons against its own citizens as well as against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.[19]

1. Description

The ammunition supply point was located in an orchard or tree farm outside one of several roads encircling Kuwait City. According to an entry in GySgt Grass's journal, the ASP was at map grid coordinates QT 766395,[20] roughly five miles west of Kuwait International Airport. Message traffic and unit log entries, however, indicated the ASP's location was QT 75393910[21]—approximately eight miles west of the airport (see Figure 5). The Fox driver believed inherent inaccuracies in the vehicle's navigation system caused the disparity—a difference of about three miles (see glossary, Vehicle Orientation System).[22]

Figure 5. The ASP position as reported by GySgt Grass and a 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment log

Figure 6. The ASP location, based on GySgt Grass's drawing

According to GySgt Grass, the ASP was divided into two sections—a large area with hundreds of bunkers and a small area across the road. GySgt Grass provided a drawing that depicts the ASP and the surrounding area. Figure 6 is based on that drawing. He provided another drawing depicting the small area. Figure 7 is based on that drawing. An earthen berm and a road surrounded the small area where, inside, roads ran between rows of bunkers. A line of trees outside the berm impeded the view of the main road outside the small area. At the entrance to the small area stood a small brick building, and close by, a dug-in vehicle.[23] A large industrial area was nearby,[24] as was the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, which had established a position near the small area (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. A depiction of the small ASP area, based on GySgt Grass's drawing.

GySgt Grass believed several facts indicated that the ASP's small area possibly was a chemical weapons storage area. In testimony he stated he completed, "the technical escort course several months prior to deployment to Southwest Asia … [was] a former ammunition technician for six years, and … was the NCOIC of a … chemical unit … I observed several signs of possible chemical weapons storage. There were blue, red, and green-colored fire extinguishers with each group in its own specific area … this particular storage area had … open top 55-gallon drums that were painted all blue, red and blue, green, or white and green. Each set of drums … [was] grouped according to … color and whether the … drums were solid or striped. No other area of the entire 3rd Armored Corps Ammunition Supply Area that my Fox vehicle checked was designed or set up like that area."[25]

2. MM-1 Alerts (February 28, 1991)

GySgt Grass testified that "while monitoring for chemical [warfare] agent vapors … next to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines … location, the alarm on the [MM-1] computer was set off with a full distinct spectrum across the monitor and a lethal vapor concentration of S-Mustard [sulfur mustard]."[26]

In his testimony, the MM-1 operator stated the Fox crew was outside the vehicle trying to get a closer look at some bunkers when they heard the MM-1's alarm.[27] He did not mention what Mission Oriented Protective Posture[28] level the crew was in, but the driver and wheel operator recalled never being higher than MOPP-2 (wearing their protective overgarments and overboots but carrying, not wearing, their protective masks and gloves; see Figure 8) while outside the Fox in this ASP.[29]

The crew returned to the Fox and backed up to the nearest dug-in bunker. According to GySgt Grass, the MM-1 operator completed a spectrum and then printed the results onto a paper tape.[30] GySgt Grass identified 155mm rounds in this bunker as the source of the sulfur mustard alert.[31] He described the bunker in testimony, suggesting additional indications of chemical weapons in the ASP: "[F]ully visible were the skull and crossbones either on yellow tape with red lettering or stenciled to the boxes or some had a small sign with the skull and crossbones painted on it."[32] Artillery rounds (155mm) with colored bands around them were stacked on top of several boxes, which had labeling from the United States.[33]

Figure 8. MOPP-2 and MOPP-4

After the MM-1 operator printed the tape, GySgt Grass notified the Task Force Ripper NBC officer they had found some "honey"-(Ripper's NBC officer had instructed the Fox crew to use that code word if they had any chemical warfare agent alerts while in the ASP to avoid alarming the entire task force). Ripper's NBC officer ordered the crew to return to the task force headquarters.[34]

GySgt Grass testified:

[A]s we continued driving through the ammo storage area the [MM-1] alarm sounded again. The chemical agent HT Mustard in a lethal dose came across the monitor. Again, the skull and crossbones were present, although the boxes were closed with markings from the United States and Holland. Again a full spectrum on the Mass Spectrometer was easily accomplished and printed out as proof of detection.[35]

GySgt Grass did not identify a specific ammunition type as the source for this alert. He testified the third, final MM-1 alert occurred as the Fox was leaving the ASP.

[T]he [MM-1] alarm sounded once more showing a positive reading of Benzene [Benzyl] bromide. This reading was taken next to a large metal container with no distinct markings. The vapor concentration was in the air and a full spectrum was ran [sic] on the Mass Spectrometer and printed out as proof of the detection.[36]

During our interview, GySgt Grass attributed the possible source of this alert to a large shipping container (a conex box) located in the southeast corner of the ASP.[37]

The Fox drove past several other bunkers in the area without incident as it exited the ASP. GySgt Grass and his crew headed to the nearby 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (the 1/5) headquarters to warn the 1/5 NBC officer that they had detected chemical warfare agents in the ASP.[38]

In contrast to GySgt Grass's recollections of events at the ASP, the MM-1 operator recalled the three MM-1 alerts occurred simultaneously. Before the Presidential Advisory Committee, he said:

After surveying a number of the bunker areas without any abnormal readings, the Fox was stopped and all four of us got out to take a break and look a little closer at some of the bunkers. The MM-1 was still in operation. While we were outside the vehicle, the MM-1's alarm went off. It scared all of us back into the vehicle. Once inside, there were a number of readings on the MM-1's computer screen. They were S mustard, HT mustard and a benzene [benzyl] bromide agent. Again, a couple of spectrums were run and the printouts were given to [GySgt] Grass.[39]

3. 1/5 Actions in the ASP (February 28, 1991)

When GySgt Grass's Fox arrived to survey the ASP, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment was there already, having taken control of the ASP without resistance during the night of February 27. By the February 28 cease-fire, the battalion had established a defensive position at the ASP.[40]

According to the 1/5 NBC officer, he and a team of Marines visually inspected bunkers in the area [41] using chemical agent monitors to search for chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents, but their search revealed conventional munitions only. He recalled that while his team was inspecting, GySgt Grass's MM-1 detected a chemical warfare agent-perhaps mustard. Everyone in the area went to MOPP-4-they put on their protective gloves and masks for full protection. The Fox then drove around the area and attempted to recreate the alarm but was unsuccessful. The NBC officer's team entered several bunkers in the vicinity of the MM-1 alert and found nothing, but nonetheless, the NBC officer reported the alert to the battalion assistant operations officer. No one present during the MM-1 alert reported any injuries.[42]

The battalion assistant operations officer recalled the NBC officer's report-a Fox drove through the ASP and its MM-1 detected mustard but then lost its detection, and so was unable to confirm the alarm. He and the NBC officer decided there was no need to move the unit to a new location-the MM-1 alert could not be recreated and the CAMs detected nothing. Personnel were warned to stay away from the area, due not to a perceived chemical threat, but rather to the large amount of ammunition at the ASP. He, the commanding officer, and the executive officer said the ASP was never declared off limits or physically cordoned off.[43]

The 1/5 remained camped around the ASP through at least March 2 and several Marines, including the commanding officer, the NBC officer, the assistant operations officer, and approximately 25 to 30 others entered the ASP at various times while they were in the area. The 1/5 Marines who entered did so at MOPP-2-carrying, but not wearing, protective gloves and mask. None of the 1/5 Marines we interviewed reported any physical symptoms consistent with chemical warfare agent exposure after going through the ASP. Additionally, no one, including the commanding officer, to whom such a thing should have been reported, recalled hearing reports throughout the 1/5 of any symptoms or injuries consistent with exposure to chemical warfare agents.[44] Furthermore, the commanding officer and his executive officer stated that the Fox crew did not tell them of any chemical warfare agent detections.[45]

4. Task Force Ripper Actions (February 28, 1991)

After stopping at the 1/5 headquarters area, the Fox crew returned to Task Force Ripper's headquarters. GySgt Grass recalled reporting to the combat operations center and then to the command post, where he reported on his mission. After some discussion about the MM-1 results, GySgt Grass gave the MM-1 tapes to the task force NBC officer.[46]

At 3:31 PM that afternoon, Task Force Ripper reported GySgt Grass's MM-1 alerts to the 1st MARDIV headquarters, known as PRIDE (Figure 9).

Figure 9. The Task Force Ripper message to the 1st MARDIV

"Have detected S mustard, HT mustard, and Benzine [Benzyl] bromide at grid QT75393910. Means of detection: Fox vehicle. Hazard seems to be very localized vapor from bunker complex."[47]

Soon after (5:20 PM), the 1st MARDIV requested explosive ordnance disposal support for the next day (March 1):

"Req[uest] EOD support at QT 75393910-Suspected chemical mustard agent munitions in ammo bunker-Agent detected by Fox vehicle-POC [point of contact] TF [Task Force] Ripper NBCO [NBC officer] at grid QT 805350."[48]

GySgt Grass and his Fox crew escorted the EOD team to the ASP the next day.[49]

Reports of the suspected presence of chemical weapons spread from the 1st MARDIV up the chain of command to the I Marine Expeditionary Force NBC watch officer:

1st MARDIV rpts [reports]
Probable ammo bunker w/chemical munitions, vic[inity] of 2914N/4750E, 5 miles west of Ku[wait] City airport.
Area has been cordoned off.
EOD personnel will enter bunker tomorrow morning.[50]

An entry (February 28, 7:30 PM) in the US Central Command NBC desk log stated:

1st MARDIV has come across an ammo bunker complex (QT75393910) with suspected chemical munitions. The Fox … has come up with indications of small conc[entrations] of sulfur mustard after numerous tests. All possible interferences with petroleum products ruled out. They are outside the bunker now; no one has gone in. They've moved their EOD people up, but won't do anything until the morning. Area is cordoned off, all their people in the area have been warned.[51]

Reports of the MM-1 alerts also appeared in several 1st MARDIV unit logs, including those of the 5th Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment:

Fm Div
To All units

1. Possible Mustard Hazard
2. QT 7539/3910
3. Vapor Hazard local to area
4. Hazard appears to be from bunker in that area
5. Method of detection left by Fox veh[icle][52]

And the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion:

281620C Feb 1991 [February 28, 4:20 PM] Possible mustard agent QT 75393910 localized to area appears to be from bunker. Fox vehicle detected.[53]

The 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment journal recorded a message from the 1st MARDIV on February 28: "Mustard agent hazard in bunker."[54]

The next day (March 1) GySgt Grass and his crew escorted to the ASP a five-member EOD team. This team belonged to the EOD platoon, 1st Force Service Support Group, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, working at Al Jaber Airfield.[55] We interviewed four team members who entered the ASP, as well as the officer in charge of the platoon during the Gulf War, to whom the EOD team reported its findings.

When they arrived at the ASP, the EOD team established a command post in their vehicle, donned their protective gear, and then inspected the ASP. According to the team leader, his team searched bunker-by-bunker for chemical munitions. In addition to a thorough visual inspection, they used M8 chemical detector paper and M18A2 chemical detector kits to check for chemical contamination on any suspicious-looking munitions.[56]

Another team member explained the thoroughness and importance of the team's visual inspection. He explained that depending on a munition's country of origin, color codes often indicated the munition type. In the Gulf War, however, this criterion was unreliable because Iraq frequently painted munitions with whatever color was readily available, so a weapon's physical configuration often was a better indicator. Because chemical munitions by their very nature must be built to hold liquids, their assembly points have filler plugs. The team members, therefore, relied on these visual clues rather than munition color to identify possible chemical weapons in the ASP.[57]

During the inspection, only one particular incident stood out in this team member's mind as unusual, but it turned out to be a false alarm. A specific stack of artillery rounds, in a puddle of liquid, aroused the team's suspicion because the rounds were painted grey-the same base color the US used to mark chemical weapons. When he picked up a round, liquid ran down his arm. The team tested the liquid with M8 paper and M18A2 chemical detector kits. Neither test indicated the presence of chemical warfare agents. The team member further explained that the ASP was not sealed to protect the ammunition from the elements. Several stacks of munitions were sitting in dark puddles of rainwater and, to the untrained eye, these munitions could have appeared to be leaking.[58]

The EOD team leader concluded that the area was not arranged in a manner indicative of chemical weapons storage. He remembered the open 55-gallon drums were full of water, standard practice for fire-fighting purposes in an ASP. He also recalled fire extinguishers, also standard equipment in an ASP, and did not consider them evidence of a chemical weapons storage area. An entry in GySgt Grass's journal, "What do blue, red & green fire exting[uishers] mean,"[59] suggests he was unsure of the configuration's meaning. The team leader explained that after the war, local merchants told stories that Iraq's soldiers took what they needed, in this case fire extinguishers (regardless of color), at gunpoint.[60]

During the inspection lasting several hours,[61] the team found no evidence of chemical weapons or chemical warfare agents in the ASP;[62] they found only conventional munitions (e.g., small arms, grenades, and artillery and mortar rounds), primarily manufactured in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Writing on the sides of the ammunition boxes indicated some of these munitions might have entered Iraq through Jordan. The team leader recalled that while at the ASP, he told GySgt Grass he found no chemical munitions.[63]

Afterwards, the team followed GySgt Grass back to Ripper's headquarters at Kuwait International Airport, where the team leader informed Ripper's NBC officer that they had found no chemical weapons at the ASP.[64] The team returned to its unit, where the team leader filed a report to record the inspection and subsequently informed the platoon's officer in charge that they had found no chemical weapons in the ASP.[65]

In contrast to the team member's recollections of the ASP inspection, GySgt Grass recalled the results quite differently. He testified:

I watched everything that they did. They went in there and got in their chemical protective equipment.... They had a little monitor, a little hand-held kind of machine. I am not sure what that was ... and they walked around the area that we showed them and they were writing things down. When they got done, they decontaminated themselves and there was nothing destroyed while I was standing there…. They said, yes, you are right. There are chemical weapons stored out there … [but] they were not sent up there to verify that. They were up there to check the lot numbers on the ammunition that was stored up there to ... see if those rounds were coming after sanctions were imposed on Iraq.[66]

The team leader, however, stated that his team was dispatched to the ASP to investigate a bunker complex in which a chemical warfare agent had been detected.[67] Each team member categorically denied finding chemical weapons or any evidence of chemical warfare agents in the ASP, and all recalled informing the Fox crew that they did not find chemical munitions in the ASP.[68]

Task Force Ripper spread the word that no chemical weapons were stored at the ASP. Ripper's NBC officer reported to his supervisor, the 1st MARDIV NBC officer, that the EOD team did not discover any chemical weapons in the ASP and also gave him the MM-1 tapes from GySgt Grass's Fox. Thinking the matter closed, the 1st MARDIV NBC officer saw no need to keep the tapes. He believes he destroyed them or put them in files routinely destroyed after the Gulf War.[69]

The US Central Command received a report at 7:20 PM on March 1:

Suspect chem[ical] munitions bunker in 1st MARDIV sector (2914N04515E) checked by EOD - No chem[ical] munitions present.[70]

Similar information appeared in the USCENTCOM NBC logs:

011930 [redacted (I MEF NBC watch officer)] called back. The suspect bunker was checked out thoroughly - no chemical munitions found.[71]

According to the NBC operations summary (Army Central Command VII Corps After Action Report):

ARCENT reported 1st MARDIV sent individuals to check suspected chemical munitions storage site (no grid available) on 28 Feb. Initial results of testing indicated mustard agent. An NBC/EOD team re-evaluated the site with more sensitive equipment. They determined that no chemical agent was present. Initial readings were result of petrochemical burning.[72]

After the war, Kuwait's government contracted ordnance-clearing services to rid the country of munitions left by Iraq's occupying army. Kuwait's government divided the ordnance clearing operation, which ran from 1992 to 1994, among seven countries: the United States; the United Kingdom; France; Turkey; Egypt; Pakistan; and Bangladesh.[73]

The designated US sector, the largest and most difficult to clear, stretched 3,000 square kilometers across the country from Kuwait Bay to the southwestern border, including the ASP/Orchard area.[74] Nearly all the 150 US personnel involved in the disposal of unexploded ordnance were US military-trained EOD personnel; the technicians' field experience ranged from 8 to more than 20 years.[75]

CMS, Inc., a US contracting company, extensively surveyed the US sector before bidding on the cleanup contract. The CMS survey team was on the alert for anything that would complicate clearance operations-in particular, chemical warfare agent-filled munitions requiring special disposal procedures. The survey team found only identifiable conventional munitions-no evidence of chemical warfare agents, no decontamination gear, and no Iraqi chemical-warfare-related documentation. CMS bid on the contract and decided to operate without special equipment, e.g., protective clothing.[76]

US sector cleanup operations took place in two distinct stages: reconnaissance and clearance. During the nine-month reconnaissance phase, unexploded ordnance teams visually inspected and cataloged all ordnance they discovered. To ease the cataloging effort and ensure complete coverage, they divided the US sector into 36 subsectors, each approximately 80 square kilometers. They created a database by using portable global positioning system kits and laptop computers to mark the exact location and type of all ordnance-during the clearance phase unexploded ordnance teams used the database and moved methodically through each subsector.[77]

The teams were particularly alert for chemical-warfare-agent-filled munitions and new or different munitions. Standard procedure called for suspending operations whenever the teams discovered previously unencountered munition types. The teams resumed operations only when they had positively identified and classified each new munition.[78]

The EOD team leader, whose team inspected the ASP on March 1, 1991, returned to Kuwait as a civilian, and was involved in all phases of US sector cleanup operations. He participated when unexploded ordnance teams dismantled the ASP in late fall 1992 or early spring 1993. During ASP cleanup operations, teams cleared all bunkers, sorted all ordnance into serviceable and unserviceable items, and transported serviceable ordnance to designated areas and ordnance selected for destruction to demolition areas. Unexploded ordnance teams used the same demolition pits in the same demolition areas six nights a week, entering the areas daily to stack ammunition and set charges. As a safety precaution they established safe areas a certain distance around the pits to protect against exploding munitions' fragments-not against possible chemical exposure. They neither wore chemical protective gear nor used chemical warfare agent detectors during these operations. Nonetheless, there were no indications of chemical weapons, agents, or injuries.[79]

The CMS division president (who oversaw the US sector cleanup) confirmed that his team found nothing to indicate that chemical weapons or chemical warfare agents had been in the US sector.[80]

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, during the three-year, post-Gulf War ordnance clearance operation, chemical warfare agents were never detected and there were no reports of chemical weapons in Kuwait's designated US sector or indeed in any other. Furthermore, in a three-year period after clearance operations in Kuwait, no contractor personnel who worked in the US sector reported any medical problems related to chemical warfare agent exposure.[81]

These facts are consistent with testimony before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses by United Nations Special Commission on Iraq representatives, who stated that there was no evidence Iraq moved chemical weapons into Kuwait.[82]

The MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer in the Gulf War-era Fox was a sophisticated detector. It was intended primarily to detect, sample, identify, and mark areas of persistent liquid chemical warfare agent ground contamination (e.g., liquid blister agents). The MM-1 detects chemical warfare agents by analyzing the ions of a sample that have been collected in one of three ways - the MM-1's sampling probe draws vapors from the surrounding air; the MM-1 operator uses silicone sampling wheels to raise liquid samples from the ground to the retractable sampling probe; or the MM-1's sampling probe draws air directly from the source of the contamination, or the MM-1's sampling probe draws vapors from the surrounding air. According to MM-1 experts the MM-1 has a limited capability to detect chemical warfare agent vapors in the surrounding air. Although it can detect vapors, it is not optimized for this mission.[84]

The MM-1 continuously monitors samples passing through it, checking for the presence of chemical warfare agents identified on a pre-selected target list of chemical compounds, primarily chemical warfare agents. During the initial identification step, the MM-1 fragments each sample into a characteristic pattern of ions and then compares the information on the target list against the sample, searching for a match. If the MM-1 makes an initial match and the ion intensities are above a specific level (unique for each agent), an alarm sounds to alert the operator. This alert is also displayed on the MM-1 operator's screen and can be printed on a paper tape.[85]

A false positive is an alert for a chemical warfare agent that is not present. A variety of contaminants (e.g., diesel fuel, vehicle exhaust, and oil well fire smoke) and chemical compounds can cause false positives in the MM-1. False positives can occur because many of the characteristic ion patterns stored in the MM-1's chemical warfare agent target list also are prevalent in petroleum-based hydrocarbons (e.g., oil, fuel, and benzene derivatives) found on the battlefield.[86]

Due to the potential for false positives, MM-1 initial alerts do not verify the presence of chemical warfare agents. Following an initial alert, MM-1 operators must perform a spectrum analysis in order to increase their confidence that the initial alert is not a false alarm. Because every chemical has a characteristic combination of ions (known as a spectrum), spectrum analysis results can be used to identify a substance. A spectrum analysis involves several procedures that optimize the MM-1 and allow it to acquire a better-prepared sample. It takes several minutes for the MM-1 operator to collect a sample and obtain a good spectrum analysis, but this process properly evaluates the sample for any suspected chemical warfare agents and minimizes the possibility that contaminants (e.g., exhaust, oil, etc.) affected the initial MM-1 indications. The MM-1 operator also should print a tape, which saves the details of the spectrum as a hard-copy historical record. Should a properly performed spectrum procedure identify a chemical warfare agent, the MM-1 operator and Fox commander can be confident, though not certain, that the chemical warfare agent is present. Conversely, if the spectrum analysis does not identify one of the chemical warfare agents contained in the MM-1 library, the MM-1 operator and Fox commander can be confident that the chemical warfare agent that was displayed during the initial alarm is not present. Further analysis of the spectrum tape printout by a mass spectrometry expert comparing the spectrum results to an established database of compounds can increase the degree of confidence in the detection. Additionally, the MM-1 operators were taught to collect a specimen of the contamination (e.g., a soil sample) to further aid confirmation of the substance by thorough analysis in a laboratory.[87]

According to GySgt Grass, his MM-1 was monitoring for chemical warfare agent vapors in the surrounding air when it initially alerted to "lethal vapor concentration[s]" of sulfur mustard and "HT Mustard in a lethal dose."[88] This indicates the MM-1 was sampling by drawing in surrounding air. As noted above, the MM-1 is not well-suited for this mission, and cannot measure vapor concentrations or indicate agent dose-"It is only a qualitative, not a quantitative, detector."[89] According to the experts, while the MM-1 "will respond to vapor ... its sensitivity threshold to most chemical warfare agents is well above the militarily significant concentration."[90]

During his testimony before the Presidential Advisory Committee, the MM-1 operator did not explain the procedures or steps he took while in the ASP. We only know he stated, "A couple of spectrums were run…."[91] We interviewed the MM-1 operator but he recalled little additional detail regarding the procedures he used. He recalled a single MM-1 alert and indications of the possible presence of HT mustard, S-mustard, and benzyl bromide, but he did not know what caused the MM-1 alert. He gave the MM-1 printout to GySgt Grass.[92]

The lost-and most likely destroyed-MM-1 tapes could have provided information about the method in which the MM-1 operated, the spectrum procedures, and information about the suspected chemical warfare agents. Without the tapes it is impossible to determine what the MM-1 operator saw on his screen, how he performed the spectrum analysis, and what caused the MM-1 alerts. In addition, the Fox crew did not collect samples.

In 1994, in response to questions raised by Congress, the Army dispatched a team of subject matter experts to read the memories of MM-1s in all Operation-Desert-Storm-era Fox vehicles. It is possible to retrieve a spectrum from the MM-1 computer if it is among the last 72 spectra saved in memory. However, restarting the MM-1 or switching off MM-1 power will erase the MM-1 memory.[93] By then, GySgt Grass's Fox (#5604) was in Okinawa, Japan. According to a 1994 Army memorandum, "no spectra or extra substances were found in USMC S/N 5604."[94] This indicates that no spectra remained in the MM-1's memory, most likely a result of routine maintenance or restarts that erased the memory.[95]

Therefore, without the MM-1 tapes, samples, or data from GySgt Grass's MM-1 computer, we have no physical evidence of chemical warfare agent presence or the MM-1 alerts.

Mustards are persistent liquid chemical warfare agents. Sulfur mustard, also called distilled mustard (HD), is colorless or amber-colored. HT, a mixture of HD and T (a sulfur, oxygen, chlorine agent), is clear or yellow in color.[96] Characteristics include low volatility-meaning mustard in its liquid form produces little vapor. For instance, HT's "low volatility makes effective vapor concentrations in the field difficult to obtain."[97] Had lethal vapor concentrations of mustard been present in the ASP, large amounts of liquid agent should have been present. Experts believe a vapor detection of mustard would occur close to an identifiable source like a pool of liquid mustard agent.[98] The Fox crew and other personnel who inspected the ASP would likely have noticed such a large amount of liquid agent, yet except for rainwater, no Marines who entered or inspected the ASP mentioned large puddles of liquid. The low volatility of persistent chemical warfare agents causes identifiable traces to linger for days to weeks.[99] Again, had mustard been present in the ASP, Marines from the 1/5 should have detected the agents when they searched the ASP on February 28. Furthermore, the EOD team should have detected mustard's presence when it inspected the ASP the following day.

More importantly, had mustard been present in the ASP, particularly in the immediate area of the Fox crew and the 1/5 Marines and EOD team, we believe these Marines would have experienced physical symptoms of exposure. Exposure to mustard can cause injuries ranging from eye lesions and respiratory tract difficulties to death, depending on the dosage received. Eyes are very susceptible to low concentrations. At higher concentrations symptoms appear more quickly. Protective masks are required for protection from mustard vapor.[100] Several Fox crew members, however, recalled they were outside the Fox in MOPP-2-carrying, but not wearing, their protective masks and gloves-when the MM-1 alerted to the possible presence of what GySgt Grass testified was "lethal"[101] amounts of mustard. In that case, we would expect that the unprotected, exposed Marines would have experienced injuries or symptoms. However, no one from the Fox crew recalled, and none reported, any physical symptoms consistent with exposure to mustard. Additionally, blister agents like mustard have distinctive odors, but no one recalled the garlic-like smells indicative of mustard.[102] 1/5 Marines also were unprotected from mustard vapor hazards, but again, none reported scents or symptoms indicating mustard presence.[103]

Benzyl bromide (see glossary), the third agent to which the MM-1 alerted, is one of the 60 chemicals in the MM-1 library, but it is not normally on the MM-1's pre-selected target list.[104] Benzyl bromide is not typically weaponized and there is no evidence Iraq produced, researched, or developed a delivery method for it.[105] Exposure to benzyl bromide can severely irritate the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract. In large amounts, it may cause effects on the central nervous system.[106]

The Fox driver and the wheel operator recalled that unprotected soldiers were present (in addition to the Fox crew) when the MM-1 alerted. The driver recalled he felt a temporary burning sensation on his hand after the benzyl bromide alert but believed the short-lived burning sensation was a psychosomatic response to the alert. No one recalled any physical symptoms consistent with benzyl bromide exposure.[107]

According to experts at the Army's Soldier Biological and Chemical Command, several explanations for the benzyl bromide alert are possible. The ions that identified benzyl bromide could have come from toluene, a common solvent present in aviation fuels, which could have come from the industrial area located nearby, or from cyclopentadiene (C5H6), a common insecticide and fungicide, which could have been used some time previously in the orchard.[108]

Although other Marines used chemical warfare agent detection equipment in the ASP on February 28 and March 1, no other detection equipment corroborated the MM-1 alerts. 1/5 Marines used chemical agent monitors to search for chemical warfare agents in the ASP but detected none.[109] The EOD team used M8 chemical detector paper and M18A2 chemical detector kits to check for chemical contamination on any suspicious-looking munitions and found none.[110]

Searching for all available evidence, we contacted the 1st EOD Platoon headquarters at Camp Pendleton, CA, for the report the EOD team leader filed after the inspection. They searched their files but could not find the document, probably because the unit retains its records for only two years. Therefore, it is most likely that the document was destroyed sometime in 1993.[111] However, numerous log entries and witnesses' interviews corroborate the absence of chemical weapons in the ASP. In late 1996, after watching on television Marines testify before the House of Representatives Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee, one of the EOD team members wrote a letter to the congressman who chaired the hearings. He took exception to the claims that chemical weapons were stored at the ASP. He wrote, "We went through all the pits [in the ASP] and no CW were found."[112]

After the Gulf War, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, through its chemical and biological weapons inspections program, identified, inventoried and, in some cases, supervised Iraq's destruction of its chemical warfare agents and chemical weapons. According to UNSCOM, Iraq had 155mm artillery shells filled with sulfur mustard. UNSCOM did not find any weaponized HT mustard.[113] Therefore, although the ASP contained 155mm rounds, this does not prove the rounds were mustard-filled. There is no evidence to explain a possible presence of the suspected HT mustard.

Once the ground war ended, only Coalition forces, primarily America's and Kuwait's, had access to the ASP. We found no records indicating US forces discovered or destroyed chemical weapons in Kuwait between March 1991 and the beginning of cleanup operations in 1992. The ASP was still intact when the EOD team leader returned as an unexploded ordnance contractor. The ASP was inspected twice during the operation's reconnaissance and dismantling phases. No chemical weapons were found either time. Furthermore, we found no records indicating Kuwait discovered chemical weapons anywhere inside the country after the war. While it is possible they did so but did not report it, it is unlikely. Kuwait had no reason to conceal the presence of chemical weapons on its soil-had chemical weapons been found we believe the government would have announced such a discovery.

To date we have found no evidence Iraq moved chemical weapons or chemical warfare agents into Kuwait. In a memorandum to our office, the Defense Intelligence Agency stated:

Our current understanding is that Iraq did not deploy CW into Kuwait during the Gulf War. The furthest south Iraqi CW has been found is at Khamisiyah, Iraq.

There are several reasons to believe that the Iraqis never deployed CW into Kuwait. First, there is no confirmed evidence that they did so. Neither Kuwait nor the Explosive Ordnance Disposal  companies assisting the Kuwaitis have reported finding any CW during cleanup operations. Iraqi troops stationed in Kuwait often did not have the best CW defensive equipment. This indicates they were not prepared to fight in a contaminated environment.

The Iraqis also feared US retaliation if they used chemical weapons and may have decided to use them only if the regime's survival were threatened. This would explain why Iraq deployed CW to Khamisiyah and An Nasiriyah, but not to Kuwait. Finally, Iraq's most well trained and trusted forces, the Republican Guard-who were in Iraq, not Kuwait-were the units best equipped to deliver CW. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that any CW were stored behind these forces, not in front of them.[114]

The Central Intelligence Agency reached a similar conclusion. In testimony before the PAC, CIA representatives stated, "We conclude that Iraq did not use chemical agents nor were any agents located in Kuwait."[115]

UNSCOM confirmed that it did not believe Iraq moved chemical weapons into Kuwait. In 1997 testimony, a PAC member posed this question to an UNSCOM representative:

Question: Do you see any evidence where any weapons were moved from the three lower depots, actually down into Kuwait, maybe brought back at some time?

Answer: We have seen no evidence of that and Iraqis have said that no movements took place other than what is described here [referring to munitions' movements to and from Baghdad-area depots and the three lower depots, of which the southernmost, and closest to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, was Khamisiyah].[116]

Based on participants' testimony and interviews, we know the MM-1 alerted to the possible presence of sulfur mustard (HD) and HT (both persistent blister agents) and benzyl bromide (a tearing agent) in the ASP on February 28, 1991. The evidence includes testimony from the Fox crew, particularly GySgt Grass and his MM-1 operator. Both believed the MM-1 detected chemical warfare agents in the ASP. GySgt Grass testified to possible sources of these agents-artillery munitions and a conex (storage) box. Both testified that the MM-1 operator performed at least one spectrum analysis and printed MM-1 tapes. However, these tapes, which might have provided additional information for analysis, no longer exist. Since the tapes were unavailable, we could not review them or have MM-1 experts analyze information printed on them. Furthermore, without the tapes or an explanation of the specific procedures the MM-1 operator took to obtain spectrum analyses, we could not analyze the steps necessary to evaluate an MM-1 initial alert. Without the tapes, or at least samples, there is no physical evidence to determine what caused the MM-1 alerts, only the Fox crew's testimony and their reports up the chain of command documenting the suspected chemical warfare agent in the ASP.

We believe more convincing evidence exists indicating chemical weapons or chemical warfare agents were not present in the ASP. According to interviews of 1/5 Marines and Fox crewmembers, unprotected (unmasked) Marines were in the ASP when the MM-1 alerted to the possible presence of chemical warfare agents. We would expect mustard agent exposure effects on unprotected persons, but no unprotected Marines experienced or reported symptoms or injuries consistent with exposure to the suspected chemical warfare agents. Furthermore, no Marine present in the ASP at any time reported other indications of chemical warfare agent presence (for example, odors associated with mustard agents).

In all alerts to the possible presence of chemical warfare agents we look for additional, corroborating information. In this case there is none. When the EOD team and Fox crew returned to the ASP on March 1, they visually inspected the ASP for signs of chemical weapons and used chemical warfare agent detectors to search for chemical warfare agents. The EOD team found no evidence of chemical warfare agents and no chemical weapons. In addition to the Fox and EOD team inspections, 1/5 Marines used chemical agent monitors and visual methods to inspect the ASP. They too found no evidence of chemical warfare agents or chemical weapons presence. As a result, and despite the reports of suspected chemical warfare agent presence in the ASP, reports after the EOD team inspection state that no chemical weapons or chemical warfare agents were present in the ASP. We believe these facts are the most convincing evidence in our assessment. Additional information supports this evidence. The EOD team leader returned to Kuwait after the Gulf War and was involved in cleanup operations throughout the country, including operations in this ASP. Teams of experts from seven nations discovered no chemical weapons or chemical warfare agents at any time, in Kuwait or in the ASP, during the multi-phase operations that lasted for three years. Furthermore, UNSCOM experts testified that no evidence exists that Iraq ever moved chemical weapons into Kuwait. The US intelligence community reached and testified to the same conclusion.

Without the MM-1 tapes we cannot definitively state that the February 28, 1991, MM-1 alerts in the ASP were false positives. However, most evidence suggests that the alerts indeed were false and, according to MM-1 experts, most probably caused by battlefield contaminants, contaminants from the orchard, and/or contaminants from a nearby industrial facility. Therefore, based on all available information, we assess that it is unlikely chemical weapons or chemical warfare agents were present in the ASP.

A. MM-1 Tapes

During Operation Desert Storm, there were no established procedures to collect and archive MM-1 tapes. The MM-1 tapes from GySgt Grass's Fox were destroyed at some point after he turned them over to senior NBC officers. Were those MM-1 tapes available today, we would have thoroughly examined them and possibly would have additional evidence to consider in our assessment of the presence of chemical warfare agents at the ASP.

Today, however, specific doctrine exists for Fox NBC reconnaissance. According to current doctrine, printed MM-1 information (e.g., detection results, spectrum analyses) should be transferred to technical intelligence or escort teams along with samples (if) taken at suspected contamination sites.[117]

B. Organizational and Administrative Record-keeping

Some organizational and administrative records to corroborate interviews were not available in this case. Many Marine Corps Gulf War EOD records were routinely destroyed in compliance with Marine Corps directives. The Department of Defense should ensure that all unit operational records from contingency operations are gathered, indexed, and forwarded to the appropriate records repository. The Department of Defense should re-evaluate the length of time it requires the maintenance of unit operational records from contingency deployments.

This is a final report; however, if you believe you have information that may change this case narrative, please call 1-800-497-6261.

I MEF I Marine Expeditionary Force

AOR area of responsibility

ARCENT United States Army Central Command 

ASP ammunition supply point

BW biological warfare

CAM chemical agent monitor

CBDCOM Chemical and Biological Defense Command

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CW Chemical Weapons; chemical warfare

CWA chemical warfare agent

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DSC Direct Support Command

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

FSSG Force Service Support Group

GPS Global Positioning System

GySgt Gunnery Sergeant

MARDIV Marine Division

MARCENT United States Marine Forces Central Command 

MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture

NAVEODTECHEN Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Center

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical 

NBCO nuclear, biological, and chemical officer

NCOIC  non-commissioned officer in charge

SWA southwest asia

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

USCENTCOM US Central Command 

VOS  Vehicle Orientation System

Benzyl bromide

Benzyl bromide (C7H7Br) is a colorless to yellow liquid with a pungent odor. The Germans used it as a war gas in March 1915, but later completely abandoned it. Benzyl bromide usually is prepared in a laboratory by the action of bromine on toluene. Effects of short-term exposure include severe irritation of the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract.

Chemical names: alpha-Bromotoluene
Bromophenylmethanel[118]

Blister Agent

A blister agent is a chemical warfare agent that produces local irritation and damage to the skin and mucous membranes, pain and injury to the eyes, reddened and blistered skin, and when inhaled, damage to the respiratory tract. Blister agents include mustards, arsenicals like lewisite, and mustard and lewisite mixtures. Blister agents are also called vesicants or vesicant agents.[119]

Chemical and Biological Defense Command 

CBDCOM is a US Army command with a mission to provide research, development, and acquisition for nuclear, biological, and chemical, and obscurant equipment for the US Forces; to act as the Army NBC defense commodity command; to provide management of joint service NBC defense material; to provide US chemical stockpile management and safe storage; to provide installation management; to prepare for and respond to chemical biological emergency events/accidents; provide weapons of mass destruction (chemical or biological) domestic preparedness support; to conduct emergency remediation/restoration actions at chemical sites; to provide successful planning, management, and execution of treaty responsibilities; and to provide demilitarization support. The Chemical and Biological Defense Command merged with the Soldier Support Command to form the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command.[120]

Chemical Monitor Agent 

A chemical agent monitor is a hand-held, soldier-operated device used to monitor chemical warfare agent contamination on soldiers and equipment. The chemical agent monitor may give false readings when used in enclosed spaces or sampling near strong vapor sources (e.g., in dense smoke). Some vapors known to give false readings are aromatic vapors (perfumes, food flavorings, some aftershaves, peppermints, cough lozenges, and menthol cigarettes when vapors are exhaled directly into the nozzle); cleaning compounds (disinfectants, methyl salicylate, menthol), smokes and fumes (exhaust from some rocket motors, fumes from some munitions); and some wood preservative treatments (e.g., polychlorinated biphenyls).[121]

Chemical warfare agent

A chemical warfare agent is a chemical substance used in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate through its physiological effects. Excluded are riot control agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame. Included are blood, nerve, blister, choking, and incapacitating agents.[122]

Concentration

The amount of a chemical agent present in a unit volume, usually expressed in milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m3) of air.[123] Concentration can be used to calculate whether chemical warfare agent vapors would physically affect unprotected, exposed people.

Dosage

The term dosage represents a cumulative exposure (to chemical warfare agents) over a period of time and is calculated by multiplying the amount of agent present by the time of exposure (mg•min/m3). Specific dosages produce specific physical symptoms.[124]

Dose

The quantity of chemical warfare agent having entered the body. The effect a chemical warfare agent vapor has on a person depends on the cumulative dose received through breathing or absorption.[125]

Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It also may include removal of explosive ordnance that has become hazardous by damage or deterioration.[126]

GulfLINK

A World Wide Web site maintained for the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments (www.gulflink.health.mil).

HD

A blister agent known as distilled mustard.

Chemical name: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide[127]

HT

A blister agent which is a mustard-T mixture.

Chemical name: HD: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide

T: Bis [2(2-chloroethylthio) ethyl] ether[128]

H-series blister agents

A series of persistent blister agents that includes levinstein (sulfur) mustards (H), distilled mustard (HD), nitrogen mustards (HN), a mustard-lewisite mixture (HL), a mustard-T mixture (HT), a sulfur-mustard/sesqui-mustard mixture (HQ), and sesqui-mustard (Q).[129]

M18 and M18A2 Chemical Agent Detector Kits

The M18 and improved M18A2 kits are portable, expendable items capable of surface and vapor analyses. The M18A2 kit is designed primarily for detecting dangerous concentrations of vapors, aerosols, and liquid droplets of chemical agents. Distinctive color changes indicate the presence of a chemical warfare agent.[130]

M8 Chemical Agent Detector Paper

M8 paper is used to detect the presence of liquid chemical warfare agents. M8 paper responds (changes color) within 30 seconds of exposure to liquid G and V nerve agents and H or L blister agents. It does not detect chemical warfare agent vapors. The detector dyes react to different pH levels by changing to one of three colors: yellow indicates the presence of a G-series nerve agent; green indicates a V nerve agent; red indicates the presence of H-series or L blister agents. M8 paper responds to some common battlefield interferents. Among them are certain cleaning solvents (ammonia), decontaminating solution number 2 (DS20, "Break Free" (a weapons cleaner and lubricant), high temperatures, and some petroleum products.[131]

Mission Oriented Protective Posture 

Mission oriented protective posture is a flexible system used to direct the wearing of chemical protective garments and mask—a system that balances mission requirements with the chemical warfare agent threat. Wearing chemical protective garments and mask provides soldiers protection against most known chemical warfare agents, biological agents, and toxins.

At MOPP Level 0 soldiers carry their protective masks while their remaining MOPP gear must be readily available (e.g., within the work area, fighting position, living space, etc.) At MOPP Level 1, soldiers wear their overgarments and carry the rest of their MOPP gear. At MOPP Level 2, soldiers wear their overgarments and overboots while carrying the masks with hood and gloves. At MOPP Level 3, soldiers wear their overgarments, overboots, and masks with hood, but not the gloves. At MOPP Level 4, soldiers wear all their MOPP gear.[132] Commanders can raise or lower the amount of protection through five levels of MOPP. In addition, commanders, under certain situations, can exercise a mask-only option.[133]

MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer

The MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer is the primary chemical warfare agent detector in the Fox vehicle. During Operation Desert Storm, the MM-1 monitored against a target list of approximately 10 selected chemical warfare agents most likely to be present, based on intelligence reports of the suspected chemical warfare agent threat. To speed the initial search, the sampling probe operates at 180� C and the MM-1 looks for only four ion peaks of each detected chemical warfare agent and attempts to match the target list of chemicals against the pattern and ratio of these peaks. If an initial match is made with these four ion peaks at a pre-determined intensity and relationship, the MM-1 sounds an alarm. However, this first alert does not confirm the presence of a chemical warfare agent, since there are many chemicals that have similar ion peaks and many combinations of chemicals that may yield ion patterns similar to those in the target list. Consequently, the MM-1 can falsely indicate the presence of dangerous chemical warfare agents. To more conclusively determine what chemical is present, the operator must lower the sampling probe temperature to 120� C, re-acquire a sample of the suspected substance, and run a spectrum analysis with the MM-1 against all the detection algorithms stored in the MM-1 chemical library. For more detailed analysis later, the complete ion spectrum of the suspected sample can be printed on a paper tape.[134]

Soldier and Biological Chemical Command 

Headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, SBCCOM has a broad research, development and acquisition mission to ensure the decisive edge and maximum protection for the United States. SBCCOM develops, acquires, and sustains soldier, soldier support, and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense technology, systems, and services. SBCCOM also provides for safe storage, treaty compliance, and destruction of chemical materiel.[135]

Task Force

A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed to carry out a specific operation or mission; a semi-permanent organization of units, under one commander, formed to carry out a continuing specific task.[136]

Vehicle Orientation System 

The Fox vehicle system that provided position information and allowed the crew to report areas of possible chemical contamination. The VOS relied on the number of wheel revolutions to determine the vehicle’s position. Therefore, if the wheels turned without moving the vehicle (for example, when stuck in the sand), from that point on the location the VOS displayed would be inaccurate. Resetting the VOS required a visual fix on a major land feature—an infrequent occurrence in the desert. The more accurate Global Positioning System has since replaced the VOS.[137]

XM93 Fox Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle

The Fox is a six-wheeled, light-armored vehicle intended primarily for reconnaissance of liquid chemical warfare agent hazards. On-board chemical warfare agent detection capabilities include the MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer, the primary detection device; the M43A1 chemical agent detector, an integral component of the M8 alarm system; and the M256A1 chemical agent detector kit. The Fox also is equipped with two radiation detectors. The Fox does not provide any biological warfare agent detection capability, but it does protect the crew from biological hazards, and allows the crew to mark areas of potential hazard and safely take samples for laboratories to analyze for biological hazards.[138]

• 7th Marine Regiment (Task Force Ripper)
• 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment
• 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment
• 3d Tank Battalion
• 7th Engineers Support Battalion
• 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon

1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991," April 5, 1991.

1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment Journal, February 28, 1991.

1st Combat Engineer Battalion, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991.

1st Marine Division Journal (February 1991), Subject: "Radio Message Traffic-Ripper," February 28, 1991.

1st Marine Division Journal (February 1991), Subject: "Radio Message Traffic-DSC [Direct Support Command]," February 28, 1991.

1st Reconnaissance Battalion Journal, February 28, 1991.

11th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991," March 13, 1991.

5th Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, Combat Operations Center Journal, February 28, 1991.

7th Marine Regiment, "Breaching Operations, 7th Marines Log," February 24, 1991.

7th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991," April 25, 1991.

Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During ‘Desert Storm’ - Update," Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1991.

Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, and Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995.

Bruker-Franzen Analytik, GMBH, "MM-1 User Manual," February 1987.

Callback interview of team member, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 9, 1997. (CMAT # 1997170-0000026).

Central Intelligence Agency, "Factbook on Intelligence," 1997, web site www.odci.gov/cia/publications/facttell/intcomm.htm (as of October 31, 2001).

Central Intelligence Agency, "Persian Gulf Special Summary," September 1990.

Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997.

Chemical and Biological Defense Command mission statement, web site www.sbccom.army.mil/hooah/pubs/cbdcom98.pdf (as of October 31, 2001).

"Chemical Warfare Agent Detectors Probe the Fogs of War," Chemical and Engineering News, August 1, 1994.

"Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997.

Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1993.

Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0082-97, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," June 1997.

Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0087-97, Subject: "Post-Gulf War Chemical Warfare Detection Methodology Used in Kuwait," June 1997.

Defense Intelligence Agency Report, Subject: "Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq’s Capability and Posturing," undated.

Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, April 1992.

Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report (draft), Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DOD (U), Standalone version of Chapter 11, "Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release," June 9, 1997.

Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," April 6, 1999, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (as of October 31, 2001).

Department of the Navy, Judge Advocate General Investigation, "Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Redacted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm," February 23, 1994.

Eddington, Patrick, Gassed in the Gulf, Washington, DC, Insignia Publishing, 1997.

Facsimile from program manager, NBC Defense Systems, Subject: "Interferents," December 7, 1998.

GySgt George Grass (Fox commander), " "Personal Journal," (unpublished), February 28, 1991.

Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985.

Heflin, Ron CWO3, Ordnance destroyed in SWA, NAVEODTECHEN, 1997.

International Chemical Safety Cards, National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety web site www.cdc.gov/niosh/ipcs/icstart.html (as of October 31, 2001).

Interview of GySgt George Grass, February 20, 1997.

Lead Sheet #748, Interview of MM-1 subject matter expert, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, April 30, 1996.

Lead Sheet #764, Interview of Fox expert, Chemical and Biological Defense Command, May 28, 1996.

Lead Sheet #1288, Interview of division president, CMS, Inc., February 11, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5259, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 11, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5263, Interview of 1st Marine Division nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, June 13, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5291, Interview of team member, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 18, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5293, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 17, 1996.

Lead Sheet #5294, Interview of officer in charge, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 16, 17, 18, 21, 1996.

Lead Sheet #5325, Interview of Task Force Ripper nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, June 18, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5333, Interviews of commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 10 and 24, 1997, and March 29, 2000.

Lead Sheet #5334, Interview of Marine, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 24, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5353, Interview of Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5338, Interview of executive officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 25, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5352, Interview of assistant operations officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 26, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5357, Interview of executive officer, 1st Marine Division, June 30, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5370, Interview of nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, July 1, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5390, Interview of Marine, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon (1st & 2d), 7th Engineer Support Battalion, July 2, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5411, Interview of Fox 5604 wheel operator, July 2, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5431, Interview of Fox expert, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, July 9, 1997.

Lead Sheet #10899, Interview of Fox 5604 MM-1 operator, December 1, 1997.

Lead Sheet #23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, May 6, 1999.

Lead Sheet #26230, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command Fox expert, e-mail message, Subject: "PSOB Questions," April 13, 1999.

Letter from the chairman, Presidential Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents, July 24, 2000.

Letter from GySgt [redacted], 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, to the Honorable Christopher Shays, Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, December 19, 1996.

Letter from Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] (investigating officer), to commanding general, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Redacted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm," February 23, 1994.

Marine Corps Research Center, Technical Paper #92-0004, "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia," July 1991

Memorandum from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Subject: "DIA Answers to Questions from Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses," June 23, 1997

Memorandum from Department of the Army, Office of the Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, NBC Reconnaissance Office, Subject: "Answers to Fox Questions," February 24, 1997.

Memorandum from Marine Corps Casualty Section, Subject: "Chemical Casualties During Desert Shield/Desert Storm," March 11, 1996.

Memorandum for the record, US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Subject: "Summary of MM-1 Spectra Checked re: Chemical Warfare Agents in Operation Desert Storm," February 15, 1994.

Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985.

Mroczkowski, Dennis P., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1993.

Peterlick, Daniel Capt., EOD Situation Report for the Period 23 February 1991 through 31 March 1991, MALS-16 [Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16], April 10, 1991, Enclosures 1, 3.

"Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare.html.

Sartori, Mario Dr., The War Gases; Chemistry and Analysis, New York, NY, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1940.

Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5212.5D, "Navy and Marine Corps Records Disposition Manual," April 22, 1998.Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox Detections in an ASP/Orchard" (Case Narrative), September 25, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/asporchard/.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), November 13, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Reported Detection Of Chemical Agent, Camp Monterey, Kuwait" (Case Narrative), January 13, 2000, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/camp_mont2/.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii/.Statement of CWO3 [redacted] (Task Force Ripper NBC officer), December 14, 1993, Enclosure (13) to Letter from Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] (investigating officer) to commanding general, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Redacted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm," February 23, 1994.

Statement of GySgt George J. Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, December 10, 1996.

Statement of SSgt George Grass, January 11, 1994, Enclosure (18) to Letter from Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] (investigating officer) to commanding general, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Redacted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm," February 23, 1994.

Statement of [redacted] (Fox 5604 driver) Enclosures (20, 21) to Letter from Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] (investigating officer) to commanding general, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Redacted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm," February 23, 1994.

Testimony of CWO Joseph P. Cottrell, USMC before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, November 18, 1993.

Testimony of Fox 5604 MM-1 operator before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of GySgt George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, May 1, 1996 and May 7, 1997.

Testimony of LtGen Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., before the Armed Services Committee, US Senate, February 27, 1997.

Testimony of Mr. [redacted] before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, March 11, 1996.

Testimony of Mr. [redacted] before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, April 16, 1996.

Testimony of Mr. Charles Duelfer and Mr. Igor A. Mitrokhin, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, July 29, 1997.

Testimony of Mr. Richard Vigus, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command MM-1 subject matter expert, before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, November 18, 1993.

Testimony of Mr. Richard Vigus, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command MM-1 subject matter expert, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of Ms. Sylvia Copeland, Central Intelligence Agency, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, July 9, 1996.

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United States Army Central Command, VII Corps After Action Report, "Enclosure A (Main) to Appendix 2 (Daily Log Summary) to Tab H (NBC Operations) to VII Corps Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report."

United States Army Central Command Intelligence Report, "Iraqis Prepositioned Chemical Munitions," March 1991.

United States Central Command, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Desk Logs," February 28 and March 1, 1991.

United States Central Command, "SPOT Report 282150C," February 28, 1991.

United States Central Command, "SPOT Report 011930C," March 1, 1991.

US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, e-mail message, Subject: "Response to CWA Detection Claims," November 12, 1993 @ 4:57 PM.

US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," May 1992, Change 2, February 21, 1996.

US Army Field Manual 3-5, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-10, "NBC Decontamination," November 17, 1993.

US Army Field Manual 3-7, "NBC Field Handbook," September 29, 1994.

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US Army Field Manual 3-100, "NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke and Flame Operations," Washington, DC, May 1991.

US Army Field Manual 3-101, "Chemical Staffs and Units," Washington, DC, November 19, 1993.

US Army Field Manual 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," August 10, 1994.

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US Army Material Safety Data Sheet, "Chemical Agent Monitor," December 2, 1999.

US Army message form, Subject: "MARCENT Report," February 24, 1991, @ 9:55 AM.

US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command mission statement, web site www.sbccom.army.mil/about/mission.htm (as of October 31, 2001)

US Army Test and Evaluation Command Test Report, "International Material Evaluation of the German NBC Reconnaissance System," April 1989.

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The Department of Defense requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community, which had chemical weapons experience (e.g., the United Nations' investigation of the chemical weapons used during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war). Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigative and validation procedures[139] to provide objective information about possible chemical weapons incidents. Based on these international procedures and guidelines, our methodology includes these factors:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site.
• Physical evidence from the site, e.g., weapons fragments and soil, water, vegetation, human, or animal tissue samples.
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence.
• Testimony of witnesses.
• Several analyses.
• A review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While we base our investigative methodology (Figure 10) on these procedures, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected when an event occurred. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents and must tailor each investigation to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough investigative process to define each incident's circumstances and determine what happened. Our methodology's major efforts are:

• To substantiate the incident.
• To document available medical reports about the incident.
• To interview appropriate people.
• To obtain information available to external organizations.
• To assess the results.

A case usually starts with a report of a possible chemical warfare agent incident, often from a veteran. To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches operational, intelligence, and environmental logs for documentation. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard," as well as anecdotal, evidence.

Figure 10. Chemical warfare incident investigation methodology

Alarms alone are not certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence nor is a single observation sufficient to validate a chemical warfare agent's presence. The investigator looks for physical evidence collected at the time of the incident possibly indicating whether chemical agents were present in its vicinity. Such evidence might include tissue samples, body fluid samples, clothing, environmental samples of soil or vegetation, weapons parts, and MM-1 tapes with properly documented spectrums.

The investigator searches available medical records to determine if the incident injured anyone and notes deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc., near an incident's time and location. We ask medical experts to provide information about any possible chemical warfare agent casualties.

We interview those involved in or near the incident (participants or witnesses). First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-sets of those involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. We interview nuclear, biological, and chemical officers or specialists trained in chemical testing, confirmation, and reporting to identify the unit's response, tests conducted, injuries sustained, and reports submitted. We contact commanders to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made about the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of it. If appropriate, subject matter experts provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment and evaluate selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to further clarify details of the case, including, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case.
• The clinical registries of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs which may provide data about the medical condition of those involved in the incident.
• Agencies capable of computer modeling meteorological and source characterization data in cases in which we suspect airborne dispersion of agent.

Once the investigation is complete, the investigator evaluates the available evidence to assess it objectively. The available evidence is often incomplete or contradictory, so we must look at it in the total context of what we know about the incident. Physical evidence collected when the incident occurred, for example, can be tremendously valuable to an investigation. We generally would give properly documented physical evidence the greatest weight in any assessment. The testimony of witnesses and contemporaneous operational documentation also is significant when making an assessment. Testimony from witnesses who also happen to be subject matter experts is usually more meaningful than testimony from untrained observers. Typically, we give secondhand accounts less weight than witnesses' testimony. If witnesses' accounts conflict, investigators look for other information supporting the witnesses' statements. Investigators evaluate the supporting information to determine how it corroborates any conflicting position. Generally, such supporting information will fit into a pattern corroborating one of the conflicting accounts of the incident over the others. Where the bulk of corroborating evidence supports one witness more than another, that person's information would be considered more compelling.

In each investigation our assessment relies on the investigator's evaluation of the available information. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 11) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. The investigator uses this scale to make an assessment, which is our best judgment, based on facts available on the report publication date; we reassess each case over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 11. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were present or not? If insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence emerges.

Version 2.0

The Presidential Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents reviewed the interim case narrative (Version 1.0) and wrote the special assistant as follows:

The Board agrees with OSAGWI's overall assessment. OSAGWI should consider the investigation complete, amend the narrative to address a minor finding … and change the report's title to read "Final Report" vice "Interim."[140]

A conclusion and recommendation accompanied the Board's finding:

1. Finding. The empirical data necessary to support several statements about Fox MM-1 capabilities, especially in regard to blister agent (HD-mustard), do not exist.
2. Conclusion. Statements comparing the relative sensitivities of various detection equipment to blister agent (HD) [sulfur mustard] have no documented support.
3. Recommendations. OSAGWI should amend the narrative by eliminating … comparisons of the sensitivity of the MM-1 and other CWA detection equipment to mustard agent vapors.[141]

We have amended the interim narrative in accordance with the Board's concerns. We have removed comparisons of various chemical warfare agent detector capabilities, specifically regarding the abilities of various detection equipment to detect airborne blister agent vapors, e.g., sulfur mustard. No documented support exists regarding the MM-1's capability in that regard, because the MM-1 was intended primarily to detect, sample, identify, and mark areas of persistent liquid chemical warfare agent ground contamination (e.g., liquid blister agents). The MM-1 was not tested against blister agent vapors.[142] In addition, we conducted two additional interviews and information from those interviews is included in this narrative-of note an interview of the MM-1 operator after publication of the interim narrative. Finally, we made editorial improvements to the narrative for this final report. We have not received any new information about the material we presented in Version 1.0 (the interim narrative), nor have any additional leads developed to change the narrative's assessments.

1. Tab A lists acronyms and abbreviations and contains a glossary.
2. Testimony of Mr. [redacted] before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, March 11, 1996; Testimony of Mr. [redacted] before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, April 16, 1996.
3. Department of the Navy, Judge Advocate General Investigation, "Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Redacted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm," Finding of Fact #36, February 23, 1994, and First Endorsement, May 5, 1994. We note that Finding of Fact #36 was the investigating officer's opinion. The commanding general, I Marine Expeditionary Force recommended (in the First Endorsement) that the final resolution to the question of exposure should be determined by the Veterans Administration.
4. Statement of SSgt George Grass, January 11, 1994, Enclosure (18) to Letter from Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] (investigating officer) to commanding general, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Redacted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm," February 23, 1994; Statement of GySgt George J. Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, December 10, 1996; Testimony of GySgt George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.
5. Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report (draft), Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DOD (U), Standalone version of Chapter 11, "Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release," June 9, 1997, p. 19-20.
6. Eddington, Patrick, Gassed in the Gulf, Washington, DC, Insignia Publishing, 1997, p. 178-180.
7. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox Detections in an ASP/Orchard" (Case Narrative), September 25, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/asporchard/.
8. Letter from the chairman, Presidential Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents, July 24, 2000, p. 1, 3.
9. Two minefield belts (sometimes called obstacle belts in unit logs) extended from the Persian Gulf generally across south central Kuwait below the Al Burqan oil fields and north of the Al Wafrah oil fields. Marine Corps Research Center, Technical Paper #92-0004, "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia," July 1991, p. 3-4.
10. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 128-136.
11. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 14, 15.
12. Lead Sheet #5325, Interview of Task Force Ripper nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
13. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 110, 119, 120.
14. Statement of GySgt George J. Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, December 10, 1996, p. 2.
15. Lead Sheet #5325, Interview of Task Force Ripper nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
16. Lead Sheet #5263, Interview of 1st Marine Division nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, June 13, 1997, p. 1.
17. Testimony of LtGen Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., before the Armed Services Committee, US Senate, February 27, 1997, p. 18.
18. The intelligence community is comprised of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State), National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, military services' intelligence staffs and centers, and several other organizations within the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice, and Energy. Intelligence related to military efforts includes information at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Central Intelligence Agency, "Factbook on Intelligence," 1997, web site www.odci.gov/cia/publications/facttell/intcomm.htm (as of October 31, 2001).
19. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 1.
20. GySgt George Grass (Fox commander), "Personal Journal," (unpublished), February 28, 1991.
21. 1st Marine Division Journal (February 1991), Subject: "Radio Message Traffic-Ripper," February 28, 1991; 1st Marine Division Journal (February 1991), Subject: "Radio Message Traffic-DSC [Direct Support Command]," February 28, 1991.
22. Lead Sheet #5353, Interview of Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, p. 2.
23. Interview of GySgt George Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 50, 51. Several Marines identified a dug-in vehicle, which they identified as a school bus, Winnebago, or motor home at the entrance to the small ASP section.
24. Lead Sheet #5370, Interview of nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, July 1, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #5353, Interview of Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, p. 2.
25. Statement of GySgt George J. Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, December 10, 1996, p. 3.
26. Statement of GySgt George J. Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, December 10, 1996, p. 3.
27. Testimony of Fox 5604 MM-1 operator before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
28. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), November 13, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.
29. Lead Sheet #5411, Interview of Fox 5604 wheel operator, July 2, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5353, Interview of Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, p. 2. See the glossary for a complete description of all MOPP levels.
30. Statement of GySgt George J. Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, December 10, 1996, p. 3.
31. Interview of GySgt George Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 59, 60.
32. Testimony of GySgt George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.
33. Statement of GySgt George J. Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, December 10, 1996, p. 3.
34. Interview of GySgt George Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 61.
35. Statement of GySgt George J. Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, December 10, 1996, p. 3.
36. Statement of GySgt George J. Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, December 10, 1996, p. 3.
37. Interview of GySgt George Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 63, 64.
38. Interview of GySgt George Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 64.
39. Testimony of Fox 5604 MM-1 operator before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
40. Lead Sheet #5333, Interviews of commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 10 and 24, 1997, and March 29, 2000, p. 1, 2, 3.
41. Lead Sheet #5333, Interviews of commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 10 and 24, 1997, and March 29, 2000, p. 2, 3.
42. Lead Sheet #5370, Interview of nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, July 1, 1997, p. 1.
43. Lead Sheet #5352, Interview of assistant operations officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 26, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #5333, Interviews of commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 10 and 24, 1997, and March 29, 2000, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5338, Interview of executive officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 25, 1997, p. 1.
44. Lead Sheet #5333, Interviews of commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 10 and 24, 1997, and March 29, 2000, p. 1, 2; Lead Sheet #5338, Interview of executive officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 25, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #5370, Interview of nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, July 1, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #5352, Interview of assistant operations officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 26, 1997, p. 1. The 1/5's commanding and NBC officers did not recall hearing the EOD team visited the ASP.
45. Lead Sheet #5333, Interviews of commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 10 and 24, 1997, and March 29, 2000, p. 1, 2; Lead Sheet #5338, Interview of executive officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 25, 1997, p. 1.
46. Testimony of GySgt George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.
47. 1st Marine Division Journal (February 1991), Subject: "Radio Message Traffic-Ripper," February 28, 1991.
48. 1st Marine Division Journal (February 1991), Subject: "Radio Message Traffic-DSC [Direct Support Command]," February 28, 1991.
49. Testimony of GySgt George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.
50. United States Central Command, "SPOT Report 282150C," February 28, 1991. The geographic coordinates in this spot report correspond to the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid coordinates recorded in other logs.
51. United States Central Command, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Desk Log," February 28, 1991.
52. 5th Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, Combat Operations Center Journal, February 28, 1991.
53. 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Journal, February 28, 1991, p. 4.
54. 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment Journal, February 28, 1991.
55. Lead Sheet #5293, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 17, 1996, p. 1.
56. Lead Sheet #5293, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 17, 1996, p. 1, 2.
57. Lead Sheet #5291, Interview of team member, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 18, 1997, p. 1, 2.
58. Lead Sheet #5291, Interview of team member, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
59. GySgt George Grass (Fox commander), "Personal Journal," (unpublished), February 28, 1991.
    
    
60. Lead Sheet #5259, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 11, 1997, p. 2.
61. Lead Sheet #5259, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 11, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5291, Interview of team member, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
62. Lead Sheet #5291, Interview of team member, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 18, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5293, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 17, 1996, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5259, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 11, 1997, p. 2; Callback interview of team member, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 9, 1997, p. 2, 3.
63. Lead Sheet #5293, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 17, 1996, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5259, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 11, 1997, p. 1, 2.
64. Lead Sheet #5259, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 11, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5293, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 17, 1996, p. 3.
65. Lead Sheet #5294, Interview of officer in charge, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 16, 1996, p. 1; Lead Sheet #5293, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 17, 1996, p. 2.
66. Testimony of GySgt George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.
67.  Lead Sheet #5293, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 17, 1996, p. 1.
68. Lead Sheet #5291, Interview of team member, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 18, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5293, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 17, 1996, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5259, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 11, 1997, p. 1, 2; Callback interview of team member, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 9, 1997, p. 2, 3.
69. Lead Sheet #5263, Interview of 1st Marine Division nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, June 13, 1997, p. 1.
70. United States Central Command, "SPOT Report 011930C," March 1, 1991.
71. United States Central Command, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Desk Log," March 1, 1991.
72. United States Army Central Command, VII Corps After Action Report, "Enclosure A (Main) to Appendix 2 (Daily Log Summary) to Tab H (NBC Operations) to VII Corps Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report," p. 27.
    
    
73. Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0087-97, Subject: "Post-Gulf War Chemical Warfare Detection Methodology Used in Kuwait," June 1997, paragraph 1; Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0082-97, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," June 1997, paragraph 1, 2.
74. Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0082-97, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," June 1997, paragraph 4.
75. Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0087-97, Subject: "Post-Gulf War Chemical Warfare Detection Methodology Used in Kuwait," June 1997, paragraph 3.
76. Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0087-97, Subject: "Post-Gulf War Chemical Warfare Detection Methodology Used in Kuwait," June 1997, paragraph 2.
77. Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0082-97, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," June 1997, paragraph 4.
78.  Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0087-97, Subject: "Post-Gulf War Chemical Warfare Detection Methodology Used in Kuwait," June 1997, paragraph 4.
79.  Lead Sheet #5259, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 11, 1997, p. 2, 3.
80. Lead Sheet #1288, Interview of division president, CMS, Inc., February 11, 1997, p. 1.
81. Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0082-97, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," June 1997, paragraph 7, 8; Lead Sheet #5259, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 11, 1997, p. 2, 3.
82.  Testimony of Mr. Charles Duelfer and Mr. Igor A. Mitrokhin, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997.
83. For more detailed information on the Fox and MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer, see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii/.
84. US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, e-mail message, Subject: "Response to CWA Detection Claims," November 12, 1993 @ 4:57 PM; Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 3, 8, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii/.
85. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 10, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii/.
86. US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, e-mail message, Subject: "Response to CWA Detection Claims," November 12, 1993 @ 4:57 PM; Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 10, 12, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii/.
87. Testimony of Mr. Richard Vigus, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command MM-1 subject matter expert, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997; Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 6, 10, 11, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii/.
88. Testimony of GySgt George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996. See the glossary for more on concentration, dose, and dosage.
89. Memorandum from Department of the Army, Office of the Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, NBC Reconnaissance Office, Subject: "Answers to Fox Questions," February 24, 1997, Enclosure 1; US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, e-mail message, Subject: "Response to CWA Detection Claims," November 12, 1993 @ 4:57 PM; Lead Sheet #764, Interview of Fox expert, Chemical and Biological Defense Command, May 28, 1996, p. 2. The Fox expert worked at the NBC Reconnaissance Systems, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, now known as the US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, in Edgewood, Maryland.
90. US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, e-mail message, Subject: "Response to CWA Detection Claims," November 12, 1993 @ 4:57 PM.
91. Testimony of Fox 5604 MM-1 operator before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
92. Lead Sheet #10899, Interview of Fox 5604 MM-1 operator, December 1, 1997, p. 2.
93. Bruker-Franzen Analytik, GMBH, "MM-1 User Manual," February 1987, Chapter 8, p. 11.
94. Memorandum for the record, US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Subject: "Summary of MM-1 Spectra Checked re: Chemical Warfare Agents in Operation Desert Storm," February 15, 1994.
95. Lead Sheet #5431, Interview of Fox expert, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, July 9, 1997, p. 1.
96. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 31, 37.
97. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 37.
    
    
98. Lead Sheet #23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, May 6, 1999, p. 2; Lead Sheet #26230, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command Fox expert, e-mail message, Subject: "PSOB Questions," April 13, 1999, p. 1.
99. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, p. 32.
100.  US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 30, 32.
101. Testimony of GySgt George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.
102. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 31; Lead Sheet #5353, Interview of Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5411, Interview of Fox 5604 wheel operator, July 2, 1997, p. 2; Interview of GySgt George Grass, February 20, 1997.
103. Lead Sheet #5333, Interviews of commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 10 and 24, 1997, and March 29, 2000; Lead Sheet #5338, Interview of executive officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 25, 1997; Lead Sheet #5370, Interview of nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, July 1, 1997; Lead Sheet #5352, Interview of assistant operations officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, June 26, 1997.
104. US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, e-mail message, Subject: "Response to CWA Detection Claims," November 12, 1993 @ 4:57 PM; Lead Sheet #748, Interview of MM-1 subject matter expert, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, April 30, 1996, p. 2.
105.  United Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," Document 141, "Fourth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," New York, NY, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 502.
106.  International Chemical Safety Card 1225, National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety web site www.cdc.gov/niosh/ipcs/ipcs1225.html (as of October 31, 2001).
107.  Lead Sheet #5353, Interview of Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5411, Interview of Fox 5604 wheel operator, July 2, 1997, p. 2.
108. Lead Sheet #748, Interview of MM-1 subject matter expert, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, April 30, 1996, p. 2; US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, e-mail message, Subject: "Response to CWA Detection Claims," November 12, 1993 @ 4:57 PM.
109. Lead Sheet #5370, Interview of nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, July 1, 1997, p. 1.
110. Lead Sheet #5293, Interview of team leader, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, May 17, 1996, p. 2.
111. Lead Sheet #5334, Interview of Marine, 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, June 24, 1997, p. 2.
112. Letter from GySgt [redacted], 1st Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, to the Honorable Christopher Shays, Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, December 19, 1996.
113. United Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," Document 141, "Fourth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," New York, NY, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 502.
114.  Memorandum from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Subject: "DIA Answers to Questions from Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses," June 23, 1997.
115. Testimony of Ms. Sylvia Copeland, Central Intelligence Agency, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 9, 1996.
116. Testimony of Mr. Charles Duelfer and Mr. Igor A. Mitrokhin, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997.
117. US Army Field Manual 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (Fox) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," August 10, 1994, p. 5-15.
118. International Chemical Safety Card 1225, National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety web site www.cdc.gov/niosh/ipcs/ipcs1225.html (as of October 31, 2001); Sartori, Mario Dr., The War Gases; Chemistry and Analysis, New York, NY, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1940, p. 132, 133.
119. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 4-5, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of October 31, 2001); US Army Material Safety Data Sheet, "HQ Mustard," Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
120. Chemical and Biological Defense Command mission statement, web site www.sbccom.army.mil/hooah/pubs/cbdcom98.pdf (as of October 31, 2001).
121. US Army Material Safety Data Sheet, "Chemical Agent Monitor," December 2, 1999.
122. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 6, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of October 31, 2001).
123. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Glossary, p. 107.
124. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, p. 108. For additional information on physical symptoms and dosage see; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of October 31, 2001).
125. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, p. 108.
126. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," April 6, 1999, p. 162, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (as of October 31, 2001).
     
     
127. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 31.
     
     
128. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 37-38.
     
     
129. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 30; US Army Material Safety Data Sheet, "HQ Mustard," Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
130. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, and Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 421-424. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site http://iac.dtic.mil/cbiac/ (as of November 2, 2001).
     
     
131. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, and Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 408-409.
132. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), November 13, 1997, p. 4, 8, 9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.
     
     
133. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992, Chapter 2, p. 4.
     
     
134. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 10, 11, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii/.
135. US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command mission statement, web site www.sbccom.army.mil/about/mission.htm (as of October 31, 2001).
136. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," April 6, 1999, p. 430, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (as of October 31, 2001).
137. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 5, 24, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii/.
138. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 5, 6, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii/.
139. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This chemical weapons convention opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. As of June 26, 2001, 174 states have signed, ratified, or acceded to it. The United States signed on January 13, 1993, and ratified the Convention on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. We found other protocols and guidelines in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment of Unusual Events in Relation to Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/Part_I/index.htm (as of October 31, 2001).; US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," November 25, 1985; and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas in developing this methodology.
140. Letter from the chairman, Presidential Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents, July 24, 2000, p. 1.
141. Letter from the chairman, Presidential Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents, July 24, 2000, p. 3.
142. US Army Test and Evaluation Command Test Report, "International Materiel Evaluation of the German NBC Reconnaissance System," April 1989, p. 21.